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ABSTRACT 
 
The relationship between provocation and the criminal law can be categorised as a 
necessary but troubled union. Historically, anger was considered as a ground mitigating 
punishment in Roman law with the law distinguishing between crimes that were 
committed on impulse and those that were committed with premeditation. This attitude 
continued into the Middle Ages; however, anger was considered as a complete defence 
in certain circumstances. The attitude of the Roman-Dutch writers was that anger could 
only be regarded as a factor mitigating punishment in cases where the anger was 
justified and was not a ground which excluded capacity. 
.  
Since 17
th
 century English law, provocation has been recognised as having an impact on 
the criminal liability of the accused who killed while ―passions were aroused‖. Serious 
crimes such as murder, committed while in a state of anger brought on by serious 
provocation were considered less serious than those commited in ―cold blood‖ or with 
premeditation. Historically, the basis for this leniency is rooted partly in the need for the 
concession to human frailty in cases where provocation leads to a loss of self-control. 
This basis for a defence of provocation continues in jurisdictions such as England and 
Canada.  
 
However, despite this leniency, the general approach in jurisdictions such as England 
and Canada is that a provoked act cannot excuse the agent from criminal liability 
completely, but only partially, as fundamentally, individuals are expected to exercise 
control over their emotions and their actions. Achieving this balance between the 
recognition of human frailty and enforcing a standard of acceptable behaviour in 
society, is where the controversy in jurisdictions such as England and Canada emerges.  
 
On this fundamental level, the provocation defence emerges as one of the most 
contentious defences in modern times and has remained that way for many years in 
jurisdictions such as South Africa, England and Canada. The dilemma in England and 
Canada centres around ensuring that there is room for a concession to human infirmity 
on the one hand, while simultaneously ensuring that unacceptable standards of 
behaviour are not condoned by the law. An important basic principle in most modern 
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legal systems is that acts of vengeance, which are argued to be the main motivation 
behind retaliation to provocation, should not only be discouraged but punished.  It is due 
to these considerations of policy that the provocation defence in England and Canada 
exists only as a partial defence to murder. 
 
This approach is in stark contrast to the approach in South African law, where the law 
during the past quarter of a century, has gone far enough to allow provocation and 
emotional stress to operate as a complete defence. This dynamic approach is based on 
the psychological or principle-based approach to criminal liability which is based on the 
legal principle that unless an individual possesses the capacity or the fair opportunity to 
regulate his behaviour in accordance with the requirements of the law, the consequences 
of his behaviour should therefore not apply. 
 
The formulation of this innovative approach has been the source of debate which has 
focused on the purely subjective test for criminal capacity. The defence of non-
pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress has occupied an 
important role in South African criminal law as it accommodates those individuals who 
kill out of anger, emotional stress, fear, shock and emotional collapse provided that the 
accused did not possess criminal capacity at the time of the killing.  
 
The principle-based approach to provocation and emotional stress, though logical and in 
line with interests of justice and fairness has been under scrutiny since its development 
with commentators arguing that the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress is inherently problematic and should, primarily on 
grounds of policy, be limited to prevent the ―hot-head‖ from being acquitted. This point 
has been argued by commentators in South Africa who believe that South African law 
should align itself with Anglo-American systems who take a more stringent stance in 
relation to provocation. 
 
It is with these arguments in mind that the notorious leading case of Eadie is assessed. It 
was hoped that the case of Eadie would provide much-needed clarity and offer a 
solution to the problem of perceived facile acquittals. It is submitted that the Eadie 
judgment failed in both respects. The study assesses this judgment and the reasons for 
its deficiencies. At present, the defence of of non-pathological incapacity due to 
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provocation and emotional stress is in a state of limbo as confusion and controversy 
dominate. The cause of this disarray has emanated from the notorious landmark 
judgment by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Eadie. 
 
The Eadie judgment has brought about drastic and far-reaching repercussions to the 
criminal law to the extent that the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress may have been abolished. The judgment itself has had 
varied interpretations with some academics welcoming its pronouncements, while 
others have being critical of certain aspects. This study considers the various 
interpretations and opinions put forth by academic commentators of the Eadie judgment 
in order to assess the precise significance of the exact import of the Eadie judgement 
and whether the changes made in this controversial case are warranted.  
 
Furthermore, this study evaluates and critically assesses the basis and justification for 
the defence in South African criminal law. In achieving this aim, the landmark 
judgment of Eadie is assessed to determine the extent to which the judgment goes in 
revising the traditional approach of the courts to provocation and emotional stress. 
 
In achieving the goal of this inquiry, which is to re-assess the defence of non-
pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress, the development of this 
defence was traced in South African law to determine if a coherent rationale exists 
underpinning the defence. The most important  objective of this study is thus to assess 
whether the law governing the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to emotional 
stress and provocation in South Africa is in need of reform in light of the controversy 
and criticisms attacking the inherent nature of this defence. 
Furthermore, a comparative analysis is conducted with the respective provisions 
governing the provocation defence in Canadian law as well as English law, which is one 
of the common-law parent systems of South African law. It is important to gain an 
understanding of the basis of the defences in each jurisdiction; therefore, the origins of 
the defence of provocation in each jurisdiction are traced. 
 
The comparative analysis seeks to determine whether the approach to provocation in 
these jurisdictions is preferred to the principled approach in South African law and 
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whether South Africa should place a greater emphasis on policy considerations in its 
treatment of provocation. Should South African law follow England and Canada by 
limiting the defence to a partial one the critical analysis of the different approaches will 
aid in identifying the pitfalls inherent in adopting aspects of these alternative models. 
The most important objective of this study is thus to assess whether the law governing 
the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to emotional stress and provocation in 
South Africa is in need of reform. 
 
In tracing the development of the law in South Africa, a historical survey of South 
African law and the development the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress reveals somewhat of a turbulent past. Due to the 
differing influence of different parent systems of law, namely Roman and Roman-Dutch 
on the one hand and English law on the other, South African law took time to formulate 
its own unique approach to provocation. Emotions such as anger were historically never 
considered a complete defence to a killing in South African law. 
 
From this standpoint, the law moved on from considering the effect of provocation on 
criminal intention which was objectively assessed. Ultimately, the law progressed to a 
stage where intention is assessed subjectively as the focus fell on the state of mind of 
the accused. These developments eventually led to the re-assessment of the approach to 
provocation.  
 
The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Responsibility of Mentally Deranged 
Persons and Related Matters, popularly known as the Rumpff Commission Report was 
highly influential in popularising the notion of criminal capacity which was subjected to 
investigation by the Commission. The recommendations of the Commission gave rise to 
s 78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977 which governs mental illness. However, 
the test formulated was extended to encompass non-pathological incapacity. The 
Rumpff Commission Report identified two essential components of criminal capacity 
that is cognitive and conative capacity. The concept of self-control was defined in the 
Rumpff Commission Report. 
 
The popularization of this notion of criminal capacity eventually changed the landscape 
of how provocation and emotional stress is treated today. The emergence of the doctrine 
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―toerekeningsvatbaarheid‖ or criminal capacity marked the broadening of the defence 
which began towards the latter part of the twentieth century when it was accepted that 
factors such as intoxication, emotional stress and provocation could in circumstances 
impair criminal capacity. These factors are not the cause of a mental defect, thus the 
notion of non-pathological incapacity was developed. The courts recognised that 
criminal incapacity could result from non-pathological causes and the defence of non-
pathological incapacity based on provocation and emotional stress emerged.  
 
Notably, the Rumpff Commission identified a third category, that of affective functions, 
which govern an individual‘s feelings and emotions. Provocation and emotional stress 
are categorised as affective functions, the Rumpff Commission cautioned against 
allowing affective functions excluding criminal liability in cases where volitional 
control and insight were present. Despite this warning South African law has allowed 
affective functions to impinge upon the inquiry into criminal capacity where cognitive 
or conative functions are affected. 
 
The case of Laubscher set out the classic two-stage test for the defence of non-
pathological incapacity, which is: (1) the ability to distinguish between the 
wrongfulness or otherwise of his conduct, (2) the capacity to act in accordance with 
such an appreciation. The Laubscher case provided a theoretical framework for the 
defence and stated that in terms of legal principle, non-pathological incapacity could 
lead to an acquittal; the defence of non-pathological incapacity gained an autonomous 
independent existence from the defence of pathological incapacity. The court 
emphasised that in order for an accused to be criminally accountable, the accused‘s 
mental faculites must be such that he is legally to blame for his conduct. The law 
distinguishes between conduct which is uncontrolled and that which is uncontrollable; it 
is uncontrolled actions which attracts criminal liability as the conduct is blameworthy.  
 
In the last two decades, the law‘s treatment of provocation and emotional stress has 
undergone major development with the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress becoming a legitimate, fully-fledged defence. 
However, a controversial aspect of the provocation defence in South African law is the 
fact that criminal capacity is completely subjectively assessed.   
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There have been certain contentious acquittals in cases such as Arnold, Moses and 
Nursingh which further fuelled debate on the acceptability of a defence based on 
provocation and emotional stress and highlighted the risk of facile acquittals. However, 
the acquittals in these cases unearthed problems relating to application of principle 
rather than the principle itself. In each case the presence of a series of goal-directed acts   
on the part of the accused indicated the presence of conative capacity, volitional control 
and insight on the part of both accused were present therefore indicating that capacity 
was not lacking. It is submitted that these cases were wrongly decided which 
consequently brought the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and 
emotional stress into disrepute. However, it is clear that the acquittals in these cases 
were a direct result of failure of the courts to properly apply the fundamentals of the 
defence to the facts. 
 
A significant feature of Nursingh is that the prosection did not lead expert testimony to 
rebut the expert evidence led by the defence. In Arnold, the State did not lead expert 
psychiatric evidence either in support of its case or challenge the opinions of the 
evidence led by the defence witness. This may have created an unbalanced view for the 
court. 
 
In an attempt to bring clarity to this area of the law and to quell public outrage arising 
from the acquittals in Arnold, Nursingh and Moses, the court in Eadie effected 
fundamental changes in the form of a policy brake to the principles underpinning the 
defence of non-pathological incapacity, which, in a drastic turn of events, has led to 
uncertainty regarding whether the defence of non-pathological incapacity still exists. 
 
There are two major difficulties arising from the Eadie judgment. First, there is 
undoubtedly the court‘s conflation of the defence of non-pathological incapacity with 
the defence of sane automatism; the ramifications of this conflation are tremendous and 
far-reaching. It is submitted, with respect, that the court in Eadie has demonstrated a 
failure to understand the distinct attributes and purpose of both defences of non-
pathological incapacity and the defence of sane automatism. In terms of legal principle, 
there is a distinct difference between making a decision and having the ability to 
execute the decision. A person may be capable of voluntary conduct but may lack the 
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ability to set goals and may not have the ability to pursue these goals or to resist 
impulses to act contrary to what his insights tell him is right and wrong.  
 
In addition, the subjective test for capacity is substituted by the objective standard in the 
form of the test for sane automatism. The result is that the test for voluntariness occurs 
twice, firstly to determine if the accused acted voluntarily, and secondly once cognitive 
capacity is determined, in lieu of the test for conative capacity. This new development 
results in unnecessary duplication and complication. This amounts to the integration of 
a totally different defence, sane automatism, into the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity. Hence the test for capacity is defeated and thus becomes redundant. The 
conflation of the two defences creates difficulties not only in application, but  the 
presence of automatism also erodes the test for capacity; there is a clear 
misunderstanding since the lack of capacity does not necessarily mean voluntary 
conduct is not present.  
 
 
The rejection of the difference between the test to determine voluntariness and the test 
for conative capacity will lead to the basic concepts of criminal liability losing their 
significance. Furthermore, the negation of the existence of the defence is detrimental to 
the criminal law system as it results in the partial elimination of the element of criminal 
capacity. It is submitted that the defence serves an important need in society and erosion 
of the defence is not in the interests of justice as it deprives individuals such as the 
battered woman of a defence; it is submitted that victims of abuse who kill their abusers 
stand a greater chance of succeeding when pleading non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress. 
 
The second major problem with the Eadie judgment relates to the introduction of an 
objective test into the inquiry for criminal capacity. There have been proposals by 
academics to bring South African criminal law in line with other jurisdictions in Anglo-
America by incorporating an objective test into the defence, mainly to prevent abuse of 
the defence. However, it is submitted that this study has revealed that the incorporation 
of an objective test is not only unnecessary, but will be detrimental to the proper 
functioning of the defence, as there are clear problems concerning the application of an 
objective standard in the form of a reasonable or ordinary person. 
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This conclusion can be deduced after analysing the results of the comparative analysis. 
Jurisdictions such as Canada and England have a strong bias for the use of an objective 
test which is considered to be an essential safeguard within the defence. The model of 
the reasonable man or ordinary person is favoured to determine if the reasonable man 
would have lost control in the same way as the accused. 
 
There is difficulty in deciding what attributes to assign to the fictional 
reasonable/ordinary person. This has led to inconsistent judgments and confusion in 
both England and Canada. The objective test is arguably one of the most problematic 
aspects of the provocation defence in England and Canada. There is a common problem 
of interpretation and application of the objective test.  
 
The difficulties associated with the objective test was one of the main problems 
identified with the now abolished provocation defence in terms of section 3 of the 
Homicide Act of 1957. Clearly, England and Canada have struggled with creating a 
balance in respect of the problem of accommodating human weakness while 
simultaneously ensuring that a person‘s right not to be killed by enraged individuals is 
protected. This delicate balance has seemed elusive and almost impossible to achieve. 
This indicates that fundamentally, that the rationale for the objective test is flawed and 
application of this rigid standard is practically unworkable since the courts are unable to 
effectively apply a stringent objective standard; a just and fair result cannot be obtained 
especially considering the nature and differing effects of provocation on different 
individual.  
 
This strongly indicates that the use of an objective test in trying to uncover what was 
going on in the mind of a human being is fundamentally illogical and application of this 
standard will be difficult to interpret and to apply to the facts, besides being extremely 
unfair and unjust. The use of ―reasonable man‖ or the ―ordinary man‖ to determine 
acceptable behaviour has been justifiably described as ―oxymoronic‖.  
 
In light of the introduction of an objective test in Eadie, it is submitted that the use of an 
objective test within the defence of provocation constitutes an unjust imposition of 
dominant cultural values. This criticism is key especially in light of the history and 
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racial and socio-economic diversity in South Africa, furthermore, social and economic 
backgrounds may differ immensely from person to person and it is unfair and unjust to 
apply a uniform standard which cannot take cognisance such differences. 
 
Furthermore, it is correctly argued that an objective test subverts the principle upon 
which the concept of justification on which the criminal law is based, that individuals 
are autonomous moral agents who possess the right to freedom of action, therefore it is 
in light of this principle they are held responsible for their actions. Therefore, in terms 
of this argument the introduction of an objective test for conative capacity can be 
subjected to constitutional challenge for unjustifiably infringing on the right to dignity, 
granted by section 14 of the 1996 Constitution, furthermore, the right to freedom and 
security of the person in terms of section 12(1) (a) of the 1996 Constitution.  
 
The comparative analysis has revealed that there are other problems with the 
provocation defence in England and Canada. The restrictive nature of the defence in 
both jurisidictions have led to problems of gender discrimination by not encompassing 
persons such as the battered woman. The requirement of loss of self-control is a large 
part of the problem in both England and Canada since it is predicated on the angered 
states and is dependent on the ―eruptive‖ moment. This leaves little room for other 
causes of loss of self-control such as fear, thereby automatically excluding cases 
involving cumulative provocation from the ambit. 
 
A coherent rationale for the defence in England and Canada does not exist and there is 
debate regarding whether the defence is a justication or an exuse. This is the cause of 
the problem as in terms of policy, the actions of an accused can neither be partially 
justified or partially excused, since a degree of blameworthiness exists. 
 
Though the current defence in England has undergone reformation and now 
accommodates loss of self-control emanating from fear, the new provisions may still 
prove problematic, as fear and loss of self-control in English law may be incompatable 
as killing arising out of fear usually lacks the traditional eruptive moment. The notion of 
self-control in the respective defences is flawed and is the primary cause of gender 
discrimination against abused persons such as the battered woman in England and 
Canada. 
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It is argued that the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and 
emotional stress in South Africa has avoided these problems for several reasons. Firstly, 
there is a solid theoretical framework underpinning the notion of loss of self-control 
which derives much of its content from the Rumpff Commission Report, and the case of 
Laubcher which provides guidance on the application of the test for capacity. 
 
The recognition of affective functions causing lack of criminal capacity in South 
African law has brought persons such as the battered women within the scope of the 
defence and has avoided the problems relating to gender discrimination, therefore it is 
submitted that this was a positive and forward-thinking development in South African 
law. 
 
Therefore, it is submitted that the Eadie judgment is problematic on several levels and 
has brought tremendous confusion and uncertainty to the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress. Judicial intervention is necessary in 
order to bring clarity and restore the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress in terms of the two stage test delineated by Laubscher 
by over-ruling Eadie. It is submitted that the fears of easy acquittals are unfounded, 
proper application of the established principles governing the defence are adequate safe-
guards for preventing facile acquittals. However, there is one short-coming of the 
defence, this relates to the uncertain role of expert evidence. 
 
It is submitted that analysis of South African case law reveals that there is lack of clarity 
regarding the role of expert evidence in cases involving non-pathological incapacity due 
to provocation and emotional stress. There is uncertainty surrounding the necessity of 
the expert testimony, though it has been stated that the success of the defence is unlikely 
if expert testimony is not led in support of the defence. Due to the nature of this 
defence, which may involve killings arising from trauma, especially when abused 
persons are involved such as the battered women, the law should be reviewed with the 
view of making referrals for psychiatric evaluation and counselling mandatory. 
Providing a structure regulating expert evidence will assist in ensuring that case law is 
consistent.  
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Furthermore, from the assessment of case law it is clear that an imbalance of expert 
evidence on the part of the prosecution may deprive the court of a balanced view and 
result in inconsistent case law. Thus, it is proposed that expert testimony should be 
mandatory. This, according to Burchell, will ensure that the court obtains a balanced, 
well-informed view, which will work to prevent facile acquittals and ensure consistent 
outcomes of cases. The defence of non-pathological incapacity is lacking in this respect; 
consultation and review of this area is required with the view to formulating a structure 
that could form part of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977. 
 
Furthermore, it has correctly been argued by Burchell that expert evidence should be led 
after evidence relating to the accused‘s version of events has been heard. Expert 
witnesses would thus have an opportunity to re-evaluate their evidence after hearing the 
facts of the case as well as hearing the accused‘s version being tested at cross-
examination. This is important since the psychiatric evidence is largely based on the 
cogency of the accused‘s version of events.  
 
It is submitted that these proposals will ensure that established principles which were 
eroded by Eadie are restored while addressing a clear void in respect of the lack of 
clarity and framework delineating the role of expert testimony. 
 
The defences in both England and Canada are based on the misguided need to 
accommodate human frailty and predicated on the problematic concept of loss of self-
control which favours angered states, there this concept lacks effective content. This is 
the reason that determining the rationale for the partial defence in both jurisdictions has 
proved tricky. The defence in both England and Canada falter in this respect. 
 
It is submitted that it is unwise to adopt the foreign models of the provocation defence 
such as the English and Canadian model. The defence of non-pathological incapacity is 
a simple formulation which lacks the unnecessary complexities and unfair rigidity of 
both the English and Canadian codified provisions. A coherent rationale exists which 
provides for a solid basis for providing an acquittal based on blameworthiness.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Provocation and emotional stress are powerful emotions. In South Africa the criminal 
law recognises that these emotions may impact criminal liability by resulting in the 
temporary loss of criminal capacity. This is the nature of the defence of non-
pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress. This defence is 
arguably one of the most debated defences in South African criminal law; since the very 
notion of permitting provocation to function as a defence excluding criminal liability is 
on a basic level controversial.
 
The controversy surrounding a defence based on 
provocation stems from the principle that an individual cannot use the loss of temper to 
justify or excuse the killing of another human being.
1  
 
This attitude towards provocation and emotional stress in South African law is 
considered to be a revolutionary one as it offers the accused a complete acquittal if 
sufficient and compelling evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused which creates a 
reasonable doubt regarding the presence of criminal capacity.
2
 In terms of this defence, 
provocation or severe emotional stress has been recognised to deplete an individual‘s 
power of self-control thereby causing a disintegration of criminal capacity.
3
  The result 
of loss of criminal capacity is that an individual loses the ability to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to act in accordance with such appreciation.
4
  
                                                     
1
 S.V. Hoctor ―A Peregrination through the law of Provocation‖ in Joubert (ed) Essays in honour of CR 
Snyman (2008) at 110; Kemp et al Criminal Law in South African Criminal Justice (2012) at 169; C.R. 
Snyman Criminal law 6
th
 ed (2014) at 159 notes that the term of ―non-pathological incapacity‖ has been 
given by the courts to describe circumstances where mental illness or immature age is not pleaded. This 
term was first formulated in S v Laubscher 1988 (1) SA 163 (A) in order to differentiate the defence 
from mental illness as contained in section 78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, see discussion in 
Chapter 2 at 46. 
2
  J.M. Burchell Principles of Criminal law 4
th
 ed (2013) at 324. 
3
  P.A. Carstens and J Le Roux ―The defence of non-pathological incapacity with reference to the battered 
wife who kills her husband‖ (2000) South African Journal of Criminal Justice 180 at 182. 
4
 P.A. Carstens and J. Le Roux supra (n 3) at 182; C.R. Snyman Criminal law 4
th
 ed (2002) at 237-239 
states that the effect of provocation in the current law is: firstly, it may exclude capacity, secondly, it 
may exclude intention, thirdly, it may confirm the presence of intention and finally, provocation may 
act as a ground mitigating punishment. The fact that an accused was insulted does not mean that the 
 2 
Louw states that the terms emotional stress and provocation are used synonymously; 
however, ―emotional stress‖ indicates a build-up of stress over a period of time as 
opposed to ―provocation‖ which suggests a once-off incident that sparks the agent into 
action. Furthemore, Hoctor notes that the factors relating to provocation are usually 
inextricably tied to provocation, it is on the basis of this view that the following study 
proceeds.
5
  
 
This defence is not restricted to incapacity arising out of provocation, it encompasses  
situations where an  agent has been provoked to commit an action by emotions such as 
jealousy, mercy,
6
 anger
7
 or fear;
8
 however, the critical element is that in order to escape 
criminal liability, the provoked person must have suffered a total collapse of criminal 
capacity.
9
  
 
This is a novel approach which was developed in the last three decades of the 20
th
 
century by the South African courts who acknowledged that evidence of provocation 
had an impact on criminal capacity as well as being relevant to proving the existence of 
intention.
10
 
 
However, Snyman states that a scenario where provocation actually causes loss of 
criminal capacity is rare.
11
 Courts are aware of the dangers of this defence and will 
                                                                                                                                                           
provocation automatically comes to his aid, the insult must have had the effect of excluding the criminal 
capacity of the accused. 
5
 R. Louw ―S v Eadie: The end of the road for the defence of provocation?‖ (2004) 16 South African 
Journal of Criminal Justice 200 at 200-201, Hoctor supra (n 1) at 111. 
6
 See S v Hartmann 1975 (3) SA 532 (C), in this case the accused, killed his father who was suffering 
from terminal cancer. 
7
 In S v Mokonto 1971 (2) SA 319 (A), Holmes JA stated at 324F-G that ―Provocation and anger are 
different concepts, just as cause and effect are. But in criminal law, the term provocation seems to be 
used as including both concepts, throwing light on an accused‘s conduct‖, see discussion in Chapter 2 at 
29. 
8
 See S v  Campher 1987 (1) SA 940 (A) discussed in Chapter 2 at 44 and S v Wiid 1990 (1) SA 561 (A) 
discussed in Chapter 2 at 48. 
9
  Burchell supra (n 2) at 324, Snyman supra (n 1) at 160. 
10
 Burchell supra (n 2) at 54. 
11
 Snyman supra (n 1) at 165. 
 3 
approach the defence with great caution.
12
 The meaning of provocation has not been 
precisely defined in South African law; however, Bergenthuin states that provocation 
contains two elements:
13
 
1. The provocative and confrontational behaviour of the provoker, which is assessed 
objectively; and 
2. The actual state of mind of the provoked which is assessed subjectively. 
 
The general approach in many legal systems is that that a provoked act cannot totally 
excuse the agent from criminal liability as, fundamentally, individuals are expected to 
exercise control over their emotions and their actions.
14
 Furthermore, it has been 
recognised that in most cases, retaliation to the provocative conduct is a vengeful act.
15
 
Thus, on a basic level, modern criminal justice systems do not justify these perceived 
acts of vengeance. Individuals must rely on the justice systems for recourse rather than 
resorting to personal retribution. 
 
Allowing provocation as a defence poses many legal as well as moral dilemmas; these 
controversies are the reason for the defence being extensively argued between 
academics for many years in South Africa and in jurisdictions such as England and 
Canada. 
 
In South Africa, the courts have also struggled in deciding what role, if any, provocation 
should occupy in criminal law. Another difficulty seems to be the application of these 
principles; controversial cases are evidence of these difficulties.
16
 Arguably much of the 
confusion and controversies relates to the subjective nature of the capacity inquiry.
17
 
                                                     
12
  Snyman supra (n 1), see S v Kensley 1995 (1) SACR 646 (A), see discussion in Chapter 2 at 50. 
13
 G.P. Stevens ―The role of expert evidence in support of the defence of criminal incapacity‖ (2011) 
LLD, University of Pretoria at 241 citing J.C. Bergenthuin ―Provokasie as Verweer In die Suid- 
Afrikaanse Strafreg‖, Unpublished LLD University of Pretoria, (1985) at 20-21. 
14
  Snyman supra (n 1) at 235 fn 345. 
15
  J.M. Burchell and J. Milton Principles of Criminal Law 2
nd
 ed (revised reprint 2000) at 278. 
16
  S v Nursingh 1995 (2) SACR 331 (D), S v Arnold 1985 (3) SA 256 (C) and S v Moses 1996 (1) SACR 
701(C), see discussion in Chapter 2 at 52 and in Chapter 5 at 213. 
17
  J.M. Burchell ―Criminal justice at crossroads‖ (2002) 119 South African Law Journal 579 at 591. 
 4 
These problems have been exacerbated by the leading case of Eadie which has plunged 
the defence into a state of uncertainty.
18
 
 
The differing views regarding this defence have led to much confusion in respect of its 
application and therefore this study will reassess this defence in the South African 
context by investigating the large body of legal literature available on this subject both 
locally and internationally. A comparative analysis of other jurisdictions; namely 
England and Canada, will provide insight as to how the defence operates in other 
countries.  
 
However, before delving into the substantive laws of each of the compared jurisdictions, 
it is important to gain an understanding of the theoretical basis of the defence in each 
jurisdiction. Thus, it is necessary to trace the origins of the defence of provocation in 
each jurisdiction, and to assess the rationale behind the developments in each legal 
system. 
 
This study will trace the development of the provocation defence in England, from the 
common law to its current form in terms of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Analysis 
of the evolution of the provocation defence in English law will aid in gaining a deeper 
understanding of reasons behind certain developments relating to the defence. This is 
especially pertinent to this study since English law is one of the parent systems of both 
South African law as well as Canadian law. 
 
The provocation defence has developed over many centuries, its origins regarded as 
ancient; the defence in English law underwent a number of different changes over 
time.
19
 The provocation defence earned a place in English law primarily due to the 
law‘s recognition of human frailty and the role that ―passion‖ plays in disrupting the 
ability to reason in the provoked killer.
20
 
                                                     
18
 S v Eadie 2002 (1) SACR 663 (SCA); S v Eadie (1) 2001 SACR 172 (C), see discussion in chapter 2 at 
57 and critical analysis in chapter 5 at 225. 
19
  A.Reed ―R v Baillie: Provocation as a concession to human frailty‖ (1997) 61 Journal of Criminal Law 
at 439,  see discussion in Chapter 3 at 74 of the provocation defence in English law. 
20
  A. Clough ―Loss of self-control as a defence: the key to replacing provocation‖ (2010) 74 The Journal 
of Criminal Law at 118. 
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In Canada, the provocation defence is codified under section 232 of the Canadian 
Criminal Code.
21
 The defence embodied in section 232 recognises the relationship 
between emotion and capacity for self-control.
22  
The defence of provocation may only 
be considered after the jury has ruled that the accused has committed second degree 
murder.
23  
The element of intention is an essential part of the defence.
24
 The defence of 
provocation is only available for a charge of murder and can only be used when all the 
elements of murder are established.
25   
 
The provocation defence in Canada is not without controversy, mainly due to the origins 
of the defence being rooted in mitigating violent reactions to marital infidelities.
26
 It has 
been trenchantly argued that the provocation defence contains archaic phrases designed 
to excuse acts performed in the heat of passion and therefore should be abolished for 
allowing deadly rage and violent responses to be treated with leniency.
27
 The 
provocation defence has been criticised for its perceived out-dated approach, especially 
where spousal homicides are concerned.
28
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
21
  Criminal Code R.S.C. 1985 c.C-46 (The Code), see discussion in Chapter 4 at 164 of the provocation 
defence in Canadian law. 
22
  A. Reilly ―The Heart of the Matter: emotion in criminal defences‖ (1997-1998) 29 Ottawa Law 
Review at 131. 
23
  S.Anand ―A provocative perspective on the influence of anger on the mens rea for murder: The 
Alberta Court of Appeal‘s Interpretation of Parent in Walle‖ (2008) Criminal Law Quarterly at 29. 
24
   Anand supra (n 23) at 34. 
25
  M.E. Hyland., ―R v Thibert: Are there any ordinary people left?‖ (1997) Vol: 28:1 Ottawa Law 
Review at 146. 
26
   K.Roach Criminal Law 2
nd
 ed (2000) at 248. 
27
   Ibid.  
28
   N.W Renke ―Calm like a Bomb: An assessment of the partial defence of provocation‖ (2010) 47:3 
Alberta Law Review at 730. 
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1.1. Objectives of the study 
The following research questions are considered in this study: 
In assessing the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to emotional stress and 
provocation in South African law, this study will evaluate and critically assess the basis 
and justification for the defence in South African criminal law. 
 
In achieving this aim, the landmark judgment of Eadie
29
 will be assessed to determine 
the extent the judgment goes in revising the approach of the courts to provocation and 
emotional stress as a complete defence to criminal liability. This investigation will seek 
to determine if the test for non-pathological capacity should be entirely subjective or 
whether an objective evaluation should be included to determine if a loss of self-control 
has been suffered in cases where provocation or emotional stress have been raised as a 
defence. 
 
The comparative study with England and Canada is critical to this investigation, the 
objectives of the comparative analysis will determine if alternate models of the 
provocation defence are worth incorporating into South African law. The underlying 
rationales for the provocation defence in England and Canada is different to that of the 
defence in South African law; hence, this study seeks to assess how well provisions 
governing the defence work to serve the purposes intended. 
 
The basis of the provocation defence is commonly challenged. This study aims to assess 
the importance and the desirability of the provocation defence in South African law, 
especially in light of the fact that, unlike the comparative jurisdictions, successfully 
pleading the provocation defence in South Africa may lead to a total acquittal. This 
study aims to assess this controversial aspect to determine if it is in the interests of 
justice to allow a complete defence or whether South African law should follow other 
jurisdictions by limiting the defence to a partial one. 
 
The most important  objective of this study is thus to assess if the law governing the 
defence of non-pathological incapacity due to emotional stress and provocation in South 
Africa is in need of reform. 
                                                     
29
  S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
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Before proceeding with the comparative analysis, it is important to examine the 
justification for using the specified systems in this investigation. Furthermore, it is 
useful to identify the legal structures in the compared legal systems. 
 
1.2. Justification of choice of comparative systems 
South African law consists of a hybrid system of law with roots in English and Roman-
Dutch law.
30
 English law has been largely influential on South African criminal law, 
especially in the formative years of development of the definition and detail of the 
criminal law.
31
  English law has influenced and continues to influence South African 
criminal law and therefore should not be ignored.
32
 It therefore makes sense to trace the 
development of both English law and Canadian law in respect of the provocation 
defence to assess how these jurisdictions treat provocation as a defence in criminal law. 
In this study a comparative analysis will be conducted with English law and Canadian 
law. English law is one of the parent systems of South African law and Canadian law 
and is therefore similar in many respects; however, there are also major differences. 
 
English law infiltrated the existing Roman-Dutch criminal law during the 19
th
 century; 
Snyman notes that this change was inevitable and welcome, as the common law at the 
time was deficient in certain respects.
33
 There were problems with the Roman- Dutch 
system such as contradictions in expositions of the law by the various Roman- Dutch 
writers, and descriptions of certain crimes were vague with little focus on the various 
elements of a crime. Furthermore, these problems were exacerbated by the language 
barrier as few legal practitioners were able to read and write Latin correctly.
34
 
 
The adoption of English law into South Africa was facilitated by the adoption of the 
Transkeian Penal Code of 1886, also known as the ―Native Territories‘ Penal Code‖ 
which contained a criminal code for the Transkei and adjacent areas.
35
 The Code 
                                                     
30
  Burchell supra (n 2) at 8. 
31
  Burchell supra (n 2) at 8. 
32
  Snyman supra (n 1) at 8. 
33
  Snyman supra (n 1) at 8. 
34
  Snyman supra (n 1) at 8. 
35
  Koyana :The influence of the Transkeian Penal on South African Criminal Law (1992) states that the 
code was passed by Parliament of the Cape of Good Hope in 1886 and formed part of the Cape 
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exerted a tremendous amount of influence on the South African criminal law more 
especially in 1910 after the formation of the union. The Code facilitated the integration 
of English law into South African law.
36
 Koyana states that the Code was to some extent 
―a careful blend of western and customary law principles.‖37  
 
Snyman notes that the provisions of this code were almost an exact copy of a criminal 
code written by Sir James Stephen who introduced a bill in the British parliament, 
although this bill was never adopted into English law.
38
 The influence of English law is 
quite discernible in the labelling and subdivision of specific offences along with the 
requirements for crimes.
39
  
 
Canada is one of the jurisdictions which have also inherited common law principles 
from England.
40
 Therefore, it would be interesting to investigate how jurisdictions who 
built legal systems on a similar foundation currently treat provocation and to analyse 
what impact it should have on criminal liability. 
Provocation in English law and Canadian law is regarded as a partial defence resulting 
in a charge of murder being reduced to manslaughter; unlike South African law where a 
person can be totally acquitted if provocation negates criminal capacity.  
 
Provocation in English law is dealt with differently in comparison to South African law. 
                                                                                                                                                           
colonial authorities governing the Xhosa-speaking population who resided between the Great Kei and 
Mtamvuna Rivers. However, soon enough the Code became the authority that governed all individuals 
residing in the Transkeian Territories despite the race or ethnicity of the individual, see discussion in 
Chapter 2 at 21 and 30. 
36
  Koyana supra (n 34) at v. 
37
  Koyana supra (n 34) at v. 
38
  Snyman supra (n 1) at 8. 
39
  Snyman supra (n 1) at 8. 
40
  E.Colvin and S.Anand Principles of Criminal law 3
rd
 ed (2007) at 2-3 states that in 1867, during the 
time of the Confederation, the criminal law governing the British North American colonies were 
acquired from England and Wales by the respective colonies. The criminal law principles consisted of 
statues and common law along with respective amendments. In terms of the principles of colonial law, 
the mode of acquiring the English law hinged on whether the colony was conquered or considered a 
settlement. In conquered colonies English law was not automatically accepted. During the 19
th
 
century, the decisions by English courts were still authoritative outside England. The vast majority of 
criminal law developed till the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century was built on judicial precedent. 
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However, certain issues and problems with the defence are common in all three 
jurisdictions, for example, the test to determine loss of self-control is as perplexing in 
Canadian law and English law as it is in South African law. Canadian law and English 
law are examples of jurisdictions which have codified the defence. Investigation of the 
pitfalls and advantages of codification will be conducted to determine if South Africa 
should follow a similar model.  
 
There is a large body of literature and case law available in Canadian law and English 
law to conduct a comparative analysis. Investigating the application and scope of the 
defence in both Canada and England will be pivotal to this study. It is also relevant to 
study the effects of the defence of provocation on society and what limits should be 
imposed to ensure that the defence in not abused. Furthermore, the tests to determine 
provocation in both these jurisdictions have both an objective and subjective nature; this 
is useful and will aid in determining how South African courts should formulate a test 
that will ensure a correct application of the defence.  
 
1.3. Legal Structures in the Compared Systems 
1.3.1. South African Law 
The courts within the Republic of South Africa are vested with judicial authority of the 
Republic derived from section 165 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 
1996.41 In South Africa, the court structure can be divided into two categories; the 
superior courts, which consist of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal 
and the High Courts, the lower courts encompass the Regional courts, Magistrate‘s 
courts and Small Claims courts.
42
 
 
The Constitutional Court
43
 is the highest court in South Africa. Decisions made by this 
court cannot be overturned or challenged by any other court. It was established in 1994 
as a result of the Interim Constitution of 1993, with the first sitting in February 1995. 
The establishment of the Constitutional Court brought an end to the legal doctrine of 
                                                     
41
 Department of Justice and Constitutional Development of South Africa website 
http://www.justice.gov.za/about/sa-courts.html (accessed on 2015/06/24). 
42
   Ibid. 
43
  The Constitutional Court is located on Constitutional Hill in the city of Johannesburg, South Africa. 
See www.constitionalcourt.org.za (accessed on 2015/06/24). 
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parliamentary sovereignty in terms of which the Acts of Parliament could not be 
challenged and courts were responsible for enforcing these laws.
44
 
 
The Constitutional Court consists of eleven judges who are considered guardians of the 
human rights of all individuals in South Africa and who preside over matters relating to 
the interpretation of the Constitution, prescribing scope of application and possesses the 
authority to determine laws that are unconstitutional and therefore invalid.  
 
In terms of legislation, Chapter 2 of the Constitution, 1996, which contains the Bill of 
Rights, towers above all other legislation in terms of importance, in that, if any law is 
considered to be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, such provision can be 
declared null and void.
45
  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal
46
 possesses appellate jurisdiction and presides over 
matters emanating from the High Courts. Apart from the Constitutional Court, no other 
court may change the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal. The decisions by the 
Supreme Court of Appeal are binding on all other courts in South Africa; this is in terms 
of judicial precedent. 
The High Courts, which were formerly known as the ‗Supreme Courts‘, possess general 
jurisdiction to preside over cases which are within the geographical area in which they 
are situated. Decisions of the High Court are binding over the decisions of the lower 
Magistrate‘s Court within their geographical jurisdiction. The High Courts may also 
hear appeals or reviews originating from the Magistrate‘s courts. The Magistrate‘s 
courts are lower courts and consist of regional courts and district courts. Unlike the 
District Magistrate‘s courts, the Regional Magistrates courts preside over criminal 
matters only; these matters are usually of a more serious nature. A Regional 
                                                     
44
  Snyman supra (n 1) at 9. 
45
  Ibid. 
46
 The Supreme Court of Appeal sits in Bloemfontein, where the Chief Justice presides over matters along 
with a certain number of Judges of appeal, see website www.supremecourtofappeal.gov.za/index.htm    
(accessed on 2015/06/24). 
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Magistrate‘s court may hand down a sentence of life imprisonment for serious offences 
such as rape and murder in terms of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997. 
The District courts preside over the less serious cases, and may not try cases involving 
murder, rape or treason. District Magistrates courts may not impose a sentence of 
imprisonment exceeding three years or issue a fine exceeding R120 000.  
1.3.1.1. Sources of South African law 
There are three main sources of South African criminal law; the first is legislation, 
which occupies the first place since legislation receives priority over the provisions at 
common law. South African criminal law is not codified so the second source is the 
common law; common law refers to provisions which are not contained in any 
legislation promulgated by parliament; however, the common law is still a binding 
authority. The common law has its roots in Roman law which emerged approximately 
2500 years ago in Rome.
47
 
 
The third main source comprises of case law; the courts provide a vital role in 
developing the criminal law through the common law. South Africa follows the 
principle of judicial precedent as it is in England. In terms of the principle of judicial 
precedent, a lower court is bound by the decisions of a higher court; Snyman states that 
the common law and case law may overlap since the common law derives its content 
mainly from reported case law.
48
  
 
South African criminal law has to a large extent also been influenced by English law, 
German criminal law and the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa. The operation of the Constitution had a far-reaching influence on the entire 
country, the Parliament of South Africa was no longer sovereign and all law must be 
consistent with the Bill of Rights. Snyman states that the Constitution created a ―new 
human rights culture‖ where the substantive criminal law amongst other laws are 
                                                     
47
  Snyman supra (n 1) at 6. 
48
  Snyman supra (n 1) at 5-6, in terms of the case law, the courts provide a vital role in developing the 
criminal law in through the common law. South African follows the principle of judicial precedent as 
it is in England. In terms of the principle of judicial precedent, a lower court is bound by the decisions 
of a higher court; Snyman states that the common law and case law may overlap since the common 
law derives its content mainly from reported case law. 
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influenced by the rights contained in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of South 
African, 1996.
49
  
 
1.3.2. English Law 
The Supreme Court replaced the House of Lords as the highest court in the United 
Kingdom in 2009.
50  
The Supreme Court may hear appeals from the Court of Appeal 
and the High Court (in limited circumstances). Beneath the Supreme Court is the Court 
of Appeal which has appellate jurisdiction.
51  
 
The Appeal Court is divided into two divisions, that is, the Civil and Criminal 
Divisions. The Criminal Division has the jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Crown 
Court against conviction and sentence. Cases which are referred by the Home Secretary 
and questions on points of law posed by the Attorney General may also be heard. The 
Court of Appeal has the power to order a retrial as well as to adjust sentences handed 
down by lower courts. The Court of Appeal is followed by the High Court of Justice 
and the Crown Court which possess appellate jurisdiction and original jurisdiction.
52
 
The High Court consists of three divisions, the Chancery Division, the Family Division, 
and the Queen‘s Bench Division. The High Courts are courts of first instance in certain 
instances and may hear appeals.
53
 
The Crown Court, which has the jurisdiction to hear all indictable offences, hears 
appeals from the lower Magistrate Courts. These include sentencing and appeals along 
with the hearing of serious criminal offences such as murder, rape, robbery and cases 
                                                     
49
   Snyman supra (n 1) at 9. 
50
   https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/ (accessed on 2015/06/24). 
51
 http://www.justispublishing.com/current/editorial-policies/terms/uk-court-structure/(accessed on   
2015/06/24). 
52
 http://www.justispublishing.com/current/editorial-policies/terms/uk-court-structure/(accessed on 
2015/06/24). 
53
 http://www.justispublishing.com/current/editorial-policies/terms/uk-court-structure/ (accessed on 
2015/06/24). 
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sent for sentencing and appeals. Rulings by the Crown Court may be appealed to the 
Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal.
54
 
 
The lower courts are the Magistrates‘ courts; the Magistrates‘ court is in most cases a 
court of first instance depending on the seriousness of the offence. The Magistrates‘ 
court handles summary criminal cases and committals to the Crown Court. Criminal 
decisions of the Magistrates‘ Courts may be appealed to the Crown Court.55 There are 
two possible paths of appeal from the magistrates court, the common route is to the 
Crown Court. Alternatively, an appeal can be made to the Divisional Court of the 
Queen‘s Bench Division of the High Court.56 
 
1.3.2.1. Sources of English Law 
The main source of English criminal law is the common law.
57
 Many important and 
grave offences such as murder and manslaughter were derived from the common law 
rather than statute, besides offences, many of the English law defences is also founded 
by common law principles, these include the defences of insanity, intoxication and 
automatism.
58
 Ashworth notes that doctrines that determine criminal liability such as 
intention and recklessness which are foundational to criminal law are still governed by 
the common law; this point illustrates that judges retain a significant role in the 
development of the criminal law.
59
  
 
The other prominent source of English law is contained in statute, in the form of 
thousands of different statutory offences.
60
 Omerod notes that another source of English 
                                                     
54
  M. Jefferson Criminal law 9
th
 ed (2009) at 18. Appeal against conviction is based on the ground that 
the conviction was ―unsafe‖. The grounds of appeal can be on a point of law, or on a point of fact or 
both. Appeal against sentence may also be instituted. 
55
 http://www.justispublishing.com/current/editorial-policies/terms/uk-court-structure/ (accessed on 
2015/06/24). 
56
   Jefferson supra (n 54) at 18. 
57
  A. Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law 6
th
 ed (2009) at 8. These writers include Coke and Hale 
during the seventeenth century, and during the eighteenth century writers such as Hawkins, Foster and 
Blackstone influenced the common law. 
58
   D.Ormerod Smith and Hogan‘s Criminal Law 13th ed (2011) at 16-17. 
59
   Ashworth supra (n 57) at 8. 
60
  Ormerod supra (n 58) at 17. 
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criminal law is the law of the European Union which has been influential in many areas 
of mainstream criminal law.
61
  
 
Another important source of English criminal law is the international law which exerts 
some influence on domestic criminal law.
62
 Other sources of English law include the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 which is considered to be highly significant in 
the progression of the criminal law as criminal courts are obliged to consider the import 
of the Human Rights Act 1998 (in terms of section 2 of the Act) when applying the 
criminal law.
63
 
 
1.3.3. Canadian Law 
The court structure in Canada can be described as having four levels with the Supreme 
Court of Canada being at the top and the Provincial/Territorial courts being on the 
lowest rung.64  
Firstly, the Supreme Court of Canada is the highest court and the final court of appeal in 
Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada possesses jurisdiction to preside over all 
matters, in all areas of the law, ranging from constitutional law and administrative law 
to criminal law and civil law. Apart from these functions, the Supreme Court of Canada 
also may act as a special advisor to the Federal Government. In certain instances, the 
government may need assistance by the Supreme Court of Canada to interpret the 
Constitution or any other law for that matter.
65
 
The Provincial/Territorial courts of Appeal together with the Federal Court of Appeal 
come after the Supreme Court in order of importance. The provincial/territorial superior 
courts are below the Federal Court of Appeal and the provincial/territorial courts of appeal.  
                                                     
61
  Ormerod supra (n 58) at 18-19. 
62
  Ormerod supra (n 58) at 21 states that an example of this influence is illustrated in the case of Jones 
[2006] UKHL 16 where the appellant argued that the definition of crime in terms of section 3 of the 
Criminal Law Act 1967 should be interpreted in a manner that encompasses the crime of aggression 
which is recognised in international law. 
63
  Ormerod supra (n 58) at 21. 
64
 The Government of Canada, Department of Justice website see http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-
sjc/ccs-ajc/page3.html. (accessed on 2015/06/24). 
65
  http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/ccs-ajc/page3.html (acessed on 2015/06/24). 
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These courts deal with more serious crimes and also take appeals from 
Provincial/Territorial court judgments. The Provincial/Territorial Superior court, though 
on the same level of the Federal Court handles matters of a different nature. On the 
lowest level are Provincial/Territorial courts which handle the great majority of cases 
that come into the criminal court system.
66
 
 
1.3.3.1. Sources of Canadian Law 
One of the primary sources of Canadian law is statute; at the heart of the Canadian 
criminal law lies the federal Criminal Code
67
 which contains most of the criminal law 
federally enacted.
68
 The Criminal Code is considered to be the main source of 
substantive and procedural criminal law. The Criminal Code was enacted in 1869 with 
the intention of consolidating the English common law crimes which governed Canada 
and the Colonial regulations.
69
 Statute has priority over case law and will overrule case 
law if in conflict. Judges are under a duty to apply statute in circumstances where it 
exists, even where existing case law also exists. 
 
The Federal Parliament and the Provincial Legislatures derive their powers in criminal 
matters from the provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which is 
Part 1 of the Constitution, Act 1982, and therefore a potential source of criminal law in 
Canada.
70
 The substantive elements of criminal offences are subject to the assurance of 
specified fundamental freedoms in terms of section 2 and section 15 which contain 
equality rights.
71
 
                                                     
66
  http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/ccs-ajc/page3.html (accessed on 2015/06/24). 
67
  Colvin and Anand  supra (n 40) at 1,  See Clarke et al Criminal Law and the Canadian Criminal Code 
(1977) at 12-13; the Criminal Code consists of twenty five sections, offences are divided into two 
classifications, that is: indictable offences and secondly offences which may be punished by summary 
conviction. 
68
  Colvin and Anand supra (n 40) at 1. 
69
  Clarke et al supra (n 67) at 12. 
70
  D.Stuart Canadian Criminal Law  A Treatise 4
th
 ed (2001) at 14. 
71
  Colvin and Anand supra (n 40) at 18; See R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R 295 (S.C.C) 
where the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the Lords Day Observance Act, a federal law, on the 
basis that it enforced a religious morality and thus was contrary to the guarantee of freedom of 
religious in terms of section 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Colvin and Anand 
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There have been attempts to reform the provocation defence using Charter litigation.
72
 
In the case of Cameron, the accused challenged the constitutionality of the objective 
standard based on the argument that the test was contrary to the constitutionally- 
mandated subjective test for mens rea for the charge of murder.  The court stated ―the 
objective component of the statutory defence of provocation serves a valid societal 
purpose…and cannot be said to be contrary to the principles of fundamental justice.‖73 
 
The chapters‘ which follow trace the development of the defence of provocation in each 
of the three jurisdictions, namely, South Africa, England and Canada. 
                                                                                                                                                           
at18 fn 63 state that the Charter has limited the use of authority to enforce standards of religious 
morality. 
72
  Colvin and Anand supra (n 40) at 386. 
73
   R v Cameron (1992), 71 C.C.C (3d) 272 (Ont.C.A.). 
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CHAPTER 2: DEVELOPMENT OF THE DEFENCE OF 
PROVOCATION AND EMOTIONAL STRESS AS A FORM OF 
NON-PATHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
 
 
2.1. The evolution of the provocation defence in South African law
74
 
The development of the provocation defence in South African law is fascinating, since it 
reveals an evolution of the law in its approach to emotions such as anger and stress 
forming the basis of a defence to criminal liability. The movement of the law towards  
treating provocation and emotional stress as factors which, in the face of compelling 
evidence, may create reasonable doubt as to the presence of criminal capacity is not 
only novel but revolutionary.
75
  
 
The formation of the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and 
emotional stress is considered to be a fairly recent controversial development in South 
African law.
76
 Snyman states that the law‘s treatment of the defence of provocation is a 
strong indication of the conflict between legal theory and practical demands of the 
criminal justice system.
77
 
 
Essentially, the law has recognised that a person who suffered no mental illness or 
defect at the time of killing can be acquitted if evidence shows a suffering of loss of 
self-control due to provocation and severe emotional stress at the time of commission of 
the killing.
78
 The causes of non-pathological incapacity or ―emotional collapse‖ can be 
attributed to emotions such as fear, shock and anger.
79
  
                                                     
74
  The structure of Chapter 2, as well as the discussion of the defence of provocation and emotional stress 
as a form of non-pathological incapacity together with the development of the defence is adopted from 
Hoctor supra (n 1) at  110-133. 
75
   Burchell supra (n 2) at 324. 
76
   Carstens and Le Roux  supra (n 3) at 180. 
77
  C.R. Snyman ―The tension between legal theory and policy considerations in the general principles of 
criminal law‖ (2003) Acta Juridica 1 at 11. 
78
  Carstens and Le Roux supra (n 3) at 180. 
79
  Carstens and Le Roux supra (n 3) at 181. 
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This approach, though innovative, is innately controversial. The reason behind the 
controversy stems from the the argument that the criminal law is founded on the legal 
principle that all persons must be treated equally. Hence, if the law allows a defence 
based on losing one‘s temper then this goes against this principle. It is contended that 
essentially this amounts to the law offering a defence to a person who failed to control 
his temper while punishing the individual who was able to control himself.
80
  
 
It has been argued that this amounts to a distinction between the indisciplined and the 
disciplined, which is unjustified. The law expects the same standard of behaviour from 
all adult mentally competent members of society. This principle ties in with the 
objective nature of law according to Snyman, that all individuals should receive the 
same standard of treatment.
81
  
 
Besides the allowance of a complete defence based on provocation, which in itself is 
highly controversial, South African law sets itself apart from other jurisdictions in terms 
of the manner in which criminal capacity is tested. There is a distinct shift from the 
initial adoption of a combination of subjective and objective standards to a complete 
emphasis of subjectivity.
82
 The reasoning behind the movement towards a pure 
subjective approach will be investigated and will be one of the main focal points of this 
chapter. 
 
Snyman states that before 1987, South African courts refused to recognise a defence 
based on anger and caused by provocation to become a fully-fledged absolute defence 
that leads to a complete acquittal.
83
 It is interesting to note that historically Roman- 
Dutch and Roman writers considered anger as a factor which may mitigate punishment 
and therefore did not accept that anger alone could serve as an excuse for criminal 
                                                     
80
  Snyman supra (n 1) at 159. 
81
  Snyman supra (n 1) at 159. 
82
  J.R. Du Plessis ―The law of culpable homicide in South African law (with reference to the law of 
manslaughter in English law and the law relating to negligent killing in German law‖ (1986) Phd, 
University of Pretoria at 246. 
83
  Snyman supra (n 1) at 159. 
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conduct.
84
 Crimes that were committed on impulse were considered to be different to 
premeditated crimes, the latter being punished more harshly.
85
  
 
During the Middle Ages, this approach to anger and its impact on criminal liability 
continued and on occasion anger could operate as a complete defence.
86
  Crimes that 
were planned were considered more serious and received harsher punishment. Anger 
was not regarded as an excuse but if a crime was committed while in ―the heat of the 
moment‖ then the accused could be regarded as not having had direct intention.87  
 
South African courts adopted the approach of the English and applied the ―specific 
intent‖ doctrine as opposed to the Roman-Dutch principle of considering anger as a 
factor which at most may mitigate punishment in cases where it was justified. In terms 
of the ―specific intent‖ doctrine,88 if an accused is charged with a crime requiring a 
specific intent, such as assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm, the specific intent 
required can be negated by provocation or intoxication and results in reducing the 
charge to a lesser one such as common assault.
89
   
 
The case of Pascoe
90
 illustrates the operation of the specific intent doctrine. The accused 
                                                     
84
  J.M. Burchell ―A provocative response to subjectivity in the criminal law‖ (2003) Acta Juridica 23 at 
23. 
85
  Hoctor supra (n 1)  at 110-111. 
86
  J.C. de Wet De Wet & Swanepoel Strafreg 4ed (1985) at 131. 
87
  See Burchell and Milton supra (n 15) at 279 for a discussion of the background of provocation and 
emotional stress as forms of non-pathological incapacity. 
88
  J.M. Burchell ―Intoxication and the criminal law‖ (1981) 98 SALJ at 177; See R v Bulani 1938 EDL 
205 for an example of the application of the specific intent doctrine (cited by Hoctor supra (n 1) at 113 
fn 21. 
89
  C.R.M. Dlamini ―The changing face of provocation‖ (1990) 3 South African Journal of Criminal 
Justice 126 at 130 notes that the specific intent theory was introduced into South African law in 1906 
in the case of R v Fowlie 1906 TS 505. Later on this doctrine was accepted in R v Bourke 1916 TPD 
303; R v Ngobese 1936 AD 296; R v Innes Grant 1949 (1) SA 753 and in the latter case of S v 
Johnson 1969 (1) SA 201 (A). 
90
  Pascoe 2 SC 427, at 427 , in instructing the jury the court stated: 
      ―I must tell that no person is justified by the law of this Colony in killing his wife, even if he sees her 
in the act of adultery. It is quite true it would not be murder, but culpable homicide. The law 
recognises the frailty of human nature, and so where a man in a sudden transport of passion kills his 
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was charged with murder of his wife and her suspected lover. The court instructed the 
jurors that this was a case of culpable homicide and not murder due to the 
circumstances.
91
 Similarly, in the case of Udiya
92
 where the killing resulted upon the 
discovery of an adulterous affair, the killing was deemed culpable homicide as opposed 
to murder. In the case of Tsoyani,
93
 the accused was charged with assault with intent to 
do grievous bodily harm but was found guilty of common assault. The court justified 
the verdict by citing the provocation suffered by the accused.  
 
However, the overriding reason behind the adoption of the English approach over the 
Roman Dutch approach may have not been due to doctrinal preferences, but rather a 
convenient way to avoid the severe sentencing regime wherein murder, despite the 
existence extenuating circumstances, would be punishable by the mandatory death 
penalty for murder which was introduced in the year 1917.
94
 
 
De Wet
95
 states that judges were tempted to convict on the lesser charge of culpable 
homicide when considering the facts, the killing was less blameworthy,  especially in 
light of the introduction of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1917 was passed and which 
punished murder with death.
96
 South African courts applied the ―separate doctrine‖ 
approach before 1970 to the defence of provocation.
97
  
 
The ―specific intent‖98 doctrine adopted from English law is evident when the court in 
Potgieter stated that:  
―One of the circumstances under which a charge of murder may be reduced to culpable homicide 
is where there has been great provocation, resulting in justifiable heat of mind which prevents the 
accused from forming an actual intention which he would have been able to form had these 
                                                                                                                                                           
wife upon discovering that she is unfaithful, an in the act of committing adultery, it is a case of 
culpable homicide and not murder.‖ 
91
  Hoctor supra (n 1) at 112. 
92
  R v Udiya 1890 NLR 222. 
93
  R v Tsoyani 1915 EDL 380 at 382. 
94
  Burchell supra (n 2) at 323, De Wet supra (n 86) at 134. 
95
  De Wet supra (n 86) at 134. 
96
  De Wet supra (n 86) at 134, Snyman Strafreg-Vonnisbundel: Criminal law Case Book (1991) at 108. 
97
  Hoctor supra (n 1) at 113. 
98
  See R v Bulani supra (n 88) which illustrates the operation of the ―specific intent‖ doctrine. 
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circumstances of provocation not existed‖.99 
 
However, this rule has been the object of criticism both in Anglo-American literature 
and in South Africa due to the difficulty of determining which crimes require a specific 
intent and which crimes do not.
100
  
 
The specific intent doctrine has been criticised for two main reasons: firstly, that a 
person who cannot form a specific intent cannot form a general intent and, secondly, 
that there is no clear distinction between crimes of specific intent and crimes of general 
intent in South African law.
101
 Furthermore, the doctrine was considered to be in 
conflict with the legal principle that an individual should not be convicted for an offence 
that he is not criminally responsible for.
102
  
 
The courts initially leaned towards this policy-based partial excuse rule in cases of 
provoked killings which led to the conviction of the middle verdict of culpable 
homicide. This approach was made possible by the adoption of section 141 of the 
Transkeian Penal Code of 1886
103
 by the Appellate Division in the case of Butelezi
104
 
where the court stated that the Transkeian Penal Code correctly reflected South African 
law on matter of provocation.
105
 
 
This provided a means to circumvent the mandatory death penalty for murder. Section 
141 of the Code is pertinent for consideration in the present context since it introduced a 
mixture of subjective and objective factors into the test for intention in cases involving 
provocation. The classic example which would fall under section 141 would involve a 
                                                     
99
   R v Potgieter 1920 EDL 254 at 256 discussed by Hoctor supra (n 1) at 113 fn 18. 
100
 Burchell supra (n 88) at 178. 
101
 Du Plessis supra (n 82) at 547; In S v Johnson  supra (n 90) at 205D the court stated  ―…in the case of 
a crime for which a specific intent is a requirement, such as murder drunkenness can be relied on to 
rebut the presence of such a specific intent…‖. 
102
 Dlamini supra (n 89) at 131. 
103
 Also known as the Native Territories Penal Code, see discussion in Chapter 1 at 7 and at 30. 
104
  R v Butelezi 1925 AD 160; at 197 Kotze JA states that in terms of the doctrine of reduction, and the 
application of the specific intent doctrine ―[o]ur law and that of England are in agreement…‖. 
105
 Burchell and Milton supra (n 15) at 279. 
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husband discovering his wife in the act of adultery and who reacts by killing the wife‘s 
lover.
106
 
 
2.1.1 The provocation defence and the ordinary person test 
In terms of this approach, the effect of provocation was that it could reduce a conviction 
of murder to culpable homicide provided that the provocation consisted in a wrongful 
act/insult in which an ordinary person in the accused's position would have lost his 
power of control.
107
 In terms of this Code, provocation was a partial defence. 
 
Intention at this stage was judged objectively; in terms of s 141 of the Transkeian Penal 
Code, the question was not whether the accused lacked intention for murder, but 
whether an ―ordinary fictitious person‖108 would have lacked intention as a result of 
provocation. The Transkian Penal Code had aspects of objectivity and subjectivity. This 
Code was criticized for its objective test to determine intention instead of a subjective 
test.
109
  
 
The Code acknowledged the defence while ensuring that the accused did not receive a 
total acquittal. This in effect introduced an objective test into South African law where a 
conviction of murder could be reduced to a form of intentional culpable homicide.
110
 An 
important note is that at this stage provocation was never regarded as a complete 
defence to a crime.
111
  
 
 
 
                                                     
106
 Burchell and Milton supra (n 15) at 280. 
107
 R v Mbombela 1933 AD 269. 
108
 E.M Burchell and P.M.A Hunt South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol I General Principles of 
Law (1970) at 374: ―The reasonable person is the embodiment of all qualities which we demand of a 
good citizen, a device whereby to measure the criminal‘s conduct by reference to community values‖. 
109
 Dlamini supra (n 89) at 136. 
110
 Hoctor supra (n 1)  refering to R v Hercules 1954 (3) SA 826 (A) at 352F-H; where the court stated 
that the law does recognize a middle ground or hybrid situation wherein intention is present but that 
intention may be excusable to a certain extent. 
111
 Snyman surpra (n 2) 235-237. 
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Section 141 of the Transkeian Penal code provided the following: 
112
  
 
―Homicide which would otherwise be murder may be reduced to culpable homicide if the person 
who caused death does so in the heat of passion occasioned by sudden provocation.‖ 
 
Furthermore: 
―any wrongful act or insult of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive any ordinary person of 
the power of self-control may be provocation, if the offender acts upon it on the sudden and before 
there has been time for his passion to cool.‖ 
 
However, eventually it was decided that provocation did not depend on mechanical 
rules, but is a factor which aids in determining the state of mind of the accused at the 
time of the committing the act in question.
113
  
 
Dlamini states that this approach was ―eminently pragmatic‖. The justification behind 
the defence in this form was founded in social policy, that every person in society is 
under a duty to control their emotions.
114
  Dlamini notes that at one time this section 
was considered to be a correct reflection of South African law; however, as time 
progressed the approach changed and focus on the accused mind at the time of the 
commission of the act took focus. One of the main criticisms of this section was the use 
of an objective test for mens rea.
115
  
 
This provision was criticised in Mokonto
116
 for applying an objective test where a 
subjective test was required. Furthermore, Burchell and Milton state that this approach 
was based on expediency and not on logic or principle since an intentional killing if 
unlawful, must lead to a conviction.
117
 
 
The objective test prevailed in most cases 
118
 and remained in force in South African 
                                                     
112
 Native Territories Penal Code Act 24 of 1886 (c). 
113
 Dlamini supra (n 89) at 136. 
114
 Dlamini supra (n 89) at 132. 
115
 Dlamini supra (n 89) at 132. 
116
 R v Mokonto supra (n 7). 
117
 Burchell and Milton supra (n 15) at 280. 
118
 R v Tshabalala 1946 AD 1961; R v Attwood 1946 AD 331; R v Blokland 1946 AD 940, R v Zwane 
1946  NPD 396. On certain occasions, the courts did apply a subjective test, finding that the accused 
 24 
law until the case of Thibani.
119
 In this case, the court placed an emphasis on the 
accused's state of mind and a subtle move towards a subjective test for the defence of 
provocation began in South African law.
120
 The court stated that provocation had 
assumed its proper place as a ―special kind of material from which in association with 
the rest of the evidence, the decision must be reached whether or not the crown has 
proved the intent, as well as the act beyond reasonable doubt‖.121  
 
2.2. The swing towards a subjective test for criminal intention 
Despite the Appellate Division in Kennedy
122
 adopting a completely objective test to the 
provocation defence, the approach towards mens rea gradually began to change from an 
objective test to a subjective one; this was one of the most far-reaching developments in 
South African criminal law.
123
 The move towards the subjective approach was 
noticeable since 1951 in cases such as Mkize,
124
 Hercules,
125
 Bougarde
126
 and 
Morela.
127
  
 
Further support in the case of Molako
128
 of a subjective test was evident in the 
assessment of the effect of provocation on the accused, however, the court emphasised 
that a sane person must be held responsible for the ordinary consequences of his 
conduct and this principle should not be compromised. Furthermore, the court also 
                                                                                                                                                           
was guilty of culpable homicide rather than murder because provocation excluded intent, see the cases 
of R v George 1938 CPD and R v Cebekulu  1945 (2) PH H 176 (A).  
119
 R v Thibani 1949 (4) SA 720 (A). 
120
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 114 states  that Schreiner JA was influenced by the English case of R v 
Woolmington 1935 AC 462 and the South African case of R v Ndhlovu 1945 AD 369. 
121
 Thibani supra (n 119) at 731; CR Snyman ―Is there such a defence in our law as criminal law as 
―emotional stress?‖ (1985)  SALJ at 246, according to Snyman, provocation was never considered to 
be a complete defence; the statement by Schreiner JA that provocation had assumed its proper place 
meant that it was considered to be a factor that assists the court in deciding if intention to kill was 
present. 
122
 R v Kennedy 1951 (4) SA 431 (A).  
123
 E.M. Burchell ―Recent developments in South African Criminal Law‖ (1959) Acta Juridica 98 at 99. 
124
 R v Mkize 1951 (3) SA 28 (AD) at 33.  
125
 R v Hercules supra (n 110) at 831. 
126
 R v Bougarde  1954 (2) S.A 5 (C) at 8. 
127
 R v Morela 1947 (3) SA 147 (AD) at 154. 
128
 R v Molako 1954 3 SA 777 (O). 
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expressed concern regarding difficulties with the evidentiary aspects accompanied with 
a subjective test for provocation.
129
 
 
South African law on provocation took another development in the Federal Supreme 
Court case of Tenganyika,
130
 where an attempt to create a solution which would satisfy 
principle and policy was made using a two-stage test. 
 
In terms of the first stage, the test, it must be investigated whether, despite the existence 
of provocation (and in the context of other evidence), the accused (subjectively 
assessed) possessed the requisite ―intent to kill‖.131  
 
If the intent to kill was not present then the accused would be acquitted of murder, and 
found guilty of culpable homicide. If however, the accused is found to have had intent 
to kill, then the second stage of the test investigates whether, on an objective 
assessment, the reasonable person would have lost his self-control in the circumstances. 
If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, then the court will reduce the crime 
of murder to one of culpable homicide despite the presence of ―'intent to kill‖.132  
 
Hoctor notes that the approach in Tenganyika
133
 has received academic support by 
certain South African writers
134
.
135
 This two-leg test comprised of an objective and 
subjective element
136
 whilst still providing a measure of leniency in the form of a lesser 
conviction of culpable homicide, this was welcomed in some quarters over the test in 
Thibani.
137
 The approach in Tenganyika
138
 was followed in the cases of Bureke,
139
  
                                                     
129
 R v Molako supra (n 128) at 718 B-G. 
130
 R v Tenganyika 1958 (3) SA 7 (FSC) at 11G H; 13 A E; discussed by Hoctor supra (n 1) 115. 
131
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 115. 
132
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 115. 
133
 R v Tenganyika supra (n 130). 
134
 E.M. Burchell ―Provocation: subjective or objective?‖ (1958) SALJ 246; JvZ Steyn ―The basis of 
provocation re-examined‖ (1958) SALJ 383.  
135
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 115. 
136
 R v Tenganyika supra (n 130) at 11G H, 13 A E. 
137
 R v Thibani supra (n 119). 
138
 R v Tenganyika supra (n 130). 
139
 R v Bureke1960 (2) SA 49 (FSC). 
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Howard
140
 and Nangani.
141
 
 
However, this approach was criticised in the case of Krull,
142
 where Schreiner JA 
slammed the approach in Tenganyika
143
 for mixing objective and subjective factors in 
both stages of the test and stated that the responsibility of the trial court in provocation 
cases is: 
―....to examine all the evidence which throws light on the mental state of the accused at the time of 
the killing in order to see whether , having regard to the effect of provocation and intoxication on 
his powers of understanding and self-control, but excluding mental abnormalities short of insanity 
and excluding normal personal idiosyncrasies , he had intention to kill‖.144 
 
In Krull,
145
 Schreiner JA refused to assess a provoked and intoxicated person by the 
standard of the man on the bus, rather, it was held that in cases where a drunk person is 
provoked, the court is under a duty to consider subjectively if there was intention to kill, 
taking into account the fact that the accused was intoxicated and provoked.
146
 
 
Furthermore, the court stated that ―idiosyncrasies such as hot-headedness and timidity 
should be excluded from the inquiry into the effect of provocation on the accused‘s state 
of mind‖.147 It was held that mental illness such as insanity could not be linked with an 
inquiry into provocation. The court stated that on a charge of murder where there is 
evidence of provocation only one inquiry is necessary and that is to determine if the 
accused had intended to kill, if the answer is in the affirmative, then he should be found 
guilty of murder possibly with extenuating circumstances. In cases where intention to 
kill is negated by provocation, a conviction of culpable homicide is made possible. 
 
The court was emphatic in stating that the objective element in the examination of 
provocation cases was imperative for practical purposes. The court stated that ―hot-
                                                     
140
 S v Howard 1972 (3) SA 227 (R). 
141
 S v Nangani 1982 (3) SA 800 (ZS). 
142
 R v Krull 1959 (3) SA 392 (A).  
143
 R v Tenganyika supra (n 130). 
144
 R v Krull supra (n 142) at 400A. 
145
 R v Krull supra (n 142). 
146
 C.J.R Dugard ―Provocation: No more rides on the sea point bus – recent cases‖ (1966) 83 South 
African Law Journal at 262. 
147
 R v Krull supra (n 142) at 396, see discussion by Dugard supra (n 146) at 262. 
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headed individuals should not be allowed to give free reign to their emotions‖.148  
 
Burchell correctly argues that the use of the words ―mental abnormalities short of 
insanity‖ and the exclusion of ―normal personal idiosyncrasies‖ indicate that conduct is 
actually objectively assessed.
149
 Hoctor states that the conflation of subjective and 
objective factors still occurred despite the court‘s effort to separate the two and thus this 
approach ―smacks of inconsistency, and cannot be reconciled with the approach in 
Thibani
150‖.151 
 
The Krull
152
 approach was however affirmed in Lubbe
153
 where the court stated that 
despite the test for provocation being subjective, the prosecution could not adduce 
evidence that the accused did not easily lose self-control and hence unlikely to have lost 
self-control in the circumstances in question.
154
 
 
However, despite the difficulties in constructing a subjective standard in in Krull
155
 the 
movement towards a completely subjective method of judging provocation was picking 
up speed.
156
  
 
This is evident in the case of Magondo,
157
 where the court stated that since criminal 
intention was now being subjectively assessed there was a necessity to reassess the law 
relating to provocation as well. Mangondo
158
 and Lubbe
159
 raised the question of 
whether to test provocation subjectively or objectively. This is more specifically noted, 
if the reasonable man in the position of the accused would have to lose self-control, or if 
                                                     
148
 R v Krull supra (n 142) at 396FF. 
149
 E.M. Burchell supra (n 134) at 386. 
150
 R v Thibani supra (n 119).  
151
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 116. 
152
 R v Krull supra (n 142). 
153
 S v Lubbe 1963 (4) S.A 459 (W). 
154
 S v Lubbe supra (n 153) at 465. 
155
 R v Krull supra  (n 142).  
156
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 116. 
157
 S v Mangondo 1963 (4) SA 160 (A). 
158
 S v Magondo supra (n 157).  
159
 S v Lubbe supra (n 153). 
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the accused himself suffered a loss of self-control which led to the exclusion of 
intention.
160
 The subjective test for intention was given firm support in the case of 
Dlodlo,
161
 where the Appellate Division fully accepted the subjective test to determine 
intention in murder cases and where the defence of provocation was raised.  
 
In this case, the appellant attended a ―beer drink‖ where the deceased incited the 
accused into an argument. After the ―beer drink‖ the deceased followed the accused 
home and challenged him to a fight which was declined by the accused. The deceased 
persistently followed the accused to his home even to the point of entering the accused‘s 
home. The accused forcefully ejected the deceased twice. On the third attempt, the 
accused stabbed the deceased fatally.
162
 
 
The court held: 
―The subjective state of mind of an accused person at the time of the infliction of a fatal injury is 
not ordinarily capable of direct proof, and can normally only be inferred from all the 
circumstances leading up to and surrounding the infliction of that injury‖.163 
 
The Appellate Division thus affirmed the subjective test for intention in cases involving 
provocation. The court stated that the onus was upon the prosecution to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that when the accused inflicted the injury he ―as a fact appreciated, 
subjectively, the possibility of death resulting therefrom‖.164 
 
The court stated: 
―The subjective state of mind of an accused person at the time of the infliction of a fatal injury is 
not ordinarily capable of direct proof, and can normally only inferred from all the circumstances 
leading up to and surrounding the infliction of that injury‖.
165 
 
 
The courts began to understand that in determining the presence of intention, the 
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workings of the mind of the accused needed to be investigated and a subjective 
assessment was the only fair method. Emphasis was placed on state of mind, in the case 
of Delport,
166
 the court stated that in cases where the presence of intention was in 
dispute: 
―...it is self-evident that the trier of a fact is required to have regard to all the evidential material 
which, in the light of our available knowledge of how the human faculty of volition functions, is 
relevant to the determination of the state of mind of the accused concerned‖. 
 
The case of Mokonto
167
 is considered to be an important milestone in the development 
of the law of provocation as it sounded ―the death knell for the objective approach to 
provocation in relation to intent‖.168  
 
The facts of this case concern witchcraft, the appellant a young Zulu man was found 
guilty of murder with extenuating circumstances of killing a woman known to his tribe 
as a witchdoctor. The woman had prophesised that the accused ―would not see the 
setting sun‖. The appellant became extremely fearful as the woman also predicted that 
his brothers would die and astoundingly the brothers did indeed die. Fearful that that he 
would meet the same fate, the accused decided to kill the woman in order to avert his 
impending doom. He then went about to kill the woman by gruesomely decapitating her 
to ensure she ―would not rise again‖ and chopped off her hands since these were the 
hands that handled the muti (medicine believed to have supernatural powers) 
responsible for the deaths of the appellant‘s brothers. 
 
Holmes JA stated that this case: 
 ―illustrates the dead influence of witchcraft which still holds in thrall the minds of some Bantu, 
notwithstanding the coming of Western civilization to Natal some 150 years ago‖169 
 
The accused pleaded self-defence and a defence based on provocation as an alternative 
plea. The Appellate Division rejected the accused's defence that his conduct fell within 
the confines of self-defence.  
 
                                                     
166
 S v Delport 1968 (1) PH H172 (A). 
167
 S v Mokonto supra (n 7). 
168
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 117; Van Niekerk supra (n 162) at 169. 
169
S v  Mokonto supra (n 7) at 320. 
 30 
The court examined the alternative defence based on provocation and stated that: 
―the facts of a particular case might show that the provocation, far from negating an intention to 
kill, actually caused it. The crime [then] would be murder, not culpable homicide…However, 
depending on the circumstances; such provocation could be relevant to extenuation‖.170  
 
In respect of section 141 of the Transkeian Penal code, the court stated that this 
provision encompassed an objective approach to provocation which was incompatible 
with the ―subjective approach of modern judicial thinking‖,171 which  excludes the 
doctrines that an individual is presumed to have intended the reasonable and probable 
consequences of his act,
172
 and the versari in re illicita doctrine.
173
  
 
The court further emphasised that provocation no longer reduced murder to the lesser 
charge of culpable homicide and in reference to the case of Dlodlo
174
 the court stated 
that provocation may, instead of disproving intention, actually aid in proving 
intention.
175
  
 
Furthermore, it was held that section 141 of the Transkeian Penal Code should be 
restricted to the district in which it was passed and that provocation is important to the 
subjective enquiry into the presence of intention and investigating what was in the 
appellant‘s mind at the time of the killing. Depending on the circumstances, provocation 
could be relevant to extenuation and mitigation.
176
 The Appellate Division confirmed 
the conviction of murder with extenuating circumstances, the original sentence of five 
years imprisonment was confirmed. 
 
Hoctor notes that the court explicated the law relating to provocation in the context of 
the specific intent doctrine which was applicable during this era.
177
 In the case of De 
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Blom,
178
 the Appellate Division held that the intention inquiry consisted of an 
investigation into the accused‘s subjective knowledge of unlawfulness.179  However, 
this case was criticised for declaring an honest mistake (regardless of how 
unreasonable) a defence in law where the offence committed required the element of 
dolus. If the crime in question required mens rea in the form of culpa then the mistake 
or ignorance must have been reasonable in order to negative the required culpability.
180
 
 
2.3. The emergence of criminal capacity 
It is quite evident that up to this point the courts grappled with provocation and how, or 
if, it should impact criminal liability. Besides this dilemma, the other consideration 
centred on how this defence should be assessed (that is, either objectively or 
subjectively). 
 
Provocation was traditionally viewed as impacting on the presence of intention. 
However, the concept of criminal capacity or ―toerekeningsvatbaarheid‖started gaining 
momentum in South African law, especially in relation to provocation. 
 
The court‘s acknowledged that evidence of provocation could not only impact intention, 
but also criminal capacity. The notion of criminal capacity or imputability entered South 
African law in 1967.
181
 Criminal capacity or “toerekeningsvatbaarheid”182 is one of the 
cornerstones in the system of concept jurisprudence known as ―strafregwetenskap‖.183  
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This concept was unknown in South African law before the 1960‘s, even in jurisdictions 
such as England or in Anglo-American law the notion is foreign.
184
  
 
Criminal capacity was virtually unknown in the sources of South African common law 
until it infiltrated from the Continental Legal systems, more specifically German law.
185
 
The notion of criminal capacity was a relatively new concept in South African criminal 
law, before its introduction, South African courts linked provocation with mens rea, that 
is, the possibility of provocation negating the element of intention.
186
  
 
The notion of criminal capacity came to the fore in South African criminal law when it 
was the subject of investigation by The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the 
Responsibility of Mentally Deranged Persons and Related Matters.
187
 
 
The Rumpff Commission made recommendations which led to the creation of section 
78(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act
188
 which sets out the defence of mental illness in 
South African law. The exposure emanating from investigation of Rumpff Commission 
acted like a catalyst in the development of the element of criminal capacity in South 
African criminal law. In 1967, the same year as the release of the Rumpff Report, in the 
Appellate Division case of Mahlinza,
189
 it was held that criminal capacity was an 
essential element in determining criminal liability.
190
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2.3.1 Essential components of criminal capacity 
In South African criminal law, criminal capacity is seen to have two essential 
components: 
a) Cognitive capacity, which relates to the individual‘s ability to think. Thus the ability 
to comprehend, reason and perceive is encompassed within cognitive capacity. Of 
importance is the person's ability to distinguish between right and wrong.
191
 Hence, 
when cognitive capacity is lacking, the actor behaves without adequate insight into his 
or her behaviour. 
 
b) Conative capacity refers to an individual's ability to control his or her behaviour. 
Self-control or powers if resistance was defined in the Rumpff Commission Report as: 
―...a disposition of the perpetrator through which his insight into the unlawful nature of a particular 
act can restrain him from, and thus set up a counter-motive to, its execution. Self-control is simply 
the force which insight into the unlawfulness of the proposed act can exercise in that it constitutes 
a counter-motive‖.192  
 
In normal, non-criminal persons the idea of committing an unlawful act arouses 
aversion. Only where very strong motives are present to promote the execution of such 
an act, even though present, arouses no aversion at all, so that such insight cannot 
operate as a counter-motive, there is no self-control.
193
 
 
If either type of capacity is lacking, the element of criminal capacity will be negated and 
the accused cannot be held criminally liable. The test which has been developed by the 
Rumpff Commission relates to incapacity arising out of mental illness; however, it has 
been extended to incapacity arising out of intoxication, provocation and emotional 
stress. Hoctor states that the courts have indeed appropriated the s 78(1) test in 
evaluating non-pathological incapacity.
194
 Besides the two types of capacity identified 
by the Rumpff Commission, a third type of mental function exists, that of affective 
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functions.
195
  
 
Affective functions relate to an individual‘s emotions or feelings. Affective functions 
may: 
 ―range from the pleasurable or the unpleasant barely perceptible, feelings of hopeful anticipation 
or disappointment to the most intense emotions of hatred, fury, jealousy, etc. Intense emotions 
may sometimes create such strong tensions in the internal muscular organs, as well as in the 
external skeletal muscles that a person involuntarily contracts his muscles-fist clenching, trembling 
of the limbs etc.,-and may resort to unconsidered action.‖196 
 
However, unlike cognitive and conative capacity, affective emotional disturbances do 
not exclude criminal liability.  
The commission stated that: 
 ―in our opinion, however, the fact remains that as an adult personality he is capable, or ought to 
be capable of volitional control of the expression of his emotions.‖197  
 
This applies in cases where an accused person shows evidence of volitional control and 
insight into their conduct. In circumstances where the affective functions impact 
negatively on the cognitive or conative capacity then only may criminal liability be 
excluded. 
 
There has been some debate regarding in the sequence in which elements of criminal 
liability should be tested: should the test for criminal capacity precede the test for 
voluntary conduct?
198
 Hoctor states that it is of high importance that elements of 
voluntary conduct and criminal capacity are not confused.
199
  
 
In the case of Mkize, Jansen JA held that in instances where there is an absence of 
voluntary conduct, ―there is no need to investigate the presence or absence of mens rea 
because it is ―necessarily excluded; nor is it necessary to investigate whether the person 
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has criminal capacity‖.200 This is in contrast with the case of Mahlinza201 where it was 
stated that the inquiry into capacity was of extreme importance, where it is shown that 
criminal capacity is lacking, there would be no need to enquire further into fault or 
voluntariness of the accused's conduct.
202
 
 
Academics have stated that the approach in Mkize
203
 and Chretien
204
 should be 
followed; the test for a voluntary act ought to precede any other inquiry so as to avoid 
an overlap between the ―act‖ and ―capacity‖ elements.205 Hoctor notes that there are 
also divergent views in respect to the distinction between criminal capacity and fault. 
 
Van der Merwe
206
 summarises three different positions: 
1. That the concepts are totally different and capacity remains a requirement in the case 
of no fault liability. 
2. In theory the concepts are different; however, both are constituent parts of the 
culpability element. 
3. Two concepts are indistinguishable since a person if capable of forming an intention 
will obviously possess criminal capacity, essentially the same inquiry. 
 
Van der Merwe notes that the psychological approach was followed in the landmark 
case of Chretien,
207
 where capacity and fault are separate elements. The capacity inquiry 
is a preliminary one, conducted before the inquiry into actus reus and mens rea. 
Therefore, South African law follows position that both concepts are distinct but are 
both constituent parts of the culpability element.
208
 
 
It is important when explicating the notion of criminal capacity to clearly distinguish it 
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from fault. The inquiry to ascertain the presence of criminal capacity is whether the 
accused had the capability of ―something‖ and whether that ―something‖ actually 
existed is only ascertained in the inquiry into fault.
209
 
 
2.4. The defence of non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional 
stress 
The landmark case of Chretien
210
 indirectly played a pivotal role in the development of 
the defence of non-pathological incapacity as a result of provocation and emotional 
stress.
211
 The Chretien
212
 case provided a foundation for the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity.
213
 Prior to the case of Chretien,
214
 the question of incapacity seldom 
occurred. Louw notes that it was usually reserved for cases involving mental illness and 
youth. Within the last two decades it has ―shifted from the periphery of our law to a 
fully developed defence available to those who kill when provoked‖.215 
 
Before the year 1981, the position in South Africa in regard to criminal capacity was 
that it could only be excluded by youthfulness and mental illness, before this turning 
point, provocation and intoxication was only regarded as partial defences at most.
216
 
 
The decision in Chretien
217
 dramatically altered the legal landscape of the in the area of 
criminal incapacity specifically in relation to voluntary intoxication,
218
 but also later 
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impacted the areas of non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional 
stress and its potential to exclude criminal capacity.
219
 The field of application of the 
concept of criminal capacity was increased to encompass the defence of intoxication.
220
 
In 1985 Snyman queried:  
 ―Yet the question remained: could one not argue by analogy that, just as extreme intoxication    
may negative criminal capacity, extreme provocation could have the same effect?‖ 221 
 
In the case of Chretien
222
, the accused attended a party where he consumed a sizeable 
amount of alcohol. The accused being intoxicated drove his car into a crowd of people 
who attended the party and who were gathered on the road. The result was that five 
people injured while one person was killed. The accused was charged with murder and 
attempted murder. The trial court held that the accused was guilty of culpable homicide 
and acquitted him on the charges of murder and attempted murder. The court held that 
in light of the explanation given by the accused, which was that due to his intoxicated 
state, he expected the individuals to move out of the path of the vehicle. The court 
doubted that the requisite mens rea for the charge of attempted murder and common 
assault was satisfied therefore acquitted the accused on these charges.  
 
On appeal, the state contended that the trial court should have applied that the Johnson 
case, the Appellate Division dealt with the question of whether the court a quo was 
correct in acquitting the accused of common assault where the requisite intention may 
have been adversely impacted due to the voluntary consumption of alcohol. The 
Appellate Division held that that ruling of the trial court was correct and that intention 
must be proven where the charge of common assault is concerned.
 223
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The Appellate Division addressed two important areas of law: 
Firstly, the court dealt with the judgment of Johnson
224
 and stated that the decision in 
this case was juridies onsuiwer (judicially impure). The reason for this criticism was its 
policy-driven conviction, despite the court a quo finding that at the time of the 
commission of the act, the accused acted mechanically.
225
 Secondly, the court stated 
that the ―specific intent‖ doctrine was contrary to that of South African law.226  
 
Before the Chretien decision, the ―specific intent‖ rule was followed, Snyman states that 
Rumpff CJ limited the rejection of the ―specific intent‖ theory to cases of 
intoxication.
227
 The Court applied a principled approach to the problem of voluntary 
intoxication, holding that the intoxication could exclude liability by negating various 
elements of liability: this includes the element of criminal capacity at the time of acting, 
the requirement of fault in the form of intention, and the requirement that the act was 
voluntary.
228
 
 
The court distinguished between diminished responsibility and the lack of capacity.
229
 
The state of intoxication was described as being characterised as an acute blunting of 
accused‘s capacity to appreciate the moral quality of the act in question, together with a 
severe lapse of inhibition.
230
 It was further stated that the position in South African law 
needed greater circumspection.
231
 
 
Furthermore, it was  emphasised by the court that only in exceptional circumstances will 
it be found that the effect of the intoxication was such as to exclude the accused's 
capacity to know that what he is doing is unlawful or such as to result in a fundamental 
disintegration of the accused's inhibitions and consequently that the accused lacked 
                                                     
224
 S v Johnson supra (n 89). 
225
 S v Chretien supra (n 204) at 1104A. 
226
 S v Chretien supra (n 204) at 1104A. 
227
 Snyman supra (n 121) at 247 discussing S v Chretien supra (n 204) 
228
 Snyman supra (n 121) at 247 discussing S v Chretien supra (n 204) at 1104E-F and 1104H and 1106F-
G. 
229
 S v Chretien supra (n 204). 
230
 S v Chretien supra (n 204) at 1106B-C. 
231
 S v Chretien supra (n 204). 
 39 
capacity.
232
 The Court, in relation to amnesia, stated that an accused person who alleges 
amnesia will not be considered to have lacked criminal capacity unless there is credible 
evidence to support this plea.
233
 
 
The court‘s absolute acceptance of the principled approach to liability was 
controversial, as not everyone believed that the legal convictions of the community will 
tolerate the scenario.
234
 The Chretien
235
 case is considered to be a case decided in 
accordance with legal principle and logic.
236
 
 
Since the decision in Chretien,
237
 a new approach to provocation as a defence was 
followed. The judgment raised pertinent questions relating to the exclusion of the basic 
elements of liability – in the same way intoxication does. Questions arose regarding 
whether the same approach in Chretien
238
  could be applied to cases involving extreme 
provocation and emotional stress as a form of non-pathological incapacity.
239
 However, 
Rumpff CJ emphasised the principles must be applied in a correct manner and in order 
for voluntary intoxication to succeed as a defence, sufficient evidence would be 
necessary to avoid criminal liability.
240
 
 
The Chretien
241
 case played a significant role in the development of the defence of non-
pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress and created somewhat 
of a snowball effect in that the cases which, following its precedent, embraced the 
principled approach in Chretien.
242
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In the case of Bailey,
243
 the court recognised that an emotional state, induced by fear 
and not coupled with intoxication could lead to a lack of criminal capacity. The 
Appellate Division stated that it was possible for the accused to have become so fearful 
due to threats that he could lack criminal capacity.
244
 The court confirmed the absence 
of the concept of excuse and took the stance that it cannot regard unlawful and 
intentional killings anything other than murder; hence, degrees of blameworthiness in 
relation to the element of intention are not recognised.
245
 
 
In the year 1983, a new chapter in the development provocation began with the case of 
Van Vuuren. 
246
 The court dealt with a defence of lack of mens rea as a result of 
provocation and intoxication.  
 
The defence relied on the principles set out in Chretien,
247
 in regard to incapacity arising 
out of provocation, the court stated that: 
―I am prepared to accept that an accused person should not be held criminally responsible for an 
unlawful act where his failure to comprehend what he is doing is attributable not to drink alone, 
but to a combination of drink and other facts such as provocation and severe mental or emotional 
stress. In principle there is no reason for limiting the enquiry to the case for the man too drunk to 
know what he is doing. Other factors which may contribute towards the conclusion that he failed 
to realise what was happening or to appreciate the unlawfulness of his act must obviously be taken 
into account in assessing his criminal liability. But in every case the critical question is – what 
evidence is there to support such a conclusion‖. 248 
 
The court therefore stressed the importance of evidence in arriving at the conclusion 
that criminal capacity was lacking. Furthermore, in the case of Lesch
249
 the defence of 
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non-pathological incapacity based on provocation was raised. The court (per Hatting 
AJ) adopted a traditional approach to the defence of provocation and recognised that 
loss of self-control could not only be caused by provocative words or conduct but also 
emotional stress.
250
 
 
The accused stated that while shooting his neighbour (the deceased) realised what he 
was doing was wrong but due to his anger he could not act accordingly.
251
 The court 
confirmed the murder conviction in this case as it felt that the provocation did not 
negate any of the elements of the liability since the accused behaviour indicated that he 
was thinking rationally throughout the chain of events and therefore the court could not 
accept that the accused could not have refrained from shooting the deceased if he so 
desired.
252
 
 
It is evident that the court adopted the same systematic approach as that in Chretien,
253
 
which established the existence of voluntary conduct, criminal capacity and intention as 
essential elements. The court held that instead of negating the element of intention due 
to provocation, it contributed to the forming of intention.
254
 
 
The importance of the cases of Van Vuuren
255
 and Lesch
256
 are that the courts in both 
cases accepted that provocation and emotional are important factors when determining 
if the element of criminal capacity was lacking.
257
 The Rumpff Commission
258
 report 
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played a vital role in the development of the defence of non-pathological incapacity as it 
formed a crucial part of the judgment in the case of Lesch.
259
  
 
In Lesch and Van Vuuren it was accepted that provocation could be a complete defence 
despite the defence failing on the facts.The case law indicated that at this point, the 
courts were approving of a defence based on provocation and it was not long before the 
defence succeeded. 
260
  
 
In the case of Arnold,
261
 decided in 1984, the defence of non-pathological incapacity 
based on provocation and emotional stress was successful. However, this case generated 
debate regarding the decision to allow emotional stress or any other form of provocation 
to operate as complete defence. The court acknowledged that emotional factors could 
contribute to a lack of capacity thereby leading to an acquittal as a result of provocation. 
Snyman is a fierce critic of this case and and argues that the court erred in acquitting the 
accused. In this case the accused, a 41-year-old man, was charged with killing his wife, 
an attractive 21-year-old woman. Defence counsel led psychiatric testimony to support 
the assertions that at the time of the killing, the accused's mind overflowed with 
emotions and as a result may have lost the ability to control his actions or that he may 
have acted subconsciously when shooting his wife.
262
  
 
The court posed the following legal questions: 
(a) Did the accused perform an act in the legal sense? 
(b) If he did perform a legal act, did he have the necessary criminal capacity at the time 
of the act? 
(c) If he did have the necessary criminal capacity, did he have the requisite intention?
263
 
 
The court accepted the evidence led by the defence as being truthful. Expert testimony 
by a psychiatrist was led supporting the assertions that the accused was subjected to 
tremendous emotional stress. 
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The psychiatrist testified that: 
―His conscious mind was so ―flooded‖ by emotions that it interfered with his capacity to 
appreciate what was right or wrong and because of his emotional state, he may have lost the 
capacity to exercise control over his actions.‖264 
 
The defence placed voluntariness of the accused's conduct and criminal capacity at 
issue. The psychiatrist further stated: 
―subconsciously at the crucial time because of the emotional storm and hence that he did not know 
what he was doing but that the severity of the storm was a question of degree and that he could not 
say whether in fact the accused was conscious of what he was doing or not‖.265 
 
The accused was found not guilty as the court (per Burger J) accepted his version of 
events. The court stated that it could not be found that when the accused killed he was 
acting consciously and not subconsciously,
266
 however, if indeed he was acting 
consciously it had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that criminal capacity 
was present. In support of this finding, the court cited the cases of Van Vuuren
267
 and 
Bailey
268
 and stated that the defence of criminal incapacity was not limited to factors 
such as intoxication, youth and mental disorder and the defence of incapacity extends to 
―severe emotional distress‖ as well.269 
 
Hoctor states that a ―puzzling‖ feature of this judgment is that the court found it 
reasonably possible that the accused was acting in a state of sane automatism at the time 
of the shooting and proceeded to hold that it was reasonably possible that the accused 
was lacking capacity at the time of the death of this wife.
270
  
 
However, the court was mindful of the need to need to proceed with caution when 
accepting that the accused lacked capacity, the court was of the opinion that due to the 
―most unusual‖ of facts in the case, the killing of the ―accused‘s wife was a variance 
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with the whole conduct of the accused both before and after‖ indicated that the accused 
may not have had control of his conduct.
271
 
 
The next case significant to the development of the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress was the Appellate Division case of  
Campher.
272
 This judgement was in turn cited in Laubscher
273
 which was extremely 
significant in the defence of provocation as it set the test for non-pathological 
incapacity. In the case of Campher,
274
 the court examined whether provocation and 
emotional stress could be the basis of a defence excluding liability. Hoctor states that 
the case of Campher
275
 is remarkable in that the three judges all delivered differing 
judgments, resulting in separate majority findings on the facts and on the law.
276
 This 
case was particularly more complex since the defence failed to raise the possibility that 
at the time of the killing, conative capacity may have been lacking along with the fact 
that defence counsel failed to lead expert psychiatric evidence. 
 
 
                                                     
271
 S v Arnold supra (n 16) at 264 G-H discussed by Hoctor supra (n 1) at 124-125. 
272
 S v Campher supra (n 8). 
273
 S v Laubscher  supra (n 1) at 167 A-B,167E. 
274
 S v Campher supra (n 8) the accused was the subject of tremendous emotional abuse by her husband 
(the deceased). During the marriage the accused was assaulted and taunted by the deceased, she was 
compelled to send her children from a previous marriage to live with her former husband. She was 
forced into cleaning the deceased's pigeon coops and sit at the bedside of the deceased during the 
nights to protect the deceased from bad spirits which he (the deceased) believed haunted him. On the 
day of the shooting, the deceased awoke in bad mood. He argued with the deceased and forced her to 
help him fit a bolt-lock into the pigeon coop. Since the accused was sleep-deprived due to the fact that 
she was forced to sit by the deceased‘s bed-side to ward of ―evil spirits‖, she did not hold the bolt 
fitting to the satisfaction of the deceased. This resulted in the hole not being drilled straight. This 
angered the deceased who then threatened the accused with a screwdriver. The accused then ran into 
the house and attempted to lock the deceased out of the house, this attempt was unsuccessful. The 
accused took hold of a pistol, despite being armed; the deceased was not afraid and proceeded to force 
the accused back to the pigeon coop. Still armed with the gun, the accused was forced on her knees 
and violently urged to pray for the hole in the wooden frame of the pigeon hole to become straight. 
The accused then shot the deceased. 
275
 S v Campher supra (n 8). 
276
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 125. 
 45 
Viljoen JA stated that since the appellant based her defence on the lack of self-control, 
in an attempt to negate the element of intention, this amounted to an argument of lack of 
conative capacity. Viljoen JA proceeded to deal with the case on this basis.
277
 
 
Viljoen JA further stated that the test contained in s 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
was not limited to cases where incapacity was due to pathological disturbances but also 
applied to mental incapacity arising out of non-pathological factors. Viljoen JA further 
noted that the enquiry into criminal capacity is distinct from the enquiry into intention; 
hence, criminal capacity should be assessed before intention. Only if a person is found 
to possess criminal capacity, should an enquiry into intention follow.
278
 
 
Viljoen JA found that the appellant did indeed lack conative capacity at the time of the 
shooting and as a result failed to control the urge to kill her abusive husband and should 
thus be acquitted. 
279
 It was stated that the accused laboured under the impulse which 
she could not resist, that being the impulse to destroy the ―monster‖ (her abusive 
husband). This impulse resulted in the accused being unable to act in accordance with 
the distinction between right and wrong.  
 
Hence, according to Viljoen JA, the actions of the accused were not imputable at the 
time of the shooting. Jacobs JA on the other hand felt that appellant failed to properly 
plead the lack of capacity, hence it made it difficult to conclude that she did not possess 
capacity at the time of the killing. Moreover, it was held that the test in s 78 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act only applied to cases where the accused lacked self-control due 
to pathological factors. As Jacobs JA held that the appellant did not lack self-control 
due to non-pathological factors, he dismissed the appeal against conviction.
280
 
 
Boshoff AJA was in agreement that the appeal against conviction should be dismissed, 
furthermore, that the lack of criminal capacity not only emanated from mental illness 
but could also be caused by a ―temporary clouding of the mind‖.281  
                                                     
277
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 125. 
278
 S v Campher supra (n 8) at 955C-F. 
279
 S v Campher supra (n 8) at 958I. 
280
 S v Campher supra (n 8) at 960D-E. 
281
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 126. 
 46 
Although the appeal did not succeed and the appellant was found guilty, this judgment 
was significant as it confirmed the existence of the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity arising from provocation and emotional stress. Out of the three judges, two 
accepted that a defence of incapacity is not limited to section 78 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act.
282
 
 
Du Plessis states that as a statement of law Campher
283
 is unsatisfactory due to the 
divergent views taken by the judges on the law and on the facts. If the view of the 
majority gains acceptance then it would result in the weakening of the law of culpable 
homicide.
284
 
 
By the mid-1990‘s, the defence of non-pathological incapacity based on provocation 
and emotional stress was well established in South African law. The defence developed 
along the principle that if any element of criminal liability is not proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt then the accused cannot be found guilty of crime that he is charged 
with. This is in accordance with the principle-based or psychological approach to 
criminal liability. This approach is based on the principle which requires that ―unless a 
man has the capcity and fair opportunity or chance to adjust his behaviour to the law its 
penalties ought not to be applied to him‖.285 However, although the defence was 
accepted, it was never intended to ―provide blanket exculpation for irate or distraught 
accused‖.286 
 
The crucial case which set out the test for the defence of non-pathological incapacity is 
the case of Laubscher.
287
 In this case, the Appellate Division finally produced a 
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theoretical framework to add to the foundations that had been laid down in the previous 
cases.
288
 The court distinguished between statutory criminal incapacity and incapacity 
caused by non-pathological causes which may be momentary in nature. 
 
Although the court held that the accused did possess criminal capacity although 
diminished to a degree, non-pathological incapacity could in principle lead to an 
acquittal.
289
  
 
The court (per Joubert JA) delineated the recognised psychological characteristics of 
criminal capacity as follows: 
―To be criminally liable, the perpetrator must at the time of the commission of the alleged offence 
have criminal capacity. Criminal capacity is a prerequisite for criminal liability. The principle of 
criminal capacity is an independent subdivision of the doctrine of mens rea.  . To be criminally 
accountable, a perpetrator's mental faculties must be such that he is legally to blame for his 
conduct.  The recognised psychological characteristics of criminal capacity are: (1): the ability to 
distinguish between the wrongfulness or otherwise of his conduct. In other words, he has the 
capacity to appreciate that his conduct is unlawful. (2) The capacity to act in accordance with the 
above appreciation in that he has the power to refrain from acting unlawfully; in other words, that 
he had the ability to exercise free choice as to whether to act lawfully or unlawfully. If either one 
of these psychological characteristics is lacking, the perpetrator lacks criminal capacity, [for 
example] where he does not have the insight to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act. By the same 
token, the perpetrator lacks criminal capacity where his mental powers are such that he does not 
have the capacity for self-control‖.290 
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In Laubscher
291
 in drawing the distinction between non-pathological incapacity and 
pathological incapacity, Joubert JA stated: 
―to be criminally accountable, a perpetrator‘s  mental faculties must be such that he is legally to 
blame for his conduct‖.292  
 
The court emphasised that there was no need to specify the particular type of the 
condition which led to non-pathological incapacity.
293
 The court cemented the existence 
of the defence by using the term ―nie-patologiese ontoerekeningsvatbaarheid‖ (non-
pathological incapacity).  This formulation of the defence in Laubscher
294
 remains the 
classic statement on the matter to this day.
295
  
 
However, despite the recognition of the defence in Laubscher,
296
 some time had passed 
before it was successfully raised in the Appellate Division.  
 
The issue of emotional stress serving as a complete defence emerged in the case of the 
case of Wiid,
297
 the appellant who was convicted of murder in a court a quo for the 
killing of her husband. The deceased abused the appellant numerous times during their 
marriage. On the day of the killing, the appellant was assaulted severely. There were 
some indications that the appellant suffered a concussion as a result of the assault. After 
the assault, the appellant shot the deceased several times killing him. The appellant was 
convicted of murder with extenuating circumstances and sentenced to five years‘ 
imprisonment which was suspended in totality.  
 
 
The appellant appealed against her conviction. She alleged that her relationship with the 
deceased ―reached breaking point‖ as a result of an assault on the accused by the 
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deceased shortly before the killing. The appellant alleged that the deceased also 
threatened her. 
 
The appellant further stated that she did not have any recollection of the killing and may 
have acted unconsciously and did not appreciate the unlawfulness of her conduct. 
Furthermore, she was not able to exercise self-control over her conduct and therefore 
not criminally accountable. The appellant further stated that her loss of criminal 
capacity was temporary and not due to any permanent or temporary mental illness or 
defect in terms of section 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
 
The court found that that a reasonable doubt existed as to the voluntariness of the 
appellant actions. The court could not reconcile the fact that the appellant loved the 
deceased yet could have consciously fired seven shots at him. The court accepted the 
possibility that the appellant may have not been fully conscious when the shots were 
fired. Therefore, the court found that the appellant lost self-control. The court was thus 
of the view that a reasonable doubt existed as to whether the appellant possessed 
criminal capacity at the time of the killing and thus the accused should be given the 
benefit of such doubt. The appeal thus succeeded.
298
 
 
The court (as per Goldstone AJA) cited Laubscher,
299
 using the formulation of the test 
in that case. The court held that the state failed to prove that the Appellant possessed 
criminal capacity beyond a reasonable doubt at the time of the killing, and was therefore 
acquitted on this basis thus the defence of non-pathological incapacity was 
acknowledged and succeeded as a result of the application of this principle. The source 
of dysfunction of the appellant's conscious mind was not relevant to determine liability; 
the importance was placed on the fact that her capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness 
of her conduct or to act in accordance with such appreciation was disturbed.
300
 The 
Appellate Division placed emphasis on the onus of the State to disprove the defence 
beyond a reasonable doubt where a factual foundation of the defence had been laid. 
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In the case of Smith
301
 the issue ―emotional storm‖ and its bearing on criminal capacity 
was also addressed. The court stated:  
―I assume for the present purposes that what was described as an ―emotional storm‖ or ―emotional 
flooding of the mind‖ can result in loss of criminal capacity, that is that such an emotional 
disturbance could result in a person being, in the words of section 78, incapable of appreciating the 
wrongfulness of her act or of acting in accordance with appreciation of such‖.302 
  
The cases of Wiid
303
 and Smith
304
 both give recognition to the effect that emotional 
stress can cause a complete lack of criminal capacity. The court in Wiid
305
 recognised a 
general test for the defence of criminal incapacity. 
 
In the case of Kensley
306
 the accused was convicted of two counts of murder and 
another two counts of attempted murder. On the night in question, the accused 
consumed alcohol and began making sexual advances to two transsexual men not 
knowing that they were in fact transsexual. Upon discovering that they were men not 
women, the accused lost his temper and shot them. The accused claimed that he could 
not remember the shooting and he was unable to exercise control over himself. The 
defence of non-pathological incapacity was rejected by the Appellate Division. The 
court emphasised the responsibility of criminal law to ensure that law must encourage 
just behaviour and guard against applying different rules for different individuals. In the 
case of provocation serving as a defence, an enraged state can be used as an excuse for 
criminal behaviour. 
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Van den Heever JA stated: 
―Criminal law for purposes of conviction – sentence may well be a different matter constitutes a 
set of norms applicable to sane adult members of society in general, not different norms depending 
on the personality of the offender. Then virtue would be punished and indiscipline rewarded: the 
short-tempered man absolved for the lack of self-control required of his more restrained brother. 
As a matter of self-preservation society expects its members, even when under the influence of 
alcohol, to keep their emotions sufficiently in check to avoid harming others and the requirement 
is a realistic one since experience teaches that people normally do.‖307 
 
In the case of Gesualdo
308
 the court in this case emphasised that the defence of non-
pathological incapacity is one of law and not of psychology.
309
  In this case, the accused 
was charged with murdering the deceased, a fellow immigrant from Argentina. The 
accused led in evidence that the deceased had exploited him financially and abused him 
personally when confronted about the exploitation.
310
 The accused was stressed and 
angry on the day of the killing. He claimed that he felt betrayed and powerless. The 
accused personal circumstances contributed to his stress and anxiety, as he was a 
foreigner who struggled to communicate in a different language, this was exacerbated 
by the fact that he was away from his family. On the day of the killing, the accused 
came up to the deceased; a witness described the accused as being angry and appearing 
out of control. The deceased challenged the accused and said ―are you going to kill 
me?‖  
 
The accused then fired five shots at the deceased after apparently being driven over the 
edge by the deceased‘s arrogant behaviour. The accused suffered total amnesia and was 
later found wandering the streets in a totally uncomprehending state .When he was 
informed of the killing he wept. After psychiatric evaluation the accused was certified 
fit to stand trial and found not to be mentally ill. He was found to have amnesia after the 
killing and experienced a deep sense of remorse for killing the deceased. The accused 
was found to have a repressive personality and hence was capable of angry outbursts or 
bouts of rage.
311
 The court found that the defence had laid a factual foundation for the 
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defence after considering the accused‘s amnesia, his remorse and general behaviour. 
The defence contended that the accused did not satisfy the second leg of the capacity 
test.
312
 
 
The court stated: 
―A person who suffers from no mental illness and from no physical defects, such as concussion or 
hypoglycaemia, and who can distinguish between right and wrong, can ipso facto control his actions.‖ 
 
Borchers J relied on the leading cases at the time, Kalagoropoulos
313
 and Wiid
314
 and 
Moses
315
 and stated that the defence of non-pathological incapacity was one of law and 
not psychology.
316
 Instances where the defence of provocation and emotional stress due 
to non-pathological incapacity being successful were arguably few and far between, this 
until the notorious cases of Nursingh
317
 and Moses
318
.
319
 
 
In the case of Nursingh
320
  the accused, a university student was charged with three 
counts of murder after he shot and killed his mother and his maternal grandparents. The 
accused alleged that at the time of the shooting he suffered an ―emotional storm‖ which 
was as a result of prolonged and severe sexual, psychological and physical abuse mainly 
by his mother.
321
 The defence stated that this abnormal upbringing created a personality 
make-up which was predisposed to violent eruptions of anger when faced with certain 
circumstances. The defence attempted to lay a factual foundational basis for the defence 
of non-pathological incapacity based on emotional stress and provocation by relying on 
expert evidence of psychiatrist and psychologists. Expert witnesses on behalf of the 
defence were of the opinion that the accused suffered an altered state of consciousness 
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at the time of the shooting. This altered state of consciousness allegedly deprived the 
accused of an awareness of normality. He had a mental state where his intellect and 
emotions were separated.
322
  
 
The psychiatrist stated that despite the accused's goal-directed behavior ―he would be 
using no more intellect than a dog biting in a moment of response to provocation‖. The 
court accepted that accused's series of goal-directed acts constituted only one act in each 
case.
323
 
 
According to the psychiatrist this syndrome is well documented in psychiatric research 
and literature. This was state was brought about by provocation by his mother, and 
together with his personality make-up and years of abuse triggered a state of altered 
consciousness.
324
  
 
The psychologist on behalf of the defence stated further that the accused suffered an  
―…acute catathemic crisis resulting in an overwhelming of the normal psychic equilibrium by an 
all-consuming  rage , resulting in the disruption and the displacement of logical thinking 
manifesting itself in an explosion of aggression that frequently leads to homicide‖.325 
 
Expert witnesses stated that in certain relationships, conflict leads to ―unbearable 
tension‖. The built-up tension is released in a violent way when triggered by a certain 
event.
326
 This type of an occurrence is not caused by a pathological defect and ―ordinary 
motor movements of the body can take place with normal efficiency‖.327 
 
The prosecution did not lead expert testimony to challenge the defence raised by the 
accused in this case. The accused was subsequently acquitted on all three counts of 
murder. Squires J stated that the accused succeeded in laying a factual foundation strong 
enough to cast a reasonable doubt on the presence of criminal capacity.
328
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Burchell states that it is difficult to find fault with the judgment of Squires J in 
Nursingh
329
 judgment, since evidence was heard and the learned judge formed the 
opinion that there was a reasonable possibility that the accused was being truthful and 
that the expert psychologist and psychiatrist testimony led by the defence, although 
uncontested, was compelling. Since the test for criminal capacity is subjective, when 
doubt emerges as to the presence of capacity, the accused must be given the benefit of 
that doubt and receive an acquittal.
330
 
 
Apart from the controversial case of Nursingh,
331
 the case of Moses
332
  is also viewed as 
controversial for the acquittal of the accused as well as debate regarding the manner in 
which of the principles underpinning the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress were applied.  
 
In this case, the accused was charged with the murder of his homosexual lover together 
with one count of robbery. The accused stated that on the day of the killing he and 
deceased had unprotected intercourse. The accused stated that he had become extremely 
attached to the deceased throughout their three month relationship. After engaging in 
their first act of intercourse, the accused testified that the deceased informed him that he 
had AIDS; the accused was at first in disbelief but noticed that the deceased was 
serious. The accused realized that the deceased was telling the truth and was horrified at 
the deceased's revelation especially after engaging in unprotected intercourse. The 
accused, who has a history of violent behaviour, stated that he felt betrayed as he loved 
the deceased deeply.
333
  
 
In his testimony, the accused stated that the was not sure of all the thoughts that were 
running through his mind at the time of the incident, but does recall an overwhelming 
feeling of anger and fear of dying a horrible death as a result of contracting the HIV 
virus from the deceased. The accused said that he felt deep hate towards the deceased 
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for abusing his trust by urging him to have intercourse, which was unprotected; even 
though the deceased knew that he was HIV positive.
334
 
 
The accused also stated that the deceased's betrayal brought back memories of sexual 
abuse he endured when he was a child. Upon the deceased's shocking revelation, the 
accused flew into a rage and successively attacked his lover with an ornament, a small 
knife and also a larger knife.
335
 
 
Similarly to the Nursingh
336
 case, the defence led expert testimony from psychologists 
and psychiatrists in an attempt to cast a reasonable doubt regarding the presence of 
criminal capacity.  
 
Expert witnesses testified that the accused was in an ―annihilatory rage‖337 and as a 
result, he experienced a collapsing of controls which deprived him of the requisite 
capacity and therefore should not be held criminally liable for the killing of the 
deceased.
338
 
 
The court stated: 
―Dr.Gittleson testified that he believed Mr. Moses knew what he was doing at the time of the 
killing. He would have had the capacity to foresee that Gerhard would be killed. However, his 
capacity to exert normal control over his actions and also to consider his behavior in the light of 
what was wrong was significantly impaired at the time of the killing.‖339 
 
The court further stated: 
―Dr.Gittleson testified further that in a state of rage one‘s capacity to retain control is definitely 
impaired. With specific reference to the accused, it was possible for a state of rage to have 
continued to such a degree that the loss of control or partial loss of control lasted throughout the 
time that the killing took place. Despite the killing, the accused‘s capacity to control his behavior 
in accordance with what he knew was right and wrong, was impaired. While he knew that it was 
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wrong in principle, his awareness of the wrongfulness of what he was doing at the time was also 
impaired‖.340 
 
Expert psychiatric evidence being led by the prosecution was dismissed by the court (as 
per Hlophe J) that described it as being unhelpful and therefore chose to accept the 
expert testimony of the defence experts instead.
341
  
 
On this basis, the court acquitted the accused due to the lack of criminal capacity at the 
time of the killing. This judgment has received criticism for the possible impact it might 
have on future cases. The Moses
342
 judgment has been criticized for allowing the 
defence of non-pathological incapacity based on provocation to prevail in a situation 
where the killing did not arise after a long history of abuse or emotional stress.
343
  
 
The court stated that the accused‘s self-control was ―significantly impaired‖, this 
description has been criticized for being ambiguous since it fails to indicate whether the 
accused suffered a total absence of self-control or simply a form of diminished self-
control.
344
 The distinction is of great importance as diminished self-control affects 
sentence
345
 whereas a total lack of self-control would lead to an acquittal as it directly 
affects liability.
346
 
 
                                                     
340
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341
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 Speirs ―Should provocation/emotional stress be regarded as a complete defence to criminal liability‖ 
(2002) Responsa Meridiana 65 at 72.  
346
 Louw supra (n 215) at 214-215; De Vos, P. ―S v Moses 1996 (1) SACR 701 (C) Criminal capacity, 
provocation and HIV‖ (1996) 9 SACJ 354 at 359. 
 57 
Louw for one has criticized the judgment for not providing sounder reasons for its 
finding, referring to case and academic authority not being cited. Louw has criticized 
the court for its acceptance of the psychiatric testimony where it was stated that the 
killings could be regarded as ―one and the same eruption‖347.348 Furthermore, Louw 
stated that ―the analogy of the intellect required of a dog when biting a human being 
accurately firing ten bullets is a strained one‖.349   
 
The Moses
350
 judgment, like Nursingh,
351
 attracted a lot of critical scrutiny and raised 
old fears about a defence based on the inability to control intense emotions.
352
 
 
 
2.5. The leading case of Eadie 
The case of Eadie
353
 is a landmark case in the area of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress and has redefined the South African law and the 
principles governing the defence. Arguably the two most controversial aspects of the 
judgment relate to conflation of the defences of sane automatism with non-pathological 
incapacity and secondly, the apparent introduction of an objective test into the capacity 
inquiry.
354
  
 
This case related to ―road rage‖. The exact ambit of this term is not clear but it is 
understood that it encompasses a number of volatile emotions such as aggression, 
frustration and the feeling of authority and power whilst driving and the mixture of 
emotions create a stressful condition which leads to road rage.
355
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The case of Eadie
356
 was heard in the Provincial Division of the Cape High Court where 
the accused pleaded not guilty to murder and defeating/obstructing the course of justice. 
The accused raised the defence of non-pathological incapacity primarily due to 
provocation and road rage.
357
 The court was given the opportunity to consider the 
impact of road rage on criminal liability.
358
  
 
In this case the accused, who after a night out with his family and after consuming a 
considerable amount of alcohol, was driving home when he saw the deceased driving 
behind his motor vehicle. The deceased who was also in a state of intoxication, overtook 
the appellants' motor vehicle and then slowed his vehicle down to such an extent that 
the accused could not overtake the vehicle. After a while the accused managed to 
overtake the deceased's vehicle. The deceased then began to increase his speed and 
drove close-up the rear of the accused's vehicle. The deceased also had the lights of his 
car on bright. Despite accelerating, the accused failed to put a distance between his 
vehicle and that of the deceased. The accused eventually overtook the deceased's 
vehicle; however, the previous pattern repeated itself. This enraged the accused further.  
 
Eventually, the vehicles stopped at a set of traffic lights. The accused, who was seething 
with anger, stepped out of his vehicle with his hockey stick in hand. He approached the 
deceased's vehicle then smashed the hockey stick to pieces against the deceased's 
vehicle. The accused then proceeded to pull the deceased out of his vehicle and then 
started his fatal assault on the deceased.  
 
The assault consisted of kicking the deceased and punches to the head. The accused 
admits to dragging the deceased out of the vehicle and stamping his face with the heel 
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357
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358
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of his foot. The accused in a fit of road rage killed the deceased. The accused was 
subsequently charged with murder of the deceased. The defence of non-pathological 
incapacity was raised by the appellant.  
 
The court as per Griesel J assessed the psychiatric evidence adduced by the State and 
the defence and assessed credibility of the accused as a witness, after assessing the 
circumstances, the court convicted the accused of murder and defeating the course of 
justice. The accused was sentenced to nine months‘ imprisonment.359 The court stated 
that it could not hold that the accused's version that he was unable to control his actions 
at the time of the killing as reasonably possibly the light of the evidence.
360
   
 
The court held that argument put forward by the defence that the accused lacked 
conative capacity and in the alternative, a lack of intention to kill due to heightened 
emotional arousal could not be sustained.
361
 Counsel for the defence stated that the 
accused lacked the ability to control his actions due to a culmination of emotional stress, 
provocation, intoxication on his mind.
362
 
 
The significant aspect of this judgment was the court‘s conflation of the defence of sane 
automatism and criminal incapacity. This judgment has drawn criticisms for conflating 
the two notions.
363
  
 
The court further stated that after examination of the accused‘s actions indicated 
―focused goal-directed behaviour‖.364 The accused‘s denial of his role in the assault of 
the deceased and attempts to hide the hockey stick indicated deceit.
365
 These factors, 
taken into consideration undermined the accused‘s version of events as well as the 
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reliability of the accused as a witness.
366
 The court found that the accused did not lose 
control but lost his temper after succumbing to road rage. 
 
The court outlined the defence of criminal incapacity by stating: 
―In our common law there were only two categories of persons who lacked criminal capacity, 
namely children under the age of seven years of age and persons who were insane. Since the early 
1980‘s; however, the defence of criminal incapacity has been extended to other categories of 
persons; first to the intoxicated and later also those acting under extreme provocation. The last 
mentioned category has come to be described in the jargon as ―non-pathological criminal 
incapacity…‖.367 
 
Griesel J stated further that: 
―There appears to be some confusion between the defence of temporary non-pathological criminal 
incapacity, on the one hand, and sane automatism, on the other. The academic writers... point out 
that they are in fact two distinct and separate defences. At the same time; however, it is clear that 
in many instances the defences of criminal incapacity and automatism coincide. This is so because 
a person who is deprived of self-control is both incapable of a voluntary act and at the same time 
lacks criminal capacity‖.368 
 
This pronouncement was a significant one, according to the court the defence of sane-
automatism was equated with the defence of criminal incapacity. The trial court rejected 
the accused defence and he was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment, five of the 
fifteen years were conditionally suspended. 
 
The accused subsequently appealed both the conviction and sentence.
369
 The Supreme 
Court of Appeal in reaffirming the decision of the High Court stated that based on the 
facts of the case the accused could not successfully raise the defence of non-
pathological incapacity as he merely lost his temper and not control of his senses.
370
  
 
The central issue of the appeal involved the alleged lack of criminal capacity suffered 
by the accused at the time the killing was committed. The accused admitted that at the 
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time of the killing he was able to distinguish between right and wrong (cognitive 
capacity); however, he contested that he was not able to act in accordance with the 
appreciation of right and wrong, thus lacking conative capacity. 
 
Navsa JA proceeded by stating: 
―It is well established that when an accused person raises a defence of temporary non-pathological 
incapacity, the State bears the onus to prove that he or she had criminal capacity at the relevant 
time. It has repeatedly been stated by this court that: 
 
(i) in discharging the onus the State is assisted by the natural inference that in the absence 
of exceptional circumstances a sane person who engages in conduct which would 
ordinarily give rise to criminal liability, does so consciously and voluntarily; 
(ii) an accused person who raises such a defence is required to lay a foundation for it, 
sufficient at least to create a reasonable doubt on the point; 
(iii) evidence in support of such a defence must be carefully scrutinised; 
(iv) it is for the court to decide the question of the accused‘s criminal capacity, having 
regard to the expert evidence and all the facts of the case, including the nature of the 
accused‘s actions during the relevant period.‖371 
 
The state led evidence at trial by psychologist Stephen Lay who assessed the accused 
and observed:
372
 
1. The accused acted rationally and purposely and performed goal directed acts and 
possessed cognitive ability.  
2. The accused did not suffer a lack of criminal capacity when the deceased was killed 
3. The accused did not suffer a loss of self-control at the time of the killing. The 
evidence indicated that the accused displayed poor impulse control 
4. The accused‘s actions were brought on by anger and alcohol did play a role in the 
accused‘s conduct. 
 
Psychiatrist Dr Sean Kaliski, a sceptic of the defence of non-pathological incapacity due 
to provocation and emotional stress testified in support of the State and made the 
following findings:
373
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1. The accused possessed both cognitive and conative functions at the time of the fatal 
assault. 
2. The defence of non-pathological incapacity has never been successfully established 
and can be equated with the defence of sane automatism. 
3. Factors such as emotional stress may disinhibit a person however it could not have 
the effect of depriving a person of control. 
4. If presented with compelling facts, the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress may be valid. 
 
Dr Ashraf Jedaar testified in support of the accused‘s and testified in respect of the 
following findings:
 374
  
 
1. The accused suffered an altered state of consciousness or dissociative state which 
indicated a heightened emotional state and may have affected cognitive functions 
thus resulting in the inability to exercise control over ones actions.  
2. The accused was concerned for the safety of his family 
3. The defences of sane automatism and non-pathological incapacity are different in that 
sane automatism deprives an individual of complete cognitive control arising from 
exceptional emotional arousal. 
4. The consumption of alcohol, together with the personality make up of the accused 
and the effect of the provocation by the deceased resulted in the accused reaching a 
stage where his actions were involuntary. While in this ―heightened emotional state‖ 
the accused would have been able to make decisions regarding what and whom he 
wanted to assault. 
 
One of the main features of the Eadie
375
 judgment is that the court drew no distinction 
between the defences of non-pathological incapacity due to emotional stress and 
provocation and the defence of sane automatism
376
, the court stated: 
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375
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 Sane automatism will only succeed as a defence if there is enough cogent evidence that creates a 
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―I agree with Ronald Louw that there is no distinction between the sane automatism and non-
pathological incapacity due to emotional stress and provocation. Decisions of this Court make it 
clear. I am however, not persuaded that the second leg of the test expounded in Laubsher‘s case 
should fall away. It appears logical that when it has been shown that an accused has the ability to 
appreciate the difference between right and wrong, in order to escape liability, he would have to 
successfully raise involuntariness as a defence. However, the result is the same if an accused‘s 
verified defence is that his psyche had disintegrated to such an extent that he was unable to 
exercise control over his movements and that he acted as an automaton- his acts would then have 
been unconscious and involuntary.‖377  
 
Ultimately, according to the court the second leg of the test for criminal capacity, that is 
the test for conative capacity, and the test to determine if conduct was voluntary is the 
same. Furthermore, Navsa JA seemed dissatisfied with the way the principles of the 
defence have been applied and was especially critical of the decisions of Moses
378
 and 
Nursingh
379
.
380
 
 
The court adds to the confusion by accepting the findings in Nursingh,
381
 stating that the 
combination of factors was extreme and unusual.
382
  Despite the court‘s criticisms of the 
defence of non-pathological incapacity due to emotional stress and provocation, the 
court admits that such a state is notionally possible.
383
 There has been differing 
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academic opinion regarding another aspect of the judgment, that is whether the court 
introduced an objective test into the test for criminal capacity.The court stated that 
although in principle the test for capacity remains subjective, the test must be applied 
cautiously.
384
 
 
The court highlighted its concerns by stating: 
―I agree that the greater part of the problem lies in the misapplication of the test. Part of the 
problem appears to me to be a too-ready acceptance of the accused‘s ipse dixit concerning his state 
of mind. It appears to me to be justified to test the accused‘s evidence about his state of mind, not 
only against his prior and subsequent conduct but also against the court‘s experience of human 
behaviour and social interaction. Critics may describe this as principle yielding to policy. In my 
view it is an acceptable method for testing the veracity of an accused‘s evidence about his state of 
mind and as necessary brake to prevent unwarranted extensions of the defence‖.385 
 
Navsa JA cited Burchell‘s comments regarding policy considerations and the 
provocation defence in expressing concern that defence was being misused.
386
 The court 
further emphasised the need for the law to move away from a subjective approach to 
fault to a more objective method of establishing the element. In this regard, Navsa JA 
contended that the conduct of an accused should be weighed against ―human 
experience, societal interaction and societal norms‖.387  
The court further expressed its opinions regarding the impact of allowing a person who 
succumbed to temptation from escaping criminal liability. The court described this 
situation as an absurdity and that it is not the mark of a self-respecting system of law 
make such an allowance.
388
 The court proceeded to trace the development of the 
defence of non-pathological incapacity by chronologically detailing the previous case 
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law which dealt with the defence, along with an analysis of criticisms by academic 
writers who have addressed the manner in which the test for criminal capacity has been 
applied.
389
 
 
In an attempt to clear confusion, the court referenced previous cases dealing with the 
defence of non-pathological incapacity; the court cited the cases of Potgieter390 , 
Cunningham
391
 and Henry.
392
 However, the defences in these cases were in fact sane 
automatism.  
The court stated: 
 ―It is clear from the decisions in the Potgieter, Henry, Cunningham and Francis cases that the 
defence of [non-pathological criminal incapacity] has been equated with the defence of 
automatism.
393
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The court critiqued the defence in the cases of Arnold,
394
 Moses
395
 and Gesualdo
396
 and 
stated that the operation of the defence in these cases were misconceived and out of line 
with existing authority by stating: ―the approach adopted by this court in the decisions 
discussed earlier was not followed in these three cases‖.397 
 
In respect of this statement, Hoctor argues that it is evident that the problem the court 
has with each of the cases  is that it was accepted that a person who, despite acting 
consciously, was not able to act in accordance with the appreciation of what is right and 
wrong due to provocation.
398
 
 
However, as Hoctor notes, this position has been accepted in the views expressed in 
Van Vuuren,
399
 Campher,
400
 Laubscher,
401
 Wiid,
402
 Calitz
403
 and Kalagoropoulos
404
.
405
  
Furthermore, other than the case of Kensley,
406
 the remaining cases mentioned relate to 
either automatism rather than incapacity, or the approach adopted is either inconsistent 
with each other or divergent in their approach towards the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity.
407
 
 
The court per Navsa JA held:
408
 
1. The appellant did not act in a state of automatism at the time of the killing, this being 
common cause. 
2. The appellant possessed the intention to act in a violent and destructive manner. 
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3. The appellant acted deceitfully after the killing and this should count against him. 
4. The approach of Dr Kaliski to the defence of non-pathological incapacity is preferred 
to that of Dr Jedaar. 
5. The evidence by Dr Jedaar revealed inconsistencies and explanations which were 
unsatisfactory. 
6. The court in Moses dismissed the evidence of Dr Jedaar and this might explain the 
apparent change of approach to the defence. 
7. The appellant suffered a loss of temper and not a loss of control over his actions. 
8. The appellant possessed the intention to kill. 
 
2.6. In the aftermath of Eadie 
After the landmark decision of Eadie,
409
 Hoctor notes that the cases following the 
Eadie
410
 decision, cite the case but not in the context of the substantive law.
411
 In the 
case of Thusi
412
 which, like Eadie,
413
 involved a killing arising from road rage. The 
court took cognisance of comments made in Eadie
414
 regarding the stringent approach 
of the law to those individuals who consciously killed after succumbing to anger.
415
  
 
In the case of Beukes
416
 the court in citing Eadie,
417
 held that the defence of non-
pathological incapacity could only be successful if voluntary conduct was absent.
418
 For 
instance, in the case of Khumalo
419
, though the court referenced the paragraphs 61, 64 
and 65 of the Eadie
420
 judgment in respect of the value placed on the ipse dixit of the 
accused, the court did not examine the possible implications of the substantive law.  
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In the case of Scholtz
421
 the court applied the same rationale by placing the enquiry into 
criminal capacity into the policy driven framework of the Eadie
422
.
423
 In making a 
finding regarding liability of the accused, the court referenced paragraphs 57 and 58 of 
Eadie
424
 and determined that Navsa JA‘s comments were a warning against the 
inclination to interpret the two stages of the test as two distinct defences.
425
 
 
Furthermore, in the case of Mate
426
 the court, although referencing Eadie in the context 
of psychiatric evidence and the court‘s approach to expert testimony, chose to cite the 
test for non-pathological incapacity in the Ingram
427
 which adopted the traditional two 
stage test that was set out in the case of Laubscher,
428
 rather than Eadie.
429
 
 
A similar observation can be made in Volkman
430
 where the court referred to test laid 
down in Laubscher
431
 in the context of discussing s 78 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 
of 1977, rather than the Eadie
432
 case. 
 
Though the Supreme Court of Appeal has mentioned Eadie
433
 in the context of 
sentencing
434
 and proof,
435
 it has yet to tackle the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity in the light of the approach in the Eadie
436
 decision. However, the most 
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recent confirmation of the Eadie
437
 judgment comes from the case of Marx..
438
 This case 
is significant because the court endorsed the finding in Eadie,
439
 Sangoni J stated that 
court‘s conflation of the concept of sane automatism and non-pathological incapacity 
was binding authority.
440
 
 
In the case of Humphreys,
441
 the Supreme Court of Appeal referenced paragraph 16 of 
Eadie
442
 in discussing emotional stimulus that may give rise to the defence of sane 
automatism. It was stated that in the absence of expert evidence, the court will need to 
assess what emotional stimulus could have triggered the unusual condition of a total 
loss of cognitive control. In this respect, the court stated that such triggers have been 
located in situations giving rise to provocation, stress and frustration. 
 
 
                                                     
437
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
438
 S v Marx 2009 (1) All SA 299 (E), in the case the accused was convicted of murdering his wife. On 
the day of the killing, the accused's wife (the deceased) returned home from work in an irate mood and 
confrontational with the accused. She told the accused that she intended on filing for divorce and 
admitted having an extra-marital affair with her lover. The accused was devastated by hearing this and 
pleaded with the deceased to reconsider the divorce; the accused also told the deceased that he would 
commit suicide. The deceased allegedly encouraged the deceased to commit suicide. The accused 
remembered kneeling on the floor with the revolver in his hand while he claimed the deceased 
encouraged him to kill himself. At this point the accused claims he his memory was interrupted and 
the next moment he had a recollection of was a vague memory of feeling as though someone was 
pulling the gun away from his head. The accused claims that he could not comprehend what the first 
shot was, whether it was a reconstruction or a drama. After this, the accused could not remember the 
two shots that were fired at the deceased after that. When the accused regained control of his senses he 
remembers that his children had awaken from their sleep and questioned him about what was 
happening. The accused told them that he did not know and then proceeded to take them out of the 
house without them knowing that their mother was dead. The court found that the defence did not lay 
a proper factual foundation for the defence of sane automatism which it alleged that the accused acted 
under.  
439
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
440
 Discussed by Hoctor supra (n 1) at 253-254. 
441
 S v Humphreys  2015 (1) SA 491 (SCA). 
442
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
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2.7. Evidential requirements 
There is a presumption in law that an accused person possesses the required criminal 
capacity in cases where there is no evidence, suggesting mental illness. This 
presumption applies equally to cases where the accused was intoxicated or in an 
enraged state.
443
 
 
Although the State bears the onus of proving the presence of criminal capacity beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the accused is however, under a duty to lay an evidential foundation 
for the defence which must be sufficient enough to create a reasonable doubt on the 
point.
444
  
 
In Cunningham, the court mentioned that the State in discharging this onus: 
―is assisted  by the nature inference that in the absence of exceptional circumstance a sane person 
who engages in conduct which would ordinarily give rise to criminal liability does so consciously 
and voluntarily. Common sense dictates that before this inference will be disturbed a proper basis 
must be laid which is sufficiently cogent and compelling to raise a reasonable doubt as to the 
voluntary nature of the alleged actus reus and if involuntary, that this was attributable to some 
cause other than mental pathology‖.445  
 
In regard to evaluation of the defence, supporting evidence in the form of expert 
testimony is not essential for succeeding, but is advisable in order to corroborate the 
alleged incapacity at the time of the commission of act; expert evidence is a useful aid 
to the court since it may shed light on the accused‘s mental abilities.446  
 
However, cases such as Campher
447
 and Calitz
448
 indicate that expert evidence is not 
regarded as crucial for the defence to succeed.
449
 It is also unclear if expert evidence is 
                                                     
443
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 128 citing S v Shivute 1991 (2) SACR 656 at 660e, S v Kensley supra (n 12) at 
660b-c 
444
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 129, S v Eadie supra (n 18) at para 2, S v Kalogoropoulos supra (n 306), S v Di 
Blasi 1996 (1) SACR 1 (A) 631 (A) at 635g-j. 
445
 S v Cunningham supra (n 391) at 635j-636a, S v Eadie supra (n 18) at para 2. 
446
 See S v Wiid supra (n 8) and S v Arnold supra (n 16). See further Snyman supra (n 3) at 166 for a 
general discussion on expert evidence in cases involving the defence of non-pathological incapacity. 
447
 S v Campher  supra (n 8). 
448
 S v Calitz supra (n 295). 
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required to lay a foundation for the defence. Van Oosten notes that certain dicta indicate 
that the courts explicitly require expert evidence in the form of psychiatric or 
psychological evidence for the defence of provocation to succeed.
450
 This is arguably 
another advantage of raising the defence of non-pathological incapacity over 
pathological since in the latter defence success hinges on psychiatric evidence.
451
 
 
In respect of non-pathological incapacity and psychiatrist observation, the court 
possesses the discretion on whether to refer the accused for observation in terms of 
section 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
452
  
 
Hoctor states that a court will view the evidence on which the defence of non-
pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress is based on with 
circumspection and such a defence will be more carefully scrutinised. This applies more 
to cases where the only evidence is the ipse dixit of the accused since the 
trustworthiness of this evidence depends on the authenticity of the factual foundation.
453
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                           
449
 See further S v Eadie surpa (n 18) at 180e-g, S v Kok 1998 (2) SACR 532 (N) at 545j-546a, S v 
Laubscher supra (n 1) at 172E-F and S v Volkman supra (n 430) at para 11 and 13. 
450
 Van Oosten supra (n 186) at 141 citing Boshoff AJA in S v Campher supra (n 8) at 966J-967C; S v 
Wiid supra (n 8) at 564e-f. 
451 Van Oosten supra (n 186) at 146 argues that an accused raising the defence of non-pathological  
incapacity is at a distinct advantage to an accused raising pathological incapacity in that the latter 
defence the accused is under the onus of proving the lack of capacity on a balance of probalities. 
452
  Hoctor supra (n 1) at 129. 
453
  Hoctor supra (n 1) at 130 citing S v Kensley surpa (n 12) at 658g-h and S v Gesualdo supra   (n 308 ) 
at 74g-h where the court stated that  it ―would be unlikely to find that such a state [incapacity] may 
have existed only by virtue of the accused‘s ipsissima verba‖. See Carstens and Le Roux supra (n 3) at 
182. 
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2.8. Concluding summary 
A historical survey of South African law and the development the defence of non-
pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress reveals somewhat of a 
turbulent past. Due to the influence of different parent systems of law, namely Roman 
and Roman-Dutch law and English law; South African law took a few years to 
formulate its own unique approach to provocation. Emotions such as anger were 
historically never considered a complete defence to a killing in South African law or 
any other jurisdiction. 
 
From this standpoint, the law moved from considering the effect of provocation on 
criminal intention which was objectively assessed. Ultimately, the law progressed to a 
stage where intention is assessed subjectively as the focus fell on the state of mind of 
the accused. These developments eventually led to the re-assessment of the approach to 
provocation. The advent of a purely subjectively assessed element in criminal capacity 
changed the landscape of how provocation is treated today. 
 
The emergence of the doctrine ―toerekeningsvatbaarheid‖ marked the broadening of the 
defence which began towards the latter part of the twentieth century when it was 
accepted that factors such as intoxication, emotional stress and provocation could in 
certain circumstances impair criminal capacity.
454
  
 
These factors are not the cause of a mental defect, thus the notion of non-pathological 
incapacity was born. The courts recognised that criminal incapacity could result from 
non-pathological causes and defence of non-pathological incapacity based on 
provocation and emotional stress emerged. In the last two decades, the defence has 
undergone major development and became a legitimate defence available to those who 
killed while under emotional stress and provocation. Arguably, one of the most 
interesting and debatable aspects of the provocation defence in South African law, is the 
subjective assessment of criminal capacity.  
 
                                                     
454
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 118. 
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There have been certain contentious acquittals in cases such as Arnold,
455
 Moses
456
 and 
Nursingh
457
 which further fuelled debate on the acceptability of a defence based on 
provocation and emotional stress. Furthermore, in an attempt to bring clarity to this area 
of the law, the leading case of Eadie
458
 has effected fundamental changes to the 
principles underpinning the defence of non-pathological incapacity which, in a drastic 
turn of events, has led to uncertainty regarding whether the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity still exists. The cases decided after Eadie
459
 have not applied the law in light 
of the changes made in the Eadie
460
 decision, thus the uncertainty emanating from 
Eadie
461
 still persists and the full import of this case has not been clarified. 
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 S v Arnold supra (n 16). 
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 S v Moses supra (n 16). 
457
 S v Nursingh supra (n 16). 
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 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
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CHAPTER 3: THE DEFENCE OF PROVOCATION IN ENGLISH 
LAW 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In England the defence of provocation exists as an independent partial defence and 
applies to a charge of murder only. The requisite mens rea element must be therefore be 
proven by or conceded by the accused. The defence essentially serves to reduce a killing 
which would otherwise be considered murder, to the lesser charge of manslaughter. The 
English position is that provocation is on a fundamental level insufficient to qualify as a 
complete defence.462  
 
The provocation defence is not without immense controversy and as a result has 
undergone reformation in recent times.463 The defence originally existed as a common-
law defence for centuries until the enactment of section 3 of the Homicide Act of 1957 
which modified the defence at common law.464 The enactment of the Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009 abolished the partial defence in terms of section 3 of the Homicide Act 
1957 and the common law, and has brought about significant changes to the defence.
465
  
 
The new defence, in terms of ss 54-56 Coroners Act 2009, is called loss of self-control. 
In terms of the new defence, it is not mandatory that the defence be left with the jury in 
every case. This is in terms of s 54(6) which states that the defence should only be left 
with the jury if ―sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with respect to the 
defence‖, which is dependent on ―evidence being adduced on which, in the opinion of 
                                                     
462
 A.J. Ashworth ―The Doctrine of Provocation‖ (1976) 35(2) Cambridge Law Journal at 292; M.J.  
Allen, ―Provocation‗s Reasonable Man: A plea for self-control‖ (2000) 64 Criminal Law Review at 
216; See R v Hussain and Hussain (2010) EWCA Crim. 94 where the court stated that in cases 
involving assault, provocation can be considered in determining sentence only and cannot provide a 
defence to the assault.  
463
 Ormerod supra (n 58) at 506. 
464
 J.Herring  Criminal Law Text, Materials and Cases  6
th
 ed (2014) at 237, voluntary manslaughter is 
applied to killings which would be considered murder if extenuating circumstances were absent, 
essentially the law acknowledges the despite that presence of mens rea and actus reus the accused is 
not deserving of a murder conviction. 
465
 Section 54 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 abolished the provocation defence and in its place is 
ss 54 and 55 containing the new loss of control defence. 
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the trial judge, a jury, properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the defence 
might apply‖. It is likely that trial judges will leave the defence to the jury in cases 
where evidence could satisfy the test in terms s 54(6), this applies in cases where the 
defence chooses, for strategic reasons, not to plead loss control as a defence. 
 
Evidence indicating loss of control may present itself in the case presented by the 
Crown; however, if such evidence is lacking, there is an evidential burden on the 
defence.If evidence of loss of control is absent in the case presented by the Crown and if 
the defence fails to discharge the evidential burden, then the judge is entitled to 
withdraw the defence from the jury‘s consideration. The burden of proof rests on the 
Crown; therefore, evidence which is likely to create a reasonable doubt, in the opinion 
of the jury, as to whetherr the defendant lost his self-control, is sufficient.
466
  
 
The essential components of the new defence are: 
1. that a loss of self-control was suffered; 
2. the loss of self-control was attributed to a qualifying trigger; 
3. an individual of the same sex and age of the defendant, with a normal degree of 
tolerance and self-restraint would have reacted in the same way as the defendant 
did.
467
 
 
Historically, the defence of provocation in English law has its roots in the common law 
dating back before the 17
th
 century. During the 17
th
 century the defence started to 
―assume a recognizable form and function‖.468 The provocation defence developed and 
evolved over many centuries with its purpose being in the law‘s duty to acknowledge 
and accommodate human frailty. However, it is also argued that the other reason for this 
partial defence is that it serves to avoid the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment for 
a conviction of murder, it has even been argued that this is the only need that it serves, 
and if the fixed life term for murder was abolished the partial defences would be 
―superfluous‖.469  
                                                     
466
 Ormerod supra (n 58) at 509-510. 
467
 Herring supra (n 464) at 238, See Dawes [2013] EWCA Crim. 322. 
468
 Ashworth supra (n 462) at 292. 
469
 G. Mousourakis ―Culpable Homicide and the Provocation Defence in English Law: A Historical and 
Contemporary Analysis‖ (2009) 42(1) Housei Riron at 39. 
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In terms of the rationale for the defence, it is thought to be based on both excusative and 
justificatory considerations; however, ascertaining its precise rationale in English law 
has been elusive.
470
 Although the principles of justification and excuse
471
 are different, 
the common element between both principles is that if either is not proved, then neither 
can a conviction nor punishment follow.
472
  
 
The provocation defence is and has always been a controversial area within the criminal 
justice system and has been described as a perennial problem.
473
 Horder argues that 
provocation has had a remarkable impact on criminal responsibility even before modern 
times.
474
  Its continued impact on criminal responsibility alludes to its importance in the 
criminal law system and society itself; therefore, the tracing of its origins and the study 
of the evolution of its underlying principles is an important first step in understanding 
the nature of the defence as it stands currently.  
 
3.1.1. Tracing the development of the provocation defence in English law 
In the early stages of its development, English law categorized killings based on the 
circumstances in which they were committed. The reigning monarch exercised 
jurisdiction over all felonies, this was done to support the authority of the monarchy. In 
1278 the Statute of Gloucester was enacted and in terms of this law, if the reason for the 
                                                     
470
 G. Mousourakis ―Emotion, choice and the rationale of the provocation defence‖ (1990) 30 Cambrian 
Law Review 21 at 21. 
471
 J. Horder ―Between provocation and diminished responsibility‖ (1999) 10 Kings College of Law 
Journal at 143 states that in murder cases  the distinction between the pleas of provocation and 
diminished responsibility in law represents an ethical distinction between partial excuse for 
wrongdoing in provocation cases and partial denial of responsibility in cases involving diminished 
responsibility. The boundary between the two defences is difficult to draw. Horder argues that in 
certain cases this boundary has been blurred and certain cases of diminished responsibility have been 
wrongly categorised as provocation. 
472
  Hart supra (n 285) at 14. 
473
  Allen supra (n 462) at 216. 
474
  J. Horder Provocation and responsibility (1992) at 5; Mousourakis  supra (n 469) at 39-40. 
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killing was self-defence or se defendendo, then the matter could be referred by the trial 
judge to the monarch who had the authority to grant a royal pardon.
475
 
 
Certain homicides received the death penalty while others were not subject to state 
punishment. Killings that were considered heinous involved concealment of the act and 
those committed during an open fight were considered less heinous as they could be 
remedied by compensation to the deceased‘s family.476  
 
The distinguishing of killings on this basis began to fade away during the 13
th
 century 
and most classes of homicides were grouped under a single capital crime of culpable 
homicide.
477
 The term murder or murdrum emerged to describe killings committed in 
secret which were considered especially reprehensible and thus deserved to be punished 
by death.
478
 As the 14
th
 century approached, it became common practice for justices to 
use the term ―murder‖ when referring to killings committed during an ambush.479  
 
As time passed, the law recognized that certain homicides should be treated more 
seriously than others. Parliament felt threatened over the generous granting of royal 
pardons and so in 1390 legislation
480
 was enacted which sought to limit this in cases 
involving homicides committed while ―lying in wait, assault or malice aforethought‖. 
Essentially, the class of crime that was excluded from receiving royal pardons were the 
premeditated felonies.
481
  
 
The enactment of legislation aimed to regulate the granting of royal pardons in 
homicide cases; however, differentiating between homicides committed with malice 
aforethought and those without became difficult.
482
 It was during this period that 
                                                     
475
 Horder supra (n 474) at 5-6 states that non-felonious homicides included justifiable and excusable 
homicdes. The finding of justifiable homicides resulted in an acquittal, see further Mousourakis supra 
(n 467) at 40. 
476
  Mousourakis supra (n 469) at 39-40. 
477
  Mousourakis supra (n 469) at 40. 
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  Mousourakis supra (n 469) at 40. 
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  Mousourakis supra (n 469) at 40. 
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  Stat.13 Ric II stat.2, C.1 discussed by Mousourakis supra (n 469) at 41. 
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 Horder supra (n 474) at 10. 
482
 Mousourakis supra (n 469) at 40. 
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English law recognized for the first time that a killing committed with premeditation 
was different to that committed on impulse or by sudden chance (also known as par 
chaude melle).
483
 
 
However, during the 15
th
 century judges gradually reverted to grouping all types of 
felony homicides under a single undivided offence as it was done during the 13
th
 and 
14
th
 century where
 
the law returned to using the terms excusable, justifiable, and 
―felonious‖ to describe homicides.484 During the 16th century, culpable homicide was 
recognized as being distinct from a killing committed in self-defence. The law 
recognized felonious homicides arising from wanton negligence during this period.
485
 
 
3.1.2. The recognition of manslaughter 
The 16
th
 century saw the restriction of the ―self-informing jury‖ who dominated the 
manner in which evidence was received and restricted judicial legal determination, ―the 
age of nearly unlimited jury control was passing; the age of the law and the bench was 
commencing‖.486 
 
By the early 16
th 
century, manslaughter was considered to be distinct from murder.
487
 
This development can be attributed largely to a practice which is referred to as ―benefit 
of the clergy‖. Benefit of the clergy gave the right to clerks of holy orders accused of 
crimes to request to be tried by ecclesiastical courts. If the request of the clerk was 
successful then the matter could be handled by the ecclesiastical courts where the 
accused had a better chance of receiving a more lenient sentence and a better chance of 
an acquittal.
488
 
 
                                                     
483
 Mousourakis supra (n 469) at 41. 
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 Mousourakis supra (n 469) at 41. 
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 Horder supra (n 474) at 11. 
486
 T.A. Green ―The jury and the English law of Homicide, 1200-1600‖ (1979) 74 Michigan Law Review 
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However, the practice of ―benefit of the clergy‖ became abused over time. Persons 
accused of serious crimes relied on the ―benefit of the clergy‖ and this reliance started 
to undermine the credibility of secular criminal law of that era.
489
 As a result of this 
problem, statutes were enacted to remove the availability of ―the benefit of the clergy‖ 
in homicides committed with malice prepensed.
 490
 
 
Homicides were divided into 3 categories: 
1. Homicides committed with malice aforethought, this type was considered the most 
heinous type of homicide and thus received the harshest punishment. 
2. Secondly, those homicides committed without malice, this was known as ―chance 
medley manslaughter‖ by the year 1510. 
3. The third type of homicide was those eligible for royal pardon, known as per 
infortunium or committed by accident. 
Mousourakis states that there was a fourth category, that is, those that entitled the 
accused to a full acquittal.
491
 
 
After the promulgation of a statute in 1547, the ―benefit of the clergy‖ could not apply 
to those individuals found guilty of homicides involving malice prepensed.
492
 The 
benefit of the clergy however could still be used by those convicted. The enactments of 
a statute in 1547 led to homicides being distinguished on the presence or the lack of 
premeditation. The emergence of manslaughter or chance medley manslaughter, which 
categorised hot-blooded killings committed without premeditation, resulted in judges 
eventually regarding this type of killing as a form of provocation which was sufficient 
to reduce murder to manslaughter. 493  
                                                     
489
 Horder supra (n 474) at 11. 
490
 Mousourakis supra (n 469) at 41 citing 4 Hen VIII, C2, 23 Hen VIII, C.1. S.3 and  E. Coke The Third 
Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (1628) at 47 defines malice aforethought as: ―Malice 
prepensed is, when one compasseth to kill, wound, or beat another, and doth it sedate animo. This is 
said in law to be malice forethought, prepensed, malitiia praecogitata.‖  
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  Mousarakis supra (n 469) at 41-42. 
492
 Mousourakis supra (n 469) at 42. 
493
 See Salisbury‘s case (1553) Plowd Comm. 100 discussed by Horder supra (n 474) at 14-15 who states 
that the significance of this case is that confirms as a matter of law that the sight of a master being 
assaulted amounted to provocation that would result in ―hot-blooded chance medley‖ and the killing 
of the provoker by the servant . 
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Manslaughter came to mean that the homicide was committed deliberately although 
committed on the spur of the moment.
494
 
―This term is used to define cases where, although a person has killed with aforethought, he did so 
pursuant to a suicide pact, while provoked or while suffering from diminished responsibility. The 
existence of one of these circumstances reduces liability from murder to manslaughter.‖ 
495
 
 
The law began to acknowledge that although intention to kill was present, the killing 
occurred on impulse when the accused was overcome with anger and this factor made 
the homicide excusable, unlike a killing committed in cold blood.
496
 
 
Those individuals convicted of manslaughter received sentences involving the forfeiture 
of assets, shorter periods of incarcerations and ―burning in the hand‖.497 Problems soon 
arose involving the task of distinguishing between homicides committed with chance 
medley manslaughter and malice aforethought.
498
  
 
Jurors found making this distinction complex especially when determining if malice 
was present or not. Malice was presumed to exist in cases where the accused was not 
provoked. The role of provocation in separating manslaughter from murder became 
prominent.
499
 
                                                     
494
 Coke supra (n 490) at 47, 55-56 termed manslaughter a voluntary killing ―not of malice forethought 
but upon some sudden falling out. There is no difference between murder and manslaughter, but that 
the one is upon malice forethought, and the other upon a sudden occasion and therefore is called 
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  R. Card Cross and Jones Cases and Statutes on criminal law 6 ed (1977)   at 215. 
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In 1604, the Statute of Stabbing
500
 was enacted to due to killings arising from disputes 
regarding James I accession to the throne in 1603.
501
 This enactment further aided in 
making provocation the decisive factor when making the determination of which 
homicides are manslaughter and which are murder.
502
 The Statute of Stabbing removed 
the benefit of the clergy where the victim was stabbed without drawing a weapon and in 
cases where there was no evidence of premeditation.
503
 
 
The scope of the Statute of Stabbing resulted in the application of the new law being 
problematic. To solve this problem judges devised a solution whereby certain criteria 
would be used to determine if certain conduct amounted to provocation or not.
504
 It is 
important to note that even at this point in English law, provocation was not considered 
a complete defence and at most it could reduce murder to manslaughter.
505
 
 
The work of Sir Edward Coke was considered to be fundamental to the development of 
criminal law, published in 1628 the Third part of the Institutes of the Laws of England 
led to the shift in focus from the victim to the perpetrator.  
Coke canvassed the idea of manslaughter by stating: 
―There is no difference between murder and manslaughter, but that the one is upon malice 
forethought, and the other upon a sudden occasion: and therefore is called chance medley‖.506   
 
Coke was instrumental in defining malice aforethought and the concepts of ―blood 
cooling‖ and its relation to heat of passion in manslaughter.507 Chance medley was 
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501 Coss supra (n 486) at 573. 
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 Coss supra (n 486) at 573. 
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defined as follows: ―Homicide is called chance medley…for that it is done by chance 
(without premeditation) upon a sudden brawl, shuffling, or contention‖.508 
 
Coss notes that Coke did not state much regarding provocation, other than making a 
passing reference to malice being implied in cases not involving provocation. The law at 
the time developed rules which put parties on equal footing example manslaughter by 
chance medley.  
However, certain dilemmas remained: 
―When the mischief is the taking of inordinate vengeance for comparatively trifling injuries …the 
question is what degree of provocation is to mitigate the legal denomination of the homicide 
caused by it‖.509 
 
The advent of the 17
th
 century saw an increase in judicial activity.
510
 In Royley‘s 
Case
511
 the Court allowed a verdict of manslaughter to an accused, who killed the 
deceased after the deceased gave his son a bloody nose. This case received criticism on 
the basis that the provocation was not serious enough.
512
 Mousourakis states that the true 
basis of the defence of provocation was the recognition that the law must be lenient and 
compassionate to certain individuals who were provoked, human frailty must be 
acknowledged and accommodated by law.
513
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Furthermore, it was acknowledged that provocation had the effect of creating a 
disruption in the accused‘s ability to reason and causes a temporary clouding of 
judgment.
514
 Furthermore, in order to gain leniency from the law, the accused‘s conduct 
must have been in proportion to the type of provocative act. If the accused‘s actions 
were not in proportion then the existence of malice would still be presumed. 
 
Ashworth states that during the 17
th
 century, transformation of the defence of 
provocation occurred within a rigidly structured law governing homicides. It was during 
the 17
th
 century that the basis for the modern doctrine of provocation was laid. There are 
two developments during this period which are significant; the first is affirmation that 
the defence did not apply to cold-blooded, calculated, killings committed out of revenge 
but rather that the defence applied to the provoked, hot-blooded, killing. The second 
important development was the gradual categorisation of four types of provocation.
515
  
 
Furthermore, the 17
th
 century was important since it revealed an important link between 
virtue and honour, and how this explains the concept of anger, which has been the core 
of the provocation defence for many years. Horder states that without an appreciation of 
nature and significance of virtues that are linked, the doctrine of provocation will be not 
understood.516  Evidence indicating presence of provocation started being accepted in 
rebuttal of the implication of malice. This was based on the theory that this evidence 
indicated that the reason for the killing was not due to an underlying hatred for the 
deceased but from passion which consumed the provoked killer.
517
 
 
The 18
th
 century saw two significant cases being reported, the first, Mawgridge
518
  set 
out certain fundamentals of the modern defence. In this case the deceased and the 
defendant were involved in an argument which included physical assault and resulted in 
the accused killing the deceased with a sword. The accused in this case pleaded not 
guilty but was nevertheless convicted of murder. The court decided that the defendant 
could not rely on provocation. 
                                                     
514
 Mousourakis supra (n 469) at 45. 
515
 Ashworth supra (n 462) at 292. 
516
 Horder supra (n 474) at 23-24,40. 
517
 Ashworth supra (n 462) at 292. 
518
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 The court set out basic principles of the defence:  
 Lord Holt CJ: 
―no words of reproach or infamy are sufficient to provoke another to such a degree of anger as to 
strike , or assault the provoking party with a sword , or to throw a bottle at him , or strike him with 
any other weapon that may kill him; but if the person provoking be thereby killed, it is murder‖.519 
 
Lord Holt CJ stated which types of acts would however qualify as sufficient 
provocation: 
―1. Angry words followed by an assault; 
2. The sight of a friend or relative being beaten; 
3. The sight of a citizen being unlawfully deprived of his liberty and; 
4. The sight of a man in adultery with the accused's wife.‖ 
 
The second case was that of Oneby,
520
 where the principles set out in Mawgridge
521
 
were scrutinised. The court stated there was enough time for the accused‘s passion to 
cool and his words and actions indicated a measure of deliberation.  
The court stated that in order for the crime of murder to be reduced to manslaughter:  
―such a passion, as for the time deprives him of his reasoning faculties; for if it appears , reason 
has resumed its offices, if it appears he…deliberates…before he gives the fatal stroke…the law 
will no longer under that pretext of passion exempt him from the punishment …he justly 
deserves‖.522 
 
An accused person would be convicted of homicide in England if intention to kill or to 
cause serious bodily harm was proved. In English law the majority of unlawful 
homicides which do not fall under the umbrella of murder are categorized as 
manslaughter, a less serious crime.
523
 There are two types of manslaughter, involuntary 
manslaughter and voluntary manslaughter.
524
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3.1.3. Voluntary manslaughter and provocation 
The verdict of voluntary manslaughter is a unique charge in that the accused cannot be 
charged with voluntary manslaughter but can be found guilty of it.525 Although all the 
elements for murder are required, special circumstances may reduce murder to 
manslaughter.526 The difference between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter is the 
presence of mens rea.527  
 
In terms of the verdict of voluntary manslaughter the accused person has committed a 
guilty act (actus reus) with intention (mens rea), but, a partial defence to the crime is 
permitted due to the presence of mitigating circumstances. Liability is thereby reduced 
and the homicide becomes manslaughter rather than murder.
528
 
 
In terms of this type of partial defence, the accused person will be charged with murder 
and only during the trial will the opportunity to plead voluntary manslaughter arise.
529
 
Apart from provocation, two other types of voluntary manslaughter exist, suicide pacts 
and diminished responsibility.
530
 
 
An accused person who is successful in pleading a partial defence such as provocation 
will receive a sentence which is at the discretion of the presiding officer, who will take 
into account the circumstances in which the homicide occurred. Essentially, the defence 
of provocation is intended to reduce the accused criminal liability for murder only. 531  
 
The judge has the discretion of imposing a sentence which is harsh or lenient because of 
the conviction of voluntary manslaughter. Since voluntary manslaughter is considered 
less heinous than murder, the accused is spared the mandatory life sentence for 
murder.
532
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Voluntary manslaughter is more serious than involuntary manslaughter because of the 
presence of the mens rea of murder.
533
 An individual cannot be charged with voluntary 
manslaughter but will be charged with murder and if one of three mitigations is 
applicable, then the verdict is voluntary manslaughter.
534
 
 
Certain cases
535
 decided during the 18
th
 and 19
th
 century reflected a gradual shift from 
emphasis on the wrongfulness of provocative conduct to focus on the requirement of 
loss of self-control.
536
 During this period a different approach to anger was conceived 
and this was different to the philosophical foundations of the early modern-day defence. 
The doctrine of provocation was changed to a focus on anger and this was interpreted as 
a loss of self-control. The courts began focusing on the mind-set of the accused and the 
approach that extreme anger can be overpowering to the extent that the power of reason 
or rational thinking may have been excluded. 
537
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th
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3.1.4. Emergence of the modern doctrine of provocation 
The late 19
th
 century saw an important milestone which contributed significantly to the 
development of the modern doctrine of provocation, that is, the notion of the 
―reasonable person‖. The standard provided by the ―reasonable person‖ provided a 
uniform, universal criteria of self-control against which a provoked person‘s reaction 
could be judged against.
538
 
 
In the case of Welsh,
539
 considered to be one of the first cases wherein the reasonable 
person was referred to, Keating J stated: 
―in law it is necessary that there should be a serious provocation in order to reduce the crime to 
manslaughter, as for instance, a blow and a severe blow- something which might naturally cause 
an ordinary and reasonable minded person to lose his self-control‖.540 
 
This case highlighted the importance of the criminal law considering not only the moral 
culpability of the accused, but also giving cognisance to the social danger which his 
actions create.
541
 
 
3.1.5. Emergence of the reasonable man test 
After these milestones, the defence of provocation further evolved, this took place 
during the early 20
th
 century in the cases of Alexander
542
 and Lesbini
543
 where the 
concept of the reasonable man played a significant role in the area of provocation, with 
the courts in both cases emphasising that the reasonable man test in Welsh544  should not 
be weakened.  
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 Lesbini (1914) 3 KB 116. 
544
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In Lesbini, the court stated that in all cases the provocation must be strong enough to 
affect the mind of the reasonable man. The court did not accept the view that a lower 
standard of provocation should be applied to those individuals who suffered from 
mental impairment and Lord Reading CJ stated: 
―The Court of Criminal Appeal is not minded in any degree to weaken the state of the law which 
makes a man who is not insane responsible for the ordinary consequences of his action‖.
545  
 
The standard of the reasonable man was given full recognition in this case. In order for 
the provocation defence to succeed, two crucial conditions must be satisfied. Firstly, the 
accused must have actually have suffered a loss of self-control during the commission 
of the killing. Secondly, the provocative act committed by the victim must have had the 
same effect on the reasonable person, that is, the act must have in all likelihood caused 
the reasonable person to have suffered a loss of self-control.
546
 
 
The ―reasonable relationship‖ rule was set out in Mancini.547 The doctrine of 
manslaughter due to chance medley took a back seat in the case of Semini
548
 due to the 
emergence of the doctrine of provocation.
549
  
 
3.1.6. Sudden and temporary loss of self-control 
In 1949, the case of Duffy
550
  contributed significantly to the development of the 
defence, especially in relation to how the courts assessed the loss of self-control 
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requirement in relation to the length of time between the last act of provocation and the 
killing. The case also generated a fair amount of controversy in years to come, 
especially in relation to the utility of the provocation defence to battered women who 
killed their abusers. In this case the defendant killed her abusive husband while he was 
asleep with a hatchet and a hammer. 
 
 
In his direction to the jury, Devlin J offered the classic definition for provocation: 
 
―Provocation is some act, or series of acts, done by the dead man to the accused which cause in 
any reasonable person, and actually causes in the accused, a sudden and temporary loss of self-
control, rendering the accused so subject to passion as to make him or her for the moment not the 
master of his mind‖. 
 
The words ―sudden and temporary‖ have been interpreted to mean that a requirement of 
contemporaneity must accompany the loss of control; therefore, the reaction by the 
accused must occure immediately after the provocation.
551
 This has been argued to be 
the very essence of provocation; Horder states that loss of self-control ―by its nature 
leads to a sudden and immediate reaction to the stimulus of provocation.‖552  Smith and 
Hogan have stated that the words ―sudden and temporary‖ serve to indicate to the jury 
that there should be no time for the accused to have reflected or even think in the 
interval between the last act of provocation and the killing.
553
 
 
The requirement of sudden and temporary loss of self-control was a significant aspect of 
this case and became a staple in the common law due to the definition of provocation 
laid out in Duffy
554
 for many years which also unfortunately led to the ―immediacy‖ 
dilemma.555 Horder has argued that the ―immediacy‖ dilemma flowed from the 
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 ed (1999) at 355.  
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subjective test since the requirement that the violent reaction occure immediately after 
the final act of provocation may favour men, for whom a quick retaliation to an insult is 
typical and acceptable. The requirement of sudden and temporary loss of control was 
criticised by writers such as Ashworth for its ―bias towards those with short tempers and 
prejudicing those with a slow burning temperament despite the intensity of emotion 
being similar‖.556   
  
The court addressed the issue of revenge killings and stated that revenge killings 
indicated that the defendant had the mind to formulate a desire for revenge which 
indicated that the defendant contemplated his actions and it is unlikely that a ―sudden 
loss of self-control‖ was experienced. The requirement that the loss of self-control must 
be sudden ensured that killers who committed a planned murder could not find refuge in 
the provocation defence. 
 
The application of the reasonable man test is illustrated by the notorious case of 
Bedder.
557
 This case is notorious for its strict application of the reasonable man test and 
the fact that the jury is not entitled to consider the physical peculiarities of the 
accused.
558
 In this case, the accused killed a prostitute who he had propositioned for 
sexual intercourse; the prostitute taunted the accused about being sexually impotent and 
kicked him in the groin. The accused retaliated and stabbed the deceased. The jury was 
instructed to consider the effect of the provocation (the prostitute's taunts and kick in the 
groin) on the reasonable man. The accused was convicted of murder and appealed to the 
Court of Criminal Appeal and afterwards to the House of Lords. 
 
The House of Lords held that the jury must take into account the circumstances of the 
accused, including the taunts of sexual impotence on the reasonable man, however the 
reasonable man was by all accounts was not impotent, the condition of sexual 
impotence could not be attributed to the reasonable man since the reasonable man 
                                                     
556 J.Horder ―Reshaping the subjective element in the provocation defence‖ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 123 at 123-124. 
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 Bedder v DPP (1954) 2 All ER 201. 
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 Elliot and Quinn supra (n 525) at 76; See further Card supra (n 495) at 220. 
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would be indifferent to taunts about sexual impotence, especially if he did not suffer 
from the disorder. 
559
 
 
The courts at this point were faced with a dilemma regarding which characteristics of 
the accused could be given to the reasonable man. Since the advent of the Homicide 
Act, courts wanted to determine how far the common law could be changed in terms of 
the characteristics of the reasonable man and if the reasonable person should be imbued 
with certain characteristics of the accused.
560
 
 
Bedder
561
 was considered bad law; Ashworth for one argues that it is impossible to 
assess the gravity of provocation without considering the characteristics of the accused 
which were the subject of the taunts in question.
562
 
 
The principles of the defence at common law eventually made their way into legislation, 
and the reasonable man test and the requirement of loss of self-control became the core 
of the defence in terms of the Homicide Act of 1957. The Royal Commission on Capital 
Punishment 1953 received submissions regarding the problems with the reasonable man 
test, concerns surrounded the unfairness of the test in circumstances where an accused is 
mentally abnormal, of low intellect or for other reasons may be more susceptible to 
provocation and therefore it would be unjust to judge such an individual by the same 
                                                     
559
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standards of the ―ordinary Englishman‖.563 In an attempt to reform the law governing 
the defence, the Legislature intervened and enacted section 3 of the Homicide Act
564
 
after recommendations for revision of the defence were received from the Royal 
Commission on Capital Punishment.
565
 
 
The Royal Commission on Capital Punishment removed the restriction of ―mere words‖ 
enforced by Holmes,
566
 however, the objective standard in the form of the reasonable 
man was prescribed. In this respect, the dual requirements of the provocation doctrine 
were stressed, the first being that the accused must have actually been provoked and 
secondly, the accused must have acted in the manner that the reasonable man would 
have.
567
  
 
In addition to this, there was importance placed on time lapse between the last act of 
provocation and the retaliation, furthermore, the retaliation must have been 
proportional.
568
 In addition, the role of judge changed in that the jury was made the sole 
authority on how the objective test was to be applied.
569
 
 
3.2. THE HOMICIDE ACT OF 1957 
Section 3: 
When on a charge of murder there was evidence on which the jury could find that the person 
charged was provoked (whether by things done or by things said or by both together) to lose his 
self-control, the question whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as he 
did shall be left to be determined by the jury; and in determining that question the jury shall take 
into account everything both done and said according to the effect which, in their opinion, it would 
have on a reasonable man. 
 
                                                     
563
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The common law definition of provocation was modified by section 3 of the Act.
570
 The 
elements of the defence were defined in terms of the principles at common law but 
remained subject to requirements set out in section 3 of the Homicide Act.571 The 
accused must have executed the acts with the actus reus of murder and must have 
possessed malice aforethought. If intention was lacking then the defence could not be 
pleaded.572 
 
Section 3 of the Homicide Act consisted of two parts, a subjective part and an objective 
one. The provocation defence hinged upon two elements which were interrelated: the 
wrongful act of provocation and the impaired volition or loss of self-control.
573
  
 
The purpose of section 3 of the Homicide Act was intended to lessen the harshness of 
the common law of provocation. It recognised the dual test for provocation that is the 
accused must have suffered a loss of self-control and the reasonable man must have 
reacted to the provocation in the same manner as the accused.574  
 
The provision brought about changes in respect of the nature of the provocative act; 
firstly it abolished the previous rule of the common law pertaining to what can or cannot 
amount to provocative conduct. In terms of the Homicide Act, ―things said‖ alone could 
amount to provocation if the jury was of the opinion that a reasonable man would have 
been provoked.
575
  Hence, section 3 of the Homicide Act had the effect of extending the 
scope of provocation so that it included words and not only deeds.
576
  
 
Furthermore, the ―proportionality rule‖ was made into a factor to be considered rather 
than a prerequisite when applying the reasonable man test.577 The requirement of 
reasonable retaliation accompanying loss of self-control was argued to be 
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contradictory.578 This provision authorised that a third person could be the provoker and 
it was not mandatory that the victim must have been the source of the provocation.
579
 
 
In cases where there was evidence suggesting that the accused lost self-control in 
response to provocation, regardless of how trivial it appears to the judge; the judge was 
bound to leave the question to the jury to decide if  the reasonable man would have 
reacted as the accused did.
580
 The power of the judge to instruct the jury on the 
characteristics of the reasonable man was removed and the jury possessed the sole task 
of applying the reasonable man test.581  
 
When provocation was pleaded, the jury would be asked to deliberate whether the 
accused was indeed provoked to lose self-control. If this was established then the jury 
would have been tasked to take into account everything both done and said and assess 
the impact that this might have had on the reasonable man.
582
 This applied even in cases 
where the accused did not raise the defence of provocation, if after evidence is admitted 
and the jury forms the impression that the accused might have been provoked to lose 
self-control.
583
 
 
Section 3 did not state the whole of the law in regard to the defence of provocation, 
there were gaps and an example of this was the description of what amounts to 
provocation and the effect of pleading the defence successfully.
584
  
 
3.2.1. The nature of the provocative act  
In terms of the common law, judges could rule as a matter of law on what amounted to 
provocation. The alleged provocation had to be inherently objectionable.
585
 In terms of 
section 3, words alone qualified as a provocative act. Section 3 limited which activities 
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constituted provocation to ―things said‖ or ―done‖.586 The ―mere circumstances‖ of the 
accused did not constitute provocation in terms of section 3 of the Act.
587
 For instance, 
if a novelist, who had discovered that her manuscript had been destroyed by a dog and 
subsequently lost control and killed a person, these circumstances would not have 
entitled her to the defence.
588  
It has been argued that the word ―provoked‖ became a 
misnomer since provocation simply meant ―caused‖.589  
 
In terms of this provision, the acts or words which comprised the provocative act need 
not have been unlawful, this is illustrated in the notorious case of Doughty
590
  where it 
was held that even the persistent crying of a baby qualified as a provocative act, 
furthermore provocation could even occur in circumstances where the provocative act 
was not directed at the accused. 
 
 The decision in Doughty
591
 was controversial, since it is argued that a crying baby is at 
most a natural event, which cannot give rise to provocation, if a person becomes 
enraged, it does not necessarily mean that he was provoked.
592
 Section 3 of the 
Homicide Act removed the requirement set out in the case of Duffy
593
 requiring that the 
provocative act must have emanated from the deceased. 
 
In the case of Davies,
594
 the defendant killed his wife in the presence of her lover and 
the question arose of whether the trial judge should have directed the jury to consider 
provocation from another source other than the deceased. The Court of Appeal held that 
since the promulgation of section 3, ―everything both done and said‖ implied that all 
sources of provocation, whether committed by the deceased or not, may be considered.  
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Section 3 of the Homicide Act thus removed the restriction imposed by the common law 
that the provocation must have emenated from the deceased. The court further stated 
that it is apparent that section 3 uses a different test to consider whether a reasonable 
man would act as the accused did. 
 
 
The Court of Appeal, after quoting from section 3 stated: 
―…It is to be observed that the reasonable man test, if one may so describe it, prescribed by the 
section is quite different from the reasonable man test prescribed by Devlin J in R v Duffy in 
Devlin J‘s direction, both in regard to the particular defendant and in regard to the hypothetical 
reasonable man, the question was whether the provocation did or would cause a loss of self-control 
which would prevent the individual from being the master of his mind.‖ 
 
The new test was intended to reflect not only whether the reasonable man would have 
lost his self-control, but it also considers whether the reasonable man would have 
retaliated in the same manner as the accused.   
 
In the case of Johnson,
595
 the issue of self-induced provocation was addressed. 
The accused induced the provocation but it was held that this did not prevent the 
defence from being made out. This case involved a fight in a night club between the 
accused and deceased. The accused threatened the deceased and his girlfriend which 
resulted in physical retaliation by the deceased. The accused was in possession of a 
knife which he then used to stab the deceased. The accused was convicted of murder 
and appealed on the ground that the judge was obligated to direct the jury on the 
provocation which was the reaction of the deceased to the accused‘s own aggression. 
The appeal was successful and the accused was convicted of manslaughter.
596
 
 
In Edwards,
597
 the case involved blackmail by the accused to his victim who attacked 
him with a knife. A struggle ensued and resulted in the accused fatally stabbing the 
person he tried to blackmail.  
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The Privy Council held that the accused could only rely on the defence of provocation if 
the deceased‘s reaction to the blackmail was severe when compared to the blackmail 
itself. The Privy Council stated that self-induced provocation could not be relied on in 
circumstances where the accused‘s reaction was predictable. It could be relied upon 
where the reaction went to ―extreme lengths‖.598 Jefferson argues that this was 
inconsistent with section 3 which stipulated that any evidence must be left to the jury 
and hence the source of the events which led to the killing was not relevant.
599
 
 
The issue of mistaken belief was addressed in the case of Brown,
600
 where the defence 
was successful even though the accused, a soldier, killed the deceased with a sword 
because he was under the impression that the deceased belonged to a gang attacking 
him. The mistake was one of fact. This applies to an accused who was drunk, as in the 
case of Letenock,
601
 where the accused was drunk when he mistakenly believed he was 
under attack. The conviction for murder was quashed since the reasonable person in the 
same position as the accused may have acted in the same way. 
 
In the case of Humphreys,
602
 the accused at the age of sixteen went into a life of 
prostitution. The accused lived with the deceased, her boyfriend at the time, who 
pimped the accused out to other men and also subjected her to various forms of abuse. 
One evening the accused met the deceased along with his sons at a pub, the deceased 
asked his sons if they would be ―all right for a gang-bang‖. The accused feared that the 
deceased would rape her. On the night of the killing, the accused slit her wrists, the 
deceased taunted the accused to the effect that she had not done a good job, hearing this 
accused stabbed the deceased, fatally wounding him. 
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 Humphreys [1995] 4 All ER 1008, CA The accused‘s parents divorced when she was still a young 
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 98 
The accused was convicted of murder, however ten years later her appeal was allowed, 
the Court of Appeal stated that there was misdirection at the original trial on the law of 
provocation and thereby substituted the conviction to manslaughter resulting in the 
accused‘s immediate release from incarceration.  
 
The Court of Appeal stated that the misdirection concerned the trial judge‘s direction to 
the jury to only consider the provocative acts made by the deceased relating to the 
accused slashing her wrists when determining if she was provoked and if her reaction 
was reasonable.
603
 This was incorrect as the whole history should have been considered. 
This included the abuse inflicted upon the accused by the deceased, the comments made 
by the deceased at the pub, and the fact that the deceased took in another woman despite 
being the accused‘s boyfriend. These events constituted cumulative provocation and 
therefore the entire period of the cumulative provocation should have been 
considered.
604
 
 
3.2.2. The subjective test  
The requirements for the subjective test were set out by Devlin J in Duffy
605
.
606
 The first 
limb of the qualified defence of provocation under the Homicide Act was predominantly 
subjective. It sought to assess if there was evidence that the accused was provoked to 
lose self-control and kill.
607
 This condition contributed to the excusing element of the 
provocation defence which was based on the foundation that a person who lost self-
control was less responsible for conduct that ensued.608  The subjective test also served 
to differentiate between those actions that were uncontrolled reactions to provocation 
and those that were deliberate.
609
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In terms of the first requirement of the subjective test, there must have been a 
provocative act, and secondly, there must have been a causal link to the sudden and 
temporary loss of self-control.
610
  If the defendant possessed self-control at the time of 
the killing, then the evidence required for the defence to succeed does not exist.
611
  
 
The defence may be denied in cases where there was ―cooling off time‖ or where the 
defendant had a sufficient amount of time after the provoking incident to ―reflect‖.612 
However, the jury may exercise its discretion and decide that despite the presence of a 
significant time lapse between the last act of provocation and the killing, the defendant 
still acted under provocation.
613
 Ashworth has argued that without this element, there 
would be no method of differentiating between planned revenge killings and those that 
are genuine. Ashworth contends that the ―genuinely provoked killer‖ would have 
suffered a disturbance in his state of mind and this disturbance would prevent the 
calculation of revenge.
614
 
 
The definition of provocation provided by Devlin J in Duffy
615
 put the requirement of 
loss of self-control at the heart of the provocation defence; this view was given approval 
by section 3 of the Homicide Act.
616
 Holton and Shute state in terms of the loss of self-
control element, the accused is not required to lose control of their body or even fail to 
understand what actions are being performed.
617
 The agent thus remains an agent 
possessing intention and driven by desire if applicable. However, what is crucial is that 
there is a loss of self-control over the mental elements that drive the actions. Hence, in 
terms of Devlin J‘s ―classic definition‖ loss of self-control meant ―to lose a certain kind 
of mastery over one‘s mind‖.618 
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3.2.3. The loss of self-control must be “sudden and temporary” 
The requirement that the loss control must be sudden was laid down in the case of 
Duffy
619
. It was a controversial qualification but was considered important to prevent 
accused persons who killed out of revenge from relying on the defence. The accused in 
Duffy did not have a defence because a ―cooling-off‖ period existed.620 Although, 
section 3 did not contain the word ―sudden‖, the requirement was considered to be a 
vital part of the provocation defence.
621
 Ashworth states that the nature of the subjective 
criteria represents the widely held view that crimes committed on impulse and on the 
sudden should garner leniency when compared to premeditated crimes.
622
 
 
Holton and Shute contend that although the definition seems to impose an element of 
contemporaneity, the requirement of loss of self-control does not require this. The 
reason being is that opportunity for retaliation may have not occurred, and it is incorrect 
to assume that once loss of self-control has occurred, a response will follow 
immediately. Certain individuals might possess a ―slow fuse‖ hence a person might 
―smoulder‖ for a period of time before actually losing self-control.623 
 
The requirement of contemporaneity was a central issue in the case of Ahluwahlia
624
 
where Lord Taylor CJ stated that the phrase ―sudden and temporary loss of self-control‖ 
encompassed a vital ingredient of the provocation defence in a clear and understandable 
                                                     
619
 Duffy supra (n 550). 
620
 Duffy supra (n 550).  
621
 Ashworth supra (n 462) at 316. 
622
 Ashworth supra (n 462) at 315. 
623
 Holton and Shute supra (n 551) at 64. 
624
 R v Ahluwalia [1992] 4 All ER 889 (CA); In this case, the appellant, an Asian woman was forced in to 
an arranged marriage with the deceased. During the marriage she was abused over several years. The 
deceased regularly assaulted her and subjected her to threats to her life. The deceased taunted the 
appellant with the fact that he was involved in an extra-marital affair. On the day of the killing the 
deceased threatened to assault the appellant and burn her face with an iron. Later that night, the 
appellant poured gasoline which was purchased beforehand into a bucket, which would make 
throwing the gasoline easier, she then lit a candle and carried the gasoline upstairs. She also carried an 
oven glove for self-protection together with a stick. She proceeded to the room in which her husband 
was sleeping in and threw the petrol into the room and then lit the stick with the candle and threw into 
the room setting the room alight. The deceased suffered serious burns and eventually succumbed to 
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term. It was stressed that this requirement underlines that the defence is concerned with 
those individuals who, at the time when they acted violently, were not the masters of 
their minds.  
 
Time lapse between the provocative act and the reaction to the provocation was required 
to be considered since time for reflection may indicate that after the provocative act 
impacted on the defendants mind, the defendant regained self-control. Time lapse could 
also indicate if the acts committed were premeditated or spurred on by revenge, which 
would go against the ethos of the provocation defence.
625
 
 
The Court of Appeal in Ahluwahlia
626
 approved the position in Duffy
627
. Section 3 of 
the Act had not eroded the requirement that the loss of self-control must be sudden and 
temporary. The greater the delay between the provocative act and the killing, the 
stronger the evidence of premeditation becomes, the chances of succeeding with the 
defence diminishes. Counsel for the defence implored the court to depart from the 
immediacy requirement stating that it is not a rule of law. 
 
However Lord Taylor CJ stated: 
―Counsel‘s argument in support of this ground for appeal amounted in reality to an invitation to 
this court to change the law. We are bound by the previous decisions of this court to which 
reference has been made; unless we are convinced that they were wholly wrong…It must be a 
matter for Parliament to consider any change‖.628   
 
An important point made by the court was that the requirement of sudden and temporary 
did not mean that the response to the provocation should be immediate, but it serves to 
indicate if the reaction was premeditated. In this light, a significant delay between the 
provocation and the killing was detrimental to the accused‘s plea.629 
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The requirement of ―sudden and temporary loss of self-control‖ also appeared in the 
case of Holmes
630
 and was considered to be the overriding tenet of the subjective limb 
of the defence.
631
 
 
However, since the promulgation of section 3 of the Act, this rule was relaxed and it 
was acknowledged that if an accused did have time to calm her emotions, this factor is 
only one element that must be considered when determining if the accused regained 
self-control.
632
 The meaning of ―temporary‖ was suggested to indicate whether the 
defendant could use the defence of insanity if the loss of self-control was not 
temporary.
633
 
 
The notion that ―the conscious formation of a desire for revenge means that a person 
had time to think‖ was further expanded in the case Ibrahms and Gregory.634  In this 
case, the approach of Duffy
635
 was approved; the court stressed the requirement of a 
sudden explosion of temper. The ―cooling-off period‖ between the provocative act and 
the killing is indicative that the loss of control was not ―sudden‖.  
 
The court stated that the careful planning of the attack did not indicate a sudden 
explosion of temper or a loss of self-control. Based on the facts, the killing resembled 
that of a revenge killing. The court ruled that the trial judge was correct and the appeal 
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was rejected.
636
 The court stated that ―nothing happened on the night of the killing 
which caused the accused to lose self-control‖, it was argued that this could  suggest 
that the provocative act should have occurred immediately before the suffering of loss 
of self-control; however, section 3 clearly stated that the court must take account of 
―everything‖.637 
 
Lawton LJ (in reference to the speech of Lord Diplock in Camplin
638
) stated 
―That history shows that, in the past at any rate, provocation and loss of self-control tended to be 
regarded by the courts as taking place with a very short interval of time between the provocation 
and the loss of self-control…‖639 
And  
―In our judgment, Lord Diplock clearly thought that the loss of self-control must occur at or about 
the time of the act of provocation…‖640 
 
 
The court further cited with approval part of the direction of the court in Duffy
641
 
―Indeed, circumstances which induce a desire for revenge are inconsistent with provocation, since 
the conscious formulation of a desire for revenge means that a person has had time to think, to 
reflect, and that would negative a sudden temporary loss of self-control, which is of the essence of 
provocation…‖642 
And 
―…[the appellants] were masters of their minds when carrying [their plan] out, because they 
worked out the details with considerable skill; and in pursuing the plan as they did on the Friday 
night they were still masters of their own minds. They were doing what they had  planned to do 
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…It follows…that McNeil J was right in ruling that there was no evidence of loss of self-
control…643 
 
The appeal was subsequently rejected and the court stated that although the provocation 
extended over a period of time, it was vital that it culminated into a sudden explosion of 
temper and this was not the case in Ibrahms and Gregory.
644
 
 
In the case of Pearson
645
 the Court of Appeal ruled that despite evidence of 
premeditation there was evidence of provocation. The court stated that the cooling-off 
period was a piece of evidence used to determine if the defendant lacked self-control. 
The court held that the trial judge should have directed the jury to consider the threats 
made by the deceased not only to the accused but also to his brother when making a 
decision regarding loss of self-control.  
 
The case of Cocker
646
  illustrates that the loss of control must be caused directly by loss 
of temper. In this case the defendant killed his terminally ill wife who suffered 
tremendous pain due to her illness. The deceased pleaded with the defendant to end her 
life and he eventually succumbed to her requests and smothered her with a pillow. 
Although this was a ―mercy killing‖, the judge in this case withdrew the defence of 
provocation from the jury, which resulted in the defendant being convicted of murder.  
However, the jury was not happy with the judge's decision to withdraw the provocation 
defence. The Appeal Court ruled that the judge acted correctly since the requirement of 
anger and loss of temper was not met. The defendant had merely succumbed to his 
wife's pleas. The controversial aspect of the requirement for a sudden and temporary 
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loss of control may be unfair or discriminatory to women who kill their partners after 
suffering prolonged periods of abuse.
647
 
 
In the case of Thornton,
648
 despite the judge leaving the issue of provocation to the jury, 
the defendant was nevertheless convicted of murder. The defence subsequently lodged 
an appeal on the basis that the requirement of sudden loss of self-control was unfair, 
especially in the circumstance where the defendant had experienced a long period of 
relentless provocation. It was submitted that the long periods of provocative conduct 
may have weakened the self-restraint of the defendant, which could impact on the level 
of self-control. 
 
The Appeal Court nevertheless confirmed that the judge had acted correctly by leaving 
the issue of sudden and temporary loss of self-control to the jury. The court stressed that 
the requirement of loss of control was an essential part of the provocation defence and 
could only be changed through promulgation of new legislation.
649
  
 
Beldam LJ in dismissing the appeal stated: 
―the essential feature is that provocation produces a sudden or impulsive reaction leading to a loss 
of self-control…there is no suggestion that she reacted suddenly and on the spur of the 
moment…to the provocative statements made by the deceased‖.650 
 
In Baillie
651
 the appellant‘s conviction was later quashed by admission of new evidence. 
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In terms of the Homicide Act, the requirement of loss of self-control was considered a 
vital part of the provocation defence. The sudden and temporary requirement pertained 
to the loss of self-control and not the provocation itself, 
652
 the ―immediacy‖ 
requirement thus proved contentious in the cases aforementioned as it precluded the 
battered women especially from accessing the provocation defence.
653
 
 
3.2.4. Capacity for self-control 
What constitutes loss of self-control had been confined to include indignation or anger 
and excluded other emotional states such as grief, fear or terror and was not recognised 
to affect loss of self-control.
654
 The amount of loss required and the reasons for such 
loss were considered by the courts.  
 
In Acott
655
 Lord Steyn stated: 
 ―A loss of self-control caused by fear, panic, where bad temper or circumstances for example, 
slowing down of traffic due to snow) would not be enough‖.656 
 And  
―There must be some evidence tending to show that the killing might have been an uncontrolled 
reaction to provoking conduct rather than an act of revenge. Moreover, although there is no longer 
a rule of proportionality as between provocation and retaliation, the concept of proportionality is 
nevertheless still an important factual element in the objective inquiry‖.657 
 
The case of Rossiter
658
 illustrates this point when Russell LJ stated:  
―We take the law to be that wherever there is material which is capable of amounting to 
provocation, however tenuous it may be, the jury must be given the privilege of ruling upon it‖.659 
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Edwards interprets the phrase ―however tenuous‖ to apply to both the degree of loss of 
self-control as well as the evidence of the provocation by the deceased.
660
  
 
The Court of Appeal in Thornton
661
 confirmed that cumulative provocation should be 
considered and the lack of the trial court to consider this evidence resulted in a re-trial 
for the accused in Thornton (No2)
662
. A nexus exists between the notional 
characteristics and self-control and this is demonstrated in the cases of Ahluwalia
663
 and 
Thornton (No.2
664
), notional attributes of battered woman syndrome was acknowledged 
to have an effect on the capacity for self-control.
665
  
 
These two cases illustrate that abuse and an understanding of its impact on abused 
woman led to the following: 
1.  An expansion of the time lapse requirement; 
2. The meaning of ―sudden loss‖ being developed to accommodate a slow burn reaction 
when describing how battered woman respond and react to prolonged periods of 
abuse consisting of threats of violence as well; 
3.  It has been accepted that the last act of provocation need not be the most severe but 
could be ―milder‖ when judged in the light of cumulative acts and abuse and 
threats.
666
 
 
In Thornton (No.2)
667
 Lord Taylor CJ emphasised that the nexus between the 
characteristics of the reasonable man and the defendant‘s capacity for self-control could 
not be ignored:  
The court as per Lord Taylor of Gosforth CJ held as follows: 
―[S]ince reliance is placed upon the appellant‘s suffering from a ―battered woman syndrome‖, we 
think it right to reaffirm the principle. A defendant, even if suffering from that syndrome, cannot 
                                                     
660
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succeed in relying on provocation unless the jury consider she suffered or may have suffered a 
sudden and temporary loss of self-control at the time of the killing. The severity of such a 
syndrome and the extent to which it may have affected a particular defendant will no doubt vary 
and it is for the jury to consider‖.668 
 
And  
―…it may form an important background to whatever triggered the actus reus. A jury may more 
readily find there was a sudden loss of control triggered by even a minor incident, if the defendant 
had endured abuse over a period, on the ―last straw‖ basis‖.669 
 
Furthermore, in respect of the debate regarding flexibility of capacity for self-control, 
Edwards argues that the dissenting ―voices: in the famed case of Holley670 are 
representative of the large body of opinion in both the judicial and academic thinking 
who believe that capacity for self-control should be flexible‖.671 Lord Hoffman 
emphatically stated that the provocation defence should fit a logical pattern and which a 
jury should be able to understand and most importantly achieve justice.
672
 
 
In criticism of the majority‘s stance, Lord Carswell stated that the approach taken was 
―illogical, inexplicable and unjust‖.673 In their joint dissenting, Lord Carswell, Lord 
Hoffmann and Lord Bingham stated that in certain circumstances the objective 
characteristics and the capacity for self-control cannot be separated. 
 
Lord Hoffmann stated: 
―consideration of the gravity of the provocation cannot and rationally and fairly be divorced from 
consideration of the effect of the provocation on the particular defendant in relation to both limbs 
of the defence. Otherwise one is not comparing like with like, and is losing sight of the essential 
question whether, in all the circumstances, the defendant's conduct was to some degree 
excusable‖674 
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This fixed standard for capacity of self-control as set down in Holley
675
 left a margin of 
uncertain pertaining to two aspects, firstly, whether mental were afflictions excluded 
from the considerations of the attributes of the reasonable man where such affliction 
was the subject of the gravity of the provocation. Secondly, in circumstances where the 
mental affliction was alleged to have influenced the capacity for self-control it was 
uncertain if the affliction depended upon as affecting the capacity of the loss of self-
control.
676
 
 
The ruling in Holley
677
 had cast a shadow on the criminal law in the area of capacity for 
self-control and resulted in the reduction of the number of provocation cases that were 
pleaded.
678
 Furthermore, the cases of Ahluwahlia,
679
 Humphreys
680
 and Thornton 
(No.2)
681
 presented a dilemma for the Court of Appeal in respect of battered woman 
syndrome and the controversy surrounding the laws perceived inability to bring victims 
of abusive relationships within its ambit. 
 
3.2.5. The objective test
682
  
The objective test under section 3 of the Homicide Act existed in the form of the 
hypothetical reasonable man. The test examined what the reaction of the reasonable 
person would have been had he been in the position of the accused. The objective test in 
the form of the reasonable man has attracted ―unremitting criticisms‖ from 
academics.
683
 Before the enactment of section 3 of the Homicide Act, the characteristics 
of the reasonable person were judicially controlled, the reasonable person was deemed 
to possess normal capacities for self-control.
684
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However, the exact ambit of the objective test under section 3 of the Homicide Act was 
uncertain due to the fact that the provision was not intended to be a complete statement 
of the law on the provocation defence.
685
 The objective test was an evaluation of two 
aspects; firstly the standard of the reasonable man assesses the gravity of the 
provocation
686
 and secondly if it was in proportion to the provocation, also known as the 
proportionality requirement.
687
 
 
Allen states that the changes to the objective test brought about by the enactment of 
section 3 were unforeseen, allowing words as provocation which resulted in insults 
directed at a particular feature or impairment of the accused being constituted as 
provocation.
688
 Hence, the position adopted in Bedder
689
 could not be maintained. After 
the court establishes that the accused was provoked to lose self-control, then it proceeds 
to consider if the accused would have acted in the same manner as the defendant. The 
objective leg determines if the reasonable person would have been provoked to act in 
the same manner as that of the accused, if presented with the same circumstances. The 
reaction to the provocation must be in proportion to the provocative act itself.
690
 
 
In the case of Acott,
691
 the accused was charged with the murder of his mother. The 
deceased was found dead due to tremendous injuries sustained. The defence argued that 
the deceased had fallen accidentally.The prosecution argued that the accused had lost 
his temper and killed his mother. The prosecution alleged that the accused lost his 
temper due to a heated argument with the deceased, together with the deceased being an 
alcoholic coupled with the accused being unemployed and dependent on his mother for 
money.
692
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686
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687
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688
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In this case, the judge did not direct the jury in regard to the defence of provocation; this 
resulted in the defendant being convicted of murder. The House of Lords stated that 
where it was determined that on a charge of murder there is evidence that would 
indicate that a person charged was indeed provoked to lose control, the responsibility of 
determining if the accused acted in the same manner as the reasonable person, did fall to 
the jury.
693
 
 
The House of Lords stated that in cases where there is no specific evidence of 
provocation, only speculative indications, the judge would be correct if he decided not 
to direct the jury on the defence of provocation.
694
 
  
A bone of contention in English law has always been the characteristics of the 
reasonable man.
695
 The controversy surrounds which character traits of the accused 
could be given to the reasonable man when determining if the reasonable man would 
have acted in the same manner as the accused did. The truth of the matter is that 
ordinary people do not react to provocation by committing homicide. Hence, imbuing 
the reasonable man with ―ideal‖ qualities would theoretically be ridiculous and lead to 
the defence failing dismally. 
 
Ashworth states that the objective test represents a clumsy attempt at incorporating the 
element of partial justification on the defence of provocation. The ―clumsy‖ part is the 
―reasonable man‖ test which according to Ashworth is an ―anthromorphic (and male) 
standard which might be taken to suggest a paragon of virtue if it were not for the 
context of partially exculpating a killing by such a person‖696  
 
The fear of making an objective test more subjective is what caused the controversy. 
Prior to  the promulgation of section 3 of the Homicide Act, judges would assume the 
sole responsibility to direct the jury in respect of the attributes of the reasonable person, 
the personal characteristics of the accused was not taken into account.
697
  
                                                     
693
 Acott supra (n 655).  
694
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695
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Twenty two years after the promulgation of the Homicide Act, the House of Lords 
examined the matter in the case of Camplin.
698
 This case is considered to be a watershed 
in the law of provocation.
699
 In this case, the accused, a 15-year-old boy at the time of 
the killing, alleged that he was drinking alcohol when the deceased homosexually 
assaulted him. After the assault, the deceased laughed at him. This caused him to lose 
self-control. He then took a chapatti pan and struck the deceased over the head causing 
the deceased to die. 
 
The House of Lords directed that the jury establish how the ―reasonable man‖ of the 
same age and sex of the accused, would react to the acts of provocation by the deceased, 
would the reasonable man of the age and sex of the accused have lost control and killed 
the deceased. 
The court stated: 
―The reasonable man is a person having the power of self-control to be expected of an ordinary 
person of the sex and age of the accused, but in other respects sharing such of the accused's 
characteristics as they think would affect the gravity of the provocation to him; and that the 
question is not merely whether such a person would in like circumstances be provoked to lose his 
self-control but also whether he would react to the provocation as the accused did‖.
700  
 
The reasonable man was described as: 
―for the purposes of the law of provocation the ―reasonable man‖ has never been confined to the 
adult male. It means an ordinary person of either sex, not exceptionally excitable or pugnacious, 
but possessed of such powers of self-control as everyone is entitled to expect that his fellow 
citizens will exercise in society as it is today‖.701  
 
The court explained further: 
 ―a person having the power of self-control to be expected of an ordinary person of the sex and age 
of the accused, but in other respects sharing such of the accused's characteristics as they think 
would affect the gravity of the provocation to him‖.702 
                                                     
698
 Camplin supra (n 580). 
699
 C.D. Freedman ―Restoring order to the reasonable person test in the defence of provocation‖ (1999) 10 
The Kings College Law Journal at 29. 
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The case of Camplin
703
 sparked debate on whether only the age and sex of the accused 
could be taken into account when applying the reasonable man test, or whether the case 
of Camplin
704
 would open the doors to other characteristics being considered, such as 
mental disorders in the form of depression. The critical question was to what degree the 
House of Lords subjectivised the reasonable man test. In this respect, Lord Diplock in 
directing  the jury stated that  there are two types of characteristics which the reasonable 
person might be ascribed; there  are universal qualities which  these encompass age or 
sex and the second type is personal idiosyncrasies such as impotence.
705
 
 
The approach in Camplin
706
 softened the perceived harshness of the objective test by 
allowing age and gender to be attributed to the reasonable person. This approach did 
generate some controversy as to where the line to be drawn in respect of which 
subjective characteristics should be considered and which should not.
707
 
 
After the reassessment of the reasonable man test in Camplin,
708
 Bedder
709
 was 
considered bad law.
710
 However, this led to two opposing views being adopted in this 
regard between the Court of Appeal and the Privy Council regarding the further 
subjectivising of the objective test to individuals whose mental state may impact on 
capacity for self-control.
711
 
 
In the case of Newell,
712
 the Court of Appeal followed New Zealand law on the subject 
and extended the list of excluded characteristics by adding chronic alcoholism. The 
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result being a limitation on personal characteristics, relevance will only be given where 
the provocative act was directed at that characteristic itself. The court held that only 
permanent traits such as race, disability and ethnic origin may be considered, transient 
characteristics such as exhaustion and intoxication may not be considered.  
 
This approach was criticised in Morhall as being overly restrictive, the House of Lords 
held that the jury should be allowed to take account of any characteristic which is 
relevant to the assessment of the gravity of the provocation. 713  The court stated further 
that in order for a characteristic to be considered, it must have been the target of the 
provocation.  
The court referred to a passage from the New Zealand Court of Appeal case of 
McGregor
714
 where North J. stated that: 
―…there must be some direct connection between the provocative words or conduct and the 
characteristic sought to be invoked as warranting some departure from the ordinary man test.‖ 
 
It is argued that according to this extract from McGregor, a characteristic such as race 
will only be relevant if the provocative act was directed at the race of the accused.  
Another important judgment comes from the House of Lords, the case of R v Smith 
(Morgan).
715
 In this case the accused, Morgan Smith, received a visit from the deceased, 
James McCullagh, who was an old friend of the accused. The accused and the deceased 
were both alcoholics and had on the evening of the killing consumed alcohol. The 
accused harboured some grievances against the deceased. The accused suspected the 
deceased of stealing his tools which the accused needed as a carpenter. The two spent 
the evening arguing and drinking alcohol. Eventually, the accused took a knife and 
stabbed the deceased and caused his death. 
 
In his defence, the accused claimed that he was provoked to an extent that he lost self-
control and killed the deceased. The defence stated that the accused suffered from 
                                                                                                                                                           
the appellant‘s former girlfriend along with making uninvited homosexual advances. The court 
directed the jury to assume the remarks were directed to a person who was sober and assess if they 
would be provoked in the same manner as the deceased. See discussion in Elliot and Wells supra (n 
568) at 397. 
713
 Morhall [1995] 3 All ER 659supra (n 725) discussed by Ashworth supra (n 57) at 255.  
714
 The Queen v McGregor [1962] N.Z.L.R 1069. 
715
 R v Smith (Morgan) (2000) 4 ALL ER 289. House of Lords. 
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depression which decreased his ability to control his actions, hence more likely to 
commit a violent act. The main issue in this case was whether the objective test would 
allow that the reasonable man test could be given the mental illness of depression. 
 
The trial judge directed that the jury could not take into account the depression when 
evaluating the reasonable man test. The defendant was subsequently convicted of 
murder. An appeal was lodged to the Court of Appeal where the appeal succeeded.
716
  
The Court of Appeal stated that the jury should have been directed to consider the 
depression of the accused when the objective test of the provocation defence was 
evaluated.  
 
However, an appeal to the House of Lords was dismissed because it was held that the 
Court of Appeal was correct in its interpretation of the law regarding the reasonable 
man test.
717
 Furthermore, the House of Lords stated that the jury may take into account 
other characteristics of the accused other than age and sex when applying the reasonable 
man test and that in certain cases account must be taken of abnormalities of the accused 
when applying the reasonable man test.
718
 
Lord Hoffman stated: 
―The general principle is that the same standards of behaviour are expected of everyone, regardless 
of their individual psychological make-up. In most cases, nothing more will need to be said. But 
the jury should in any appropriate case be told, in whatever language will best convey the 
distinction that this is a principle, which is to do justice in the particular case. So the jury may 
think that there was some characteristic of the accused, whether temporary or permanent, which 
affected the degree of the control which society could reasonably have expected of him and which 
it would be unjust not to take into account. If the jury takes this view, they are at liberty to give 
effect to it‖.719 
 
The House of Lords emphasized that the jury is sovereign and interpretation of the 
reasonable man test remained their responsibility. Only in exceptional circumstances 
should the jury be directed by the judge on which characteristics of the accused to 
exclude from the application of the reasonable man test. Lord Hoffman however did 
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state that the jury should be directed to exclude characteristics such as jealousy.
720
 Lord 
Hoffman stated that the term reasonable person test may be confusing to the jury as 
many of the characteristics that can be given to the reasonable man may render him 
abnormal.
721
 
 
This case reached to the very basis of criminal liability. The concern of the majority was 
not only focused on the practical troubles associated with the objective test but also with 
the perceived confusion within the stringent doctrine which ignored the concept of 
capacity for self-control when assessing provocation. In effect, ―the law imposed a 
―straightjacket‖ which required a strict demarcation between the respective defences to 
murder which was not warranted by reality‖.722   
 
In the case of Weller,
723
 the case of Smith (Morgan)
724
 was interpreted as being the 
authority the subject of the objective test. The Court of Appeal stated that it is for the 
jury to decide which characteristics to consider when applying the objective test. It is 
not for the judge to decide. The judge may give guidance on the importance or 
weighting of the characteristic; however, it must be made clear to the jury that the final 
decision is in their hands. The characteristic of jealousy may also be taken into account 
if the jury feels that it is of importance. 
 
The requirement of proportionality was an important aspect of the defence under the 
Homicide Act, in the case of Brown,
725
 the Court of Appeal held in respect to 
application of section 3, that ―a jury should be instructed to consider the relationship of 
the accused‘s acts to the provocation‖ and ―a jury might find that the accused‘s act was 
so disproportionate to the provocation alleged that no reasonable man would have 
                                                     
720
 Smith (Morgan) supra (n 715) at 20. 
721
 Smith (Morgan) supra (n 715) at 20. 
722
 K. Kerrigan ―Provocation: the fall (and rise) of objectivity‖ (2006) 44-52 Journal of Mental Health law 
at 48 discussing Smith (Morgan) supra (n 707) at 168: Lord Hoffman ―I think it is wrong to assume 
that there is a neat dichotomy between the ordinary person contemplated by the law of provocation 
and the ―abnormal person‖ contemplated by the law of diminished responsibility…‖ 
723
 R v Weller [2003] EWCA Crim 815, [2004] Crim LR 724 Court of Appeal, Criminal Division. 
724
 Smith (Morgan ) supra (n 715). 
725
 Brown supra (n 593) at 229. 
 117 
acted‖726 Ashworth argues that the main criticisms of the proportionality requirement 
emanated from the reasoning that the reasonable man would continue to behave 
reasonably despite suffering a loss of self-control.
727
 
 
3.2.5.1. The Privy Council’s approach to the objective test 
The Privy Council took a conflicting approach to the objective test when compared to 
the approach by the House of Lords in the Smith(Morgan) case.
728
 The Privy Council 
distinguished between characteristics which are described as ―control characteristics‖ 
and ―response characteristics‖. Control characteristics have an effect on the defendant‘s 
self-control and could not be taken into account in the objective test. The response 
characteristics are the main subject of the provocative act and could be taken into 
account.
729
 
 
In the case of Luc Thiet Thuan v R
730
, the appellant was charged with the murder of his 
former girlfriend in Hong Kong. It was alleged that the accused had visited the deceased 
to collect money that was borrowed from him. At the deceased's flat, the deceased 
began comparing him to her current boyfriend, insulting his sexual performance. The 
defendant claimed that this led to him losing his control and he then killed her.  
 
The defence stated that when the accused was younger he fell and injured his head 
which caused brain damage. This brain damage caused the accused to have little self-
control or impulse control. During the trial, when the judge directed the jury, he 
neglected to make any reference to the appellant's brain injury. On this basis, the 
appellant lodged an appeal with the Privy Council to assess whether an accused person 
with his characteristics and brain injury would have acted in the same manner that the 
appellant did. The appeal was dismissed by the Privy Council on the basis that allowing 
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728
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evidence of ―purely mental peculiarities‖ will compromise the distinction between 
provocation and diminished responsibility.
731
  
 
Since the accused reacted to the deceased's insults about sexual inadequacy, he reacted 
to a ―control characteristic‖ and could not be taken into account. If the taunts regarded 
the appellant's brain injury, then this would have amounted to a ―response 
characteristic‖ and could have been taken into account in determining what the response 
of the reasonable man would be.
732
 
 
The Privy Council was reluctant to change its position on the objective element of the 
provocation defence and had chosen not to bring itself in line with the House of Lords 
following the Smith (Morgan)
733
 case.
734
 
 
In Morhall
735
 the issue was whether the characteristics of the defendant could be taken 
into account when assessing the defendant‘s capacity for self-control. The defence 
asserted that the gravity of the provocation was greater to the defendant by virtue of the 
fact that he was a glue sniffer. However, the House of Lords reversed the decision by 
the Court of Appeal and substituted a conviction of manslaughter. It was held that only 
the characteristics which have a bearing on gravity of the provocation could be 
considered as part of the reasonable person test. Glue-sniffing could be considered as a 
characteristic since it was the subject of the taunt; however, it could not be considered to 
form part of the assessment for capacity for self-control, due to public policy. This case 
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reaffirmed the approach in Camplin
736
 where Lord Diplock ruled that the hypothetical 
person was expected to possess the same capacity for self-control that is to be expected 
from an ordinary person who is the same sex and age of the defendant.
737
 
 
In the case of Paria v The State
738
, the Privy Council gave an interpretation of the word 
―characteristic‖ which formed part of the objective test. In the case of Holley,739 the 
defendant, an alcoholic, was involved in a heated argument with his girlfriend. In the 
course of the argument the deceased said to the defendant ―you haven't got the guts‖ 
after which the defendant killed the deceased using an axe. During the trial, the defence 
adduced medical evidence to support a claim that the defendant‘s alcohol addiction was 
a disease and should be considered as being a characteristic attributable to the 
reasonable man and should impact an assessment of capacity for self-control.
740
 This 
direction was qualified by excluding drunkenness when assessing capacity for self-
control. The defence was unsuccessful and the accused was subsequently charged with 
murder. 
 
This conviction was appealed, with the Court of Appeal of Jersey reducing the 
conviction to manslaughter on the basis that the trial judge had misdirected the jury.
741
 
The Court of Appeal considered alcohol addiction as a characteristic which should be 
considered in the reasonable person test as well as in an assessment of capacity for self-
control. This reasoning was not acceptable to the Attorney-General for Jersey and an 
application to the Privy Council was lodged regarding the question of whether the 
gravity of the provocation was to be considered together with the defendant‘s specific 
characteristic. The second enquiry surrounds the assessment of self-control and whether 
a uniform objective standard of self-control should be used in this assessment. 
 
The Privy Council by a majority of six Lords (Lords Bingham, Hoffman and Carswell 
dissenting) held that the gravity of the provocation should be considered together with 
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the defendant's specific characteristic and that a uniform objective standard of loss of 
self-control should be used to judge loss of self-control.
742
 
 
In the case of Mohammed (Faquir)
743
 the court followed the approach of the Privy 
Council in Holley
744
 rather than the House of Lords approach taken in 
Smith(Morgan)
745
. 
The Court of Appeal stated: 
―Although Holley is a decision of the Privy Council, and the Morgan Smith a decision of the 
House of Lords, neither side has suggested that the law of England and Wales is other than as set 
out in the majority opinion given by Lord Nicholls in Holley and we have no difficulty in 
proceeding on that basis…. Indeed the law is once again as it used to be before the decision in 
Smith (Morgan)‖.746 
 
An interesting development occurred in the case of James and Karimi
747
 where it was 
held that the ruling made by the Privy Council in Holley
748
 was binding
749
 and was 
considered to be the law and was to be preferred to the majority judgment in the House 
of Lords case of Smith (Morgan)
750
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3.2.6. Burden of proof 
The responsibility of the judge was to determine if there is evidence to show that the 
accused was provoked to lose self-control and kill. Once this was established, then the 
jury was responsible for determining if the provocation was enough to make a 
reasonable person do as the accused did. Before the advent of the Homicide Act, the 
judge would tell the jury what characteristics the reasonable man possessed without 
taking consideration of the traits of the accused. The accused was not required to prove 
his defence to the jury; the prosecution had the onus of discharging the burden of 
disproving the defence beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
3.2.7. The role of the judge and the jury 
Since the enactment of the Homicide Act, what were previously regarded as rules of law 
were downgraded to mere factors, an example of this is the proportionality requirement. 
If the reaction to the provocation was disproportionate in the circumstances, the accused 
could still have a defence provocation.
751
 The function of the judge was now transferred 
to the jury.  
In this regard, Lord Diplock in Camplin
752
 stated: 
―Until the 1957 Act there was a condition precedent: the deceased‘s conduct had to be of a kind 
capable in law of constituting provocation. The House so held in Mancini…Section 3 abolished all 
previous riles as to what could or could not amount to provocation‖.753 
 
Furthermore, factors such as the cooling-off time is being remade into a rule of law, the 
case of Thornton
754
 is an example of this. The role of the judge would thus be to instruct 
the jury that the accused must have may have lost self-control and that this is to be 
judged against the reasonable person test who must be attributed the characteristics 
under Camplin
755
 ―and its progeny‖.756  
 
In respect of the first leg of the defence, the assessment of whether the accused was 
provoked to lose self-control, the question arose of whether the judge is entitled to 
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withdraw the issue from the jury if in the discretion of the judge, no reasonable jury 
would find that accused was indeed provoked. 
 
The case of Whitfield
757
 and Camplin
758
 addressed this issue. In Whitfield
759
, the 
defendant killed his wife and sister-in-law after an argument. The wife confessed to the 
defendant that he was in fact not the father of their child. Upon hearing this revelation, 
the defendant then threatened to commit suicide. The wife replied ―see if I care‖. 
The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was wrong to withdraw the issue from the 
jury, on the basis that no reasonable jury would find that the accused was provoked.
760
  
 
In the case of Johnson 
761
, the Court of Appeal approved the case of Cascoe 
762
 where it 
was stated: 
―Whether the issue is raised at the trial or not, if there is evidence which might lead the jury to find 
provocation, then it is the duty of the court to leave that issue to the jury‖. 
 
The court emphasised that this principle applied even if the evidence is ―very thin 
indeed‖. This principle was approved in Camplin763 and by the Court of Appeal in 
Newell.
764
 Hence, even if the only evidence is the version of events put forward by the 
accused, the issue of loss of self-control remains with the jury.
765
 If the defence attempts 
not to adduce evidence of provocation, due to a fear of undermining the main defence, 
then it is the duty of judge to instruct the jury regarding provocation.
766
  
 
As in the case of Dhillon,
767
 where the defence claimed that the killing was simply an 
accident, in Sawyer
768
 the accused raised self-defence. This applied even if the defence 
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and prosecution regarded a direction in terms of provocation unnecessary. This of 
course applied where the facts gave rise to the defence of provocation.
769
 
 
Hence, if evidence indicated provocation; it should be left to the jury regardless of the 
weight of such evidence and if in the judge‘s opinion a reasonable jury would not find 
that the defendant was provoked.
770
 
 
In the case of Smith (Morgan),
771
 Lord Hoffman recommended that the judge should 
move away from directing the jury in respect of the reasonable man test. The reason for 
such recommendation was that the complex nature of the objective inquiry could 
become confusing. Attributing characteristics of a ―reasonable‖ person may pose 
difficulty especially when such characteristics may not suit the fictitious reasonable 
man. 
 
Lord Hoffman stated 
―By such a combination, they have produced monsters like the reasonable obsessive, the 
reasonable depressive alcoholic and even (with all respect to the explanations of Lord Goff…in R 
v Morhall..) the reasonable glue sniffer‖.772 
 
The case of Stewart
773
 is an example of judicial proactivity .In this case the court stated 
that even if defence counsel did not raise the defence, regardless of the reason, and if the 
evidence indicates that the accused may have been provoked, it is the responsibility of 
the judge to direct the jury to decide if evidence suggests that the accused was 
provoked. This applied even if the evidence of provocation, either words or acts, is 
slight or tenuous. The judge had to specify to the jury to consider which evidence might 
support the conclusion that the appellant lost self-control. The trial judge concluded that 
the evidence indicated a possible ―frenzied attack‖ and should thus have been put to the 
jury to counteract the element of premeditation which the prosecution depended upon.774  
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The Court of Appeal in Stewart
775
 ruled that the trial judge was correct in referring the 
matter to the jury despite that counsel did not raise the matter. It was the responsibility 
of the judge to assess whether, after reviewing the evidence, whether a reasonable 
possibility existed that a jury might conclude that the defendant had been provoked to 
lose self-control, even if the judge did not believe that a reasonable person would have 
reacted in the same manner as the defendant.
776
  
 
In the case of Jones,
777
 it was also stated that there should be full direction on the law if 
the defence of provocation is raised on the facts, even if counsel objects.
778
 In the case 
of Wellington,
779
 the trial judge concluded that due to lack of evidence that the 
defendant lost self-control, the matter could not be referred to the jury as provocation. 
The Crown conceded that if evidence of loss of self-control was present, then the judge 
was under an obligation to refer it to the jury but the factual foundation was not laid. 
This ruling was further supported by the Court of Appeal.  
 
In Cambridge,
780
 the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge is obliged to leave 
provocation to the jury despite counsel deciding not to rely on the defence. Lord Taylor 
CJ stated that it was not up to the judge to ―conjure up a speculative possibility of a 
defence that is not relied on and is unrealistic‖.  
 
In commenting on Rossiter,
781
 the accused was a battered wife who killed her husband 
by stabbing. The accused inflicted two serious wounds and seventeen superficial 
wounds. The defence of provocation was not raised by counsel. The Court of Appeal 
quashed the conviction of murder and a conviction of manslaughter was substituted as 
the trial judge neglected to put the defence to the jury, despite evidence indicating that 
the accused might have been attacked with a rolling pin, almost strangled and almost 
                                                     
775
 Stewart supra (n 773)  
776
 Bloy supra (n 582) at 146. 
777
Jones [1987] Crim LR 701. 
778
 Burgess [1995] Crim LR 425 (CA). 
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 Wellington.(1993) Crim LR 616. 
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 Cambridge [1994] 2 All ER 760 at 765(b). 
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 Rossiter supra (n 658) cited by Bloy supra (n 582) at 146. 
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bludgeoned with a mitre block. The reference of Russell LJ to ―material capable of 
amounting to provocation; however, tenuous it may be‖ described the provocative act 
either in words or acts and not the evidence of their existence.  
 
The cases of Robinson
782
 and Dryden
783
  make the point that only where evidence of 
provocation is totally lacking can the defence be withdrawn from the jury.
784
  
 
The case of Cocker 
785
 illustrated the difference between loss of self-control and loss of 
restraint. The defendant smothered his wife eventually after losing restraint and not self-
control. 
 Lord Lane CJ stated that: 
 ―This was almost …the very opposite of provocation. It was his giving way to her entreaties and 
acting …perfectly in self-control…, however terrible that act was in its meaning‖.786 
 
Jefferson states that the cases of Cocker
787
 and Acott
788
 demonstrate possible limitations 
on the discretion of the jury that is the nature of the subjective nature of the first leg, in 
Cocker the question was not whether the reasonable person would have killed but 
whether the accused in question did in fact suddenly and temporarily lose control.
789
  
In the case of Acott, Lord Steyn stated: 
                                                     
782
 Robinson [1965] Crim LR 491 (CA). 
783
 Dryden [1995] 4 All ER 987 (CA) this case attracted media attention due to the act being committed in 
front of the press and film crews. On the day of the incident, following a dispute on planning, the local 
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―Insufficient material for a jury to find that it is a reasonable possibility that there was specific 
provoking conduct resulting in a loss of self-control, there is simply no issue of provocation to be 
considered by the jury‖790 
 
In the case of Marks,
791
 it was stated that if the victim had not done or said anything 
which resulted in the defendant losing self-control then there was no provocative act. In 
Miao,
792
 the trial judge held that evidence indicating provocation was insufficient and 
the accused was then convicted of murder. The Court of Appeal reconsidered the 
question of how much evidence would be required and held that a speculative 
possibility was sufficient. The Court of Appeal applied Acott
793
 in confirming the 
decision of the trial court. There was evidence that the defendant was provoked; 
however, he did not lose self-control. Furthermore, there was only a speculative 
possibility of provocation and this was not enough for referral to the jury. Jefferson 
states that where evidence that loss of self-control was suffered, the case of Whitfield
794
 
and Camplin
795
 applied with ―full force‖.796 
 
Jefferson argues that ―the effect of shift from law to fact, from withdrawal of the issue 
to leaving it to the jury, meant that the role of the judge was narrow, narrower than in 
other areas of the law.‖ Jefferson attributes the change of the judge‘s role to that fact 
that the jury cannot be controlled as was the case under the law pre-1957 and the aim 
was to prevent inconsistent verdicts. Therefore, in this light, the role of the judge had 
been reduced to this: ―if there is any evidence of provocation, the defence must be left 
to the jury.‖797 
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 Acott supra (n 655) at 306. 
791
 Marks (1998) Crim LR 676. 
792
 Miao [2003] EWCA Crim. 3486 the defendant admitted to killing his partner during an argument, he 
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3.2.8. Assessment of the former provocation defence in terms of Section 3 of the 
Homicide Act of 1957 
 
Section 3 supplemented the common law defence of provocation; however, this co-
existence contributed to many problems relating uncertainty of the operation of the 
provocation defence.798 The provocation defence of provocation has always occupied a 
controversial place in the English legal system and often criticized for various reasons 
over the years, it is in light of these problems pertaining to the provocation defence 
which led two Law Commissions
799
 and the Ministry of Justice
800
 to undertake an in-
depth evaluation of the defence along with an impact assessment
801
 wherein the impact 
of the changes on the criminal justice system was considered. 
 
The aim of this evaluation as stated by the Ministry of Justice was to ―ensure that the 
law in this area is just, effective and up-to-date, and produces outcomes which 
command public confidence‖.802 The Law Commission was concerned that the old 
defence was a ―confusing mixture of common law rules and statute‖.803 
The Law Commission in its Consultation Paper
804
 was concerned with two issues: 
Firstly, it was questioned if it is morally sustainable for a defence based on sudden 
anger to find a partial defence to a murder charge. In essence the Law Commission 
found the defence of provocation to be fundamentally problematic and unsatisfactory. 
One of the problems identified was that the defence lacked a moral foundation.
805
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  Wells et. al. Reconstructing Criminal law-text and materials 4
th
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800
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Secondly, the emotion of anger was given importance over other emotions and this was 
identified as a flaw in the defence since anger does not provide a moral justification or 
excuse for killing.
806
 The defence thus operated to provide an ill-tempered person with a 
defence and verdict of manslaughter whereas a well-tempered individual received a 
murder conviction. Elliot argues that other credible emotions such as compassion were 
ignored.
807
 The Law Commission therefore questioned if it was sustainable to provide a 
partial defence for individuals who kill while in an angered state and not to individuals 
who kill out of a feeling of despair.
808
  
 
Furthermore, other problematic areas were that the defence encompassed revenge 
killings and the objective test was identified as being contradictory since the reasonable 
man does not kill and this further supported the argument that the provocation lacked a 
moral basis. The Consultation Paper809 was followed by a report on Partial Defences to 
Murder in 2004.810 In this report, the Law Commission rejected calls for abolishment of 
the defence of provocation but acknowledged that there was need of reform.811 
Furthermore, the defects of the defence could not be remedied by judges alone but 
legislative intervention was necessary.812   
 
In the first report
813
 three problems with the old law were identified by the Law 
Commission. Firstly, there was a concern that the defence of provocation had become 
too ―loose‖, meaning that even when the provocative act was trivial, the judge was 
obliged to leave the issue to the jury. 
 
The Law Commission also felt that as long as there was a mandatory life sentence for 
murder, proposals for reform would be in vain. The judge had no discretion in choosing 
                                                     
806
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807
 Ibid at para .4.163-4.164, see discussion in Elliot and Quinn supra (n 525) at 254. 
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the length of sentence following a conviction for murder, the definitions for the partial 
defences would be stretched to accommodate the defendant in order for discretion in 
sentencing.814 
 
Secondly, the concept of ―loss of self-control‖ was becoming problematic, especially in 
its relation to the battered woman. There was a growing perception that the defence was 
inherently gendered by being biased towards men and discriminatory towards women 
who kill an abusive partner. This has resulted in the defence being ―stretched‖ in order 
to bring cumulative provocation within its borders. The criticisms of gender 
discrimination is attributed to the historical origins of the defence, this was one of main 
factors which influenced the process of reformation.  
 
In response to the criticisms of gender bias towards men, the Law Commission 
recommended that a further leg to the provocation defence should be added that will 
allow killings resulting from fear of violence. The justification for recommending that 
the defence should cover killings committed out of fear as well as anger came from 
psychiatric evidence which shows that anger and fear have a similar effect and are 
usually present together during the commission of a violent act.815  
 
In the past, the slow burn cases had to be ―shoehorned‖ into the old provocation 
defence, so by widening the scope of the defence this would not be necessary.816 The 
―immediacy‖ requirement proved arguably the most controversial.817 It has been 
contended that the requirement stipulating that the loss self-control to be sudden and 
temporary was discriminatory against women who are more likely to experience a loss 
of self-control in a different form when compared to their male counterparts, who are 
known to react to provocation by lashing out in state of rage immediately.818 
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 Ibid at para  3.20. 
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 Partial Defences to Murder (2004) supra (n 799) at para 3.26-3.30. 
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 Discussed by Edwards supra (n 650) at 228. 
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 Edwards supra (n 650) at 225-226. 
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 A. Ashworth and J. Horder Principles of Criminal law 7
th
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The reaction of a woman to extreme provocation is described as ―a snapping in slow 
motion, the final surrender of frayed elastic‖.819 Another description for the manner in 
which women could experience a loss of control came from Lord Lane who states that 
the delayed reaction is not a cooling down, but actually a time to reflect on the events 
and then heating up.820  
 
Research indicates that a woman who is a victim of abuse would kill using a knife in 
about 82 per cent of cases, increasing the chances of a murder conviction.821 
Furthermore, during and after the killing the woman would be in a state of calm rather 
than being enraged. Men on the other hand kill their female partners through the 
application of force in an enraged state. 822 This predicament effectively forced the 
battered woman to rely on the defence of diminished responsibility which served as the 
only means to escape a murder conviction along with a mandatory life sentence of 
imprisonment.823  
 
However, it was also contended that if the immediacy requirement was relinquished the 
defence then becomes a safe haven for revenge killers.824 This potential problem 
therefore highlighted the need for a moral basis for the provocation defence which was 
lacking; it was argued that this provided a good basis for the abolishment of the 
provocation defence.825 
 
It has also argued that if the provocation defence is opened up to battered woman who 
kill, this provides a licence to kill. Ensuring justice for those who kill due to cumulative 
provocation and sudden loss of self-control is difficult. Section 3 of the Homicide Act 
was considered to be deficient in providing a defence for victims of abuse.826 
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The courts did succumb to extent the criticisms of gender discrimination against the 
battered and softened their stance. This softened approach is seen in the cases of 
Ahluwahlia827 and Thornton828.829 However, despite the legal developments in these 
cases, it was still argued that the provocation defence did not adequately accommodate 
the abused woman who kills because of the requirement that the loss of self-control be 
sudden and temporary.830 
 
The focus of the defence has always been loss of self-control; however, the Law 
Commission recommended a shift of focus to that of ―justifiable sense of being 
seriously wronged‖.831 
 
The Commission  recommended that the defence be available only where evidence of 
gross provocation was present which caused the defendant to feel a ―justifiable sense of 
being wronged‖ or fear of serious violence towards the defendant or another would also 
be accepted. The latter would be available in circumstances where excessive force was 
used in self-defence. If reasonable force was used, then the defendant would be able to 
rely on a complete defence.832  
 
The new defence recommended by the Law Commission encompassed victims of long- 
term abuse who kill their abusers.833 The defence would not be available where the 
killing was due to jealousy or to preserve family honour or due to infidelity.834 If the 
defendant initiated the provocation, then the defence would also not be available, for 
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 In Thornton, supra (n 648) the concept of ―battered woman‘s syndrome‖ was recognised and 
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example, if the deceased was insulted first. If the deceased‘s conduct was innocent, then 
the defence would not be available either.835 
 
The third problem identified related to the objective test and the concerns that the 
reasonable man test had become too subjectivised as a result of the case of Smith 
(Morgan)
836
.
837
 In its subsequent report Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide (2006), 
the Law Commission approved the stance taken by the minority in Morgan (Smith)838 
and the majority in Holley839 .840 The Commission felt that a distinction must be drawn 
between the factors only relating to a defendant‘s general capacity for self-control and 
those that have a bearing on the gravity of the provocative act.841  The only exception 
should be the defendant‘s age.842   
 
Furthermore, in its second report the Law Commission proposed that the defence should 
undergo a total reformulation in regard to the structure of murder and manslaughter with 
the creation of first and second degree murder.
843
  
 
In cases where defence of provocation is successful, the new provision should operate to 
reduce the defendant‘s liability from first degree-murder to that of second-degree 
murder. The effect would be that the defendant would still receive a conviction of 
murder not one of manslaughter, although it would still be a less serious offence than 
murder. The sentence would be a discretionary life sentence.
844
 
 
Furthermore, proposals that the definition of provocation be limited, the Commission 
recommended that ―all circumstances‖ be restricted to circumstances relevant to the 
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defendants characteristics only. This excluded the capacity for self-control from this 
consideration.
845
  
 
In this regard, the new law reflects the Law Commission‘s view; however, the sex of the 
defendant has been added along with age in terms of the general characteristics that 
should be taken into account in the objective test.
846
  
 
The Law Commission recognised, in relation to the ―age‖ characteristic that ―mental 
age is a complex subject‖847  and that in many cases those who kill can be considered as 
emotionally immature.848  However, scrutiny of psychiatric and psychological evidence 
shedding light on emotional maturity would complicate matters and may undermine the 
operation of the objective test. It was also noted that the English courts‘ refused to take 
into account the physical and temperamental distinctiveness of the accused.
849
  
 
3.3. The new defence in the terms of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
The Coroners and Justice Bill contained dramatic changes brought to the defence 
previously known as the provocation defence for England and Wales in over fifty 
years.
850
 The Bill was given Royal assent on 12 November 2009. On 4
th
 October 2009, 
the provisions regarding the provocation defence came into operation.
851
 The Coroners 
and Justice Act 2009 has abolished the common law defence of provocation together 
with section 3 of the Homicide Act of 1957 and has replaced it with a defence based on 
loss of self-control. 
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Section 56 of the Act states: 
56 Abolition of common law defence of provocation 
(1)  The common law defence of provocation is abolished and replaced by sections 54 and 55.  
(2)  Accordingly, the following provisions cease to have effect—  
(a)  Section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 (c. 11) (questions of provocation to be left to the jury);  
(b) Section 7 of the Criminal Justice Act (Northern Ireland) 1966 (c. 20) (questions of 
provocation to be left to the jury).  
 
THE REQUIREMENT OF LOSS OF SELF CONTROL IN TERMS OF SECTION 54  
54 (1)  Where a person (―D‖) kills or is a party to the killing of another (―V‖), D is not to be 
convicted of murder if— 
(a) D's acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing resulted from D's loss of 
self-control, 
(b) The loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger, and 
(c)  a person of D's sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in 
the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or in a similar way to 'D'.  
(2)  For the purposes of subsection (1) (a), it does not matter whether or not the loss of self-
control was sudden. 
(3) In subsection (1)(c) the reference to ‗the circumstance of D‘ is a reference to all of D‘s 
circumstances other than those whose only relevance to D‘s conduct is that they bear on 
D‘s general capacity for tolerance or self-restraint. 
(4)  Subsection (1) does not apply if, in doing or being a party to the killing, D acted in a 
considered desire for revenge.  
(5)  On a charge of murder, if sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with respect to the 
defence under subsection (1), the jury must assume that the defence is satisfied unless the 
prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not.  
(6)  For the purposes of subsection (5), sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with 
respect to the defence if evidence is adduced on which, in the opinion of the trial judge, a 
jury, properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the defence might apply.  
(7)  A person who, but for this section, would be liable to be convicted of murder is liable 
instead to be convicted of manslaughter. 
(8)  The fact that one part to a killing is by virtue of this section not liable to be convicted of 
murder does not affect the question whether the killing amounted to murder in the case of 
any other party to it.
852
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 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, Part 2, Chapter 1. 
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―the circumstances of D‖ is a reference to all of D's circumstances other than those whose only 
relevance to D's conduct is that they bear on D's general capacity for tolerance or self-restraint.  
Section 55 Meaning of “qualifying trigger" 
(1) This section applies for the purposes of section 54.  
(2) A loss of self-control has a qualifying trigger if subsection (3), (4) or (5) applies.  
(3) This subsection applies if D's loss of self-control was attributable to D's fear of serious 
violence from V against D or another identified person.  
 (4)  This subsection applies if D's loss of self-control was attributable to a thing or things done 
or said (or both) which—  
(a)  constituted circumstances of an extremely grave character, and  
(b)  caused D to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.  
 (5) This subsection applies if D's loss of self-control was attributable to a combination of the 
matters mentioned in subsections (3) and (4).  
 (6)  In determining whether a loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger—  
(a)  D's fear of serious violence is to be disregarded to the extent that it was caused by a thing 
which D incited to be done or said for the purpose of providing an excuse to use violence;  
(b)  a sense of being seriously wronged by a thing done or said is not justifiable if D incited the 
thing to be done or said for the purpose of providing an excuse to use violence;  
 (c): the fact that a thing done or said constituted sexual infidelity is to be disregarded.  
 (7)  In this section references to ―D‖ and ―V‖ are to be construed in accordance with section 54.  
 
3.3.1. Requirements of the loss of self-control defence 
The new defence is now called the ―loss of self-control manslaughter‖ defence rather 
than the provocation defence.
853
  The new provision applies only to a charge of murder 
only.
854
 If the defence is successful then the accused will be guilty of manslaughter.  
There are three main hurdles that must be satisfied if the defence is to be successful. 
Firstly, there must be loss of self-control which was caused by the defendant‘s acts or 
                                                     
853
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omissions. Secondly, the loss of self-control must be attributed to a qualifying trigger. 
Thirdly, a person of the defendant‘s sex and age, possessing normal powers of tolerance 
and self-control, in the same circumstance as the defendant, must have reacted to the 
qualifying trigger in a similar manner to the defendant.
855
 
3.3.1.1. The subjective test: the requirement of loss of self-control 
The loss of self-control is tested subjectively and may be best explained by basing it on 
whether the accused lost his capacity to maintain his actions in line with considered 
judgment or if normal capacity to reason was lost. The defendant must have lost self-
control in fact and in assessing this requirement the jury is allowed to take into account 
all related circumstances such as the nature of the qualifying trigger, the conditions in 
which the qualifying trigger occurred and the sensitivity of the defendant. 
856
  
 
However, Ormerod notes that in the current defence the meaning of this requirement is 
undefined. It can be assumed that loss of self-control may be judged in the same way as 
it was by the old law on provocation since no changes were made to the nomenclature, 
thus outward visible signs of an outburst857 or the defendant being noticeably enraged 
may continue to be the basis for loss of self-control.858 Angered states may continue to 
be the leitmotif of the loss of self-control. An accused person will continue to express 
themselves in the traditional formulaic terms such as ―spin round quickly‖859 and ―went 
berserk‖.860 The experience of the common law may still be relied upon and loss of 
control will be founded upon moral indignation861 or ―imperfect justification‖.862 
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The requirement of loss of control has always occupied a controversial place in English 
law, so much so that the Law Commission made a drastic recommendation of 
abolishing the requirement of loss of self-control due to the perceived difficulty in 
interpreting which led to difficulties in application.  
 
The Commission recommended that the condition of loss of self-control be done away 
and this will in turn solve the problem of gender bias towards males and discrimination 
towards women.863 It was contended that abolishing the requirement for the loss of self-
control would solve the problem of having to stretch the defence to bring in ―slow burn‖ 
cases within its ambit.864  
 
The requirement of loss of self-control was dogged by criticism that it lacked meaning 
and was a source of confusion as it was never fully explained in English law.865  
However, the reform of the defence does not go so far and loss of self-control still 
remains an important part of the new defence. The Government retained this 
requirement due to concerns of abuse of the defence and the potential difficulty in 
assessing if a killing was premeditated.  
 
In response to the Commission‘s recommendations the Government expressed the 
following justification: 
―We understand this reasoning but remain concerned that there is a risk of the partial defence 
being used inappropriately, for example in cold-blooded, gang related or ―honour killings‖. Even 
in cases which are less obviously unsympathetic, there is still a fundamental problem about 
providing a partial defence in situations where a defendant has killed while basically in full 
possession of his or her senses, even if he or she is frightened, other than in a situation which is 
complete self-defence.‖ 866  
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Mitchell and Mackay state that ―not only has the requirement been preserved; it has 
been placed at the heart of the new plea!‖867  
 
Another major reason for not only retaining the loss of self-control requirement but also 
making it an integral part of the new defence was to prevent those defendants who 
killed out of considered desire for revenge to unfairly benefit from the defence.  
 
The Government reinforced its view stating: 
―The Government believes that it is important that the partial defence is grounded in a loss of self-
control. We are not persuaded by the arguments for removing the requirement that the defendant 
must have lost self-control when they killed: we believe that the danger of opening this up to cold 
blooded killing is too great‖.868 
 
However, Yeo criticizes the law-makers for retaining the loss of self-control 
requirement, and states that it makes the new defence ―unattractive‖ due to the 
misplaced explanation for partially excusing the excessive force used by a defendant 
and for excluding deserving cases from its ambit.869.  
 
Ormerod states that loss of control requirement may lead to several other issues. The 
loss of control is still presumably required to be temporary otherwise the case would 
become one of insanity. Furthermore, in regard to the retention of the loss of control 
requirement, the government may have narrowed the availability of the defence to the 
battered woman since it may be difficult to show how loss of control arose out of a 
killing committed while the deceased slept.
870
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868
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3.3.1.2. Removal of the of the suddenness requirement in terms of 54(2) 
The current law removes the requirement of immediacy (sudden and temporary loss of 
self-control) which was introduced into the common law as a result of the famous 
definition by Devlin J in Duffy
871
 where the requirement of immediacy was placed at 
the heart of the provocation. This resulted in the ―immediacy dilemma‖ since it created 
a clear obstacle in the way of those who killed their abusers out of fear or self-
preservation.
872
 
 
The new provision relinquishes the ―suddenness‖ requirement; this was done to address 
the perceived prejudice of the old defence towards cases involving cumulative 
provocation. The requirement of sudden loss of self-control has been abandoned by the 
new provision thus solving the ―immediacy dilemma‖ which proved tremendously 
troublesome to battered woman.  
 
In the case of Dawes the court stated: 
―Provided that there was a loss of control, it does not matter whether the loss was sudden or not.A 
reaction to circumstances of extreme gravity may be delayed. Different individuals in different 
situation do not react identically, nor respond immediately. The defendant may therefore be able to 
rely on loss of control even though the qualifying trigger occurred sometime previously. So, if V 
says something gravely provocative and D thinks about it, gradually getting more and more upset, 
and then some time later D loses self-control and kills V, then the defence could be used. 
However, do not forget section 54 (4), which makes it clear that if D acted out of a desire for 
revenge he or she cannot rely on the defence of loss of self-control. The longer the time after the 
trigger the more likely it is that the jury will decide that the trigger did not cause the loss of 
control‖.873 
 
It is submitted that this change goes a long way in addressing the unfairness of the old 
provocation and this is undoubtedly a positive development; however, it is further 
submitted that though being a positive development overall, this may create a potential 
problem in that it will be difficult to differentiate between case involving revenge and 
deserving ones. 
 
                                                     
871
  Duffy supra (n 550). 
872
  Edwards supra (n 650) at 225. 
873
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Furthermore, the abandonment of the ―immediacy‖ requirement has increased 
accessibility to the defence and generally widens the scope of the defence; arguably this 
may have potentially opened the defence to abuse, especially by those who killed out of 
revenge.874 One of the difficulties that come with this change is that it will be difficult to 
assess when and if loss of self-control occurred will lack and thus has arguably made 
the defence so wide that it has become ―superfluous‖.875  
 
It is submitted that this fear is unfounded, since time lapse will still play a pivotal role in 
the defence especially when sifting out revenge killings.876 Premeditated killings may 
still be distinguished from ―provoked‖ killings despite the removal of the immediacy 
requirement on the basis that in the cases involving cumulative provocation involve acts 
committed with the intention of fulfilling a goal, with disregard to one owns well-being. 
Whereas, premeditated killings involve carefully calculated act with the intention of 
escaping criminal liability.877 There are certain differences in evidence which may 
indicate premeditation, for instance sharpening a knife in a rational state must be 
differentiated from wearing gloves to prevent fingerprints which indicates careful 
calculation.
878
 
 
Hence, despite the removal of immediacy requirement, large lapses of time between the 
provocative act and the killing will be given weight along with other evidence and may 
still work against the accused. Lapses of time will have an impact on how evidence will 
be assessed and what will pass as evidence of loss of self-control.879 
 
The Government stated that it was intent on preventing under serving cases with large 
time lapses from succeeding. Therefore, the addition of an explanatory note confirms 
that the court may consider delays between the incident and the killing when assessing 
the issue of loss of self-control.880 
                                                     
874
 Edwards supra (n 650) at 226. 
875
 C. Withey ―Loss of control, loss of opportunity‖ (2011) 4 Crim.L.R. 263-279 at 12. 
876
 Edwards supra (n 650) at 226. 
877
 Clough supra (n 20) at 119. 
878
 Clough supra (n 20) at 119. 
879
 Edwards supra (n 650) at. 226. 
880
 Coroners and Justice Act 2009: explanatory note 337. 
 141 
 
Though, loss of self-control is not required to be sudden or immediate which assists the 
persons such as the ―battered woman‖ though the lapse of time will still be assessed. 
The removal of the immediacy requirement was not only a good development but more 
importantly in the interests of justice.  
 
Historically, the requirement of loss of self-control in provocation cases was 
inextricably linked to ―suddenness‖, however the societal changes have necessitated this 
development. It is submitted that the removal of the immediacy requirement will not 
open the defence to abuse since the requirement the loss of self-control is a hurdle in 
itself and remains an adequate safeguard against unmeritorious cases. 
 
Although this direction was praised as being a model of clarity by the Appeal Court, 
objections emerged concerning two specific areas. The first question regarded whether 
the common law was being correctly interpreted. Secondly, such an interpretation was 
directly discriminatory against women, who may kill their partner out of self-defence or 
self-preservation.
881
 In terms of the new provision, Edwards argues that loss of self-
control has been approached with an all-or-nothing attitude but the removal of the 
―temporary‖ requirement leaves this question unintentionally open.882  
 
 
3.3.2. The qualifying triggers to loss of self-control 
In a bid to remedy problems of the previous defence, the new defence recognises 
different ―triggers‖ of loss of self-control. The defendant must be able to show that the 
loss of self-control is attributed to a qualifying trigger in terms of section 55. Herring 
states that this point is made clear in the case of Acott
883
 where the accused killed his 
mother while in a frenzy; however he could not explain why he lost control.
884
 
The judge therefore correctly refused to leave the defence of provocation with the jury. 
The main point is that there must be evidence of a provocative situation. This case was 
decided under the old law but this principle is still applicable in terms of the new Act. 
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Under the old provision a defendant could raise the defence if the provocation arose out 
of something ―done‖ or ―said‖, Herring notes that the new defence is narrower in that 
the provocation can only fall in one of the three prescribed categories.
885
 
These are: 
a) Fear of serious violence 
b) A tremendously provocative act 
c) A fear of serious violence combined with a tremendously provocative act.886 
3.3.2.1. “Fear” qualifying trigger section 55 (3) 
The Consultation Paper broadened the scope of the new partial defence to recognise that 
fear as well as anger can undermine self-control.887 The Law Commission recommended 
that a new law be enacted, one which would accommodate fear as well as anger, but in a 
way in which the requirement for loss of self-control was forsaken.888 The new defence 
allows for the loss of self-control triggered by fear as well as anger and is intended for 
bring women who kill their abusive partners within the partial defences.  
 
In terms of the ―fear‖ qualifying trigger, it must be shown that indeed the defendant was 
fearful of violence even if the violence itself did not occur. Hence, if the defendant was 
under a misapprehension that violence was impending, this will still amount to a 
qualifying trigger. Furthermore, the fear must be of serious or severe violence, fear of a 
minor assault will not qualify. An important aspect of this provision is that loss of self-
control must have emanated from the fear of serious violence, if the defendant reacted 
to the threat of violence in a calm manner, that is without losing control, and killed the 
attacker then the requirements of this provision are not satisfied. In this circumstance, 
where self-control remained intact, the defendant may rely on the defence of self-
defence instead.
889
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Fear has been included as a trigger and this indicates that the scope has been broadened 
to include battered women who kill their abusive partners. An abused woman can 
attribute either anger or fear as a cause of loss of self-control.
890
 The recognition of fear 
has been welcomed as it provides prima facie assistance to victims of abuse such as the 
battered women.
891
 
 
However, it is also argued that women are more emotional than men and this might 
work to discriminate against men. Despite this criticism, it is submitted that the 
recognition of fear as an emotion which may undermine self-control is a welcome 
improvement, especially in the light of the previous defence which was considered 
discriminatory against women.  
 
The acknowledgement of fear contributing to loss of self-control is a breakthrough in 
the quest for gender equality in English law, however other problems persist and the law 
is still far from ideal. Section 54(2) of the Act, rids the defence of the problems and 
controversies related to this requirement. 
 
3.3.2.2. “Circumstances of an extremely grave character” -Section 55(4) (a) 
In terms of the qualifying trigger in term of section 55 (4), the accused must have lost 
self-control due to things done or said which constituted circumstances of an extremely 
grave character and which caused the defendant to have a justifiable sense of being 
seriously wronged. 
Furthermore, the Act does not explain the exact meaning of ―circumstances of an 
extremely grave character‖; however, Herring states that this requirement should be 
interpreted to mean that the circumstances faced by the defendant was unusual and thus 
cannot be classified as forming part of ―ordinary‖ human tribulations. For example, 
being harassed at a supermarket or being cheated in a queue will not satisfy the 
requirement of this section.
892
.  
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The requirement of ―extremely grave character‖ in s55 (4) (a) informs the jury that the 
provocative act must be exceptional. Yeo states that the latter part of the clause places a 
significant limitation of the types of provocative acts that can be allowed.
893
  
In the case of Dawes
894
 the Court of Appeal emphasised that the ending of a romantic 
relationship would not usually be considered as a qualifying trigger. In the case of  
Hatter,
895
 which was heard at the same time as Dawes, the Court of Appeal ruled that 
the ending of a romantic relationship will not normally constitute circumstances of an 
extremely grave character may not entitle the accused to feel a justifiable sense of being 
seriously wronged. 
 
 
3.3.2.3. “Justifiable sense of being seriously wronged” section 55 (4) (b) 
This requirement is intended to replace the old requirement of a ―provoked loss of self-
control‖.896 In terms of the requirement that the defendant must have had a justifiable 
sense of being seriously wronged, this will be assessed by an objective test to decide if 
in fact the defendant was justified in feeling wronged.
897
 Hence, the defendants feeling 
of being seriously wronged does not automatically satisfy this requirement.
898
 In the 
case of Bowyer
899
 the court stated that the break-up of a relationship will not entitle the 
accused to feel a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged. 
Cases such as the infamous Doughty
900
 will be excluded from the ambit of the new 
defence due to the clever wording of this provision requiring justifiable sense of being 
seriously wronged. For instance, a traffic ticket will not amount to a justifiable sense of 
being seriously wrong, even if the traffic officer was less than courteous. The new 
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provision has narrowed the defence and covers a limited range of cases, thus trivial 
insults and distresses will not meet the requirements of this section.
901
 
The defendant must have a sense of being a victim of a serious injustice. This provision 
contains an objective, judgmental element which is in contrast with the purely 
subjective test of the old defence which tested if the defendant was provoked to lose 
self-control.
902
 
This provision does not cover circumstances alone, for instance, being stranded in 
traffic cannot be categorised as ―things done or said‖.903 In the case of Clinton904 the 
court stated that it is important that the defendant must have felt wronged, and if even if 
faced with circumstances of an extremely grave character, he did not become distressed 
then this does not amount to a qualifying trigger. Herring notes that this is an important 
point, since the lack of distress could mean that self-control was not lost.
905
  
3.3.2.4. Sexual infidelity is not a qualifying trigger - s.55 (6) (c) 
The reason behind the exclusion of sexual infidelity amounting as a qualifying trigger is 
that juries may show sympathy and leniency to men who killed their partners upon 
discovering sexual infidelity. The government stated: 
―it is quite unacceptable for a defendant who has killed an unfaithful partner to seek to blame the 
victim for what occurred. We want to make it absolutely clear that sexual infidelity on the part of 
the victim can never justify reducing a murder to manslaughter. This should be the case even if 
sexual infidelity is present in combination with a range of other trivial and common place 
factors.‖906 
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Section 55 (6) (c) explicitly states that ―the fact that a thing done or said constituted 
sexual infidelity is to be disregarded‖. In this regard Leigh notes that the Act does not 
expressly say that sexual infidelity in itself does not amount to a qualifying trigger.
907
  
 
In the case of Clinton908 the court stated that sexual infidelity should not on its own 
constitute a qualifying trigger, however evidence proving sexual infidelity may be 
admitted due to relevance of the circumstances wherein the accused acted legally to the 
qualifying trigger.909 
 
 
The court stated:910 
―where sexual infidelity is integral to and form an essential part of the context in which to make a 
just evaluation whether a qualifying trigger properly falls within the ambit of subsection 55(3) and 
(4), the prohibition in section 55(6) (c) does not operate to exclude the defence.‖ 
 
Herring notes that the Court of Appeal was not keen on section 55(6)(c) which excluded 
sexual infidelity from being categorised as a qualifying trigger.911 The court further 
stated that this exclusion might result in ―anomalies‖912 and ―produce surprising 
results‖.913  
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Furthermore, Mitchell argues that the meaning of sexual infidelity itself has not been 
defined in the Act.
914
  The Clinton case highlighted other uncertainties, for example, it 
is uncertain if can sexual flirting could be considered as sexual infidelity. Furthermore, 
another potential problematic aspect of the new provision is that ―sexual infidelity‖ has 
not been officially defined in the new defence nor has it been explained its relation to 
the requirement of ―seriously wronged‖915.916  
 
It is submitted that achieving a delicate balance when enacting a provision pertaining to 
a controversial defence is a tremendously difficult task, and unfortunately this balance 
has not been achieved. The reason for this criticism is that the defence now prejudices 
the male gender since the new provision expressly excludes sexual infidelity from the 
ambit of the defence.917  
 
Sexual infidelity is considered to be the ―paradigmatic example of provocation‖.918 
Hence, the exclusion is quite controversial. It is submitted that men especially will be 
harshly judged and this may result in further misuse of the law. Herring argues sexual 
infidelity is considered to be a factor which may cause a loss of self-control, thus it is 
artificial to pretend that sexual infidelity that it does not.
919
 Leigh contends that the new 
defence has excluded strong and complicated emotional reactions to which sexual 
infidelity may result.920  
 
Furthermore, this exclusion might confuse a jury who may deem sexual infidelity to be 
a qualifying trigger. Further confusion is probable in cases where diminished 
responsibility and loss of self-control are pleaded in the alternative since it will be odd 
for a jury to consider sexual infidelity in terms of diminished responsibility while 
excluding it in terms of loss of self-control.
921
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3.3.2.5. “Considered desire for revenge”- SECTION 54(4) (1) 
The new defence is denied to an accused person who acted in a considered desire for 
revenge. The government was of the opinion that this addition was necessary in order to 
ensure that the defence was not being abused by the ―honour killing‖ cases or for gang 
murders.
922
 Edwards states that wording of the Act indicates that revenge killings 
committed on impulse and those committed after a ―considered desire‖ may be treated 
differently.
923
 It is for the courts to determine how to judge time lapse in cases where 
loss of self-control caused by anger and loss of self-control caused by fear.  
The jury may conclude that the defendant had no sufficient reason to regard the 
deceased's conduct as gross provocation, or indeed that the defendant's attitude in 
regarding the conduct as provocation demonstrated as an outlook (e.g. religious or racial 
bigotry) offensive to the standards of a civilized society.
924
 
 
3.3.3. The Objective Test in s 54(1)(c) 
In order for the loss of control defence to succeed, the defendant must not only show 
that a loss of control resulted from a qualifying trigger but also that a ―person of D‘s sex 
and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstance of 
D might have reacted in the same or in a similar way to D‖ this requirement in terms of 
section 54 (1) (c) is governed by an objective test.925 
 
The requirement of this section exists in two parts. Part one describes the type of 
provocation that will be recognized by the Act and part two pertains to the reaction of a 
person possessing a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint to the provocative 
act.
926
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3.3.3.1. Meaning of "circumstances" of the defendant referred to in 54 (1) (c)  
The use of the word ―circumstances‖ as opposed to ―characteristic‖ in the Homicide Act 
is seen as a welcome change. The use of the word ―circumstance‖ is significant as it 
allows the defendant‘s history to be considered, especially in cases where the defendant 
was abused by the deceased. The jury is allowed to view the qualifying trigger in the 
light of the defendant‘s background. The defendant may show that due to his or her 
experience the wrong in question was more serious to them. 
 
The Act does not necessitate that the defendant‘s religious and cultural background be 
considered in determining how the reasonable person would behaved when faced with 
the same circumstances as the defendant; so, it remains to be seen if these factors can be 
taken into account under the term ―all other circumstances‖. These factors may be 
classified as characteristics or personal attributes; hence, the law needs to clarify how 
closely related ―circumstances‖ is from ―characteristics‖.927 
 
It must be noted that a defendant may not use their unique circumstance or 
characteristics to impact their level of self-control. In the case of Clinton the court 
emphasised that sexual infidelity by itself could not amount to a qualifying trigger but it 
would play a role in determining ―circumstance‖ when testing if a person with a normal 
degree of self-restraint and tolerance would have reacted as the defendant did.
928
 
 
3.3.3.2. “Normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint” 
This requirement is intended to prevent defendants using this defence when the loss of 
control suffered may have been due to their own intolerance or abnormally low levels of 
self-restraint. Therefore, the defence will apply if a defendant reacted in the same way 
to a qualifying trigger as a person who possessed a normal degree of tolerance and self-
restraint. This test is stringent as the defence will be denied to a person who possessed 
abnormally low levels of self-restraint and tolerance due to factors outside of their 
control, for instance in cases involving mental illness, the defendant will still be 
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required to have displayed self-restraint and tolerance expected of an ordinary person of 
their age and sex.
929
 
 
Commentators have criticised this provision, specifically the objective test that will be 
used to determine capacity for self-control and determining what a normal degree of 
tolerance and self-restraint is. Miles correctly argues that in the case of the battered 
woman whose qualifying trigger was fear, and if  the degree of force used  is objectively 
excessive , the defendant will be deprived of the defence on the basis that an ordinary 
person with [a normal degree of] tolerance and self-restraint would  not have used 
disproportionate force.
930
 
 
It is further argued that it is difficult to foresee how this requirement will function since 
degrees of tolerance and self-restraint are extremely subjective in nature and should be 
judged subjectively. 
931
  
Norrie, however, rejects the distinction made between those characteristics that pertain 
to the provocation and those that relate to the ability to exercise self-control since the 
two are not distinct.
932
 If characteristics such as age justify different degrees of self-
control, then the same principle should apply to other characteristics that could impact 
the response to provocation.
933
 
 
In respect of ―tolerance‖, this requirement is intended to handle cases where the 
defendant was provoked due to his own intolerance beliefs or philosophies. Herring 
uses the example of a boy telling his homophobic father that he is homosexual, and 
upon hearing this information the father kills his son in a fit of rage. In this 
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circumstance the father will not be able to rely on the defence due two reasons. Firstly, 
the sexual orientation of the son could not have caused the father to feel a ―justifiable 
sense of being seriously wronged‖ and therefore cannot amount to a qualifying trigger. 
Secondly, the fact that the killing was committed by a father against his son is not 
consistent of a person possessing a normal degree of tolerance or restraint. The father 
(defendant) would be considered to be an intolerant person.
934
 
 
The requirement of ―self-restraint‖ is an indication that the law expects all individuals to 
exercise self-control, thus restraint should be shown even in the face of extreme insults 
or provocative behaviour. However, the law through this defence recognises that even a 
person with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint may kill in the face of a 
terrible wrong.
935
 
 
An important note is that the provision states that it must be shown that a person of 
normal tolerance and self-restraint might have reacted in the same situation, thus if the 
jury are unsure on how the normal person would have reacted then the defendant should 
be allowed to utilise the defence. 
 
3.3.3.3 “a person of D’s sex and age...” in terms of 54(1) (c) 
Interestingly, the ―reasonable man‖ test is not mentioned in the new defence of loss of 
self-control.
936
 The new provision in terms of section 54(1)(c)  follows the Camplin
937
 
approach and retains a test of ordinariness/reasonableness for the provocative act along 
with the D's response to it, even though terms like ―reasonable man‖ or ―ordinary 
person‖ do not feature considerably in the new Act.  
 
The new provision solves the dispute in Smith (Morgan)
938 
and Holley
939
 regarding which 
characteristics of the defendant to take into account other than sex and age. The 
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characteristic of ―age‖ refers to ―youthful immaturity‖ and is based on the underlying 
rationale that it would be unfair to expect a young person to display the same emotional 
and mental maturity of an older person. This characteristic is fairly uncontroversial 
unlike the characteristic of the ―sex‖ of the accused.940  
 
Self-restraint will be judged in accordance with the defendant‘s age; however, the 
addition of ―sex‖ has garnered criticism from commentators who view it as a form of 
gender discrimination. The addition of ―sex‖ as a requirement suggests that the law 
expects different degrees of tolerance and restraint from men and women.
941
 The 
addition of ―sex‖ as a characteristic may imply women possess a higher degree of 
tolerance or restraint than men, this stereotype propagates the stereotype that women 
who kill may be wicked. Yeo notes that this may have been the reason for the Law 
Commission excluding this characteristic in its proposed reformulation of the 
defence.
942
 
 
However, if this inclusion was not an oversight, then it may have been a deliberate 
attempt by the Government to possibly account for a lower threshold of capacity for 
tolerance and self-restraint by an abused woman who kills her abusive partner. 
However, regardless of the intention behind the inclusion of ―sex‖, the result is that 
Government has failed to understand the social reality that females who kill their 
abusive partners are ordinary or normal women who have been pushed to breaking 
point.
943
 
 
Furthermore, this provision is discriminatory against men who may also have found 
themselves to be victims of abuse at the hands of their domestic partner. The 
                                                                                                                                                           
939
 Holley supra (n 670). 
940
 Yeo supra (n 869) at 11, Ormerod supra (n 58) at 523 states that this new objective criteria bears some 
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941
 Herring supra (n 464) at 251. 
942
 Murder, Manslaughter and infanticide (2006) supra (n 799) at 5.11-5.38 discussed by Yeo supra (n 
869) at 11. 
943
 Yeo supra (n 869) at 11-12. 
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government is criticised for not requiring a single standard of tolerance and self-restraint 
for both males and females.
944
 
 
3.3.4. Battered woman and the new loss of control defence 
Historically, one of the main areas of contention within the provocation was the issue of 
discrimination against women. The previous provocation defence could not 
accommodate the cases of slow burn and courts were resorting to ―stretching‖ the law in 
order to serve justice.945  
 
Edwards argues that the law needed to develop in two ways; the first, must strive to 
liberate the abused woman from being constructed through a ―psychological prism‖.946 
This construct did a disservice to the battered woman as the psychological effects of 
abuse and its effect on conduct are given paramount importance and other features of an 
abused woman‘s ―symptomatology‖ are over looked.947 
 
Secondly, the nature of the violence perpetrated against the woman should be the focus 
rather than the woman‘s subjective reaction.948  Under the old defence, the battered 
woman would need to convince a jury that by virtue of the fact that she was an abused 
person; her knowledge of the perpetrators propensity for violence resulted in her 
anticipating another violent attack and a reaction in self-defence was in the 
circumstances reasonable.949 
 
The Holley950 decision resulted in the defendant being put in the position of proving to 
the jury that conduct was reasonable.951 This was the unfortunate predicament of the 
                                                     
944
 Yeo supra (n 869) at 12 states that the Australian High Court should be lauded for applying a single 
standard of tolerance and self-restraint to both sexes in the case of Stingel v The Queen (1990) 171 
CLR 312. 
945
 Norrie supra (n 837) at 276. 
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 Edwards supra (n 654) at 350. 
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 Edwards supra (n 654) at 350. 
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 Edwards supra (n 654) at 350. 
949
 Edwards supra (n 654) at 351 proposes that battered woman‘s syndrome should be re-framed in terms 
of its focus and terminology. 
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 Holley supra (n 670). 
951
 Edwards supra (n 654) at 351. 
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battered woman.952 In terms of the new loss of control defence, the battered women 
seeking to raise the defence either in terms of section 55(3) or 55(4)(a) and (b), the jury 
must be satisfied that the defendant was justified in feeling a sense of being seriously 
wronged. 
This might create a potential problem for the battered woman if reliance on section s 
55(4) is made, due to the fact that if last qualifying trigger, either a threat or a minor 
insult was said, this on its own may not be considered as extremely grave in character. 
Furthermore, this coupled with time lapse; the jury might not consider the killing 
justifiable when application of the objective test is made.  
Edwards argues that the battered woman may be better served by formulating an 
argument around the concept of cumulative fear in terms of section 55 (3) and (4) 
However, fear will only suffice if the violence suffered by the defendant is of a severe 
nature.
953
 The mind of the battered woman is different, and reaction to violence 
perpetrated against her does not depend on the severity of the last beating so to speak. 
The mind of the battered woman is fixated on the severity of the threat the abuser poses 
to her life. Hence, the reaction of the battered woman cannot be considered an ―over 
reaction‖ at all.954 
The issue of capacity for self-control was also contentious and the case of Holley955 
considered whether the capacity for self-control is a variable or a fixed standard, and 
made it clear that the capacity for self-control was fixed.956 This directly impacted 
battered woman who found themselves in a quandary of trying to convince a jury that 
the force used to kill was reasonable in these circumstances.957   
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 Edwards supra (n 654) at 351. 
953
 Edwards supra (n 650) at 233. 
954
 Edwards supra (n 650) at 233 argues that the Law Commission failed to appreciate this aspect when 
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women who kill their abusive male partners in Edwards supra (n 650). 
957
 Edwards supra (n 650) at 235. 
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A literal interpretation of Holley958 indicated that capacity for self-control excluded any 
pre-existing emotional state and declaring that self-control will be fixed, significantly 
impacted on how the provocation defence is pleaded and its outcome.959 The use of a 
weapon was not understood and the formulation of set rules gave judges no room to 
adjust sentences where appropriate and this was unjust.960  
Edwards argues that the new provision leaves the battered woman at the mercy of the 
jury assessment of ―justifiable‖ and ultimately failing at the final hurdle.961 The jury‘s 
assessment will require an application of an objective test of what is justifiable and what 
the defendant considered justified and weighed in the light of the circumstances of the 
defendant. 
Some of the other areas (section 51(c)) of confusion the Act potentially creates are in 
regard with determining the capacity for self-control, judged objectively on threshold of 
what a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint is. Loss of control triggered by 
anger as well as loss of control triggered by fear will be judged by this standard. The 
criticism of this provision mainly concerns the defence of the battered woman whose 
reaction objectively assessed will be considered to be excessive since an ordinary 
person with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint would not have used 
excessive force.
962
 This objective assessment of capacity for self-control will arguably 
cause the battered woman to fail in her defence. 
3.3.5. Procedural aspects 
The first area of concern was that the provocation defence allowed unmeritorious cases 
to be left with the jury, specifically those were the alleged provocative conduct relied 
upon was not of a serious nature. In terms of procedure, the new provision deals with 
this concern by restoring power back to the judge in regard to the issue of provocation 
in terms of section 54(6) of the Act.
963
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 Holley supra (n 663). 
959
 Edwards supra (n 654) at 346. 
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The Commission recommended that the judge must be the gatekeeper of provocation 
and must be in more control of the case; this recommendation was incorporated in the 
Coroners and Justice Act under s 54(6). The Commission made proposals changing the 
role of the judge by recommending that judges be empowered to withdraw the defence 
if in their discretion no reasonable jury would accept it.964 
 
Section 54(6) readdresses the judge‘s role, in terms of the new Act; the wording 
―justifiable sense of being seriously wronged‖ implies that the jury is directed to assess 
what is morally or politically acceptable. Under the new law, the judge has more power 
and may use his discretion to remove an unworthy case from the jury. Norrie notes that 
in terms of this provision, power of removal possessed by the judge, the matter is 
removed from the "actual" jury and will be considered by an "ideal" jury.
965
 
 
The new provision in terms of section 54 of the Act has changed the role of the judge by 
returning the power to determine if evidence of provocation exists and if a jury could 
reasonably conclude that there was loss of control. The new partial defence restores this 
vital power to the judge which includes assessment of whether a qualifying trigger 
exists and if the defendant indeed lost self-control and if this loss was justifiable. 
Edwards notes that the threshold required is that of ―reasonably conclude‖ rather than a 
―speculative possibility‖ required under the old defence.966  
 
The judge has the power to remove cases from jury consideration.
967
 In terms of the 
common law, it was the judge‘s discretion to decide which acts amounted to 
provocation and which did not.
968
  Provocative acts had to be inherently objectionable. 
In terms of the previous defence, this limitation was removed, resulting in a wide range 
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of conduct being regarded as provocative conduct. Judges were deprived of authority to 
rule on the adequacy of provocation.
969
  
 
The Law Commission stated that for example, a case involving a racist killing in 
retaliation to a supposed provocation would be a case where:  
―the jury may conclude that the defendant had no sufficient reason to regard it as gross 
provocation, or indeed that the defendant's attitude … demonstrated an outlook … offensive to the 
standards of a civilized society‖.970 
 
Norrie states in these circumstances no well-directed and fair-minded jury would find 
that gross provocation had indeed occurred and the situation would call for the judge to 
withdraw the case for the jury's consideration.
971
 The concept of the ideal and properly 
directed jury has been incorporated into the Coroners and Justice Act under s 56(6)
972
. 
Furthermore, in regard to cases involving sexual infidelity, the Law Commission was 
the view that this issue must not be left to the jury by the judge.
973
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3.3.6. Expert evidence 
The value of expert evidence has been acknowledged by English courts and over many 
centuries experts have provided a prominent role as witnesses on medical, scientific and 
literary matters.
974
 However the famous case of Turner
975
 had the effect of excluding 
expert psychological and psychiatric testimony in numerous cases over a period of 
twenty years where the accused was not suffering from a pathological mental disorder 
which at the time of the commission of the act in question. The so-called ―Turner rule‖ 
has been used to exclude expert evidence in cases involving duress and provocation 
amongst others.
976
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reasonable person is capable of understanding normal reasonable behaviour due to their shared 
common knowledge and experience. Essentially expert testimony may not provide an insight that may 
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Lord Justice Lawton stated:
977
 
―If on the proven facts a judge or jury can form their own conclusions without help then the 
opinion of an expert is unnecessary. In such a case if it is given dressed up in scientific jargon it 
may make judgment more difficult. The fact that an expert witness had impressive qualifications 
does not by that fact alone make his opinion on matters of human nature any more helpful than the 
jurors themselves; by there is a danger that they may think it does‖. 
 
Furthermore, it was held that: 
―jurors do not need psychiatrists to tell them how ordinary folk who are not suffering from any 
mental illness are likely to react to the stresses and strains of life‖.978 
This rule hinges on the assumption that certain psychological functions and occurrences 
are a matter of common knowledge and experience and therefore a jury will be able to 
comprehend matters without the assistance of expert testimony.
979
 
The basis of this common law principle dates back to the year 1782 in the case of 
Folkes v Chad where it was held that an expert‘s opinion may only be admissible if it 
provides that court with information that may be outside the common knowledge and 
experience of the jury.
980
 
In the case of Emery
981
 the Court of Appeal relaxed the rule in Turner
982
 to the effect 
that expert testimony is permitted when it relates to a condition which ―is complex and 
it is not known by the public at large.‖ 
                                                                                                                                                           
correct or further such an understanding. Finally, this rests on the presumption that normal human 
behaviour is ultimately transparent. 
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The rule in Turner
983
 has attracted criticisms from commentators who believe that 
although expert psychiatric and psychological evidence should be limited, the scope of 
admissible evidence should be widened to include abnormal and usual states of mind 
that cannot be categorised as mental illness and may not be understood by a lay person 
even with common sense.
984
 It is thus argued that expert testimony can be very useful in 
such cases as it may aid in understanding the mind-set of the accused at the time of 
commission of the offence.
985
  
3.4. Concluding summary 
The role of provocation and its impact on criminal responsibility has always occupied a 
contentious place in English law. Historically, the basis of the provocation was to 
accommodate human frailty of the provoked killer who lost the ability to reason when 
overcome by passion; therefore, the law shows a measure of leniency to the accused in 
the form of a manslaughter conviction. Arguably, the same justification of the defence 
that is the accommodation of human infirmity still applies currently. 
 
During these formative years, the law initially began with differentiating between 
killings depending on the circumstances in which they were committed in. Premeditated 
killings were considered more heinous than those committed on impulse or on the spur 
of the moment. The emergence of manslaughter signified that the law considers killings 
arising out of provocation to be more excusable despite the presence of intention. The 
law in this area took many decades to reach its current point in the form of the Coroners 
and Justice Act 2009. 
 
The defence has its roots in the common law dating back to the 17
th
 century. As the 
common law defence of provocation developed, the doctrine of provocation emerged. 
Importance was placed on two elements of the defence, the requirement of loss of self-
control and the reasonable man test. The law placed importance on both elements, these 
elements are considered to be vital aspects of the provocation defence even in its current 
format. 
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The loss of self-control is considered to be problematic and the source for much of the 
criticisms troubling the provocation for many years. In famous case of Duffy,
986
 the 
court stipulated that the loss of control must be sudden. This gave rise to many 
controversies as the main problem which ensued was accommodating the abused 
women who kill within a defence predicated on sudden loss of self-control. Emphasis 
was placed on angered states and the law did not recognise other causes of loss of self-
control. 
 
In light of the repercussions that could result from allowing a defence based on an 
angered state, the courts increasingly placed importance on the use of an objective 
standard to measure the accused‘s behaviour against; this was in the form of the 
―reasonable man‖. The ―reasonable man‖ test was seen as an essential aspect in the 
provocation defence; however, the interpretation and application proved extremely 
troublesome for many years to come. This centred on the number of attributes of the 
accused that should be given to the reasonable man. 
 
In light of the problems associated with the application of the objective test and its 
perceived harshness, section 3 of the Homicide Act was enacted with the intention of 
modifying the defence at common law. In terms of this legislation, the requirements for 
the defence were divided into two parts, a subjective test which determined if the 
accused lost self-control and the objective test determined the impact of the loss of self-
control on the reasonable man. 
 
However, the enactment of this defence did not solve the difficulties of the provocation 
defence at common law; in fact the defence attracted more criticisms, especially 
targeted to the loss of control requirement and gender bias towards men and the 
problematic objective test which was difficult to apply and interpret.  
 
This prompted review of the law by the Law Commission and the Ministry of Justice 
which resulted in the eventual abolishment of the defence at common law together with 
section 3 of the Homicide Act and the enactment of the loss of control defence in terms 
of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The Law Commission stated that a coherent and 
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logical rationale was lacking in the provocation defence and the theoretical 
underpinning of the defence was problematic. The requirement of loss of self-control 
and the objective test were identified as troublesome areas. 
 
The Coroners and Justice Act contains certain new features which are intended to solve 
the dilemma‘s plaguing the previous defence. Notably, the law recognises fear as 
qualifying trigger to loss of self-control. This was done to redress past prejudice against 
women who fell outside the ambit of the previous provocation defence. The new 
defence has dispensed with the requirement that the loss of self-control must be sudden. 
This is considered a welcome change especially in terms of recognising the different 
ways in which men and women lose self-control, the defence has been refined to 
accommodate other emotional states rather than a complete focus on angered states. 
 
However, the new provision has received criticism for being vague and leaving certain 
important concepts and requirements undefined. The loss of control requirement 
remains controversial and has been criticised for being obscure. In Dawes,
987
 the court 
emphasised that that loss of control is a subjective question which pertains to the 
defendant's state of mind.988 This is in contrast to the case of Jewell,989 where it was held 
that loss of control means a loss of the ability to act in accordance with considered 
judgment or a loss of normal powers of reasoning. 
 
In respect of the new objective test, though no mention is made of the notorious 
―reasonable man‖, the new provision retains its objective nature. Furthermore, the 
recognition of ―sex‖ as a factor to be considered indicates that different degrees of 
tolerance and self-restraint is expected of the different sexes, this may prove to be 
problematic and lead to further gender discrimination. Furthermore, the law excludes 
sexual infidelity from being a qualifying trigger, this requirement is considered to be 
discriminatory towards men. 
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The new defence in terms of the Coroners and Justice Act is an improvement of the old 
provocation defence though what is clear is that the loss of self-control requirement and 
the objective test are staples of the defence despite being identified as problematic by 
many commentators. Only time will tell whether this reformation of the defence, was a 
success. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE DEFENCE OF PROVOCATION IN CANADIAN 
LAW 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In Canada, the provocation defence exists as a partial defence to murder only, and 
therefore if the plea is successful, the accused will be convicted of the lesser charge of 
manslaughter.
990
 The defence is codified under section 232 of the Canadian Criminal 
Code.
991
 Essentially, the provocation defence represents the law‘s recognition of the 
relationship between emotion and its impact on capacity for self-control.
 992 
 
Furthermore, the defence of provocation can be considered as a way in which the law 
takes mercy upon an accused. Hence, it is intended to provide some leniency in 
circumstances where the accused is considered to be less blameworthy.
993  
The defence 
is considered to be one that establishes society‘s tolerance for murder in situations 
involving a loss of temper to such a large degree that it becomes acceptable.
994
 
Therefore, the provocation defence in Canada operates on a fundamental level as a 
mitigatory feature of the criminal law with the aim to circumvent the harshness of a 
murder conviction and more importantly, the penalty of life imprisonment for a 
conviction of murder.
995
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The defence of provocation may only be considered after the jury has ruled that the 
accused has committed second-degree murder.
996  
The element of intention is therefore 
an essential part of the defence.
997
  The defence of provocation is only available for a 
charge of murder and can only be used when all the elements of murder are 
established.
998  
Provocation can be used to reduce murder to manslaughter and can also 
be used as a mitigating factor during sentencing for manslaughter.
999
 
 
It is important to note that provocation is not a justification of the killing; hence, an 
accused cannot be exonerated; criminal liability and the criminal sanction still apply.
 1000 
There has been debate on whether the defence of provocation is a justification or 
excuse; Da Silva argues that this is ―a rare point of near-consensus in contemporary 
criminal law theory.‖1001 
 
Berman contests the current view and states that ―[a] defence is a justification if it 
renders the actor‘s conduct not morally wrongful; whereas, it is an excuse if it renders 
morally wrongful conduct not blameworthy‖.1002  Husak also states that the provocation 
defence exists as a partial justification which reduces the wrongfulness of an act as 
opposed to partial excuse which reduces the blame attributed to the accused, although 
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not enough to eliminate liability altogether.
1003
 A partial justification reduces the 
wrongfulness of conduct while partial excuse reduces the blame of the accused, but only 
to a limited degree which is insufficient to exclude liability totally.1004
 
 
There are three types of exculpatory defences, justification, excuses and exemptions. 
Justifications focus on the wrongfulness of conduct whereas excuse focuses on 
blameworthiness of the actor.
1005
 In terms of the doctrine of provocation, the killing of 
another human while under effects of provocation remains criminally wrong.
 1006 
 
Roach argues that the provocation defence does not easily fit into the 
excuse/justification framework.
1007
 The conduct of the accused is excused partially out 
of compassion to human frailty; however, the loss of control cannot always be excused. 
The requisite elements must be considered holistically and must indicate that the 
accused had a justifiable sense of being wronged. This must not be interpreted to mean 
that the victim is responsible for their own demise nor that the law condones the 
accused‘s conduct, it simply means that the law recognises that due to human frailty, a 
person acted inappropriately and disproportionality in response to conduct that was 
―sufficiently serious wrongful act or insult.‖1008 
 
In the case of Manchuk, the Supreme Court explained the concepts of justification and 
excuse in the context of provocation and stated that: 
―provocation …neither justifies nor excuses the act of homicide. But the law accounts the act and 
the violent feelings which prompted it less blameable because of the passion aroused by the 
provocation…though still sufficiently blameable to merit punishment- and it may be punishment 
of high severity- but not the extreme punishment of death.‖ 1009 
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The provocation defence in Canada is not without controversy, mainly due to the origins 
of the defence being rooted in mitigating violent reactions to marital infidelities.
1010
 It 
has been argued that the provocation defence contains archaic phrases designed to 
excuse acts performed in the heat of passion and therefore should be abolished for 
allowing deadly rage and violent responses to be treated with leniency.
1011
 
 
The provocation defence has been criticised for its perceived out dated approach, 
especially where spousal homicides are concerned.
1012
 The controversy relates to the 
perceived role that the provocation defence has played in excusing male violence 
against women has attracted immense criticisms.1013 These criticisms centre on the law‘s 
perceived bias towards the emotions of anger and jealousy, thus, it has been argued that 
abusive husbands are more likely to receive benefit of the defence and this cannot be 
accepted.1014 
 
Frequency of spousal battery in Canada, in a 1980 estimate, revealed that one out of ten 
Canadian women was battered by her partner every year.
1015
 Later studies reveal that the 
number of battered women in Canada could be as much as one million instances of 
abuse in a single year. The problem lies with a lack of understanding of the true nature 
of the defence and accepting that the provocation defence is not a licence to kill because 
of jealousy. 
1016
  
  
In 1998, in the consultation paper ―Reforming Criminal Code Defences‖ released by the 
Department of Justice in Canada, it was reported that out of the 115 reported murder 
cases wherein the provocation defence was raised; 62 of these cases involved domestic 
homicides and alarmingly 55 of the 62 cases involved men killing their spouses.
1017
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For these reasons, critics of the defence advocate that the defence should be limited to 
exceptional and rare cases where the loss of self-control was extreme and justifies 
murder being excused.
1018
 It has been argued that the notion of protecting one‘s honour 
has been replaced by ―heat of passion‖ and the boundaries of the defence have been 
widened to the extent that infidelity or even an attempt to end a relationship may force 
the basis of a defence of provocation.
1019
 
 
4.2. Development of the defence of provocation in Canada 
The defence of provocation currently codified under section 232 of the Criminal Code 
originated as a common law defence in England during the 17
th
 and 18
th
 century.
1020
  
The defence assumed a recognisable form during the 16
th
 century with the emergence of 
the concept of chance medley killings. 
1021
 Canadian criminal law originates from 18
th
 
and 19
th
 century English law.1022 In jurisdictions where the law derived from the English 
law, the provocation defence underwent immense developments. 
 
During the 1800‘s the defence evolved from a focus on defending ones honour to the 
focus on the loss of self-control.1023 Canadian law contains a mixture of common law 
and statute. Canadian law is governed by a single criminal code and together with the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms produces a common law system which 
functions alongside the statute.1024 
 
Historically, the provocation defence served three functions; firstly, it acknowledged 
that certain intentional killings were less blameworthy where the killer was 
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provoked.
1025
 However, this concession did not mean escape from punishment; the 
doctrine still required punishment although to a less harsh extent. Secondly, the defence 
was intended to provide assistance to those accused that killed due to provocation from 
escaping a conviction of murder and the death penalty. Thirdly, the provocation defence 
served the purpose of rebutting the rule of malice aforethought.
 1026
 
 
In 1879, the Royal Commission was appointed to consider the law relating to indictable 
offences and a Draft Criminal Code for England was formulated.
1027 
 Provocation as a 
defence was contained in section 176; the categorical approach was abandoned by its 
drafters as a generalised approach was favoured instead.
1028
 The Code employed the 
objective standard of the ordinary person to determine loss of self-control.
1029
 
 
Stalker states that the foundations of the Code were developed at common law, and the 
criminal law in Canada has developed ―in the shadow of an overarching, but certainly 
not all-inclusive, statute. Canadian criminal law has had to forge its own legal process 
because of the curious interaction between Code and common law.‖1030 
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4.2.1. Section 176 of the Draft Criminal Code for England:
 1031 
―Culpable homicide, which would otherwise be murder, may be reduced to manslaughter if the 
person who causes death does so in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation. 
Any wrongful act or insult of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the 
power of self-control may be provocation, if the offender acts upon it on the sudden  and before 
there has been time for his passion to cool. 
Whether any particular wrongful act or insult, whatever may be its nature , amounts to 
provocation, and whether the person provoked was actually deprived of the power self-control by 
the provocation which he received, shall be questions of fact: Provided that no one shall be 
deemed to give provocation to another only by doing that which he had a legal right to do, or by 
doing anything which the offender incited him to do in order to provide the offender with an 
excuse for killing or doing bodily harm to any person; 
Provided also, that an arrest shall not necessarily reduce the offence fro, murder to manslaughter 
because the arrest was illegal, but if the illegality was known to the offender it may be evidence of 
provocation.‖ 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
England did not enact the Draft Code,
1032
 however, it was not a wasted effort as the 
formulation of the Code provided the basis for Canadian Criminal Code in 1892. 
1033 
The provocation defence was codified under section 229 and was a reflection of section 
176 of the Draft Code.
 1034  
 
Forell notes that unlike the United States and Australia, the 1982 Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedom provides for gender equality free from government discrimination. 
Hence, one would expect Canada to lead the way in providing substantive equality, 
especially where the defence of provocation, stalking and sexual harassment is 
concerned.
1035
 Although these provisions have undergone some amendments since 
inception, the founding principles have stood the test of time and have remained 
unchanged since.
 1036      
The codified defence remained centered on the role of passion in 
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causing loss of self-control. Furthermore, the provision accommodated verbal insults as 
well as physical insults.
1037
  
 
Significantly, the provision eliminated declarations stating that wives were the property 
of their husbands.
1038
  It is contended by commentators that in a 21
st
 century Canada 
there should not be a place for ―antiquated notions of what constitutes insult and 
honour.‖1039 Although, it has been argued that these oppressive conceptualizations were 
not actually abolished but simply elided, they ―moved from the express to the implicit, 
shifted from the judges to the silent work of the jury...‖1040 The current provocation 
defence exists as a common law defence and is codified in terms of section 232 of the 
Criminal Code: 
 
4.2.2. Section 232(1)-(4) in Criminal Code R.S.C. 1985,c. C-46 
232. (1) Culpable homicide that otherwise would be murder may be reduced to manslaughter if the 
person who committed it did so in the heat of passion caused by sudden provocation. 
(2) A wrongful act or an insult that is of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary 
person of the power of self-control is provocation for the purposes of this section if the accused 
acted on it on the sudden and before there was time for his passion to cool. 
 (3) For the purposes of this section, the questions 
(a) whether a particular wrongful act or insult amounted to provocation, and 
(b) whether the accused was deprived of the power of self-control by the provocation that he 
alleges he received, 
are questions of fact, but no one shall be deemed to have given provocation to another by doing 
anything that he had a legal right to do, or by doing anything that the accused incited him to do in 
order to provide the accused with an excuse for causing death or bodily harm to any human being. 
(4) Culpable homicide that otherwise would be murder is not necessarily manslaughter by reason 
only that it was committed by a person who was being arrested illegally, but the fact that the 
illegality of the arrest was known to the accused may be evidence of provocation for the purpose 
of this section on who was being arrested illegally, but the fact that the illegality of the arrest was 
known to the accused may be evidence of provocation for the purpose of this section. 
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4.2.3. Operation of Section 232(1)-(4) 
The defence of provocation embodied in section 232 of the Code remains largely 
unchanged,
1041
 despite the evolutionary nature of society‘s values.1042 The development 
of the defence through the ages illustrates that the defence is influenced to a large extent 
by the societal context.1043  
 
In the English case of Semini, Lord Goddard C.J gave a summary on the relationship 
between the provocation defence and social context: 
―At a time when society was less secure and less settled in its habits, when the carrying of swords 
was as common as the use of a walking stick at the present day, and when duelling was regarded 
as involving no moral stigma if fairly conducted, it is not surprising that the courts took a view 
more lenient towards provocation than is taken today when life and property are guarded by an 
efficient police force and social habits have changed.‖ 1044 
 
Section 232 makes specific reference to emotion and describes emotion in terms of 
time, temperature and control. These are characteristic of a mechanical understanding of 
emotion. Emotion in this context is given relevance because of its relationship to 
capacity for self-control.1045 Anger has been the only emotion which has traditionally 
been linked to loss of self-control. Loss of self-control due to anger has traditionally 
been described by external outward signs of rage.1046 
 
4.2.3.1. Provocation applies to a murder charge only 
In the case of Campbell
1047
  the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that the defence is 
only available for a charge of murder and offences such as attempted murder do not fall 
within the ambit of section 232 of the Code.
 1048
  
Justice Martin for the Court in relying on the wording of section 232 of the Code stated: 
―Absence of provocation is not part of the actus reus of murder in the sense that absence of 
consent is part of the actus reus of rape. The defence of provocation exists with respect to a charge 
of murder even though all the elements of the definition of murder have been established; it is an 
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allowance made for human frailty which recognizes that a killing, even an intentional one, is 
extenuated by the loss of self-control caused by adequate provocation, and is less heinous than an 
intentional killing by a person in possession of his self-control. It is unnecessary to invoke the 
defence of provocation until all the elements of murder have been proved.
‖ 1049 
 
In respect of other offences, provocation may be used as a mitigating factor during 
sentencing. The reason for this limitation is due largely in part to the mandatory life 
imprisonment sentence for a conviction of murder.
 1050 
 
 
4.2.4. Elements of the defence  
Section 232 of the Code consists of a subjective test and objective test.1051 Although 
there are other requirements set out in section 232 of the Code, the subjective and 
objective criteria form the foundation of the defence. 1052  
 
In the case of Thibert, the majority stated: 
―First, there must be a wrongful act or insult of such a nature that it is sufficient to deprive an 
ordinary person of self-control as the objective element. Second, the subjective element requires 
that the accused act upon that insult on the sudden and before there was time for his passion to 
cool.‖ 1053 
 
Stuart states that if the section 232 is analysed more closely it is clear that there are four 
essential requirements.
1054 
1. Existence of a wrongful act or insult 
2. sufficient to deprive ordinary person of self-control 
3.  The provocation must be sudden 
4. The retaliation by the accused must have occurred ―on the sudden‖ and in the heat of 
passion.  
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The four elements make up a two test inquiry that is used to determine if provocation 
existed or not; both the subjective and objective tests must be satisfied for the defence to 
be successful.1055 
 
4.2.5. The Objective test 
4.2.5.1. “Existence of a wrongful act or insult”  
In terms of s.232 (2) the wrongful act or insult must be sufficient to deprive an ordinary 
person of self-control. This aspect of the objective leg of the defence is considered to be 
two-fold. Firstly, there must have been a wrongful act and secondly the wrongful act or 
insult must have been sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of self-control.
1056
 The 
defence of provocation is unique in that the criminal responsibility of the accused is 
dependent on the conduct of another, in most cases it is the victim, hoever it is not 
compulsory that the act in question emanate from the victim.1057  
 
Stuart argues that the meaning of ―wrongful‖ has never been properly decided. In the 
case of Schwartz
1058 the Supreme Court interpreted ―wrongful‖ to mean legally wrong 
as opposed to morally wrong, although this case involved the defence of insanity rather 
than provocation. 1059  
 
However, one definition put forward defines ―wrongful act‖ as an act which, if assessed 
objectively and without concern for the rights of all affected parties, would still amount 
to ―wrongful‖ and not necessarily criminal.1060 The courts have declared acts such a slap 
on the face,
1061
 a sudden swipe
1062
 an assault with a weapon
1063
 and an unsolicited 
homosexual advance
1064
 as amounting to ―wrongful act‖ in terms of this section.1065 
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Nelson criticises the current scope of the requirement of ―wrongful act‖ in regard to 
unsolicited homosexual advances and puts forward the solution of limiting the 
provocation to an ―unlawful act‖ rather than ―wrongful‖. This would ensure that men 
who kill their female partners or who raise homosexual advance as a form of wrongful 
act would no longer have a legitimate claim.
1066
 
 
Unlike the categorical approach in early English law,
1067
 the statutory form of the 
defence accommodates provocation in the form of insults as well as physical 
assaults.
1068  
 
In respect of cumulative provocation, the objective test may be used to adapt the 
provocation defence to the facts of the case where cumulative provocation was 
indicated.
1069
 Cumulative provocation has been defined as ―connected series of 
provoking incidents, the gravity of each of which is increased by what has gone 
before.‖1070  
 
In the case of Daniels,
1071
 the trial judge did not direct the jury to consider the history of 
the killing; consideration was only given to the circumstances immediately preceding 
the stabbing. 
 On appeal, the Northwest Territories Court as per Laycraft J.A held that the trial judge 
misdirected the jury and stated: 
―In my opinion it was [an] error to limit the events which the jury were to apply to the objective 
test to the events which took place in the Beaver House. The norm was not the reaction of an 
ordinary person looking for her husband who is told to ―F-off‘. Rather the proper test was the 
reaction of an ordinary person looking for her husband after the long series of assaults and 
indignities of this case, who then hears the fatal words from one of the persons responsible.‖1072 
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The court emphasised that the objective test was being adapted to consider the external 
events that triggered the violent reaction. It is not being adapted to consider personal 
attributes of the accused. 
 
In the case of Conway,
1073
 the court expanded on the general principle in set out 
Daniels
1074
 in regard to cumulative provocation.  
The Ontario Court of Appeal stated: 
―[P]resent acts or insults, in themselves insufficient to cause an ordinary man to lose self-control, 
may indeed cause such loss of self-control when they are connected with past events and external 
pressures of insult by acts or words and accordingly in considering whether an ordinary man 
would have lose self-control [a jury] must consider an ordinary man who had experienced that 
same series of acts or insults as experienced by the appellant…‖ 1075 
 
In respect of the meaning of ―insult‖, the courts have at times used the definition of 
―insult‖ provided by the Oxford dictionary1076: 
―an act, or the action , of attacking or assailing; an open and sudden attack or assault without 
formal preparations; injuriously contemptuous speech or behaviour , scornful utterance or action 
intended to wound self-respect ; an affront; indignity.‖ 1077 
 
In the case of Murdoch,
1078
 the court held that an ―insult‖ will always be wrongful and 
hence no matter how trivial an insult may be, it will satisfy this aspect of the test.
1079
 
The wrongful act or insult must be of such a nature that it deprived an ordinary person 
of self-control and assesses if the accused lost self-control. A common act or casual 
verbal insult is not sufficient to cause provocation and hence will not be considered as a 
―wrongful act or insult‖ in terms of the act.1080  
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In the case of Clarke,
1081
 the court stated: 
―in my opinion such words are not capable of being construed as an insult by an ordinary person‖.  
And 
―However, assuming that I am wrong, and such words can be construed as an insult, then they are 
not of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control‖. 
 
In regard to cases involving a misunderstanding or misconception, the court in 
Thibert,
1082
 stated that ―wrongful act or insult‖ does not have to be an illegal act. The 
wrongful act or insult must have emanated from the victim and not a third party. An 
accused person who mistakenly was under the impression that the victim was the source 
of the provocation may still plead the provocation defence.
 1083
 
 
In the case of Manchuk
1084
 the court per Chief Justice Duff stated: 
―acts of provocation committed by a third person, which might be sufficient to reduce the offence 
to manslaughter if the victim had in fact participated in then, may have the same effect where the 
offence against the victim is committed by the accused under the belief that the victim was a party 
to those acts, although not implicated on then in fact.‖ 
 
If in the circumstances that the accused was under the wrong impression, the 
misunderstanding would be relevant to the accused‘s subjective state. Renke states that 
―there is no capitulation to the accused‘s point of view, since the jury must assess the 
alleged provocation to determine whether it was sufficient to deprive an ordinary person 
of the power of self-control.‖ 1085 
 
However, the application of the objective test may prove problematic in this scenario as 
there is confusion on whether it applies to the accused misconception of the alleged 
provocative act or what was actually said and done by the deceased.
 1086  
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In the case of Hansford
1087
 the Court of Appeal took the approach that the application of 
the objective test should be applied to the actual conduct of the deceased and not the 
accused‘s perception.  
 
The court stated:
 
―Mistake of fact can be relevant to the objective branch of provocation because it is open to the 
accused to say that any ordinary person would have misinterpreted the facts which confronted the 
accused. However, the requirement for normalcy in the objective test must apply, not only to the 
reaction by an ordinary person to such events but, also to how the ordinary person would have 
interpreted such events.‖  
 
Renke states that the approach adopted in Hansford
1088
 has been rejected by many 
commentators who favour the approach that the act alleged provocative act must be 
assessed from the point of view of the accused.
 1089 
 
 The court in Thibert adopted this approach and stated: 
―When the deceased held [the accused‘s] wife by her shoulders in a proprietary and possessive 
manner and moved her back and forth in front of him while he taunted the accused to shoot him, a 
situation was created in which the accused could have believed that the deceased was mocking him 
and preventing him from his having the private conversation with this wife which was so vitally 
important to him.‖ 1090 
 
Renke argues that the court in  Thibert
1091
 neglected to consider if the accused alleged 
interpretation of the deceased‘s conduct was reasonable when considering the 
circumstances.
1092
 Furthermore, an assessment of how the ordinary person would have 
reacted when considering the accused‘s interpretation of the alleged provocative act is 
the sensible approach since the accused understanding of what transpired governs the 
effect of the provocative act.
 1093 
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Renke does concede that the approach in Hansford
1094
 provides protection against an 
accused person who had an understanding of the alleged provocative act, which cannot 
be reasonably linked to what was actually said.
1095
 It may not be necessary for the 
objective approach to afford such protection in these circumstances since if the 
accused‘s conduct is shown to be unreasonable, evidence in this regard would go 
against accepting it.
 1096 
 
The requirement of a wrongful act or insult in section 232 is governed by three further 
rules. Section 232(3)(b) having been criticised in Galagay
1097
 for being ambiguous, 
courts have given it a restrictive meaning since a wide interpretation would result in 
provocation caused by an insult being doomed to fail since a private insult is not illegal. 
Secondly, section 232(3)(b) has also been criticised for being convoluted and an 
unnecessary prohibition against a bogus defence of provocation. 
 
In the case of Squire 
1098
 the Court of Appeal stated that this provision applied to a 
situation where there was no authentic defence of provocation and the pleading of the 
provocation defence was merely ―colourable‖. Thirdly, section 232(4) excludes an 
illegal arrest. 
 
4.2.6. Ordinary person test 
This aspect of the provocation defence is most contentious of the entire defence.
1099
 The 
objective test is considered to be the cornerstone of the defence; this belief is based on 
the principle that all members of society have a right to demand certain minimum 
standards of behaviour.1100  
The court in the landmark case of Hill explained the purpose of the objective standard 
stating: 
―The law fixes a standard for all which must be met before reliance may be placed on the 
provocation defence. Everyone, whatever his or her idiosyncrasies, is expected to observe that 
                                                     
1094
 Hansford supra (n 1087). 
1095
 Renke supra (n 28). 
1096
 Renke supra (n 28) at 743. 
1097
 Galagay  (1972) 6 C.C.C (2d) 539 (Ont.C.A.). 
1098
 Squire (1975) 26 C.C.C. (2d) 219 (Ont.C.A). 
1099
 Nelson supra (n 1050) at 1024. 
1100
 Gorman supra (n 994) at 480. 
 180 
standard. It is not every insult or injury that will be sufficient to relieve a person from what would 
otherwise be murder.  The ―ordinary person‖ standard is adopted to fix the degree of self-control 
and restraint expected of all in society.‖ 1101 
 
 
The legal concept of the ordinary person is considered to reflect the ―normative 
dimensions of the defence; that is, behaviour which reflects society‘s norms and values 
and which will ultimately attract the laws compassion.‖1102 The jury is responsible for 
determining if the wrongful act or insult was sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of 
self-control. This requirement poses a major obstacle to the accused in the form of an 
objective test.
1103
  
 
The interpretation of the objective test has been the source of controversy in the 
provocation defence in Canadian law.
1104
 The application has been met with many 
difficulties, with the main problem centred on the extent to which personal attributes 
unique to the accused should be considered when applying the objective test.
 1105 
 
The traditional objective test has been shown to be problematic especially in adapting to 
different social circumstances.  
Grant poses the following question: 
―What kind of person might be ordinary? Is the ordinary male enraged by a homosexual advances, 
sexual touching‘s, misogynist statement, the display of pornography? Is she feminist or anti-
feminist? Is the ordinary white person enraged by a racist statement? The ordinary person of 
colour? Is the ordinary Black women enraged by the idea that she is fit only for domestic work or 
that she has an insatiable sexual appetite? Does the ordinary male insist on a total control of his 
spouse so that signs of independence are enraging? Is he enraged by infidelity or by the ending of 
a relationship, by a physical attack? Is he committed to sexual quality or not? Are the 
commonplace reminders of sexual and racial hierarchies provocation, or instead the not-so-
commonplace rebellions against inequality? Would a ―nagging‖ wife provoke an ordinary person, 
but not a racist sexual harasser?‖1106 
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The objective test has undergone modification and expansion over the years to the 
extent taking into account certain characteristics or allowing the provocation to be put 
into relevant context, for instance in cases of racism, is not an impossible task.
1107
 
The traditional approach of the courts in Canada was to follow the narrow application of 
the objective test set down by the English courts in cases such as Bedder.
 1108  
 
However, this approach required the court to disregard relevant contextual 
circumstances when pronouncing on the case.
 1109
 The restrictive interpretation of the 
objective test is evident in the case of Wright, where the court held that the accused‘s 
relationship with his father could not be considered when applying the objective test 
despite the fact that it was a major source of the provocation alleged.
 1110
 At this stage, 
subjective factors such as the character, temperament and idiosyncrasies of the accused 
was not be considered when applying the ordinary person test, at this point in law the 
courts placed reliance on the English case of Bedder.
1111
 Furthermore, in the case of 
Parnekar,
 1112
 the court held that the ordinary person is not the accused and cannot be 
given the same attributes or circumstances of accused. In this case the accused was a 
black person and provoked by a racial slur. 
 
However, this restrictive approach followed by the court in Bedder
1113
 was later over- 
ruled in the case of Camplin.
1114 
The courts recognised a deficiency in the law where 
relevant contextual circumstances where ignored in making a finding.
1115
 In the 
Supreme Court case of Hill
1116
 adopted a broader approach in conceptualising the 
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ordinary person; the court accepted the new wider interpretation of Camplin
1117
 
although its pronouncements in regard to the role of the trial judge were rejected.
 1118
  
 
Prior to Hill, the Supreme Court of Canada interpreted the objective test more 
restrictively.
1119
 The case of Hill was ground breaking as it changed the nature of the 
objective standard in the provocation defence by allowing consideration of the 
accused‘s age and sex. 1120 
 
In this case the accused, the accused was 16 years old when he stabbed the deceased 
after making unwanted homosexual advances. At the trial, the accused raised the 
defence of provocation and self-defence. The trial judge directed the jury to not consider 
the particular mental make-up of the accused when making the enquiring into if the 
provocative act was enough to deprive an ordinary person the power of self-control.  
 
The court held that the jury could only consider subjective factors when deciding if the 
accused acted all of a sudden before there was time for the passions to cool. The trial 
judge denied the defence counsels request that the jury be instructed to consider if there 
was wrongful act or insult sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the age and sex of 
the accused the power of self-control.
1121
 Subsequently, the accused was found not 
guilty of first-degree murder but guilty of second-degree murder.
1122
  
 
The accused appealed the conviction to the Ontario Court of Appeal. The Appellate 
Court ordered a new trial on the basis that the trial judge erred in not instructing the jury 
to take into consideration the Hill‘s age and sex when applying the objective test. 1123 
 
The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court and succeeded, the conviction of murder was 
reinstated. The court allowed a more flexible objective test wherein some of the accused 
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individual characteristics could be considered and Stuart states that the courts partial 
softening of the previously restrictive interpretation of the objective standard was 
welcome.
 1124
 
 
In Hill, Dickinson C.J stated that the less restrictive approach is basically a matter of 
common sense and elaborated… 
―…the ―collective good sense‖ of the jury will naturally lead it to ascribe to the ordinary person 
any general characteristics relevant to the provocation in question. For example, if the provocation 
is a racial slur, the jury will think of an ordinary person with the racial background that forms the 
substance of the insult. To this extent, particular characteristics will be ascribed to the ordinary 
person. Indeed, it would be impossible to conceptualise a sexless or ageless ordinary person. 
Features such as sex, age or race do not detract from a person‘s characterisation as ordinary. Thus 
particular characteristics that are not peculiar or idiosyncratic can be ascribed to an ordinary 
person without subverting the logic of the objective test for provocation.‖ 1125 
 
The scope of the objective test was reviewed in the controversial case of Thibert,
1126
 the 
accused‘s wife was involved in an extra-marital affair with her colleague. The accused 
had come to know of the affair as his wife confessed. Despite his wife‘s declaration, the 
accused was committed to his marriage and tried to reconcile. After a period of two 
months the accused‘s wife eventually left the accused and did so via a telephone call to 
the accused to inform him of her decision to leave. The accused persuaded his wife to 
meet him at a restaurant the following morning. The accused‘s wife attended the 
meeting along with her lover. At the meeting the accused made further attempts at 
reconciliation; however, it was to no avail since the wife of the accused remained 
unrelenting. 
 
At this point the accused made a threat to his wife‘s lover saying: 
“I hope you intend on moving back east or living under assumed names.... Because as long as I 
have got breath in my body I am not going to give up trying to get my wife back from you, and I 
will find you wherever you go.‖ 1127 
 
                                                     
1124
 Stuart supra (n 70) at 544. 
1125
 Hill supra (n 1064) at 331. 
1126
 Thibert supra (n 1053). 
1127
 Thibert supra (n 1053) at 41. 
 184 
After this encounter, the accused called the work-place of his wife and again pleaded for 
her to return. After his failed attempt, he decided to go to her work-place and speak to 
her ―away from the influence‖ of the deceased. This was important to the accused since 
he had successfully managed to convince his wife to stay with him on an earlier 
occasion. Before leaving his house, the accused retrieved his rifle (which was loaded) 
and kept it in the back of his car, thinking that he might have to kill the deceased.
 1128
 
 
However, in his testimony the accused stated that a few miles from home he discarded 
that thought and instead use the rifle just to scare and thereby get his wife to come back 
to him. The accused then proceeded to his wife's workplace and followed her when she 
went to the bank where he insisted that they find some private location to talk.
1129
 
Although his wife agreed, she returned to her workplace out of fear of her husband. The 
accused followed his wife into the parking lot. While he was attempting to persuade his 
wife to go somewhere to talk, the deceased arrived and attempted to lead the wife back 
into the building.  
 
The accused, upon seeing this removed the rifle from his the car. The deceased was 
given some assurance by the accused‘s wife that the rifle was not loaded. The deceased 
started walking towards the accused, placing his hands on accused‘s wife‘s shoulders 
swinging her back and forth, saying, ―Come on big fellow, shoot me? You want to shoot 
me? Go ahead and shoot me.‖1130 The deceased kept coming towards the accused, 
disregarding the accused‘s warning to stay back. The accused then fired the rifle killing 
the deceased. The accused testified that his ―his eyes were closed as he tried to retreat 
inward and the gun discharged‖. 
 
The accused was charged with first-degree murder of his wife‘s lover. In his defence, he 
stated that the provocative act occurred when the deceased held his wife possessively 
and moved towards him despite being warned to stay back while uttering ―Come on big 
fellow, shoot me? You want to shoot me? Go ahead and shoot me.‖ 
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At trial the judge left the defence of provocation with the jury, but the judge did not 
instruct the jury that the Crown was under the onus of disproving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the accused had acted under provocation. The accused was found guilty of 
second-degree murder but appealed the conviction to the Alberta Court of Appeal on 
this basis. 
 
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the basis that there was no air of reality to 
support leaving the defence to the jury; hence, the failure of the trial judge to instruct 
the jury on this basis did not prejudice the accused. 
 
The case came before the Supreme Court the issue centred around the question on 
whether evidence existed to warrant leaving the defence to the jury in the first place. As 
a rule, the Judge must be content that there exists some evidence that the wrongful act 
or insult was sufficient to cause an ordinary person to lose control and that this did in 
fact cause the accused to lose self-control. If such evidence is not shown, then the Judge 
is under no obligation to put the defence to the jury. 
 
The Supreme Court held that such evidence did exist and this entitled the accused to a 
new trial.
1131
  
Cory J explained how the ordinary person test should be interpreted: 
―I think the objective element should be taken as an attempt to weigh in the balance those very 
human frailties which sometimes lead people to act irrationally and impulsively against the need to 
protect society by discouraging acts of homicidal violence.‖ 1132 
 
 
The court reiterated the sentiments in Hill
1133
 stating that the objective test serves to 
ensure that the criminal law encourages reasonable and responsible behaviour.
1134
 
 
The judgment of Thibert has been widely criticised, since it is argued that the nature of 
the objective standard has been changed so drastically that it resembles the subjective 
standard. One of the main controversies plaguing the Thibert judgment surrounds the 
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Courts decision that a greater number of the accused‘s characteristics should be taken 
into account when applying the ordinary person standard. 
1135
 
 
The court stated:  
―if the test is to be applied sensibly and with sensitivity, then the ordinary person must be taken to 
be of the same age and sex, and must share with the accused such other factors as would give the 
act or insult in question special significance.‖1136 
 
Furthermore, Cory J analysed previous case law regarding the ordinary person test and 
stated: 
―In summary then, the wrongful act or insult must be one which could, in light of the past history 
of the relationship between the accused and the deceased, deprive an ordinary person, of the same 
age, and sex, and sharing with the accused such other factors as would give the act or insult in 
question a special significance, of the power of self-control.‖ 1137 
 
The revised interpretation of the ordinary person test in Thibert has been met with 
criticisms, especially if gender of the accused is placed in the context of the wrongful 
act or insult. Currently, it is somewhat uncertain if gender is relevant to judge the 
wrongful act or insult in context or if it relevant to determine the level of self-control 
expected from the ordinary person. 
 
Gorman states that the court in Thibert
1138
 lost sight of the fact that accused provoked 
the incident and not the deceased. It was the accused who forced a volatile confrontation 
with bringing a weapon.
 1139  
Furthermore, the court‘s interpretation of ―confrontation‖ 
is wrong, since there was no confrontation or insult, the words “shoot me” cannot be 
considered an insult which permitted a killing. The interpretation of insult is 
problematic and gives permission to jealous husbands to act on their jealousy and 
anger.
1140
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However, the Thibert judgment has received some praise specifically for endowing the 
ordinary person with characteristics that can place the act or insult in context; however, 
there are worries that by making the gender of the accused relevant, violence against 
woman by men may be excused and is thus problematic. 
1141
  
 
Such an approach is dangerous as stated in the case of Young: 
―It would set a dangerous precedent to characterize terminating a relationship as an insult or wrong 
act capable of constituting provocation to kill. The appellant may have been feeling anger, 
frustration and sense of loss, particularly if he was in a position of emotional dependency on the 
victim as his counsel asserts, but this is not provocation of a kind to reduce murder to 
manslaughter. The appellant says he does not remember where or when he picked up the knife, but 
he was obviously armed with it when he left the apartment.‖ 1142 
 
Interestingly, the cases of Hill
1143
 and Camplin
1144
 warned against considering factors 
that are unique to the accused; however, Cory.J referred to the cases of Daniels
1145
 and 
Conway
1146
 to support his view that the courts will allow consideration of the past 
relationship between the accused and the victim.
 1147
 
 
Sahni states that the interpretation by Cory J of Daniels
1148
 and Conway
1149
 is 
problematic for two reasons. Firstly, in both cases, the courts allowed background 
events to be considered in the objective test. However, the court used these cases to 
demonstrate that the courts will consider the relationship between the accused and the 
victim even when there were no instances of provocation between them.
 1150
  
 
Secondly, in application of the ordinary person test, the court allowed evidence that 
showed particular idiosyncrasies together with the mental and emotional state of the 
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accused. By applying the ordinary test in this manner the court went against the 
warnings in Camplin
1151
 and Hill
1152
 and this may be problematic.
1153
 
Sahni is of the opinion that in determining the ordinary person standard, consideration 
of relationships that may have the potential create provocative acts or insults widens the 
objective test problematically.
1154
 Besides acknowledging the existence of infidelity, the 
court in addition considered the mental condition and emotional state of the accused: 
―At the time of the shooting [the accused] was distraught and had been without sleep for 
some 34 hours.‖ 1155 
 
In another significant case, the trial court in Tran
1156
 accepted the defence of 
provocation and held that the Crown had failed to disprove the elements of the defence 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused was consequently acquitted of second-degree 
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 Tran supra (n 1008) at 148, the accused, Tran was estranged from his wife. The couple were 
estranged for a few months prior to the killing. The appellant had relinquished his set of keys to the 
matrimonial home; however, the appellant deceitfully kept another set of keys.
 
On the afternoon of 
the killing, Tran entered his wife‘s bedroom armed with a knife through a half closed door. He 
surprised his wife who was in bed with her lover. Tran immediately proceeded with an attack on the 
couple, scratching the deceased‘s eyes accompanied by kicking and punching. Tran also attacked his 
wife in the same fashion. Tran left the bedroom and went to the kitchen and retrieved two other 
butcher knives. He used the knives to stab the deceased in the chest. The deceased pleaded with 
Tran for an opportunity to talk but to no avail. Tran continued to yell angrily. Tran stopped is attack 
to call his Godfather to whom he uttered ―I caught them.‖  Tran then resumed his fatal attack on the 
deceased. Ms Tran tried to shield the already wounded deceased who was already having trouble 
breathing. Tran then grabbed his estranged wife and asked ―Are you beautiful?‖ he then slashed her 
across her face causing a deep cut from her right ear across her right cheek.
 
The deceased at this 
point tried to crawl out the room but was soon followed by Tran who followed him and stabbed him 
with both knives.
 
Ms Tran tried to close the bedroom door but Tran forced himself back inside. He 
saw his Godfather arrive from the window, he proceeded outside the room and stepped on the 
deceased‘s chest and stomach. He then resumed stabbing the deceased in his chest and then stepped 
on his face. Tran then slashed his own hands with one of the knives and then put the knife in the 
hands of the deceased who was lying motionless. The autopsy revealed that the deceased was 
stabbed 17 times.
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murder and convicted of manslaughter. The Crown appealed to the Court of Appeal 
Alberta 
1157 
and was successful, the Appeal Court held unanimously that the defence had 
no evidential foundation in the first place. The conviction of manslaughter was set aside 
and substituted with second-degree murder. The accused subsequently appealed the 
conviction to the Supreme Court. The appeal was unsuccessful. 
 
The Supreme Court was in agreement with the Appeal Court that the defence lacked an 
―air of reality‖. The court stated that the trial judge proceeded on the wrong legal 
principles regarding the requirements of defence of provocation and this resulted in in 
the trial court erroneously finding that the defence had no evidential basis.
1158 
The 
Supreme Court held that the accused did not suffer an ―insult‖ within the meaning of 
section 232 of the Criminal Code.  
 
The conduct of accused‘s wife and the deceased could not constitute an insult within the 
ordinary meaning of the word; in the circumstances of the case.  
The court stated that 
―nothing done by the complainant or the victim come close to meeting the definition of insult. 
Their behaviour was not only lawful, it was discreet and private and entirely passive vis-á-vis [the 
appellant].They took pains t keep their relationship hidden… Their behaviour came to his attention 
only because he gained access to the building by falsely saying he was there to pick up his mail‖ 
1159 
 
The evidence regarding Tran‘s prior knowledge about his wife‘s relationship with the 
deceased ―belied any notion that this supposed ―insult‖ would have struck ―upon a mind 
unprepared for it‖ as required by law‖. 1160  Furthermore, there was no air of reality to 
the accused ―acting on the sudden at the time of killing‖. The court stated that there was 
nothing sudden about his discovery and it was actually the deceased and accused‘s wife 
who were surprised by Tran‘s appearance. The factual findings made by the trial judge 
shows that accused not only suspected his wife‘s affair but also spied on the couple‘s 
activities and eavesdropped on conversations.
1161
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In Tran, the court commented that the terms ―reasonable person‖ and the ―ordinary 
person‖ have been used interchangeably.1162 However, the term ―reasonable person‖ 
defines the standard of behaviour that is expected of a person in the eyes of the law, 
conduct which complies with standards placed by the law and therefore will not attract 
legal liability. The term ―ordinary person‖ suggests the normative nature of the defence 
and behaviour of the ordinary person reflects society‘s norms and values, behaviour of 
ordinary person will attract the laws mercy. In this sense the term ―ordinary person‖ is 
more appropriate.
1163
 
 
The court cautioned against adopting subverting the logic of the objective standard 
when applying the more flexible ordinary test. The court stated that care must be taken 
not to make the ordinary person into the accused and these defeats the purpose of the 
test. Furthermore, the subjectivising the objective test disregards the cardinal principle 
which criminal law is responsible for, that is to set acceptable standards of behaviour. 
The objective standard encourages reasonable and non-violent behaviour and this is the 
reason that criminal law endorses the objective standard.
1164
 The objective standard 
must be informed by contemporary norms of behaviour and these included fundamental 
core values such as commitment to equality.  
 
Furthermore, that in certain cases giving the ordinary person certain characteristics of 
the accused was a matter of common sense. An example would be where the 
provocative act was a racial slur; in this instance giving the ordinary person racial 
characteristics would be appropriate. An instance where it would be inappropriate 
would be where the ordinary person was given the characteristic of homophobia where 
the accused was the recipient of a homosexual advance.
 1165
 
The court stated: 
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Similarly, there can be no place in this objective standard for antiquated beliefs such as ―adultery 
is the highest invasion of property‖… nor indeed for any form of killing based on such 
inappropriate conceptualization of ―honour‖. 1166 
 
In regard to the circumstances of the accused, the court stated that the particular 
circumstances will also be relevant in determining the proper standard against which the 
accused‘s conduct should be judged. The court stated that this was a matter of common 
sense and it would be impossible to conceptualise the reaction of the ordinary person by 
disregarding relevant context. 
 
The court further elaborated: 
….there is an important distinction between contextualizing the objective standard, which is 
necessary and proper, and individualizing it, which only serves to defeat its purpose.
 1167
 
 
The issue of considering the accused‘s cultural background in the objective test surfaced 
in the case of Ly.
1168
 The defendant was charged with murder of his partner because he 
suspected her of being unfaithful to him. Ly strangled his lover because he alleged that 
he was provoked by her alleged affair and as a result lost face in the community. The 
accused was born and raised in Vietnam and alleged that in his community it is a great 
dishonour for one‘s wife to be unfaithful. 
 
The defence argued on appeal that the accused must be judged against the objective 
standard of the ordinary Vietnamese man. The jury was asked to disregard the 
defendant‘s cultural background and the alleged attitude regarding woman and 
infidelity. The court stated that it would only be appropriate to consider the accused‘s 
nationality if the provocative act was one of a racial slur.
 1169
 The court confirmed the 
conviction of second-degree murder as a result. 
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The issue of considering an accused‘s cultural background in applying the objective test 
again surfaced in the case of Nahar,
1170
 where the accused, a Sikh man, killed his wife 
after being rejected. The accused alleged that his wife was involved in extra-marital 
relationships with other men and her acts violated the ―shared expectations of the Sikh 
community and the Indo-community at large, as the proper conduct of a married woman 
and as to the importance attached to these expectations.‖1171 When the accused 
confronted the deceased about her behaviour, she confessed and told the accused that he 
could not stop her. Upon hearing this, the accused stabbed his wife in the chest and 
neck. 
 
The accused at trial raised provocation but was nevertheless convicted of second-degree 
murder. Justice Fraser did not consider the accused‘s cultural background as being 
important and stated that the accused‘s commitment to the values of the Sikh 
community was questionable. On appeal, the defence asserted that the trial court erred 
in not considering the accused‘s cultural background. However, the appeal court did not 
make this finding on the basis that it was unclear if the trial court had taken account of 
the accused‘s background.  
 
The court did however state that the accused‘s cultural background was relevant to the 
ordinary person test despite the provocation not being an ethnic slur. This is in contrast 
with the finding in Ly.
1172
 
 
In applying Thibert,
1173
 the court stated the consequences of the accused‘s upbringing 
and traditional values must be taken into account when determining the gravity of the 
provocative insult as well as determining loss of self-control.
1174
 However, ultimately 
the court found against the accused. 
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In the case of Humaid
1175
 the court was also faced with the issue of cultural background 
and the objective test, in this case, the accused was charged with first-degree murder of 
his wife. At trial the accused pleaded that he lacked the requisite intention for murder, 
alternatively he had been provoked in terms of section 232 of the Criminal Code. The 
trial judge stated that the comment regarding ―little pill‖ made by deceased constituted 
an ―insult‖ within the meaning of section 232. Furthermore, when considered 
holistically, the evidence showed that the defence had an air of reality and should be put 
to the jury. 
 
The trial judge gave the following instructions to the jury: 
―Our law adopts the standard of an ―ordinary person‖ to fix the level or degree of self-control and 
restraint expected of all in Canadian society. So on this element of provocation; you need to 
consider whether what is alleged here as provocation is beyond tolerance of an ordinary person. In 
this exercise, certain background facts pertaining to Mr. Humaid as I have just mentioned may be 
necessary considerations. However, these considerations must not include peculiar, idiosyncratic 
traits arising from Mr. Humaid‘s Muslim faith or specific to his culture.‖ 1176 
 
The appellate court held that an insult that specifically targets the accused culture or 
religion may require that the aspects of religion and cultural background to be included 
into the ordinary person test. 
 
The case of Humaid
1177
  is significant because it exposes the complex risks associated 
with cultural and religious claims in criminal courts. This case is said to have exposed 
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the cultural politics of the ordinary person standard in a similar manner to which gender 
politics were exposed in Thibert
1178
 and Stone
1179
.
 1180 
 
In the case of Parent,
1181
 the Supreme Court of Canada ordered a new trial after finding 
that the trial judge misdirected the jury by suggesting that anger, even if not amounting 
to provocation can be used to reduce the conviction from murder to manslaughter by 
excluding the element of intention.
1182
 The court based its findings on the principle that 
the traditional elements of the defence of provocation must be established in order for 
the defence to be employed.
1183
  
 
Gorman states the Supreme Court was correct in finding that anger alone is insufficient 
for provocation to be raised. The ―threshold test‖ demands that the constituent elements 
of the defence must be established to a sufficient degree before it should be put to the 
jury. 
 
Unlike Thibert, the court held that there was an air of reality to the defence and thus has 
virtually legitimised a ―stand-alone defence‖ based on anger caused by the ending of a 
marriage.
1184
 The finding in this case is thus welcome as it sends a clear message that a 
meaningful threshold test must be applied especially where the killing was a spousal 
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homicide and anger and jealousy is not enough for the defence of provocation to be 
raised successfully.
1185
 
 
Trotter noted that the outcome of the case of Parent
1186
 suggests that anger alone is 
insufficient to vitiate the intent for murder.
1187
 The author poses a question of whether 
trial judges are to remain silent on this evidence and its application outside section 232, 
or should they instruct juries not to consider evidence of anger in this manner.
1188
  
 
Trotter notes that the court needs to revisit this issue and clarify the broad implications 
of the judgement.  Critics of the defence say it promotes violence; however, Renke says 
it accounts ―for the complexity of being human.‖1189 However, Stuart contends that if 
this argument were to be accepted, then section 232 would need to be amended to 
provide for a complete acquittal in the case of any offence.
1190
 It has been contended 
that that if section 232 is founded on the lack of power of self-control, it is inconsistent 
with founding requirement that the act be voluntary.
1191
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4.2.7. The role of self-control in the defence 
In the legal concept of self-control, emotion is understood to be a powerful, irrational 
internal force which the individual cannot control.
1192
 The underlying rationale behind 
the defence of provocation is that the provocative behaviour committed by another 
induced an angered state to the extent that self-control was lost. This justifies the 
aggressive response to the provocation because it is made on impulse, ―with 
understanding of its character, but without consideration and rejection of alternative 
courses of action.
1193
  
 
The role of passion in causing loss of self-control remains an integral part of the 
provocation defence.When loss of self-control is experienced, on a technical level it 
suggests that conduct is involuntary and therefore an excusing defence is unnecessary 
because actus reus is lacking. However, it is assumed that a strong enough link exists 
between mind and body to find voluntariness. Essentially, the mind is directing the body 
but other courses of action cannot be chosen.1194  
 
 
4.2.8. The subjective test
1195
  
Once the jury has determined that the provocation would have deprived the ordinary 
person of the self-control, then they must move to assess the subjective aspect of the 
defence. Quigley notes that the subjective test is easier to pass then the objective test.
1196
  
 
Section 232(1) expressly requires that the provocation be sudden.The law has limited 
the time frame in which the provocation defence operates in this respect. The 
requirement in subsection (2) that the homicide must be committed ―in the heat of 
passion caused by sudden provocation‖ and ―on the sudden and before there was time 
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  Reilly supra (n 22) at 138. 
1193
  Colvin  supra (n 1069) at 221. 
1194
 Colvin  supra (n 1069) at 221 
1195
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for his passion to cool‖. Elements of deliberation will result in the defence failing due to 
the subjective test not being satisfied. 
 
Essentially, the retaliation by the accused must have occurred ―on the sudden‖ and in 
the heat of passion even if the act or insult was considered sufficient to deprive an 
ordinary person of self-control.1197 The purpose of the requirements in the subjective test 
is primarily to ensure that acts of revenge can be distinguished from those that were 
provoked. Both the act of provocation and the retaliation of the accused must have 
occurred on the sudden. The killing by the accused must have been committed with 
intention and ―before there was time for his passion to cool‖.1198 
 
This aspect of the defence in terms of section 232 of the Code is tested subjectively by 
applying individual factors such as idiosyncratic personality traits and temperament; this 
includes factors such as intoxication.1199 In Hill, Chief Justice Dickson stated that the 
subjective test assesses the mind-set of the accused and the jury should assess if the 
reaction of the accused to the provocation was committed on the sudden and before 
there was time for passions to cool.1200 The court further stated that in determining if the 
accused reacted as a result of the provocation, the jury are entitled to consider the 
mental state and psychological temperament of the accused.1201 
 
The subjective test is used to determine what occurred in the mind of the accused at the 
time of the killing. All factors can thus be considered.
1202
 Although the objective 
components may seem more difficult; the accused may still fail the subjective test if the 
killing involved deliberation which negates the requirement of acting on the sudden an 
in the heat of passion.
1203
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The main significance of the subjective requirement is to determine how fast the 
accused reacted. A causal connection between the provocative act and the killing must 
exist. Hence, the accused must not have acted only because there was provocation but 
he must have been provoked. The retaliation must not be calculated.
1204
 
 
It is a requirement that the accused‘s disturbed mental state caused by the provocation 
must have remained till the killing. If the evidence shows that the accused may have 
regained self-control sometime after the provocative act then the defence of provocation 
would not be available to the accused since the adverse effect of the provocative act on 
the accused‘s self-control no longer existed. 1205  
 
In the case of Faid,
1206
 the Supreme Court of Canada, per Justice Dickson, stated that 
there are two key elements that are essential for the defence of provocation to be 
successful and these are: a) The accused must have killed the victim ―in the heat of 
passion‖ and (b) the killing must be brought on by ―sudden provocation‖. 
 
 
In this case, the killing arising from provocation was described as ―impulsively in hot 
blood‖.1207  The time limit put in place is to ensure that the defence cannot be abused by 
the ―calculating revenge killer (however, sorely provoked)‖.1208 
 
In the Supreme Court in Tripodi
 1209
 the court stress that both the provocation and the 
retaliation must be sudden. In this case the accused had earlier learnt of his wife‘s 
infidelity and abortion but only lost self-control when the victim confessed; it was held 
that the defence was not available because he was not taken by surprise.   
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1204
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The court stated:  
―Suddenness must characterise both the insult and the act of retaliation…I take…[sudden 
provocation] to mean that the wrongful act or insult must strike upon a mind unprepared for it, that 
it must make an unexpected impact that takes the understanding by surprise and sets the passions 
aflame.
 ―1210 
 
The issue of ―passions aflame‖ occurred in the case of Malott,1211 the Ontario Court of 
Appeal stated that the accused could not qualify for the provocation defence since her 
actions showed a lack of passion. 
 
In Faid,
1212
 the accused was in a volatile relationship with the deceased where the 
accused was often provoked, it was held that evidence must show that despite the 
history of the relationship the accused‘s loss of self-control was brought upon by the last 
provocative act, it must have been the ―last straw‖.1213 The court stated that the 
provocative act must have induced the breakdown of the accused‘s self-control. 1214 
 
In the case of Salamon, the defence was unsuccessful since the accused had resumed a 
domestic argument. The Supreme Court of Canada stated that the accused cannot have 
instigated the provocation and then claim to be a victim of provocation. The accused 
must have acted on the sudden. Furthermore, the retaliation must be a heated response 
to the provocation.
 1215
  
 
The suddenness requirement is criticised for working against women specifically since 
they are less likely to kill ―on the sudden‖ and ―in the heat of passion‖.1216 Hence, these 
requirements create problems for women to use the defence.
1217
 Gorman contends that 
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the subjective test is unworkable, and instead of considering the individual 
characteristics of the accused, juries should be directed to assess if the accused was 
provoked and if the provocation was of such a nature that it could be excused.
1218
 
 
Furthermore, the loss of self-control must be attributed to the wrongful act or insult. A 
loss of self-control is thus not sufficient on its own. Sudden impulse is seen as the key to 
provocation, as it allows the recognition of an isolated nature of events and the 
defendant‘s sudden reaction to it, Gorman thus argues that in Thibert1219, it was the 
sudden impulse element which was lacking.
1220
 
 
Gorman states that the accused‘s conduct in Thibert1221 was the antithesis of a sudden 
loss of control.
1222
 The loss of control exhibited by defendant was not sufficient to meet 
this requirement as the ―loss of control must be sudden, unexpected, temporary and 
exceptional‖. In this light, the accused‘s anger was neither exceptional nor 
temporary
.1223 
The case of Thibert resulted in the history of relationship being 
considered provided that there are elements which indicate a sudden act or insult.
1224
 
 
Gorman emphatically states that the key to the provocation is the requirement of 
―sudden impulse‖ should form an integral part of the defence of provocation which 
recognises the isolated of the event and takes cognisance of the accused sudden 
response to it.
1225
 Murder, as heinous as it is, is excused because of the temporary and 
complete loss of self-control. The exceptional nature of the event is essential and 
excused because in the eyes of the law such an occurrence would be improbable. 
Gorman states that the conduct of the accused in Thibert was the ―antitheses of a sudden 
loss of control brought on by an unexpected and exceptional event‖. 1226 
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However, Stuart is critical of the requirements that the retaliation be ―on the sudden 
before there was time for his passion to cool‖1227 and ―in the heat of passion‖ 1228 stating 
that these provisions are vague.
1229
  
 
Dick contends that the assessment of the subjective component in Thibert is 
problematic, since it is shocking that the court could conclude that the killing met the 
requirement of ―on the sudden‖.1230 The defendant knew of his wife‘s affair for a few 
months prior and was aware of her desire to leave the marriage. Furthermore, the fact 
that he sought out his wife at the work place of the deceased indicates that there was 
nothing sudden about the situation. Despite these factors, the defence succeeded.
1231
 
 
Provisions such as section 232(1) which require that  the retaliation occur while ―in the 
heat of passion ― and section 232 (2)  that the action occur ―on the sudden and before 
there was time for his passion to cool‖ are criticised for being repetitive and vague. For 
instance, in some cases a time lapse of a four to five minutes between the provocation 
and the retaliation was a critical in determining if that the defendant had not acted while 
provoked.
1232
  
 
This begs the question of whether a few minutes less would have made the difference to 
the outcome. Stuart states that flexibility is required and an assessment of how 
timeously that particular accused would have reacted.
1233
 Stuart argues that the 
requirements of sudden provocation and sudden reaction which are difficult to apply 
and the ―their wisdom can be seriously questioned‖.1234 
 
Thornton stated that in the context of pure retributivism, subjectivism makes perfect 
sense in view of criminal culpability and by reviewing three theses with differing views 
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on subjectivity and objectivity he noted that the authors‘ rejected pure retributivism for 
crime and punishment; however failed to argue their cases convincingly in a different 
way.
1235
 Anand and Roach noted that both the England and Canadian justice systems 
still do not respond to homicide in a principled and rational manner as there is a great 
deal of uncertainty and there is need for judges to explain the law of homicide to juries 
due to the seriousness of the crimes.
1236
  
 
4.2.9. Role of the judge and burden of proof 
The actions of the accused are judged by the jury who are a representation of the 
society. The jury is not required to decide on the reasonableness or the proportionality 
of the accused‘s retaliation to the alleged provocation, since, the accused did kill a 
person and that is not reasonable or proportional in the circumstances wherein no other 
mitigating circumstances existed.  
 
The focus of the jury is to determine if the ordinary person would have lost self-control 
due to the wrongful act or insult as the accused did.1237 The accused bears no burden of 
proving the defence, only a tactical burden on whether the defence of provocation 
should be raised or not.
 1238
 The trial judge may only put the defence to the jury once it 
is determined that ―an air of reality‖ on the evidence exists. 
 
In the case of Power, the accused shot and killed the deceased after a fight ensued with 
one of the accused‘s friends.1239 The Newfoundland Court of Appeal held that there was 
no air of reality to the defence of provocation since none of the elements of the then 
section 215 existed.
1240
 Furthermore, the circumstances could not be considered 
exceptional to ―justify finding that the wrongful act or insult could emanate from a third 
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party, there being no association whatsoever between the victim, the provoker and the 
provoked.‖1241 
 
In the case of Ivany the Newfoundland Court of Appeal again dealt with this issue and 
concluded that: 
―The section requires the provoking act to be such as to deprive an ordinary person of power of 
self-control. To hold that words which merely got on the nerves of someone could be sufficient to 
raise a defence of provocation in its criminal context would, I suggest, extend the concept some 
distance beyond its intent. No reasonable jury could conclude the appellant was stirred to the ―heat 
of passion‖ entitling him to a reduction of responsibility for his homicidal act on the basis of words 
which he could not remember and which he merely described as getting on his nerves‖1242 
 
In the case of Faid, the Supreme Court held that this is a ―preliminary question to be 
decided by the judge as a question of law‖.1243 The court stated that evidence must exist 
on which a ―reasonable jury‖ and acting ―judicially‖ could determine that provocation 
existed.
1244
 It is the responsibility of the trial judge to determine if  some evidence  
exists which have a bearing on each element of the defence, which may show that a 
properly directed jury acting reasonably could make a finding in favour of the 
accused.
1245   
 
The question of when to put the defence to the jury is a question of law and requires a 
reconsideration of the application of the standard threshold test.
1246
 Determining if an 
act amounted to provocation is the responsibility of the jury and the trial judge is not 
entitled to make this determination. The trial judge is however under a duty to 
determine at the outset if the defence has an evidential foundation. 
1247
 
 
The accused is not under a ―persuasive‖ burden. It is not a requirement that the defence 
must be proved on a balance of probabilities. If a reasonable doubt is created by the 
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prosecution regarding the availability of provocation, the accused must be convicted of 
manslaughter. The crown bears the onus of proving that provocation has not been 
established beyond a reasonable doubt, this is done by showing that some or all of the 
elements of the defence have not been established by evidence.
 1248 
 
Gorman has praised the approach adopted by the Appeal Court in Power
1249
 and 
Ivany
1250
 as the threshold test was set to higher standard and provocation could only be 
left with the jury in exceptional circumstances. This approach made it clear that 
provocation is a defence to a murder charge and must be limited. This is in contrast to 
Thibert,
1251
 where the ―any evidence‖ test seems to have been used.1252  
 
In Thibert the court stated: 
―…before the defence of provocation is left to the jury, the trial judge must be satisfied (a) that 
there is some evidence to suggest that the particular wrongful act or insult alleged by the accused 
would have caused an ordinary person to be deprived of self-control…‖1253 
And  
―….the trial judge must still determine if there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury 
properly instructed and acting judicially could find that there had been provocation. If the trial 
judge is satisfied that there is such evidence, then the defence must be put to the jury to determine 
what weight, if any, should be attached to that evidence.‖ 1254 
 
Gorman argues that the threshold for leaving the defence to the jury has been set at such 
a low level that it would be difficult to imagine a case where the trial judge could ever 
refuse especially where the deceased uttered an insult or committed an act prior to being 
killed. If ―shoot me‖ was considered to be sufficient then arguably nothing could be 
insufficient.
1255
 Gorman argues that unfortunately the Supreme Court of Canada has 
taken the issue out of the trial judge‘s hands.1256 
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Burnett noted that in the case of Tripodi
1257
 where five judges in the Ontario Court of 
Appeal and four judges in the Supreme Court of Canada could be an ―insult‖ if the 
accused had forgiven his wife.
1258
 It was noted that in the face of divergence of opinion 
Kellock J. has not found an insufficiency of evidence but rather than a confession of 
adultery to a husband that already knows cannot provide the grounds for 
provocation.
1259
 Sankoff said that he was troubled by the majority‘s view that the 
remarks were predictable and therefore not provocative as it seems to him as a stretch 
that an ordinary person would not be surprised.
1260
  
 
The Federal Department of Justice released its Consultation paper in 1998 found that 
out of 115 murder cases in which provocation was raised, 62 involved domestic 
homicides and 55 of these involved men killing women,
1261
 indicates that the defence of 
provocation is being used at a disproportionate rate; this is alarming and are grounds for 
concern relating to utilization and development of the defence.
1262
 
 
4.2.10. Expert evidence 
The general approach in Canada was that expert evidence was inadmissible,
1263
 the 
reason being was that Canadian courts were apprehensive about admitting expert 
evidence in cases where the ordinary person could understand the subject matter without 
the assistance of an expert.
1264
  
 
Expert evidence is generally inadmissible in respect of the standard of loss of self-
control and the ordinary person. Quigley states that this poses a possible problem in 
regard to different degrees of self-control with persons of different ages. Jurors will lack 
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guidance in deciding what degree of self-control to expect and may resort to stereotypes 
in making a determination.
1265
 This restrictive rule is based on two rules; the first is the 
―ultimate issue‖ rule which works to prevent an expert from expressing his view on an 
issue which ultimately the jury must decide. The second rule is the ―common 
knowledge rule‖ as laid down in the influential English case of Turner1266.1267  
 
The courts have generally struggled with identifying criteria for admitting expert 
evidence; this problem is present in jurisdictions such as England, Australia, New 
Zealand as well as Canada.
1268
  
 
The United States was the first to allow expert evidence cases involving the battered 
women syndrome. After these jurisdictions such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand 
followed the lead of the United States and began admitting evidence relating to battered 
women syndrome.
1269
  The admissibility of expert evidence in cases involving battered 
women syndrome has been the source of debate in Canada, especially in light of the 
criticisms of gender discrimination towards women. Expert evidence may be led to 
show the emotional makeup of the accused made him or her more prone to 
provocation.
1270
  
 
The general approach in Canada expert evidence must satisfy a twofold precondition 
test in order to be admitted. Firstly, the expert opinion must be of value to the ordinary 
person, secondly, the expert must be qualified to give opinion through experience, 
qualification or in practice.
1271
 Expert evidence will only assist the accused in terms of 
satisfying the subjective test, that is assessment of suddenness of retaliation and if loss 
of self-control actually occurred. 
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In the landmark case of Lavallee
1272
  which involved the battered woman syndrome and 
the defence of self-defence, the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the admission of the 
expert evidence and stated:  
―How can the mental state of the appellant be appreciated without it? The average member of the 
public (or of the jury) can be forgiven for asking: Why should a woman put up with this kind of 
treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How could she love a partner who 
beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would expect the woman to pack her bags 
and go. Where is her self-respect? Why does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? 
Such is the reaction of the average person confronted with the so-called ―battered woman 
syndrome‖. We need to understand it and help is available from trained professionals‖ 1273 
 
Although this case did not involve the pleading of the provocation defence, it is relevant 
and important in respect of the courts treatment of expert evidence in relation to battered 
women syndrome, which is used as the basis for the provocation defence in jurisdictions 
such as England and South Africa. The court emphasised that expert evidence was 
necessary in order to shed light on the mental state of the accused and explain the 
battered women syndrome to the jury. The court stated that this was an aspect of human 
behaviour which was not common knowledge to the jury and therefore required 
assistance from an expert. 
 
Evidence is support of battered women syndrome is referred to as syndrome evidence 
and usually consists of forensic psychiatric and psychological evidence which is 
intended to explain the behaviour of the accused or the provoker. Syndrome evidence 
may explain the impact of long-term violence on an individual. Syndrome evidence is 
therefore important in cases involving cumulative provocation.
1274
  
 
4.2.11. Concluding summary 
The provocation defence in Canada was originally derived from 16
th
 and 17
th
 English 
law .The provocation defence became part of Canadian law when it was adopted and 
codified in the Criminal Code of Canada. The defence currently exists in the form of 
section 232 of the Criminal Code of Canada and remains largely unaltered since 
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inception. The basis for the provocation defence exists as a concession to human frailty 
and provides for a conviction of the lesser verdict of manslaughter.
1275
  
 
However, a main criticism of the provocation defence is centred on this fact, that the 
law has failed to evolve alongside the changing social context in which it is rooted. This 
is especially notable in light of the fact that historically the provocation was recognised 
to cause loss of self-control and served to benefit men who killed after discovering their 
spouse in the act of adultery.1276 Jealousy was considered the rage of a man and adultery 
was considered ―the highest invasion of property‖.1277 
 
 Early provocation cases commonly involved the killing of a male rival, the view of 
wives being the property of their husbands was strong belief. Furthermore, the 
provocation defence has been described as being one of the most male-biased areas of 
criminal law since it involves reduction of the severity of punishment for convicted 
killers who in many killers are men.
1278
 
 
Killing while in the ―heat of passion‖ is the most common basis of provocation 
replacing honour killings. Unfortunately, this basis has been extended so drastically that 
ending a romantic relationship and sexual infidelity has amounted to provocation in 
terms of s231 of the Code.
1279
 Ultimately, one of the foremost criticisms of the 
provocation defence in Canada is that the law and the courts have remained 
accommodating of men who kill their female partners in a fit of rage and jealousy.
1280
  
 
These criticisms also extend to the law not accommodating the battered women within 
the provocation defence, this is attributed to requirements in terms of the subjective test 
that the retaliation to the provocation be sudden, this does not accommodate the battered 
                                                     
1275
 Dick supra (n 993) at 522. 
1276
 Mitchell supra (n 1039) at 2-3. 
1277
 Mawgridge supra (n 518), see discussion in Chapter 3 at 83. 
1278
 Forell supra (n 1019) at 161. 
1279
 Forell supra (n 1019) at 162. 
1280
 Forell supra (n 1019) at 163 notes that Australia has taken the lead in modifying provocation and has 
denied the defence in many instances to men who kill their intimate partners while enraged, See S v 
Stingel supra (n 944) , Hart v The Queen (2003) 27 W.A.R 441 (Western Australia); R v Yasso 
(2004) WL 177776623. 
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woman who does not lose control suddenly but is delayed in her reaction where her 
passions had time to cool.
1281
 The subjective and objective components are the basis of 
the defence. The underlying rationale of the ordinary person standard is to prevent 
individuals from using self-generated excuses as a basis of the defence.
1282
 
 
However, the objective test and characteristics of ordinary person are considered to the 
most problematic aspects of the defence, with some critics calling for the scrapping of 
the objective requirement.
1283
 The uncertainty of which characteristics to attribute to the 
ordinary man have been the subject of debate for years, furthermore the concept is 
complex and without direction, a jury might disregard relevant factors or consider the 
wrong factors.
1284
 Other problems relate to evidentiary aspects in that the trier of fact is 
not allowed to assess expert evidence relevant in making a determination on the 
objective test.
1285
 
 
The case of Thibert has been the source of controversy due to the court broadening the 
scope of the objective test, giving an individuated and contextual definition of the 
ordinary person test.
1286
 The result is that the objective test has lost its objective nature.  
The subjective test is also seen to be problematic; this element is criticised for its 
suddenness requirements governing the provocative act and the retaliation which results 
in women, specifically the abused women being deprived of the provocation 
defence.
1287
 This makes the provocation defence in Canada inherently unfair. Generally, 
the view of the provocation defence in Canada is that the provision is an out-dated 
provision based on sexist doctrines; furthermore, the provision are overly complex 
formulation that makes it difficult for judges and juries to understand certain technical 
aspects of the defence.
1288
  
                                                     
1281
 Wannop supra (n 1250) at 266. 
1282
 Nelson supra (n 1035) at 1024. 
1283
 Quigley supra (n 1015) at 253. 
1284
 Quigley supra (n 1015) at 252. 
1285
 Quigley supra (n 1015) at 253. 
1286
 Roach supra (n 26) at 255. 
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 Quigley supra (n 1015) at 253. 
1288
 Quigley supra (n 995) at 12, Renke supra (n 28) at 749. 
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CHAPTER 5: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
 
5.1. Critical analysis of the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation in South African Law 
 
5.1.1. Introduction 
The recognition of the effect of provocative conduct on criminal liability dates back 
centuries. Provocation is recognised for its role in arousing passion in the provoked and 
depriving the accused of the ability of rational reasoning resulting from a loss of self-
control. It is clear that the defence of provocation is controversial in South Africa as 
well as in England and Canada. However, it must be noted that despite the controversial 
nature of a defence based on provocation, the aforementioned jursidictions continue to 
retain and preserve this defence. It must therefore be argued that the continued existence 
of the provocation defence indicates that this defence is important and serves a 
legitimate purpose in society in general. 
 
Historically, the underlying rationale for a defence based on provocation has been the 
law‘s concession to human frailty, the concept of loss of self-control being has and 
continues to play a prominent feature in the respective provisions in England, Canada 
and South Africa. 
  
This concluding section will re-assess the troubled defence of non-pathological 
incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress in South African law using a 
comparative study along with analysis of the controversial landmark judgment of 
Eadie.
1289
 The purpose of this investigation is to determine what the current status of 
this troubled defence is in the South African criminal law system.  
 
The provocation defence in South Africa has been troubled by a few controversial 
decisions such as Arnold,
1290
 Moses
1291
 and Nursingh,
1292
 however, it is submitted that 
                                                     
1289
 S v Eadie supra (n 18), see discussion in chapter 2 at 57 and at 225 below. 
1290
 S v Arnold supra (n 16), see discussion in chapter 2 at 42 and at 213 below. 
1291
 S v Moses supra (n 16), see discussion in chapter 2 at 54 and forthcoming discussion at 213. 
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the Eadie
1293
 judgment has significantly contributed to the confusion and uncertainty 
currently besieging the defence. The judgment of Navsa JA has garnered differing 
opinions regarding the precise import of the judgment. This indicates the extent of the 
confusion generated and as a result, the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress has remained in a state of limbo ever since.
1294
  
 
A critical analysis of the judgment will assist in deciphering this case; this will allow for 
a correct assessment of the implications of the court‘s pronouncements on the 
provocation defence. The importance of this analysis is to determine if the defence of 
non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress serves a legitimate 
purpose, and to assess how the changes to the defence will impact upon the criminal law 
and society in general. The critical question remains whether the changes brought about 
by Eadie
1295
 result in an improvement to the defence of non-pathological incapacity 
arising from provocation and emotional stress or not. 
 
In conducting this analysis, it is important to pin-point the starting point of the 
problematic developments which may have had a negative impact on the defence. This 
study will seek to assess and analyse the problems associated with the defence of non-
pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress as it functioned before 
the landmark judgment of Eadie.
1296
  It is critically important to delve into the root of 
the problems associated with the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress before Eadie
1297
  in order to determine the extent to 
which the court effected the correct solutions to these problems. 
 
It is submitted that in tracing the evolution of of the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress, there is a strong indication that the 
                                                                                                                                                           
1292
 S v Nursingh supra (n 16), see discussion in chapter 2 at 54 and forthcoming discussion 213. 
1293
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1294
 Snyman supra (n 77) at 20-21 has criticised the Eadie judgment for its unsound reasoning, see further 
Hoctor supra (n 1) at 110, Louw supra (n 5) at 206 and Kemp supra (n 1) at 176-178. 
1295
 S v  Eadie supra (n 18). 
1296
 S v  Eadie supra (n 18). 
1297
 S v  Eadie supra (n 18). 
 212 
difficulties with the provocation defence began with the cases in Arnold,
1298
 Moses
1299
 
and Nursingh.
1300
 Analysis of these cases will expose the reasons behind the 
controversy regarding the provocation defence which preceded the Eadie
1301
 judgment. 
The circumstances under which the killings in the aforementioned cases occurred raised 
questions not only regarding the correctness of the findings, but also the desirability of a 
defence based on provocation and emotional stress.
1302
  In the South African context, 
allowing the provocation defence to operate as a complete defence is contentious.
1303
  
 
Analysis of the provocation provisions in England and Canada reveal that the inherent 
nature of a defence based on provocation is contentious, thus the controversy 
surrounding provocation as a defence is not limited to South Africa. The problems 
relating to the provocation defence have led to calls for the reformation of the defence 
in Canada,
1304
 in England the defence has undergone reformation due to criticisms of 
the previous formulation of the defence.
1305
 
 
However, it must be noted that the South African defence of non-pathological 
incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress differs markedly from the provisions 
in England and Canada. Most notably, is the fact that in England and Canada 
provocation is at most a partial defence, whereas in South African law the successful 
pleading of provocation and emotional stress can lead to a total acquittal if criminal 
capacity was lacking.  
 
                                                     
1298
  S v Arnold supra (n 16). 
1299
  S v Moses supra (n 16). 
1300
  S v  Nursingh supra (n 16). 
1301
  S v  Eadie supra (n 18). 
1302
  Hoctor supra (n 1) at 131-133, Louw supra (n 5) at 205 in respect of the S v Moses supra (n 16) and S 
v Nursingh supra (n 16) states that ―It is in acquittals such as in S v Nursingh 1995 (2) SACR 331 
(D) and S v Moses 1996 (1) SACR 702 (C) that disquiet and controversy have been caused in 
respect of the provocation defence‖. 
1303
  J.M. Burchell ―Heroes, poltroons and persons of reasonable fortitude-juristic perceptions on killing 
under compulsion‖ (1988) 1 South African Journal for Criminal Justice 18 at 31, Burchell supra (n 
2) at 324-323, Hoctor supra (n 1) at 110. 
1304
  See discussion in chapter 4 at 167. 
1305
  See discussion in chapter 3 at 127. 
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In this concluding chapter, it is proposed to firstly examine, the provisions in 
England
1306
 and Canada
1307
 that govern the respective provocation defences. The 
assessment of the utility and functioning of the provocation defence in England and 
Canada follows, the focus of this analysis will be on the objectively assessed 
requirements within the respective provisions governing the provocation defence in 
English and Canadian law.  
 
The aim of the comparative analysis is primarily to gain insight into how the defence 
operates in different jurisdictions; specifically the role and functionality of the objective 
test in assessing the defence of an accused person raising provocation as a defence and  
to determine the possible shortcomings of this manner of assessment. This analysis 
seeks to determine if the South African law can benefit from the incorporation of 
aspects of the defence as set out in these foreign models. A critical analysis of the 
relevant provisions governing the respective defences in England and Canada will aid in 
this pursuit.   
 
5.1.2. Pre-Eadie: the problematic cases of Nursingh, Moses and Arnold 
In the South African context, the defence of non-pathological incapity due to 
provocation and emotional stress has for many years been the subject of criticisms.
1308
 
However, it is submitted that tensions surrounding the defence reached its breaking 
point following the acquittals in Nursingh
1309 
and Moses
1310
 and Arnold.
1311
 These three 
cases will be discussed in this chapter as these cases deserve some focus since, it is 
submitted, the controversy of these judgments were instrumental in the reformulation of 
the defence by the court in Eadie,
1312
 as it highlighted important policy considerations 
related to a defence based on provocation and emotional stress.  
 
                                                     
1306
 In terms of ss 54-56 of the Coroners Act 2009, see Chapter 3 at 74 for discussion of the provocation 
defence in English law. 
1307
 In terms of the section 232 of the Canadian Criminal Code, see Chapter 4 at 164 for discussion of 
Canadian law. 
1308
 See discussion by Hoctor supra (n 1) at 149-160. 
1309
 S v Nursingh supra (n 16). 
1310
 S v Moses supra (n 16). 
1311
 S v Arnold supra (n 16). 
1312
 S v Eadie supra (n 18).  
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The acquittals in Nursingh,
1313
 Moses
1314
 and Arnold
1315
 generated fierce debate 
regarding the desirability of a defence based on provocation and emotional stress since 
the acquittals in these cases created the perception that success in pleading the defence 
seemed certain.
1316
 In the case of Nursingh,
1317
 which involved multiple killings, the 
acquittal of the accused was surprising. In respect of Moses
1318
 and Nursingh,
1319
 
intense academic debate has focused on the whether the acquittal of the accused was 
justified in the light of the facts of the respective cases.
1320
  
 
Regarding Nursingh, Burchell states: 
―…one cannot help but feel a measure of disquiet about the conclusion that an intelligent person, 
albeit under a good deal of stress, can shoot his mother and grandfather by firing three bullets into 
their bodies and his grandmother by firing four bullets into her body , and escape criminal liability 
completely.‖1321 
 
The acquittal of the accused led detractors of the defence to challenge the very basis and 
the nature of the defence. This case rekindled old fears of a defence based on 
provocation and emotional stress providing for facile acquittals.
1322
  
 
The controversy regarding the provocation defence deepened after the acquittals in both 
the Nursingh
1323
 and Moses
1324
 cases causing outrage and disbelief amongst certain 
commentators who questioned the correctness of the decision to acquit.
1325
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 S v Nursingh supra (n 16). 
1314
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1315
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It is submitted that a problematic feature in these cases is that the courts have shown a 
lack of understanding when applying the distinct elements of criminal liability, for 
instance, in the case of Arnold
1326
 there is indication of unsound reasoning by the court 
in certain respects,
1327
 firstly, the court made the finding that the accused acted while in 
a state of sane automatism after concluding that the presence of voluntary conduct was 
not proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
1328
  
 
In respect of this finding, critics of this case such as Snyman contend that upon analysis 
of the facts, it is apparent that the accused acted voluntarily when he handled the firearm 
before firing the fatal shot. The handling of this firearm amounts to negligent conduct 
therefore the court should have convicted the accused of negligence rather than 
acquitting.1329 The court then stated that it was reasonably possible that the accused 
lacked criminal capacity.
1330
 The court stated further that the accused acted in a state of 
sane automatism and therefore declined to make a finding regarding the presence of 
intention.  
 
In essence, the court demonstrated a lack of understanding of the principles of criminal 
liability by confusing the elements of capacity, voluntary conduct and not understanding 
when the inquiry into intention comes into play, since once conduct is deemed 
involuntary, the inquiry into the presence of capacity and intention is superfluous.1331 
Furthermore, the court seemed to use the term ―sane automatism‖ interchangeably when 
referring to lack of capacity. This case highlights the problem that the courts have at 
times failed to maintain the distinction between the defences of sane automatism and 
non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress.  
 
                                                     
1326
 S v Arnold supra (n 16). 
1327
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 124-125. 
1328
 S v Arnold supra (n 16) at 263G-H. 
1329
 Snyman supra (n 121) at 251. 
1330
 S v Arnold supra (n 16) at 264D. 
1331
 Hoctor supra (n 355) at 201 notes that despite the courts ―discordant reasoning‖ it approvingly cites 
the reasoning of Rumpff CJ in Chretien supra (n 204) differentiating between the concepts of sane-
automatism and criminal capacity. 
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In respect of the Nursingh1332 judgment, another troubling feature relates to legal 
imprecision in regard to the court‘s definition of criminal capacity, which is not correct 
and is not in line with precedent which states that the test for criminal capacity consists 
of two legs where the assessment considers if the accused had the capacity to 
distinguish between right and wrong and if he had the capacity to act in accordance with 
such an appreciation.1333  
 
The following statement by the court illustrates this argument: 
―The primary issue in the matter is whether, at the time and in the circumstances, in which he fired 
those ten shots, he had the mental ability or capacity to know what he was doing and whether what 
he was doing was wrongful. If he did, then a second issue fails to be considered, which is, whether 
he could have formed the necessary level of intention to constitute the offence of murder.‖ 1334 
 
The court in Nursingh confused the elements of criminal capacity and intention as it 
stated:1335 
―Now, although the onus is on the state to show that the accused had the necessary criminal 
capacity to establish and found the mens rea necessary to commit an offence, where an accused 
person relies on non-pathological causes in support of a defence of criminal incapacity, then he is 
required to lay a factual foundation for it in evidence, sufficient at least to create a reasonable 
doubt on the issue as to whether he had the mental capacity.‖1336  
 
Criminal capacity is considered a distinct element of liability;1337 the court complicates 
matters by conflating the elements of criminal capacity and intention1338: 
―That explosion [the shooting of the three deceased] was not the result of a functioning mind, and 
so all its consequences can be regarded as unintentional.‖1339 
 
The capacity and intention elements cannot be conflated since there can be no intention 
if the capacity element is lacking; it is a preliminary inquiry which results in an accused 
                                                     
1332
 S v Nursingh supra (n 16). 
1333
 Louw supra (n 215) at 208. 
1334
 S v Nursingh supra (n 16) at 332E-F, discussed by Louw supra (n 215) at 208. 
1335
 S v Nursingh supra (n 16) at 334B-C, discussed by Louw supra (n 215) at 208. 
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 Louw supra (n 215) at 208. 
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person being acquitted if the element is negated, the court erred in not recognising that 
criminal capacity is a distinct element of liability. 1340  
The court stated: 
―In our law a man is responsible for wrongful acts that he knows he is committing. Before he can 
be convicted of an offence, he must have the intellectual or mental capacity to commit it. That 
means an ability to distinguish between right and wrong and act in accordance with that 
appreciation. If that is lacking then obviously it follows he does not have the necessary capacity 
and it is for the prosecution to prove that he knew what he was doing‖.1341 
 
Louw is correct in criticising the Nursingh1342 judgment for lacking in sound 
reasoning.1343 The tendency of the court‘s to confuse the elements of capacity and 
intention is unacceptable and indicates that the problems with the defence is actually not 
with defence itself but with incorrect application of principle.1344  
 
One of the other main sources of controversy surrounding both Nursingh
1345
 and 
Moses
1346
 is that there are indications that accused in both cases did not suffer a total 
loss of criminal capacity since both demonstrated volitional control and insight in the 
commission of the killings, therefore commission of goal-directed acts in both these 
cases seems apparent upon assessment of the facts of both cases, yet the court in both 
instances determined that capacity was lacking. It is submitted that on the facts of both 
cases, clear goal-directed acts were committed and this indicates that the accused in 
both cases may have not suffered complete loss of self-control and therefore possessed 
criminal capacity.  
 
These two cases highlight the problem that there may be confusion regarding the 
application of the requirement of loss of self-control and that the courts in both these 
cases struggled to interpret this notion and apply the requirements to facts of the case. 
                                                     
1340
 Louw supra (n 215) at 209. 
1341
 S v Nursingh  supra (n 16) at 339A-B, discussed by Louw supra (n 215)  at 209. 
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 S v Nursingh supra (n 16). 
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The courts may have erred in correctly applying the test of conative capacity to the facts 
of Nursingh
1347
 and Moses
1348
 resulting in problematic acquittals.
1349
   
 
In respect of Moses
1350
 it is submitted that this judgment is problematic in two main 
respects. Firstly, the assessment of ―goal-directed‖ behaviour was a central issue and the 
courts findings in this regard are questionable. It is submitted that the judgment is 
disturbing for several reasons but the collapsing of the series of goal-directed acts into 
one is highly problematic.  
 
Louw correctly asserts that on the facts of the case, to deem the series of acts committed 
by the accused to being just one is outrageous, since at the very least the killing 
involved two stabbings with two different knives, by deeming these acts to be just one 
the court essentially solved the ―problem‖ of goal directed behaviour.1351  
It is submitted that Louw is correct in his assertions and therefore the reasoning by the 
court is indeed unsound. The court accepted that the series of goal directed acts actually 
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 S v Nursingh supra (n 16). 
1348
 S v Moses supra (n 16). 
1349
 Krause supra (n 290) at 330, Louw supra (n 215) at 213. 
1350
 S v Moses supra (n 16). 
1351
 Louw supra (n 215) at 214 points out 14 instances of goal directed acts committed by the accused and 
these are: 
The accused attempted to pick an ornament in the bedroom; 
 Consciously returning to the lounge for another weapon; 
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 Returning to the bedroom with the weapon (black cat ornament) 
 Forcefully opening the bedroom door; 
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 Then returning to the kitchen for another knife 
 Selection of another larger knife in the kitchen 
 Return to the bedroom with larger knife 
 Slitting the deceased‘s neck and wrist 
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constitute a single act; unfortunately the court did not elaborate extensively on the 
reasoning behind this conclusion and simply stated that:  
―Mr.Yodaiken [defence witness] did not contend that the accused was acting in a state of 
automatism during the killing. On being asked to comment on the different weapons used to inflect 
injuries on the deceased, he stated that the two acts, namely the hitting of the deceased with a blunt 
object and the stabbings, were in fact one action. The accused was in an annhilatory rage which 
tends to damage or destroy.‖1352  
 
It is submitted that judging the two stabbings in the Moses
1353
 case as a single act cannot 
be accepted since it involved two separate weapons, there was a definite thought 
process, that is insight, the accused made the conscious decision to seek out anything 
that could be used as a weapon; he purposefully sought out knives because he wanted to 
harm the deceased violently, this indicates the presence of self-control. It is submitted 
that the accused possessed the presence of mind and possessed the determination to go 
to the kitchen and search for another knife thus performed and accurately executed a 
series of clear goal-directed behaviour which strongly indicates the presence of criminal 
capacity. 
 
Similarly to Nursingh,
1354
 the court seemingly justified the accused‘s actions by 
labelling the rage in the case of Moses
1355
 as an ―annihilitory‖. Furthermore, the 
commission of the series of acts and this suggests that the court failed in differentiating 
between acts that were controlled and uncontrollable.
1356
 Furthermore, rage, may mean 
that the accused made a decision to control certain actions and does not necessarily 
indicate that the actions were uncontrollable.
1357
 The differentiation between 
uncontrolled and uncontrollable actions is thus crucial. The court‘s collapsing of these 
acts into one is bewildering and this reasoning ultimately led to the acquittal which with 
respect, is based on illogical reasoning.
1358
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 In Moses
1359
 the accused went about systematically killing the deceased and was 
rewarded with an acquittal, this despite the lack of prolonged abuse, at the hands of the 
deceased, preceding the killing. This fact separates the circumstances of the accused 
from other cases in South African where the defence was successful.
1360
  This begs the 
question, what made the killing in Moses
1361
 special or different from other cases 
involving the murder.
1362
  
 
In assessing the technical aspects of the Nursingh1363 judgment, the subject of ―goal-
directed‖ behaviour also emerges as a main area of contention.One of the main areas of 
dissatisfaction in this case is that the act of killing three people was considered to be a 
single act by the court.1364  
 
 In this regard the court stated:  
―it is not possible to distinguish between the three killings on the basis that the mother had caused 
and provoked the reaction more than the others. It was one and the same eruption that resulted in 
the three separate acts. It is really as though one explosion achieved all three deaths.‖1365 
                                                     
1359
 S v Moses supra (n 16). 
1360
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Significantly, the court did not distinguish each killing from each other and described 
the three separate acts were part of a single explosion. The eruption suffered by the 
accused indicated to the court that a loss of self-control was experienced and indicated 
lack of criminal capacity. However, critics such as Louw have emphatically slammed 
the reasoning of the court and argue that the collapsing of the shooting into one act is 
untenable and that the court should not have accepted psychiatric evidence to this 
effect.1366 
 
Louw is correct for criticising the reasoning of the court in collapsing the three killings 
into a single act.1367 Despite the commission of several goal-directed acts, the court 
viewed the killing as an explosion thus arriving at the conclusion that the killing 
constituted one act. It is submitted that the outward show of anger and rage by the 
accused did not necessarily mean that he lost self-control. Therefore, it is submitted that 
it was the responsibility of the court to do a more thorough investigation into the state of 
accused‘s mind by requiring additional expert evidence to aid in its investigation.  
 
It is submitted that the Nursingh1368 case illustrates that there is no problem with 
substantive principles of the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to provocation 
and emotional stress but the problem lies with poor decisions which arise from improper 
application of legal principles governing the defence. Furthermore, the problem of legal 
imprecision in this judgment has unjustifiably given rise to criticism of the defence of 
non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress. 
 
Indeed, it is submitted that although the provocation was severe, the reaction to the 
provocation did not indicate a complete loss of self-control, but it did indicate that the 
accused made a conscious choice in deciding not to act in accordance with his 
appreciation between right and wrong, this was brought on by the fact that that the 
accused was extremely angry with the deceased and desired revenge, and such revenge 
was extracted through a prolonged period of torture.  
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The case of Moses
1369
 is an example of a case where the principles of the defence were 
incorrectly applied, and resulted in a situation where a person, who savagely killed 
while in an ―annihilatory rage‖ was allowed to plead non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress and was acquitted.
 1370
 The Moses
1371
  judgment was 
problematic because it allowed for enraged individuals to use the provocation defence to 
escape criminal liability. 
1372
 Louw argues that if   Moses
1373
 is followed, then, unlike 
Eadie,
1374
 those who kill in circumstances of road rage can expect to be acquitted.
 1375
  
 
It is submitted that it is not the purpose of the defence to aid individuals who kill out of 
rage and vengeance as the purpose of the defence is to aid persons who suffered a total 
lack of criminal capacity. Society should never be at the mercy of the short-
tempered.
1376
 It is submitted that it is misconception that the defence of non-
pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress is intended for serving 
the short-tempered in any event. 
 
Furthermore, another point is that the accused was pre-disposed to angered states and 
the court should have taken cognisance of this.
1377
 Other evidence indicates that the 
accused was a short-tempered individual who ―snapped‖ when faced with emotional 
stress.
1378
 Though the court was aware of this pattern of behaviour, it still accepted that 
provocation by the deceased caused a lack of criminal capacity.
1379
  
 
This finding is, with respect incorrect; the court erred in acquitting the accused. 
Furthermore, the deceased‘s conduct, before, during, and after the committing of the 
                                                     
1369
 S v Moses supra (n 16). 
1370
 Louw supra (n 215) at 216. 
1371
 S v Moses supra (n 16). 
1372
 De Vos supra (n 346) at 358. 
1373
 S v Moses supra (n 16). 
1374
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1375
 Louw supra (n 215) at 216. 
1376
 Louw supra (n 215) at 216. 
1377
 S v Moses supra (n 16).  
1378
 S v Moses supra (n 16). 
1379
 S v Moses supra (n 16). 
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killing further supports the assertion that the accused‘s controls did not collapse; the 
court should have at most made a finding that the accused suffered a state of diminished 
capacity.
1380
  
 
Other areas of dissatisfaction with the Moses1381 judgment concern the court failing to 
draw a distinction between diminished capacity and total lack of capacity.1382 The 
court‘s failure to consider that the accused may have suffered a state of diminished 
capacity rather than a complete lack of capacity is alarming. 
 
 Furthermore, the court implied that either state, that is, diminished capacity or lack of 
capacity can lead to a complete acquittal which is incorrect.1383 
―….his capacity to exert normal control over his actions and also to consider his behaviour in the 
light of what was wrong, was significantly impaired at the time of killing‖1384 
And  
―Despite the killing the accused‘s capacity to stop himself and to control his behaviour in 
accordance with what he knew was right and wrong, was impaired. While he knew that it was 
wrong in principle, his awareness of the wrongfulness of what he was doing at the time was also 
impaired‖1385 
 
It is submitted that examination of case law demonstrates that there are problems with 
misapplication of the law to the facts of the cases in Nursingh
1386
 and Moses.
1387
  It is 
further submitted that the problems lie with application of legal concepts rather than 
with the concepts themselves. Due to the misapplication of legal principles, cases such 
as Moses
1388
 and Nursingh
1389
 have plunged the defence of non-pathological incapacity 
due to provocation and emotional stress in an unfavourable light thus resulting in the 
perceived need for reformation and even abolition of the defence. Commentators were 
                                                     
1380
 Louw supra (n 215) at 215. 
1381
 S v Moses supra (n 16). 
1382
 Louw supra (n 215) at 215. 
1383
 Louw supra (n 215) at 215. 
1384
 S v Moses supra (n 16) at 710c-d. 
1385
 S v Moses supra (n 16) at 710h-i. 
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 S v Nursingh supra (n 16). 
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S v  Moses supra (n 16). 
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not happy with the new direction of the law whereby a complete acquittal could result 
out of provoked behaviour.
1390
 
  
It is submitted that  the cases of Nursingh
1391
 and Moses
1392
 are problematic and created 
the perception that a defence based on provocation and emotional stress is intrinsically 
problematic,  however upon closer analysis it is clear that these concerns are unfounded 
as the problem of facile acquittals are not due to the lack of safeguards within the 
defence, both Moses
1393
 and Nursingh
1394
 unearthed a lack of understanding of legal 
principle, specifically application of conative capacity; it is in this light that both 
decisions are questionable . 
 
In the light of the troublesome cases in Arnold,
1395
 Nursingh
1396
 and Moses,
1397
 it was 
necessary that Eadie
1398
 provide much needed guidance to the courts on the proper 
application of principle and clarify possible points of confusion, with the aim of 
preventing problematic acquittals.  It is submitted that the Eadie
1399
 judgment failed in 
both respects. The forthcoming section will assess this judgment and the reasons for its 
deficiencies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1390
 Burchell supra (n 2) at 324-325. 
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S v Nursingh supra (n 16). 
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 S v Nursingh supra (n 16). 
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5.1.3. Analysis of Eadie  
The case of Eadie
1400
 has been the subject of much debate for many years due to the far-
reaching implications of the judgment on the defence of non-pathological incapacity 
due to provocation and emotional stress. Snyman has stated that the judgment is ―one of 
the most enigmatic judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal in the field of the 
general principles of criminal law during the past half century.
1401
 It is must be noted 
that the judgment itself has had varied interpretations with some academics welcoming 
its pronouncements,
1402
 while others have been strongly critical of certain aspects of the 
judgment.
1403
 These views will be interrogated in this chapter. 
 
Firstly, it is submitted that the court in Eadie
1404
 was correct in confirming the accused‘s 
conviction for murder by dismissing the appeal.
1405
 However, it is unfortunate that the 
judgment is often considered as a ―good example of a correct decision arrived at for the 
wrong reasons.‖1406  
 
                                                     
1400
  S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1401
  Snyman supra (n 1) at 161. 
1402
  Snyman supra (n 1) at 164 welcomes the courts recognition of the need for an objective factor within 
the concept of culpability; Louw supra (n 5) at 206 states that ―Navsa JA‘s judgment is an extremely 
thorough one in which he systematically traces the development of the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity due to emotional stress and provocation.‖; Burchell supra (n 17) at 587 fn44, at 592 at fn 
73 states that ―the judge of appeal took the bold and encouraging step of emphasising the significant 
role of objective norms of behaviour as a barometer against which to test the accused‘s alleged lack 
of criminal capacity in a road rage situation‖ 
1403
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 110 states that ―despite the well-established nature of the defence of non-
pathological incapacity, the law has been thrown into flux by the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Appeal in S v Eadie, which constitutes a serious erosion of the notion of criminal capacity..‖ , Louw 
supra (n 5) at 206 praises the judgment for bringing clarity to the defence criticises the possible 
introduction of an objective test and states ―But (Navsa JA) goes too far when he introduces an 
objective test as well. This may be a hint at a swing towards a more normative approach to our law 
criminal law heralded by public sentiment aghast at the country‘s alarming crime rate, but it is not in 
line with our general principles. It ought to be reviewed.‖ Snyman supra (n 1) at 161-163  and  
Burchell supra (n 2) at 327  are critical of the courts conflation of the  distinct concepts of conative 
capacity and voluntariness. 
1404
  S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1405
  S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1406
  Snyman  supra (n 77) at 14 
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It is submitted that the best way to interpret the judgment is to understand the overall 
intention of the court. The Eadie
1407
 judgment is, according to Snyman an example of 
the tension between legal theory and policy considerations. However it is submitted that 
in this case the purely ―theoretical approach‖1408  suffered a defeat at the hands of the 
―policy approach‖.1409 The ―policy approach‖ taken by the court is evident when 
analysing the reasoning of the court, the quest of the court was undoubtedly to restrict 
the operation of the defence non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and 
emotional stress spurred on by policy driven considerations, the following analysis of 
Eadie
1410
 will address these submissions. 
 
5.1.3.1. Problematic conflation: non-pathological incapacity = sane automatism 
It is submitted that there are two major difficulties arising from the Eadie
1411
 judgment, 
the first, is undoubtedly the courts conflation of the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity with the defence of sane automatism.
1412
 The ramifications of this conflation 
are tremendous and far-reaching. 1413   
 
                                                     
1407
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1408
 Snyman supra (n 77) at 12 in terms of the ―theoretical approach‖ the provocation defence is treated in 
terms of pure legal theory in contrast with the practical demands of criminal justice. This approach 
entails that the enquiry is restricted to assessing the accused‘s mind at the moment when the 
unlawful act was committed. This determines if criminal capacity was present and if it is indeed 
shown to be present then it must be enquired if intention was present. If this approach is followed 
the test into determining liability in cases involving provocation is entirely subjective. This excludes 
an objective assessment in the form of the reasonable person. In terms of this approach provocation 
and in severe cases can operate as a complete defence in that it leads to an acquittal and not just a 
lesser conviction.  
1409
 Snyman supra (n 77) at 12-13 states that in terms of the policy approach the defence of provocation is 
not restricted to the accused‘s subjective state of mind but extends further to include an objective 
standard. The underlying rationale for the imposition of an objective standard is that the law expects 
individuals in society to control their tempers, therefore the those that chose not to control their 
emotions would not receive preferential treatment from the law, if the law makes this distinction 
then this amounts to the law holding the evenly tempered individual to a stricter standard.This 
approach is in line with that followed in Anglo-American law 
1410
  S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1411
  S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1412
  S vEadie supra (n 18) at para 57, 70. 
1413
  Hoctor supra (n 1) at 148,166-168, Snyman supra (n 77) at 20-22. 
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It is submitted that while it is true that the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress has had its controversies; namely the application of 
principle in cases of Arnold,
1414
 Nursingh,
1415
 Moses
1416
 it is the conflation of the 
defence of non-pathological incapacity with the defence of sane automatism by the 
court in Eadie
1417
 that has added the most uncertainty regarding the nature and operation 
of the defence. Burchell is correct in arguing that that the court has added to the 
confusion by redefining the fundamental general criminal requirement governing the 
element of criminal capacity by blurring the distinction between the concepts of 
conative capacity and the element of voluntariness.
1418
  The effects of this approach are 
not limited just to this defence but have the potential to cause a ripple effect on other 
areas of law as well.
1419
  
 
The fundamental problem with this conflation is that it consists of the fusing of two 
distinct elements of criminal liability which changes the legal principle; this new 
development is not limited to cases involving provocation but may extend to cases 
involving emotional stress and other cases where the presence of criminal capacity is 
disputed.
1420
  
 
The court has demonstrated a lack of understanding of the element of capacity since the 
defence of sane automatism and non-pathological incapacity are governed by two 
different elements of criminal liability and confusing the two is indeed unscientific and 
retrogressive.
1421
  
 
In terms of legal principles the two defences are fundamentally distinct, sane 
automatism relates to the ability to exercise control over muscular movement of an 
individual and assesses if the muscular movements were subject to the will of an 
                                                     
1414
 S v Arnold supra (n 16). 
1415
 S v Nursingh supra (n 16). 
1416
 S v  Moses supra (n 16). 
1417
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1418
 Burchell supra (n 2) at 327. 
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 Snyman supra (n 77) at 22.  
1420
 Burchell supra (n 2) at 327. 
1421
 Hoctor supra (n 355) at 205. 
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individual, while the defence of non-pathological incapacity relates to the ability to act 
in accordance with insight into right and wrong are different.
1422
 Essentially, the crux of 
the matter is that even though a person performs a voluntary act he may still lack the 
ability to act in accordance with his appreciation of right and wrong.
1423
 The two tests 
are distinct in nature because they test two different elements of criminal liability.
1424
  
 
Ultimately, a person may still lack capacity even where the conduct is voluntary. Hence, 
voluntariness of an act cannot and should not be equated with self-control. If it is 
accepted that there is no difference between the two defences, then the result is that an 
accused person would have to show involuntary conduct in order for the defence of lack 
of conative capacity to succeed. 
1425
  
 
Equating the test into voluntariness with the test into conative capacity is irreconcilable 
in the light of the same courts statement in Chretien
1426
 where it was held that if a 
person, due to the effects of intoxication, is not able to differentiate between right and 
wrong and also does not have the capacity to act in accordance with this appreciation, 
then the individual does not possess criminal capacity.
1427
 
 
The purpose of the test to determine if conduct was voluntary is to assess if the 
individual was capable of directing muscular movement according to will and 
intellect.
1428
 Principally, there is a distinct difference between making a decision and 
having the ability to execute the decision.
1429
 An important point made by Snyman is 
that a person capable of performing voluntary conduct may still lack the ability to set 
goals and may not have the ability to pursue these goals or resist impulses to act 
contrary to what his insights tell him is right and wrong.
1430
  
 
                                                     
1422
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 145. 
1423
 Snyman supra (n 77) at 15-16. 
1424
 Snyman supra (n 77) at 17. 
1425
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 195. 
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This is illustrated by the example of children between the ages of ten and fourteen, who 
are able to control their muscular movements and therefore are capable of voluntary 
action, are usually found to be lacking the criminal capacity to resist temptation to 
perform unlawful actions; this is often the case when older offenders are involved. 
Snyman notes that the courts have traditionally acknowledged this sound principle and 
therefore the reasoning in Eadie
1431
 is inconsistent with this approach as it presupposes 
the element of voluntary conduct by an individual who not able to act in accordance 
with his appreciation of right and wrong.
1432
 
 
The ramifications of this view, as espoused by the court in Eadie
1433
 is adverse and as 
Snyman correctly argues results in the rejection of the difference between the test to 
determine voluntariness and the test for conative capacity will lead to the basic concepts 
of criminal liability losing their significance. The court in Eadie
1434
essentially has 
approached the defence based on the lack of criminal capacity due to provocation as the 
same as a defence based on the lack of a voluntary act. The reasoning of the court is 
contradictory to the fundamental principles on which criminal liability is based.
1435
  
 
Burchell in an initial analysis of Eadie, describes the court‘s comment regarding the 
interrelationship between the defences of automatism and lack of capacity as ―a difficult 
feature of the judgment‖ but concedes that at times the court seemingly regards the 
second leg of the capacity inquiry as being equivalent to the inquiry into voluntariness. 
Burchell submits that this ―cautious‖ separation is warranted. The test for conative 
capacity tests the capacity to act voluntarily whereas the voluntariness inquiry is centred 
on the ability of the accused to control his conscious will.
1436
 
 
Furthermore, it must be born in mind that though in practice the two tests will, in most 
circumstances lead to the same result , this does not mean that the two tests should 
                                                     
1431
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1432
 Snyman supra (n 1) at 162. 
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 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
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 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
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 Snyman supra (n 1) at 162. 
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 Burchell supra (n 84) at 34-35 discusing S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
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merge on a theoretical basis. Snyman states that it is not unusual to find two tests 
leading to the same result, but nevertheless retaining their distinct nature. 
1437
  
 
The court in Eadie
1438
 stated that it acknowledged that the new approach to the defence 
meant a critical reinterpretation of the formulation of the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity formulated in the case of Laubscher
1439
 as it stated: 
―It appears to me to be clear that Joubert JA was concerned to convey, in the second leg of the test 
set [out] in the Laubscher case that the State has to prove that the acts which are the basis for the 
charges against an accused were consciously directed by him. Put differently, the acts must not 
have been involuntarily.‖1440 
And 
―It is clear that in order for an accused to escape liability on the basis of non-pathological criminal 
incapacity he has to adduce evidence, in relation to the second leg of the test in Laubscher’s case, 
from which an inference can be drawn that the act in question was not consciously directed, or put 
differently, that it was an involuntary act.‖1441 
 
However, despite this acknowledgement, the departure from precedent is unjustified and 
baseless. The court in Eadie
1442
 although mentioning the case of Chretien,
1443
 failed to 
discuss the landmark judgment which clearly delineates the distinct nature of concepts 
of automatism, capacity and fault.
1444
  
                                                     
1437
 Snyman supra (n 77)  at 17 notes that a few examples can be found, firstly, the objective test in the 
test for assessing negligence is to a great extent the same as the inquiry into unlawfulness in regard 
to delict and crime, however the two tests nevertheless are considered distinct and kept separate. 
Another example can be found in the case of legal causation where the test to determine if result 
objectively assessed was foreseeable is the same as the inquiry into negligence, however the 
principle is that these two tests relate to two distinct elements in law. Furthermore, the inquiry into 
determining if a causal link existed in terms of the theory of adequate causation is similar in many 
respects to the test to determine negligence. 
1438
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1439
 S v Laubshcer supra (n 1).  
1440
 S v Eadie  supra (n 18) at para 58. 
1441
 S v Eadie supra (n 18) at para 42. 
1442
 S v Eadie supra (n 18) at para 29-30 the court ―in the quest for greater clairity and precision‖ dealt 
with previous decisions where the defence of non-pathological incapacity was considered and 
therefore cited S v Van Vuuren supra (n 246) where it made reference to  S v Chretien supra (n 204). 
1443
 S v Chretien supra (n 204). 
1444
 S v Chretien supra (n 204) at 1104F-G and 1106E-G, discussed by Hoctor supra (n 1) at 145. 
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The reason behind the deliberate snubbing of the basis in Chretien
1445
 could be because 
the court disagreed with the very principles delineated in the judgment. It is submitted 
that the court in Eadie
1446
 has failed to understand the distinct attributes and purpose of 
the defences of non-pathological incapacity and the defence of sane automatism. 
 
Furthermore, the court in Eadie
1447
 states the approach taken is influenced by the 
previous decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal
1448
 However, it is submitted that the 
conflation of two distinct defences is not in line with precedent and this statement is 
therefore incorrect. This conflation is most troubling when one considers the 
ramifications on the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and 
emotional stress. Snyman is correct in questioning if the defence based on the lack of 
criminal capacity continues to exist after the pronouncements in Eadie
1449
 when it 
essentially becomes the defence of sane automatism.
1450
   
 
According to Snyman, it may have been the intention of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
to abolish the defence but doing so would go against its own approach; hence, to avoid 
―losing face for changing its tune‖ the court went about redefine the defence in terms of 
which leads the reader to think that it was merely refining the defence to determine if 
the ―boundaries of the defence… have been inappropriately extended.‖.1451 The 
Eadie
1452
 judgment only makes when it is assumed that certain mental states where non-
pathological incapacity is caused by factors other than intoxication or provocation.
1453
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Navsa JA in addressing the conflation of the above defences in the judgment by Griesel 
J in Eadie
1454
 acknowledged that the conflation has been criticised and specifically 
quotes Louw in support for this argument.
1455
  
 
The court placed  reliance on the testimony of Dr Kaliski, a witness for the State along 
with this statement by Louw: 
―Logic…dictates that we cannot draw a distinction between automatism and lack of self-control. If 
the two were distinct, it would be possible to exercise conscious control over one‘s action 
(automatism test) while simultaneously lacking self-control (the incapacity test)‖1456 
 
However, in respect of the courts reliance on the arguments of Louw and Dr Kaliski, 
Hoctor correctly points out that neither of these sources on whom Navsa JA based his 
findings on are compelling since, for one, Dr Kaliski, (a sceptic of the defence) 
concedes that despite being extremely critical of the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity, he accepts that where supporting evidence exists, the defence may be 
valid.
1457
 Secondly, it is in the context of the lack of clarity regarding the notion of self-
control that Louw puts forth this solution and the courts adoption of this view should 
have taken cognisance of this.
1458
 
 
 
Navsa JA was aware of the consequences of equating the two defences and states`:  
―It appears logical that when it has been shown that an accused has the ability to appreciate the 
difference between right and wrong, in order to escape liability, he would have to successfully 
                                                     
1454
  S v Eadie (2001) supra (n 18).  
1455
  S v Eadie supra (n 18) at para 55. 
1456
  S v Eadie supra (n 18) referring to Louw supra (n 215) at 210-211 where Louw states that there is no 
actual distinction between automatism and a lack of self-control, the second leg of the capacity 
inquiry should fall away and capacity should be determined only on the basis of the whether a 
person is able to appreciate the difference between right and wrong.  
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 S v Eadie supra (n 18) at para 16: ―Kaliski accepted that courts have held that in certain 
circumstances a combination of factors such as stress, provocation an the disinhibiting effects of 
alcohol may cause a person to lack criminal capacity .His experience, however, led him to conclude 
that temper an rage disinhibits people but does not rob them of control. Kaliski stated that he may be 
willing to concede the validity of a defence of non-pathological criminal incapacity due to stress and 
provocation in the fact of compelling facts.‖ 
1458
  Hoctor supra (n 1) at 143. 
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raise involuntariness as a defence. In the present contest [sic] the two are flip sides of the same 
coin.‖1459 
 
Navsa JA stated that an accused should be able to plead his case either on the basis that 
he acted as an automaton or alternatively on the basis that he acted involuntarily.
1460
 
The court recommended, in regard to the former, that the investigation into the mental 
component is not unconnected to the investigation into the involuntariness component. 
 
Louw presumes that these two components come together during the inquiry into 
criminal capacity and is not persuaded by the argument against the separation of the two 
components, that is the physical and the mental.
1461
 In regard to this argument proposing 
the elimination of the second leg of the capacity inquiry, the court stated that it was ―not 
persuaded‖ that this aspect of the capacity inquiry should be eliminated.1462 Although 
the court has demonstrated a lack of understanding of the criminal theory and despite its 
antipathy towards the notion of conative capacity, it ultimately takes the approach that 
the two inquiries have an independent existence, since the court stated that it was not 
persuaded that the second leg of the capacity should fall away.
1463
  
 
 Louw‘s justification for the separation of the mental and physical components of the 
capacity test was that it ―will enhance the clarity and certainty of that inquiry‖.1464 
Accordingly, Louw criticises the court in Eadie
1465
 for retaining the physical and mental 
components of the capacity inquiry and dismissing the argument for elimination of the 
second leg as being an ―over-refinement‖ which serves to ―maintain a more scientific 
approach to the law‖.1466  
 
It is submitted that the separating the mental and the physical component of the capacity 
enquiry will not bring clarity and certainty to the capacity test, rather this will result in 
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 S v Eadie supra (n 18) at para 57. 
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 S v Eadie supra (n 18) at para 57. 
1461
 Louw supra (n 5) at 204. 
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 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
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 Louw supra (n 5) at 205. 
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 Louw supra (n 5) at 205 citing S v Eadie supra (n 18) at para 58. 
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an erosion of the capacity element. The second leg of the capacity inquiry is in fact an 
important and fundamental component of the capacity inquiry.
1467
 As Burchell correctly 
argues, the two component elements  of the different defences differ from each other in 
that one tests if the accused had the capacity to act unlawfully (cognitive control) and 
the second tests if the accused ―actually acted unlawfully‖ in the defence of sane-
automatism. The inquiries into capacity or rationality and mens rea are inherently 
distinct and should not be confused. 
1468
 
 
Furthermore, the court‘s conflation of the conative leg and the test for automatism is 
problematic for another reason, it is not only positive actions which may form the basis 
of criminal liability but an omission also suffices. It is a requirement that both omissions 
and commissions must be voluntary in order to form the basis for criminal liability. 
Hence, the same rule must apply mutatis mutandis to omissions as well.
1469 The 
requirement of voluntary conduct must then be the same as the capacity to act in 
accordance with the appreciation into right and wrong.  
 
Snyman uses the example of a life-saver who has been physically detained and is 
therefore prevented from rescuing a drowning swimmer. This omission on the part of 
the lifesaver cannot form the basis of criminal liability for the death of a swimmer since 
the omission itself was involuntary in that the lifesaver was unable to subject his bodily 
movement in accordance to his will power. It is therefore ridiculous to postulate  that 
the reason for this non-liability was that the capacity to act in accordance with the 
appreciation of right and wrong of the omission for the simple reason that the omission 
was not wrongful and not because conative capacity was lacking. 
 
The same rules that apply to omission applies to positive actions since both forms of 
conduct form the basis of criminal liability and the defences of automatism cannot 
therefore be equated with conative control.
1470
 Furthermore, one of the fundamental 
aspects of criminal liability in Continental legal systems is that there is a clear 
distinction between muscular movements committed while in a state of automatism and 
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 Burchell supra (n 2) at 327-328. 
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 Burchell supra (n 2) at 328. 
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 Snyman supra (n 77) at 19. 
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 Snyman supra (n 77) at 19. 
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acts committed when loss of self-control is suffered, that is when conative capacity is 
absent.
1471
 
 
Snyman argues that by discarding the fundamental difference between the test to 
determine voluntariness and the test or conative capacity leads to the keystone doctrines 
of criminal liability being stripped of their significance. This process of merging the two 
tests results in the mental element in crime becoming a component of the test into the 
existence of voluntary conduct.
1472
 This approach is unsustainable although put forth in 
Eadie.
1473
 Burchell argues that the courts ―Delphic utterance‖ in this regard further 
exacerbates the confusion already created by the court on whether the scope of the 
defence of provocation is limited to cases involving sane automatism.
1474
 
 
Apart from the problematic conflation of two distinct defences, the Eadie
1475
 judgment 
is beset by other inconsistencies and confusion, especially where the element of 
conative capacity is concerned. 
 
The court, despite being unaccepting of the notion of conative capacity still maintains 
that the traditional two stage test for criminal capacity and states:  
―Whilst it may be difficult to visualise a situation where one retains the ability to distinguish 
between right and wrong yet lose the ability to control one‘s actions it appears to be notionally 
possible‖1476 
 
The retention of the test (although fundamentally reinterpreted) indicates that the court 
considers that such a situation is possible and avoids nullifying the large body of 
contrary precedent which has developed since the landmark case of Chretien
1477
.
1478
 
However, Hoctor correctly contends that retention of the second leg of the capacity 
inquiry may be meaningless since it is negated by a totally different defence of sane 
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automatism and the result is that the accused‘s ability to act in accordance with the 
appreciation of right and wrong will not be evaluated.
1479
  
 
Furthermore, the subjective test for capacity is substituted by the objective standard in 
the form of the test for sane automatism.
1480
 The result is that the test for voluntariness 
occurs twice, firstly to determine if the accused acted voluntarily, and secondly once 
cognitive capacity is determined, in lieu of the test for conative capacity.
1481
 This new 
development is illogical and has twisted the clear principled reasoning of the criminal 
law resulting in a muddle of confusion.  
 
It is true that this confusion could have been prevented had the court in Eadie
1482
 
applied the established criminal law principles which, it is submitted, were not in need 
of reform in the first place.
1483
  
 
5.1.3.2. Implications of the conflation 
The revision of the test for conative capacity is unwelcome as it will have direct 
implications on those individuals who have a genuine need for the defence non-
pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress.  
 
It is submitted the changes brought about by Eadie1484 are especially prejudicial towards 
the battered woman or any victim of abuse who suffers a loss of self-control kills her 
abuser, since due to the conflation of the concepts of conative capacity and sane 
automatism, the accused would have to prove that her actions were involuntary. It 
seems that loss of self-control resulting from provocation and emotional stress is 
therefore no longer acknowledged as a result of this judgment. 
 
It is submitted that by drastically limiting the scope of the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress the court has dealt a blow towards 
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victims of abuse such as battered woman by depriving these individuals of society 
without a suitable defence. This is a travesty of justice. The victim of abuse such as the 
battered woman, who does not allege that her actions were involuntary, must have the 
option of a defence based on lack of capacity; furthermore, the defence of sane 
automatism is narrower and more difficult to prove.1485  
 
Therefore, it is submitted that the negation of the existence of the defence is detrimental 
to the criminal law system as it results in the partial elimination of the element of 
criminal capacity.
1486
 The one consolation is that there is a place for the defence of non-
pathological incapacity based on provocation in South African law although severely 
tempered.
1487
  
 
It is submitted that the integration of a totally different defence, sane automatism, into 
the defence of non-pathological incapacity results in the test for capacity being defeated, 
thus rendering it redundant. The conflation of the two defences creates difficulties not 
only in application but  the presence of automatism also erodes the test for capacity ; 
there is a clear misunderstanding regarding the place and purpose of the capacity 
element since the lack of capacity does not necessarily mean voluntary conduct is not 
present.
1488
  
 
The Eadie
1489
 judgment contains other problematic features; there are certain glaring 
inconsistencies which reveal discord in the reasoning of the court. The court‘s 
acceptance of the acquittal in that in Nursingh
1490
 while rejecting the reasoning in 
Arnold,
1491
  Moses
1492
 and Gesualdo
1493
 is an example.  
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Hoctor correctly points out that Navsa JA
1494
 described the accused in Nursingh
1495
 as 
having displayed ―goal directed actions‖ when he aimed and shot at his mother and 
grandparents multiple times, and that he was not acting as an automaton, thus he could 
not have relied on the new approach formulated by the court in Eadie
1496
 and hence 
should have been found guilty of murder based on the new approach.
1497
  
 
Although, the court acknowledged the enormity of the ―deed‖ in Nursingh1498 and 
despite stating that the killing creates a sense of disquiet, the court nevertheless felt that 
the evidence proved that the intellect of the accused in Nursingh
1499
 was destroyed and 
the goal-directed actions performed by the accused were limited to the multiple 
shootings. Furthermore, the court explains that the trigger was an accumulation of 
physical, emotional and sexual abuse over a period of a few years and this combination 
of factors were extreme and unusual.
1500
 
 
In regard to the Moses
1501
 judgment, the court felt strongly that ―the unsatisfactory state 
of affairs‖ allowed the accused to succeed in pleading the defence. The court attributes 
this ―problem‖ to the misapplication and misreading of the previous decisions of the 
court.
1502
  
 
It is submitted that from the interpretation of the above statement, that the court is 
dissatisfied with the manner in which the defence of non-pathological incapacity has 
been applied and this misapplication of law over recent times has led to individuals who 
did not exhibit automatic behaviour, being acquitted and the problem of inconsistent 
application of the law has led to wrongly decided cases leading to unjust results and this 
may bring the law into disrepute. Evidently, the court is of the opinion that if an accused 
did not exhibit automatic behaviour, then they are undeserving of an acquittal.  
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It is submitted that the court has either misunderstood the nature of the defence of non-
pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress or does not accept that 
such a state can possibly exist without being in a state of automatism. When an 
individual is unable to resist an urge or to exercise self-control, then he does not possess 
conative capacity and cannot act in accordance with the distinction between right and 
wrong or decide whether to succumb to temptation. 
 
According to Hoctor the apparent disregard for existing precedent in Eadie
1503
 is hard to 
explain, and a possible explanation is that the court disagrees with the operation of the 
defence and speculates that this approach ―amounted to a sort of judicial ground-
clearing for the theoretical edifice which was to follow‖.1504 If it was the intention of the 
court was to re-define the defence then the court should have clarified its decision to 
depart from existing law. 
1505
  
 
The intention of the court was to redefine the defence in order to demonstrate that there 
is little allowance in our law for such a defence based non-pathological incapacity due 
to provocation and emotional stress. However in order to effect such a drastic change to 
the defence of provocation due to non-pathological incapacity the court sought to justify 
its reasoning by using legal theory to justify rejecting the basic difference between the 
inquiry into voluntariness and conative capacity. The intention of the court was to show 
that there is little or no place for this defence in South African law; however, as Snyman 
correctly argues this back-fired and proved that the opposite is true.
1506
 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal has not addressed the question on whether the defence of 
non-pathological incapacity continues to exist after Eadie,1507 Snyman states that in 
effect the defence has been abolished, not only in circumstances where provocation has 
caused the incapacity, but may also extend to cases where incapacity was caused by 
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stress, shock, concussion, panic or fear since these states are closely tied to emotional 
stress brought on by provocation and which may be difficult to separate.1508  
 
This development by the Eadie
1509
 judgment results in the disintegration of defence of 
non-pathological incapacity based on provocation and emotional stress. It follows that 
only if it is proved that provocation and emotional stress caused the accused to act 
involuntarily will liability be excluded.
1510
  
 
5.1.3.3. Affective functions and criminal capacity 
In the following emphatic statement by the court in Eadie
1511
 the court further raised an 
important issue, which warrants interrogation. The court attacked the basis of the 
defence of non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress which 
allows affective functions of the mind to impinge on the inquiry into criminal capacity 
and stated: 
―[t]he view espoused by Snyman and others, and reflected in some of the decisions of our courts, 
that the defence of non-pathological criminal incapacity is distinct from a defence of automatism, 
followed by an explanation that the former defence is based on loss of control, due to an inability 
to restrain oneself, or an inability to resist temptation, or an inability to resist one‘s emotions, does 
violence to the fundamentals of any self-respecting system of law.‖1512 
 
The courts view on affective functions is in line with the influential report by The 
Rumpff Commission where it was emphasised that emotional disturbances resulting 
from affective functions should not operate to exclude criminal capacity unless 
cognitive or conative functions were lacking.  
 
The Commission stated: 
―The uncontrolled emotional outbursts to which some people are liable sometimes adduced as a 
ground for non-responsibility, it being alleged that the person was acting on an irresistible, 
uncontrollable impulse. Admittedly severe emotional tension can evoke involuntary muscular 
reactions- trembling, palpitations, fainting fits, vomiting-but where there is volitional action, 
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volitional control is possible, unless the facts prove that there was disintegration of the other 
functions as well. Emotional impulsiveness or lability there does not, in our opinion, exclude 
responsibility, especially if the behaviour of the person concerned gives or has given evidence of 
insight and volitional control‖. 1513  
 
However, it is submitted that the Commission emphasised that emotional impulsiveness 
or lability should not generally exclude criminal responsibility but it could, and it is 
submitted it should, exclude criminal responsibility if insight and self-control are also 
lacking. It is thus submitted that on a fundamental level it does not matter what causes 
lack of capacity, but the fact that capacity is lacking is the crux of the matter.1514 In this 
light, Hoctor correctly argues that any distinction between provocation or emotional 
stress forming the basis of a defence of non-pathological incapacity should only affect 
matters relating to evidence.
1515
 
 
Snyman, in addressing the court‘s view, argues that the court‘s statement above 
amounts to a unacceptable exaggeration, and argues that the courts in Germany 
recognise disturbances of affective functions such as an emotional breakdown, anger, 
fear or panic as a basis which criminal culpability may be excluded if at the time of 
commission of the act and owing to an extreme disturbance of consciousness or mental 
deviation, is not able to appreciate the unlawfulness of the act or of acting in accordance 
with such an appreciation.
1516
  
 
Furthermore, section 10 of the Austrian penal code and section 10 of the Swiss penal 
code contain provisions to a similar effect.
1517
 Therefore it is incredible to assert that 
these Continental legal systems are not self-respecting or worthy of respect.
1518
  
 
As mentioned previously, the concept of criminal capacity is derived from Continental 
law, which has been highly influential in the development of ―toerekeningsvatbaarheid‖. 
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Therefore like the Continental law, South African law has justifiably recognised and 
accepted that affective disturbances can exclude criminal capacity. 
  
Furthermore, the fear in allowing a defence based on provocation and emotional stress 
stems from fears of facile acquittals. The case of Moses
1519
 is often used to support the 
argument that affective disruptions should not impinge on the capacity inquiry, it is 
clear from analysis of the accused‘s evidence, the accused stated that he was furious1520, 
the emotion of fury, feeling of betrayal and hurt,
1521
 these fall under the category of 
affective functions of the mind. Essentially the accused hated the deceased, however the 
accused displayed controlled behaviour as opposed to uncontrollable, it is only the latter 
which results in a total disintegration of capacity. 
 
 The Moses
1522
 judgment is an example of a case where the principles of the defence 
were incorrectly applied. Acquitting an accused after systematically killing a person out 
of hate and fury meant that society is subjected to the ―whims of the short-tempered‖1523 
who chose not to control their action. However, it is submitted that the recognition of 
affective functions in Moses is not the problem, the problems lies with assessing when 
self-control is lacking. If the principles of the defence are correctly applied, then there is 
not need to fear the basis of the defence. It is therefore submitted that the source of the 
incapacity should be irrelevant, where there are indications that an accused suffered a 
complete disintergration of criminal capacity an acquittal must follow, this is the heart 
of the defence of non-pathological incapacity.  
 
The case of Moses
1524
 is problematic not because the accused was acquitted because 
affective functions were disturbed, but despite indications of the presence of cognitive 
capcacity in the conduct of the accused, the accused was acquitted.
1525
 The court failed 
to assess if the accused‘s acts were in accordance with his insights. In accomplishing a 
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series of different acts, there are strong indications that that the accused did not suffer a 
loss of self-control. 
 
5.1.4. The requirement of loss of self-control 
The notion of self-control is in itself controversial both in South African law and in 
English and Canadian law. It has been argued by academics such as Louw that there is 
no clear understanding of the actual nature of the concept loss of self-control and 
attributes this confusion to the notion being a ―legal construction without a 
psychological foundation‖.1526 
 
In support of this argument Louw
1527
 makes reference to Eadie
1528
 where the court 
stated:  
―With regard to the question of ―losing control‖, both Dr Kaliski and Mr Lay had great difficulty 
with the concept, which is not a psychological term‖.1529  
 
The court made a lame attempt to resolve this standoff between the legal fraternity and 
the medical community by relying on ―legal jealousy‖1530 and stated: 
 ―The fact of the matter is that in the final analysis the crucial issue of the appellant‘s criminal 
responsibility for his actions at the relevant time is a matter to be determined, not by psychiatrists, 
but by the court itself‖1531 
 
Louw argues that while it is trite that the courts are the final arbiter of all decisions, the 
decisions must be based on a sound foundation. In the present context a sound 
psychological foundation for the concept of ―loss of self-control‖ is lacking, therefore 
its place in this area of law is questionable.
1532
 However, it is submitted that a strong 
legal foundation supporting the notion of loss of self-control exists; this was provided in 
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the influential Rumpff Commission Report
1533
 which provides sufficient credence to 
this notion. 
 
The notion of capacity for self-control or the ability to exercise free choice to act 
lawfully or not stemmed from the Rumpff Commission Report
1534
 and forms the 
foundation for the description of conative capacity in many judgments.
1535
 Certain 
judgments
1536
 employ the definition provided in the dictum of Joubert JA in 
Laubscher
1537
 such as Wiid
1538
 and Van der Sandt.
1539
  
 
In other judgments, conative capacity has been described differently, focusing on the 
capacity to exercise restraint.
1540
 The requirement of loss of self-control is considered an 
integral part of the provocation defence not only in South African but England and 
Canada. 
 
In terms of the Rumpff Report
1541
 the notion of self-control or ―weerstandskrag‖ was 
explained. The conflation of the two concepts, that is voluntary conduct and conative 
capacity, stems from a lack of understanding of the definition of self-control as 
explicated by Wiersma in the Rumpff Report.
1542
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On this point reference can be made to the Rumpff Commission report where it was 
stated: 
―When a man kills his friend in a fit of rage, his behaviour does not spring from any blind, 
impulsive drive or uncontrollable emotion. He is performing a goal-directed act. In his 
(momentary) rage he has not controlled himself, but his action was by no means uncontrollable, as 
in cases of automatism‖.1543 
 
The definition of self-control, cited in the Rumpff Report
1544
 and the case law 
unfortunately did not resonate with the court in Eadie despite the concept being 
foundational in the development and formulation of the defence.
1545
   
 
In Eadie the court stated: 
―The courts have conflated two different scenarios: where an accused owning to his volatile and 
emotional nature commits a crime due to lack of sufficient self-control, and the situation where an 
accused, through a long series of events finds herself in a state where there has been complete 
disintegration of her control and therefore a concomitant lack of criminal capacity‖1546 
 
Self-control and its relation to conative capacity are distinct from the assessment on the 
whether an action was voluntary. In respect of voluntary conduct, the mind of the 
accused is not responsible for actions committed, the actions are performed 
―mindlessly‖ and goal-directed actions will not be possible.1547  
 
According to Wiersma, self-control refers to the nature of the perpetrator and his insight 
into the unlawful nature of an act and prevents execution of the unlawful act, creating a 
counter-motive; self-control in terms of this definition is subject to the mind of the 
accused and is distinguishable on this basis of voluntary conduct.
1548
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Snyman correctly states that with involuntary conduct something happens to the 
accused, the accused cannot prevent himself from performing the unlawful action but 
his ―mind and will‖ are involved and the actions are totally voluntary.1549 Furthermore, 
behaviour due to a lack of conative capacity is considered uncontrollable and therefore 
actions as a result do not attract blame and criminal liability since the agent was unable 
to exercise free will. The distinction between uncontrollable and uncontrolled actions is 
crucial, since the latter attracts criminal liability.
1550
  
 
De Vos defines self-control as ―a disposition of the perpetrator through which her 
insight into the unlawful nature of the particular act can restrain her from, and thus set 
up a counter-motive to, its execution.‖  
 
De Vos accurately explains this link: 
―A lack of self-control can thus lead to a collapse of this conative functioning of the mind and 
hence criminal incapacity. Such conative function (which when affected excludes criminal 
capacity) must be distinguished from the affective function of the mind, which when affected, does 
not automatically have any influence on the criminal capacity of the actor. While there is volitional 
activity on the part of the actor, volitional control will be possible, unless the facts demonstrate 
that there was a disintegration of the other functions as well. Although the affective function of an 
individual‘s mind may be impaired by provocation or other factors, this on its own will have no 
bearing on the finding on whether the accused had the requisite criminal capacity or not‖.1551 
 
Du Plessis, a proponent of this view argues that in its purest form, the defence of 
―toerekeningsvatbaarheid‖ or the lack of criminal capacity should be available only to 
those who at the time of the commission of the crime were by reason of a mental defect 
or mental illness and not able to appreciate the wrongfulness of his or her act or not be 
able to act in accordance with that appreciation.
1552
  
 
Hence, if a person acts in either of the two conditions, the accused must have been 
suffering from a mental defect. The ―extension‖ of the defence of non-pathological 
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incapacity to the intoxicated and to the ―sorely provoked‖ has amounted to the defence 
of insanity being made available to the sane.
1553
  
 
It is thus contended that the condition of lack of self-control can only be caused by a 
mental defect and if no mental defect exists then this confirms that a person can 
differentiate between right and wrong and therefore act in accordance with this 
appreciation cannot occur.
1554
  Du Plessis argues that it is unacceptable for the law to 
allow a sane person to claim a loss of self-control. This should not operate as a complete 
defence to a murder charge especially when the accused admits that the killing was 
committed intentionally.
1555
  
 
The basis of this argument is that is one thing for attribute violence to a loss of self-
control, but to commit a deliberate killing and attribute it to lost self-control is 
another.
1556
 Du Plessis is thus of the opinion that the latter scenario indicates an 
abnormal state of mind and should therefore be dealt with and investigated in terms of 
the ―insanity defence‖ that is Chapter 13 of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977.1557  
In essence, a claim of non-pathological incapacity which is characterised by a loss of 
self-control, according to Du Plessis is a form of insanity and thereby a form of 
pathological incapacity.
1558
  
 
However, it is submitted that this argument is invalid since the defence of non-
pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress has a unique quality 
that is it is a defence for the sane and accommodates a middle ground in respect that the 
effects of provocation or emotional stress short of sanity is recognised, the law through 
the defence of non-pathological incapacity rightfully acknowledges that due to 
emotional distress in the form of fear, anger and extreme emotional turmoil cause a 
disintegration of capacity resulting in actions become uncontrollable and therefore not 
blameworthy.  
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In this light, Hoctor argues that the comments by Du Plessis are not well-founded, as the 
fact that the term non-pathological incapacity has been coined gives the defence its 
recognition and identity in its own right. In the influential case of Laubscher, the court 
laid down the theoretical framework for the defence and added to established case law 
supporting the principles on which criminal capacity is based, it was definitively 
established that the defence of non-pathological incapacity has an autonomous existence 
and this means that the defence was not created by merely extending the insanity 
defence to the sane; detractors of the defence have failed to understand the purpose an 
and the nature of the defence which has created confusion and contempt towards a 
defence based on provocation  defence.
1559
  
 
5.1.5. The role of expert evidence  
There are a few important issues which relate to the expert evidence where the defence 
of non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress is concerned. In 
the South African context, expert evidence is not a prerequisite and is not considered to 
be indispensable; a plea of non-pathological incapacity may therefore be raised without 
the leading of expert evidence.
1560
  
 
However, the courts approach a defence based on non-pathological incapacity with 
caution and circumspection, and therefore success of a case will depend on expert 
evidence.
1561
 In the majority of the reported cases in which the defence was pleaded, 
expert evidence was led in respect of the accused‘s mental capabilities at the time of the 
incident in question.
1562
 The courts in South Africa have approached a defence based on 
non-pathological incapacity with caution therefore expert evidence in support of this 
defence is considered important.1563  
 
It is submitted that there is a shortcoming of the defence of non-pathological incapacity 
is that there is uncertainty in respect of the necessity of expert evidence in laying the 
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factual foundation for the defence. There are cases such as Campher
1564
 and Wiid which 
indicate that expert evidence may be essential.
1565
  
 
The uncertainties and debate regarding admissibility of expert testimony in cases 
involving the provocation defence are not limited to South Africa but extend to England 
and Canada where admissibility of expert evidence has garnered some attention.
1566
 In 
England and Canada the general position is that expert evidence is inadmissible in cases 
involving provocation; however, in England this approach has been the subject of 
criticism as it is contended that that certain behaviours or mental states cannot be 
understood without the assistance of medical practitioner who specialises in the field of 
psychiatry or psychology.
1567
 
 
However, it has been contended the scope of admissible evidence should be widened to 
include abnormal and usual states of mind that cannot be categorised as mental illness 
and may not be understood by a lay person even with common sense.1568 It is thus 
argued that expert testimony can be very useful in such cases as it may aid in 
understanding the mind-set of the accused at the time of commission of the offence.1569 
 
In Canada, Australia and New Zealand evidence relating to battered woman syndrome 
has been admitted in cases. Syndrome evidence has been regarded as important as it 
may shed light on the emotional makeup of the accused at the time of the commission of 
the killing and factors that made him or her more prone to provocation.
1570
  
 
In South Africa, the courts have used a range of terminology in defining the symptoms 
of the battered woman‘s syndrome, this includes the terms such as ―impulsive mania‖ in 
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the case of Campher
1571
 and ―emotional flooding of the mind‖ in Smith1572 and in 
Potgieter
1573
 the court termed this phenomena as an ―emotionally distraught and unable 
to exercise a normal degree of self-control‖.1574  
 
The reactions of a battered woman to an abusive situation may differ greatly, some 
women might react in fear or anger, or resort to substance abuse or self-blame, or slip 
into a state of depression. In this light the effect of abuse may not meet the criteria 
which support a clinical diagnosis in certain circumstances.
1575
 
 
In jurisdictions such as the United States, battered woman syndrome is often utilised 
and regarded as a form of post-traumatic stress disorder; however, battered woman 
syndrome is not regarded as a mental disease or defect.
1576
 Essentially expert evidence 
has been utilised to explain to the court why the accused as well as the deceased 
behaved in the manner in which they did. Syndrome evidence has been especially useful 
in cases involving cumulative provocation and the impact of long-term abuse on the 
accused. Expert evidence may aid in showing that the accused may have been more 
prone to provocation.
1577
 
 
Assessment of the provocation defence in England and Canada reveals that both 
jurisdictions take a cautious approach in admitting expert evidence in cases involving 
provocation due to the concern that the jury or the judge in certain instances may attach 
too much weight to the evidence, this essentially usurps the role of the jury in making a 
decision on the central issue.  
 
                                                     
1571
 S v Campher supra (n 8). 
1572
 S v Smith supra (n 301). 
1573
 S v Potgieter supra (n 390). 
1574
 Carstens and Le Roux supra (n 3) at 188. 
1575
 M. Reddi. ―Battered Woman Syndrome: Some Reflections on the Utility of this ―Syndrome‖ to 
South African Women who Kill their Abusers‖ (2005) 3 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 
259 at 262 
1576
 Reddi supra (n 1575) at 262,  S.Kaliski Psycholegal Assessment in South Africa (2007) at 4 states that 
clinicians in South African base their diagnosis from the categories listed in DSM-IV or ICD-10. 
1577
 Reddi supra (n 1575) at 262. 
 251 
However, in cases involving cumulative provocation like the battered woman syndrome, 
expert evidence is considered to be important issue in both Canada and England relating 
to the admission of expert evidence where mental illness is not in issue therefore 
forensic psychiatric evidence seen as unnecessary and irrelevant since the provocation 
defence is a defence for the sane. 
 
The concerns relating to over-reliance on expert testimony and the fear of experts 
usurping the courts authority is a valid one. There seems to be a struggle in achieving a 
balance in this area in regard to accepting the importance of expert evidence in coming 
to a fair and just result while also ensuring that the views of the expert don‘t unduly 
influence the court. This problem can be illustrated in the case of Nursingh. 1578  A 
critical feature of this case was that the state did not lead expert evidence regarding the 
state of mind of the accused while the defence did lead expert evidence.  This case 
highlights evidentiary problems specifically related to how expert evidence is governed 
in cases involving non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress.  
 
The Nursingh1579 case demonstrates the importance of expert evidence and more 
importantly highlights the need for judges to demand expert evidence to achieve a 
balanced view and may aid in assessing the validity of the accused‘s version of the 
defence. Besides the glaring imbalance in respect of expert evidence in Nursingh,1580  
there are issues emanating from the expert testimony itself which reveal a lack of 
understanding of legal concepts. 
 
The role of that expert evidence played in Arnold
1581
 is significant. Firstly, the State did 
not lead expert psychiatric evidence either in support of their case or challenge the 
opinions of the evidence led by the defence witness Dr.Gittleson who testified that the 
accused‘s conscious mind was flooded by emotions which interfered with his capacity 
to appreciate what was right and wrong, therefore due to the severity of his emotional 
disturbance the accused might have lost the capacity to exercise control over his actions. 
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Dr.Gittelson further stated that the accused had acted subconsciously at the significant 
moment. 
 
This case is another example of expert witnesses blurring the lines between the defences 
of non-pathological incapacity and sane automatism which amounts to ―fudging of 
doctrinal distinctions‖.1582 This error proved problematic in this case as the court relied 
on the uncontested evidence by the defence and found that it could find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused acted consciously when killing the deceased. This 
case is an example of the important role that expert evidence may play in proving a case 
based on criminal capacity or incapacity.
1583
  
 
This poses a potential problem especially if the court places reliance on the views of 
experts. It is submitted that this factor is critical as it tipped the scales in favour of the 
defence as the judge did not obtain a balanced view. In assessing the case law involving 
the non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress it is apparent 
that there is a tendency of experts such as psychologists and psychiatrists to conflate the 
defence of sane automatism and non-pathological incapacity.
1584
  
 
This poses a problem, especially when a court places reliance on that testimony, as 
stated previously, the views of the medical community may at times be in conflict with 
that of legal doctrines; however, the onus is on the court to decide on legal principles. It 
is submitted that the role of the criminal law is different to that the medical fraternity. 
Hence, when expert testimony is led, cognisance of this fact must be taken into account. 
 
It is submitted that the court in Eadie
1585
 placed over-reliance on expert evidence at the 
expense at the expense of legal principle, which resulted in fundamental adverse 
changes to the defence, the views of experts such as psychologists and psychiatrists 
should not be allowed to encroach and undermine legal principle, since the legal 
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principle may not always be compatible with those views and opinions of the medical 
community.
1586
 This constituted a fundamental error in the Eadie
1587
 judgment. 
 
There is disagreement between medical professionals (who often give expert testimony) 
and the law since a loss of self-control is a legal phenomenon and cannot be attributed 
to a pathological condition.1588 Mental health practitioners do not in most circumstances 
draw a distinction between the defences of sane automatism on the one hand and loss of 
self-control emanating out the absence of conative functions.1589  
 
Psychiatrists and other mental health care professionals are in most circumstances called 
to give evidence as expert witnesses. However, ironically, the medical fraternity doubt 
the very existence of the defence of non-pathological incapacity therefore in most cases 
cannot a link between a dissociative state or amnesia (sometimes suffered by accused 
persons raising the defence of non-pathological incapacity) to psychiatric diagnosis will 
not be made. 1590 
 
This was the situation in the case of Kensley where the expert witness, a forensic 
psychiatrist determined that the accused suffered from ―no pathology recognised in 
psychiatry‖.1591 In most cases the sceptism by mental health practitioners towards the 
defence of non-pathological incapacity is problematic to the accused since in most cases 
a psychiatrist may be only willing to concede the possibility of diminished 
responsibility (which results in an acquittal) and not a lack of criminal capacity. 
 
Furthermore, though the onus is on the state to prove that the accused possessed 
criminal capacity beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused is still under a duty to lay a 
factual foundation and will require expert evidence to meet this requirement.1592 It is 
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doubtful that a factual foundation based on a report by a sceptic of the defence will be 
sufficient. 
 
Stevens argues that this differing view has resulted in some measure of inconsistency in 
respect of the weight that may be attached to expert evidence, and that this results in 
inconsistent probative value being attached.1593 Furthermore, courts have provided little 
guidance in the rules pertaining to admissibility and how the evidence should be 
assessed.The lack of structure or framework regulating admission and assessment of 
expert evidence is troubling and can be attributed to some of the controversies relating 
to this defence. 
 
In the South African context it has been argued that it is in the interests of justice that 
the victim of battering (the battered accused) receive evaluation by the relevant mental 
health practitioners as along with counselling to ensure that she is prepared for trial and 
is emotionally capably of collecting evidence needed in her defence. The evidence of 
psychologists, psychiatrists and social workers may be crucial to the accused‘s 
defence.1594 
 
The medical community may not give credence to legal constructs such as loss of self-
control; however, it is submitted that the court must make a decision based on 
established legal principle even when faced with expert testimony that undermine such 
concepts.  As Burchell argues, the role of expert testimony is to assist the court in 
obtaining a balanced view and to assess the credibility of the accused‘s claim of 
criminal incapacity and it is in this light that the court must attach value to expert 
evidence.
1595
 
 
It is submitted that the nature and basis of a defence must be understood by a court and 
in instances  where the legal principles  are undermined or distorted by experts, the 
court is under a duty apply utilise the evidence to the extent that it sheds light on the 
case at hand. Expert evidence should not be of overriding importance. 
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It is submitted that in Eadie
1596
, the conflation of the defence of sane automatism with 
the defence of non-pathological incapacity is partly due to this over-reliance. The 
conflation is expected since from the perspective of the medical fraternity little 
recognition is given to the defence of non-pathological incapacity despite it being 
recognised in criminal law and underpinned by a solid theoretical foundation.  
 
Stevens correctly argues that the exact role and impact of the expert evidence in 
Eadie
1597
 is difficult to assess as Navsa JA clearly preferred the expert testimony put 
forth by Dr Jedaar while the testimony of Dr Kaliski contributed in part to the conflation 
of the defence of non-pathological incapacity and sane automatism. The testimony of Dr 
Jedaar was not given much weight due to the conflicting views given in testimony in a 
previous case. It is debatable if the court would have still reasoned that the notions of 
non-pathological incapacity and sane automatism were not distinct had another expert 
other than Dr Jedaar had given testimony which clarifies certain aspects regarding both 
defences.
1598
 Furthermore, it is apparent that there is a gap between law on the one hand 
and the medical community (specifically psychiatry and psychology).
1599
 
 
In the context of the role of expert evidence in the defence of pathological incapacity, 
Stevens and Le Roux state that at face value the interaction between law and medicine 
is less controversial; however, a ―post-mortem of the interface between law and 
medicine in cases of pathological criminal incapacity reveals a different picture.‖1600  
 
This interface is described by Hiemstra
1601
 and where the view taken by psychiatry is 
described as being a nurturing one where human beings are considered as a dynamic 
entity. The aim of medicine is to treat and not to condemn whereas in contrast the 
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criminal law aims to ascertain if individuals should be punished for their conduct.
1602
 
This view is in accordance with the Rumpff Report
1603
 where it was stated that 
psychiatry is essentially therapeutic and is concerned with the morality of law.
1604
  
 
Le Roux and Stevens argue that it is this difference between the essential purpose of the 
law and of psychiatry that has created the lack of mutual appreciation. The scepticism of 
the medical community towards the defence of non-pathological incapacity is a major 
problem since the assessment of the defence by medical professionals is essential.
1605
 
  
Stevens correctly argues that the one of the problems facing the defence of non-
pathological incapacity is that a legal framework governing the assessment of evidence 
upon which the defence relies does not exist, whereas in the case of pathological 
incapacity the defence is governed by the Criminal Procedure Act
1606
. 
1607
 
 
Furthermore, expert evidence is not mandatory in cases where the defence of non-
pathological incapacity is raised and the court has only a discretionary power to refer an 
accused for observation.
1608
 This is a problem with the defence. Stevens thus argues that 
both defences i.e.: non-pathological incapacity and pathological incapacity must be 
governed by the same rules relating to expert evidence.
1609
  
 
It is submitted that Stevens is correct in stating that there is a framework regulating 
aspects of expert evidence where the defence of non-pathological incapacity is involved. 
However, it is submitted that in applying the same regulations to the defence of non-
pathological incapacity may result in the fundamental distinction between the two types 
of defences fading away. The effect this may be adverse to the victims of abuse such as 
the ―battered women‖ who run the risk of being categorised as insane or deranged when 
                                                     
1602
 Le Roux and Stevens supra (n 1600) at 45. 
1603
 Rumpff Commission Report supra (n 187). 
1604
 Rumpff Commission Report supra (n 187) at para 9.39. 
1605
 Le Roux and Stevens supra (n 1600) at 45.  
1606
 Supra (n 1). 
1607
 Stevens supra (n 13) at 821. 
1608
 Stevens supra (n 13) at 411-412. 
1609
 Stevens supra (n 13) at 2-3. 
 257 
they in fact may not possess a mental disorder or defect. This may defeat the purpose of 
having a defence based on non-pathological incapacity which addresses the needs of the 
sane, if the two defences are merged in that they are regulated by the same framework. 
 
This has resulted in tension between the legal community and the medical community 
which has diminished the value of expert evidence in cases where the defence is 
raised.
1610
 In terms of the expert testimony, the notion of loss of self-control is not a 
clinical term but is merely a legal concept.
1611
  
 
In the case of Mahlinza
1612
 Rumpff JA emphasised that the concepts of ―criminal 
liability‖ and ―elements of a crime‖ are legal concepts, whereas the concepts of ―mental 
illness‖ and ―mental defect‖ are psychiatric ones. Furthermore, when the mental 
capabilities of an accused is investigated in order to make a finding regarding criminal 
capacity the evidence of medical experts is important but not conclusive.
1613
 This point 
is especially significant in relation to the views of medical health practitioners to cases 
involving of non-pathological incapacity and sane automatism, which are fundamentally 
different in terms of legal doctrine in South African law. 
 
It is submitted that Stevens has highlighted a definite disconnect between the way law 
views its principles and way the medical community views legal principles. This is 
unfortunate since the expert testimony in cases where the defence is raised is important 
and it is intended to provide an outcome which is in line with justice and fairness.
1614
 
 
If there is a tension or conflict regarding the significance of the notion of loss self-
control, it is submitted that the court must rely on legal principle rather than the 
influence of expert testimony when laying down the law. Stevens has argued that expert 
testimony contributed to the courts conflation of sane automatism and non-pathological 
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and has led to major disintegration of the defence most of which is extremely 
unfortunate.
1615
  
 
Better co-operation has to be ensured between the law and the medical community, so 
that outcome is in line with the principles of justice and fairness in cases where the 
defence of criminal capacity is pleaded.
1616
 The disregard of scientific knowledge is 
totally unjustifiable and recognition must be accorded to modern science, if the law does 
not accord such recognition to modern science then it runs the risk of ―degenerating into 
some kind of intellectual game unrelated to the realities of life‖.1617  
 
This being said, it is however not the place of the medical community to demand that 
the assessment of criminal responsibility be exclusively a psychiatric one. It is the role 
of the law to define minimum standards of acceptable behaviour. However, it is pivotal 
that scientific psychiatric knowledge be provided when the defence of criminal capacity 
is raised. Courts must welcome such evidence to the extent that it assists in explaining 
the behaviour and mind set of the accused at the time of commission of an offence. 
Medical professionals must adhere to the rules and boundaries of psychiatric evidence. 
 
The role of medical professionals in this context is thus to provide assessment as 
opposed to providing a concluding opinion of criminal responsibility. This point was 
made clear in the case of Gesualdo
1618
 where the court stated that the defence of non-
pathological mental incapacity is one of law and not of psychology. 
 
It is thus submitted that this factor indicates that some of the problems with the defence 
lie not with founding principles but relate largely to the application of the principles of 
the defence, furthermore there are aspects relating to evidentiary matters that are in need 
of review, this specifically pertains to sceptism of expert witness and the weighting 
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attached to expert opinion; furthermore, providing the court with a balanced well-
rounded view cannot be undervalued, especially when the defence has used expert 
testimony there is a need for rebuttal by the prosecution.  
 
Courts must guard against being overly influenced by expert evidence since it is 
ultimately the courts assessment of the accused‘s state of mind that is final and ruling if 
criminal capacity was absent, in making this determination the court assesses the facts 
of the case along with determining if the accused can be classified as a reliable witness 
and the nature of the accused conduct at the time of the killing.1619 Hoctor argues that 
the court ―should neither be carried away nor cowed by expert evidence‖, the role of 
expert is that it simply forms one component of all the evidence led.1620  
 
The court in Makhubele respect of the test into mens rea: 
―…the accused‘s evidence of what was going on in his mind, what his thoughts were, what 
emotions he felt, what urges or impulses, is of vital importance.That evidence is to be evaluated in 
the context of the evidential material as a whole, the ultimate objective being to establish as best 
one can, from fallible data and with imperfect knowledge of the functioning of human volition, 
what the accused‘s state of mind was at the time in question.‖1621 
 
Principles governing the admissibility of expert evidence was summarised in the case of 
Engelbrecht : 
―Firstly, in the matter in respect of which the witness is called to give evidence should call for 
specialised skill and knowledge. Secondly, the witness must be a person with experience or skill to 
tender her or him an expert in particular subject. Thirdly, the guidance offered by the expert should 
be sufficiently relevant to the matter in issue to be determined by the court. Fourth, the expertise of 
any witness should not be elevated to such heights that the courts own capabilities and 
responsibilities are abrogated. Fifth, the opinion offered to the court must be proved by admissible 
evidence, either facts within the personal knowledge of expert or on the basis of facts proven by 
others. Sixth, the opinion of such witnesses must not usurp the function of the court.‖1622 
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The court possesses the discretion on whether the accused should be refered for 
psychiatric evaluation as laid out in s 79 of the Criminal Procedure Act1623.1624 This will 
go a long way in ensuring that a defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress will not lead to a facile acquittal. Clarity is needed to 
address uncertainties regarding whether expert evidence is required to lay a factual 
foundation. Some cases courts have felt that the court itself is in a position to decide 
when assessing accepted facts whether the defence has been made out.
1625
 
 
Burchell recommends that two practical solutions may be available. Firstly, a judge 
should require the prosecution to lead expert psychologist and psychiatrist testimony. 
This will test the evidence led by the defence against the evidence led by the State.1626 
This procedure is similar to the provisions relating to insanity under section 79 of 
Criminal Procedure Act 1977 which provides for evidence from a court appointed 
psychiatrist as well as a psychiatrist appointed by the defence.1627 
 
It is submitted that in light of the difficulties relating to expert evidence governing the 
defence of non-pathological incapacity, a provision to this effect will ensure the law in 
this area is consistent and will also as a safeguard to prevent facile acquittals. It is 
submitted that this change advanced by Burchell will solve the problems relating to 
expert testimony, the aim of the expert testimony will be to obtain a ―balanced view‖ 
which is better than a one sided perspective.1628  
 
In the case of Potgieter the court stressed the importance of scrutinising the evidence of 
the accused and stated: 
―Facts which can be relied upon as indicating that a person was acting in a state of automatism are 
often consistent with, in fact the reason for, the commission of a deliberate, unlawful act. Thus- as 
one knows-stress, frustration, fatigue and provocation, for instance, may diminish self-control to 
the extent that, colloquially put, a person ―snaps‖ and a conscious act amounting to a crime results. 
Similarly, subsequent manifestations of certain emotions, such as fear, panic, guilt and shame, may 
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be present after either a deliberate or an involuntary act has been committed. The facts…must 
therefore be closely examined to determine where the truth lies.‖1629 
 
The court in Potgieter
1630
 was not entirely convinced on the truthfulness of the 
accused‘s version. The court ruled that the version of the accused could not be 
reasonably true and was rejected by the court. The factual foundation was held to be 
absent. The significant aspect of this case was that the court rejected the expert 
psychiatrist evidence since the cogency of this evidence was based on an account that 
was ruled to be false. This case highlights the problems of attaching too much weight to 
expert evidence which ultimately rests on the truthfulness of the accused‘s version.1631 
 
In this respect, Burchell proposes that the expert evidence should be led after evidence 
relating to the accused‘s version of events has been heard. Expert witnesses would thus 
have an opportunity to re-evaluate their evidence after hearing the facts of the case as 
well as hearing the accused‘s version being tested at cross-examination. This is 
important since the psychiatric evidence is largely based on the cogency of the 
accused‘s version of events.1632 It is submitted that Burchell‘s solutions are indeed 
practical and will address the problems relating to expert evidence. 
 
Carstens and Le Roux have correctly argued that in the light of the realities of violence 
against women and the killings arising out of battered women syndrome, expert 
evidence of mental health practitioners such as psychologists and psychiatrists are of 
paramount importance in the defence of such accused. Furthermore, psychiatry should 
recognise the trauma arising out of battered women syndrome in order to keep up to 
date with the law.
1633
 This will go a long way in closing the gap between law and 
psychiatry since the law has recognised the adverse effects of abuse on the emotional 
health of a person, undermining the sceptical position of the medical fraternity. 
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The courts have in cases defended their stance in this regard. In Gesualdo
1634
 the court 
rejected the view of psychiatrist who could not accept that a person who suffered from 
no mental illness or physical defect and who was able to distinguish between right and 
wrong could not act in accordance with such appreciation since there was no medical 
reason in psychiatry or science that could justify such a condition.  
 
In this respect the court stated: 
―If the human mind is capable of unconsciously creating a retrograde amnesia because the mind 
cannot tolerate an appreciation of what it had done, it seems to us to be possible that it may also be 
unable to exercise control over a person‘s conscious actions in certain circumstances‖1635 
 
This court placed reliance on the findings of the courts in previous cases rather than the 
opinions of expert witnesses.
1636
 Unfortunately, this was not the case in Eadie
1637
 which 
has led to the erosion of the defence of non-pathological incapacity. 
 
It is submitted that a framework regulating admissibility of expert evidence must be 
developed. Furthermore; the role of expert evidence in cases involving the defence of 
non-pathological incapacity must be addressed.The need for psychiatric evaluation must 
be investigated with the precise extent and nature of evaluation also being determined. It 
is submitted that this should take the form of an out-patient psychiatric evaluation for a 
maximum period of 5 days. It is submitted that even though an accused may raise the 
defence of non-pathological incapacity and not pathological incapacity, there are 
specific instances, such as where post-traumatic stress disorders are involved and the 
effects arising out of battered woman syndrome that may require explanation by mental 
health experts. 
 
 
It is in the interests of justice that accused persons receive psychiatric evaluation when, 
besides providing a safeguard against facile acquittals, it will aid the court in making a 
determination. It is apparent that there is lack of a framework regulating the role of 
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expert evidence in the defence of non-pathological incapacity; this is problematic to 
accused persons requiring expert evidence in laying a factual foundation for the 
defence. The benefits of streamlining expert evidence in the defence will ensure 
consistency in cases. 
 
In addressing the problem of differing opinions between the legal fraternity and the 
medical fraternity in relation to the validity of a defence of non-pathological incapacity 
it is submitted that the sceptism of expert witnesses towards the defence of non-
pathological incapacity still poses a threat in the form of influencing the court as long as 
there is lack of clarity regarding the nature and very existence of the defence which 
currently plagues the defence, this is attributed to Eadie
1638
 which essentially brought 
the law in line with neuroscience by equating the defence with sane automatism. 
1639
  
This is a travesty of justice as it results in limiting the functioning of the law and is a 
direct result of the court‘s misunderstanding of the law on an elemental level. 
 
5.1.6. Apparent introduction of an objective test in Eadie 
There has been much debate regarding the need for an objective test within the defence 
of non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress. There have 
been proposals by academics such as Snyman and Burchell to bring South African 
criminal law in line with other jurisdictions such as the Anglo-American systems, by 
incorporating an objective test into the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress, essentially to prevent abuse of the defence by setting 
an acceptable standard of behaviour in society with the aim of discouraging or deterring 
criminal behaviour.
1640
 
 
Burchell, a strong proponent of this view has advocated for an objective test in the form 
of the ―reasonable‖ or ―ordinary person‖ and proposes a normative evaluation of how a 
―reasonable person would have acted under the same strain and stress‖ and states that 
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 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1639
 Kaliski supra (n 1576) at 54 states that ―As a result of the Eadie judgment the defence of temporary 
non-pathological criminal incapacity has been brought into line with a psychiatric (neurological) 
understanding of automatism, …‖ 
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 Burchell supra (n 2) at 326, Burchell supra (n 1320) at 41, Snyman supra (n 1) at 164, Snyman supra 
(n 77) at 22. 
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the advantages of allowing a ―judicial value judgment‖ when faced with cases where 
violent acts are committed are: 
―..help to facilitate adherence to norms of reasonable behaviour implicit in the common law of 
South Africa, and other countries, and reflected in a Constitutional Bill of Rights that protects the 
life, physical integrity, dignity and freedom not only of persons accused of criminal conduct, but 
also of the victims of crime.‖1641  
 
In terms of this proposal, focus is centred on the rights of the victim, therefore holding 
society at large to a single uniform standard may discourage possible criminal 
behaviour. In terms of Burchell‘s view, the purpose of an objective test will also be to 
establish an acceptable standard of conduct in society in line with the Constitution and 
the Bill of Rights.
1642
 
 
Proponents for the introduction of an objective test stem from concerns regarding the 
ability of the court to properly assess the validity of the defence. It is thus argued that 
the addition of an objective element to the purely subjective enquiry will assist the court 
in establishing if the defence is valid.
1643
 
 
In this light, Burchell has argued that an entirely subjective test for capacity may not be 
correct without a normative assessment of how a reasonable person would have reacted 
in the circumstances of the accused in cases where non-pathological incapacity based on 
provocation and emotional stress are raised as a defence. Furthermore, Burchell notes 
that the need for an objective evaluation was also acknowledged by Anglo-American 
systems.
1644
  
 
Essentially, there are views that a purely subjective assessment is inherently 
imbalanced; therefore the objective test is considered necessary to provide much- 
needed balance against the flexibility of the subjective test, especially considering the 
nature of a defence based on provocation and the inherent dangers of abuse of the 
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 Burchell supra (n 17) at 592.  
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 Burchell supra (n 179) at 370. 
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 Burchell supra (n 1320) at 41. 
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defence. 
1645
 The incorporation of an objective test will undoubtedly satisfy policy 
considerations. Hoctor states that it is the responsibility of the judge to apply the value 
and norms of the society when arriving at a decision, however though concerns 
regarding crime are justified, they should not be determinative.
1646
  
 
It is has been argued that  in order to achieve this balance a combination of subjective 
and objective factors should form part of the capacity inquiry, rather than a purely 
subjective assessment.
1647
  
 
Snyman has held the opinion that the use of purely subjective criteria may not be correct 
and attributes this ―obsession‖ with subjectivity to the influence of De Wet and 
Swanepoel: 
―a belief has been created that the more subjective factors are introduced into the concept of 
culpability, the more enlightened and civilised the criminal law system becomes. This introduction 
of subjective factors was overdone especially as far as the principles governing ignorance or 
mistake of law, intoxication and provocation are concerned.‖1648 
 
In an attempt to provide for a solution to the problem of provocation and emotional 
stress allowing for a total acquittal, Burchell suggests:  
―...to accept that in fact provocation or emotional stress can exclude capacity in regard to all 
crimes (including murder) but on grounds of policy only provocation or emotional stress which 
would have induced a reasonable person to succumb to the pressure will excuse... in the interests 
of the security of the community, in cases of violence perpetrated under provocation or emotional 
stress, only reasonable lack of capacity for self-control or reasonable loss of self-control should 
excuse.‖1649 
 
Furthermore, Snyman‘s initial view on the defence of provocation was that it could not 
and should not operate as a complete defence since the recognition of provocation as a 
complete defence ―would herald yet another victory for the subjective approach to 
criminal liability.‖1650 Snyman argues that the defence of non-pathological incapacity 
                                                     
1645
 Burchell supra (n 17) at 592. 
1646
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 147 
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 Snyman supra (n 121) at 22 
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 Snyman supra (n 121) at 22. 
1649
 Burchell supra (n 84) at 23. 
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 Snyman supra (n 121) at 250. 
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should be limited and care must be taken not to extend it carelessly since the law 
expects people to keep their emotions in check and should not apply different rules for 
different types of people hence an overly subjective approach is dangerous.
1651
  
 
In respect of the issue at hand, that is the decision in Eadie,
1652
  academic opinion has 
focused on the possible introduction of an objective test into the inquiry into criminal 
capacity.
1653
 It is submitted that the lack of clarity in this regard poses many difficulties 
in itself as currently it leaves the defence of non-pathologically incapacity due to 
provocation an emotional in a state of uncertainty; the extract below has been the source 
of debate for the apparent introduction of an objective test into the inquiry for criminal 
capacity, Navsa JA stated: 
―I agree that the greater part of the problem lies in the misapplication of the test. Part of the 
problem appears to me to be a too-ready acceptance of the accused's ipse dixit concerning his state 
of mind. It appears to me to be justified to test the accused's evidence about his state of mind, not 
only against his prior and subsequent conduct but also against the court's experience of human 
behaviour and social interaction .Critics may describe this as principle yielding to policy.In my 
view it is an acceptable method for testing the veracity of an accusd‘s evidence about his state of 
mind an as a necessary brake to prevent unwarranted extensions of the defence.‖1654  
 
 
There have been differing interpretations of the import of the Eadie
1655
 judgment in 
relation to the possible introduction of an objective test into the capacity inquiry, 
notably Burchell, in an earlier analysis of the Eadie
1656
 judgment proposed three 
different interpretations of the judgment, these will be considered and discussed 
forthwith.
1657
  
 
In terms of the first interpretation, Burchell states that the judgment may not have been 
an attempt to change the law, but simply emphasized the need to recognize objective 
factors in the process of judicial inferential reasoning by which the presence or the 
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 Snyman supra (n 1) at 159. 
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 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
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 See discussion in Hoctor supra (n 1) at 149-160. 
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 S v  Eadie supra (n 18) at 64. 
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absence of the subjective notion of capacity is assessed and this is entirely compatible 
with the existing precedent on the subjective assessment of capacity.
 1658
  
 
The process of inferential reasoning is resorted to on regularly especially in cases where 
direct evidence is absent and the court is forced to rely on circumstantial evidence.
1659
 
Assessing an accused‘s state of mind or mental capacity involves the assessment of 
circumstantial evidence in most cases and cannot be supported by evidence other than 
that of the accused. Burchell argues that evidence of expert such as psychiatrists and 
psychologists are notoriously unreliable, because it is based almost entirely on the ipse 
dixit of the accused, this problem justifies the need for inferential reasoning.
1660
 
 
Hence according to Burchell, it is clear that the court had no intention of revising the 
test for capacity but rather, the court was concerned that the law was not being applied 
properly and consistently using permissible inferences from objective facts and 
circumstances.
1661
  
 
Navsa JA emphasised that the court must guard against too readily accepting the 
accused‘s evidence and is entitled to draw legitimate inferences ―from what hundreds of 
thousands‖ of people would have acted in the similar position.1662  This inference would 
assist the court by questioning the accused‘s claim of incapacity or involuntary conduct 
under due to provocation or emotional stress.
1663
 
 
Burchell further contends that the courts thorough examination of the case law on 
provocation supports the view that the core of the Eadie
1664
 judgment is to challenge 
certain previous judgments ―...where too much deference has been paid to the accused‘s 
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 Burchell supra (n 84) at 28. 
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 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 152. 
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 Burchell supra (n 1303) at 34. 
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version of the facts and not enough weight is given to a broader evaluation of this 
evidence in the light of surrounding circumstances.‖1665 
 
In support of this argument, Burchell points to the court‘s criticism of Arnold1666 where 
it was stated that the judge ―readily accepted‖ the accused ipse dixit without adding 
enough weight to the ―focused and goal-directed behaviour of the accused before, 
during and after the event.‖1667 In this light, Burchell suggests that the Eadie1668 
judgment issues a warning that in the future, the defence of non-pathological incapacity 
will be scrutinized more carefully and that the courts should not be too readily accepting 
of the accused's evidence about his or her state of mind.
1669
 
 
Hence, in the past luck may have favoured certain individuals who were acquitted 
because they were insulted; however, after Eadie
1670
, the courts will evaluate evidence 
against objective standards of acceptable behaviour.
1671
  
 
In terms of this interpretation, capacity remains in principle subjectively tested; 
however, the application of the test contains the reality that the policy of law is that 
when provoked killings are in issue, it must be one of reasonable restraint Burchell 
points out that Navsa JA was explicit in stating that there is no fault in the test for 
capacity but that there was a problem in which the test has been applied. 
1672
 
 
In respect of the court‘s criticism of Moses1673 and Arnold,1674 Burchell contends that if 
the court was critical of the court‘s misapplication of the subjective principle of capacity 
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when too much reliance was placed on the ipse dixit of the accused. Thus, it was the 
conclusion that was criticised and not the legal principle that was applied.
1675
 
 
Therefore, interpreting the words of the court to mean that the capacity test has been 
changed to objective is probably reading too much into the court‘s statement and the 
real meaning is being overlooked; that is, the court emphasised the real issue was the 
process of inference into the accused‘s thought process  and this is the crucial fact.1676  
 
Thus, in this light, Burchell argues that the test remains subjective and if the test was 
changed then Navsa JA would have to specifically over-rule all cases dealing with 
provocation dating back from the 1980‘s  and Navsa JA could not have been expected 
to drastically overrule an extensive amount of judicial authority by implication , 
therefore that the route taken by the court was acceptable and the emphasis on 
inferential reasoning would apply to all other cases where any element of criminal 
liability was disturbed.
1677
 According to Burchell, it is clear from the statement by 
Navsa JA that the court was not talking about revising the test for capacity but rather it 
was concerned with applying principles correctly.
1678
  
 
The second possible interpretation of the Eadie
1679
 judgment advanced by Burchell, 
involves a redefinition of the criminal capacity element wherein the test for conative 
capacity moves from being subjective to objective. Burchell acknowledges that the 
second interpretation is more radical since it will result in a possible restriction of the 
ambit of the defence of lack of capacity to cases where automatism is present. This 
involves a dramatic redefining of the actual subjective criterion of capacity, shifting the 
test of capacity from a subjective into an objective domain.
1680
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In terms of third possible interpretation for this aspect of the Eadie
1681
  judgment, 
Burchell contends that the court in essence identified an objective aspect that was 
always present in our law but had gone unrecognised by our court.
1682
 This 
interpretation is less radical than then the second one, essentially in terms of this theory; 
Navsa JA did not replace the existing subjective test of capacity with an objective one, 
but succeeded in identifying an essential, qualified objective component in an otherwise 
subjective test of capacity which until Eadie
1683
 was not acknowledged judicially.
1684
 
 
Burchell‘s view in this regard has since changed and states that the court in Eadie 
although recognising the role that inference plays in ensuring the defence of provocation 
and emotional stress remains within reasonable limits, expressly rejected the option of 
―objectifying‖ the inquiry into criminal capacity. Therefore, according to Burchell, the 
court mindfully chose not to abolish the defence in its entirety.
1685
 
 
In order to solve the vexed question of whether an objective test has been added to the 
capacity inquiry it is essential to determine what the court in Eadie
1686
 set out to 
achieve. It is submitted that the court set out to restore public confidence by 
implementing changes to the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to provocation 
and emotional stress; especially in light of the Moses
1687
 and Nursingh
1688
 which 
threatened to place the criminal law in disrepute. 
 
The court in Eadie based its judgments on policy considerations. The following 
statement indicates this intention when Navsa JA commenced with the following 
statement stating that: 
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―whether the boundaries of the defence in question have been inappropriately extended, 
particularly in decisions of Provincial or Local Divisions of the High Court, so as to negatively 
affect public confidence in the administration of justice‖1689 
 
One can interpret the aforementioned statement to imply that the scope of the defence 
has been increased unjustifiably and is not in line with policy. The use of the word 
―boundaries‖ indicates that the court sought to limit the scope which may positively 
affect public confidence in the administration of justice. Hence, it is apparent that the 
court undertook a policy based assessment of principles underpinning the defence of 
non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress. 
1690
 The aim of the 
court was to re-align the defence in terms of policy. 
 
The court expressed further its concern that the defence of non-pathological incapacity 
has become ―a popular defence‖1691, it is submitted that this statement by the court can 
be interpreted to mean that court is concerned that ―flood gates‖ have been open to the 
defence when assessing previous cases it perceived a number of facile acquittals and 
thus sought to limit the application of the defence through the introduction of an 
objective test. The court specifically cautioned against readily accepting the accused's 
ipse dixit regarding provocation or emotional stress. 1692  
  
The court in Eadie
1693
 may have felt that in certain cases too much reliance was placed 
on the accused‘s version which resulted in unjustified acquittals and the only way in 
which to solve this problem was to introduce and objective test.  However Hoctor 
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correctly points that in fact the court has identified a possible problem which relates to 
evidentiary matters and not with the substantive principles.1694  
 
Upon a holistic reading of the Eadie
1695
 judgment it is clear that the court had concerns 
that the defence was being abused and in order to address the sorry state of affairs in the 
realm of non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress introduced 
an objective test to assist the court in assessing the validity of the accused‘s version. 
 
It is therefore submitted that Burchell‘s first possible interpretation is unlikely, the 
courts intention was to drastically curtail scope of the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress and in order to effect this change; the 
introduction of objective factors into the capacity inquiry was the only option. Hence, 
the second possible interpretation put forward by Burchell, though radical and drastic, is 
more likely to reflect the intention of the court.  
 
The court admits that the misapplication of the test is the main contributor of the 
problems surrounding the defence and the second contributor are the courts who have 
failed in assessing the validity of the accused‘s version of events. In this light, the court 
justifies using general experience of human behaviour and social interaction , which 
essentially amounts to comparison of the accused‘s behaviour to a uniform or universal 
standard of behavoiour, this amounts to the introduction of an objective test and 
redefining of the subjective test of capacity; hence, Burchell‘s second interpretation 
though radical , is the one which has the highest probability of  representing the correct 
import of courts statement when assessed in light of the policy based back drop of the 
judgment. 
 
Furthermore, in respect of the Burchell‘s third interpretation, it is submitted that in light 
of the precedent and the principles underlining the test for criminal capacity, it is 
unlikely that an objective aspect of the capacity inquiry was suddenly unearthed by the 
court in Eadie.1696 In this respect, Hoctor is correct in stating that although this is an 
interesting interpretation, it cannot be taken seriously as a rationale for the judgment 
                                                     
1694 
Hoctor supra (n 1) at 139.  
1695
S v  Eadie supra (n 18). 
1696
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
 273 
especially in the light of the fact that the court was ―oblivious of this alleged teasing out 
of such an as yet undiscovered objective aspect‖.1697  
 
It is submitted that the subjective nature of the capacity inquiry is its cornerstone; the 
shift to an emphasis on subjectivity from the emphasis of objectivity which 
characterised the criminal law in the past was deliberate and was a progressive step in 
South African criminal law as the nature of the capacity inquiry is centred on what was 
happening in the mind of the accused at the time of the incident, similar to the shift to 
the subjective nature of intention, therefore the purely subjective nature of the capacity 
inquiry was not accidental and it is extremely unlikely the courts have overlooked a 
hidden objective aspect. 
 
The view that an objective test was indeed introduced has been espoused by most 
commentators.
1698
 Snyman approvingly states that the judgment in Eadie1699 has marked 
a turning point in regard to the courts emphasis on subjectivity as it may reintroduce an 
objective evaluation into the provocation defence thereby creating a necessary balance 
between subjectivity and objectivity in the construction of criminal liability.1700  
 
Louw states that it is apparent that the court did intend to introduce an objective test 
since it made reference to previous judgments in support and in anticipation of criticism 
made the statement
1701
 ―Critics may describe this as policy yielding to principle‖.1702  
Louw argues that although the judgment is thorough, it goes too far when an objective 
test is introduced to determine loss of control and therefore should be reviewed because 
it is not in line with the considered decisions of the court or with general principles.
1703
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Hoctor argues that it is clear that the court was disapproving of cases such as Moses
1704
 
hence the motive was to prevent facile acquittals by adding objective factors to the 
assessment for criminal capacity.
1705
 If it is accepted that the court in Eadie
1706
 
introduced an objective test, and majority of commentators believe that this is the case, 
it is crucial to assess the ramifications of an introduction of an objective test. It is 
submitted that the court, in its quest to reform the defence, reduced the scope of the 
defence further. This is problematic in light of the fact that the defence  is traditionally 
viewed with circumspection by the courts and will not succeed easily as it is.
1707
  
 
The critical question remains whether this new defence will serve the same purpose as 
the defence as it existed before the Eadie1708 judgment and if the perceived problems that 
of the facile acquittals of the ―old defence‖ have been resolved by the introduction of an 
objective test. In order to assess the precise impact of the addition of an objective test to 
the provocation defence is best assessed by analysing the functionality and utility of the 
objective test used in jurisdictions such as England and Canada. This will give insight 
into the possible difficulties of employing an objective method of analysis within the 
realm of provocation. 
 
In conducting the literature review, it is clear that there are problems associated with the 
provocation defence in both England and Canada, the objective test in both jurisdictions 
have been the subject of debate for many years and has been the subject of numerous 
challenges in both jurisdictions, especially concerning the application objective test, 
these criticisms will be discussed forthwith .  
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5.1.7. The rationale underpinning reasonable/ordinary person standard 
Canada and England have a strong bias for the use of an objective test within their 
respective provocation defences. Thus the model of the reasonable person
1709
 or 
ordinary person is favoured to determine if the reasonable man would have lost control 
in the same way as the accused.
1710
  
 
However, it is correctly argued that if the yardstick of the reasonable person is 
interpreted literally, two consequences should ideally follow. The first is that this 
ground of extenuation should seldom succeed seeing that a reasonable person would 
hardly ever commit an intentional killing, and if he does it will either be in self-defence 
or in an attempt to protect another person. Secondly, if it is found that the conduct of the 
accused was reasonable in the circumstances, and then an acquittal should be granted. A 
valid argument is that reasonable conduct should not attract criminal liability.1711  
 
However, this is not the case and a successful verdict of manslaughter still garners harsh 
prison sentences. Long terms of imprisonment under these circumstances is only 
justified if it the conduct was blameworthy1712 
 
Despite criticisms of the objective test in the form of the reasonable man or ordinary 
person, this hypothetical construct has and continues to be a principal figure in the 
landscape of the law in Canada and England1713  The reason for the use of objective lies 
in the rationale underlying the objective test which is first and foremost to assess the 
validity of the defence and to prevent abuse of the provocation defence by stopping an 
accused from relying on self-serving and self-generated excuses.1714  
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Ashworth states that the objective test serves to set a minimum standard of self-control 
and it is important to distinguish the element of self-control from other elements relating 
to personality traits. In this light, weakening of the objective standard would be wrong 
as the law would inevitably allow the exceptionally excitable or pugnacious individual 
to use the provocation defence and unjustifiably receive a manslaughter conviction as 
opposed to a murder conviction.1715 
It is clear that the objective test in the provocation defences in both England and Canada 
functions to ensure that the scope of the defence is not over-extended. Preventing abuse 
of the defence is the factor which drives the argument in favour of an objective test. The 
main concern centres on whether the law or its application promotes the right of the 
individual to equal protection by the law.1716 This notion has been the main justification 
behind the objective test in England and Canada, as it serves to protect against abuse of 
the defence and it ensures citizens are held to a uniform standard of behavior. 1717 
It seems evident that in both jurisdictions great emphasis is placed on deterrence of 
criminal behaviour and this is the overriding factor behind the objective tests in both 
England and Canada. One of the main arguments for the objective test and other 
limitations imposed in the Canadian defence is centered in the concern that the defence 
may be too readily accepted and the importance in deterring uncontrolled anger leading 
to homicide.
1718
 
However, it is submitted that there is a fundamental failing in reasoning behind 
deterrence as it presupposes free will is in operation. Essentially this entails deterring 
the killing of an individual by another who suffered a loss control and was not in control 
of the choices he made or put in another way, unable to resist the unlawful act. The 
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argument for deterrence assumes that the exercise of free will in a circumstance where 
free will is lacking. The justification of deterrence behind an objective test in respect of 
the  provocation defence predicated on a lack of self-control is flawed as it presupposes 
the presence of free-will, provocation is a quintessentially an excuse wherein the law 
exercises leniency due to the lack of free-will.1719   
It is submitted that in light of these arguments, the quest to deter crime using an 
objective test, especially in the context of the provocation defence, is illogical. The 
crucial issue is whether an objective test can deter behaviour that was beyond the 
control of the individual in the first place, due to the lack of criminal capacity. It must 
be stated that preventing abuse of the law is a valid concern; detterance should not be an 
overriding factor when it comes to developing and implementing law. This is especially 
pertinent when provocation and emotional stress are concerned, since the effect of 
provocation and emotional stress on an individual may differ from person to person. 
 
It is submitted that these concerns related to abuse of the defence are unfounded, as the 
courts acknowledge that experiencing a total lack of incapacity due to provocation and 
emotional stress is an extremely rare occurrence,
1720
 Hoctor argues that even though in 
principle a court might not refuse to hear a plea based on non-pathological incapacity 
emanating from road rage,however on grounds of policy such court is not  likely to 
exculpate the accused on these grounds, hence the defence is most likely to be  
successful in exceptional cases only.
1721
 It is submitted that with proper understanding 
and application of principles together with proper scrutiny of relevant evidence,
1722
   the 
courts themselves must be entrusted to provide the necessary safeguards to prevent 
abuse of the defence, thus the introduction of an objective test is not only unworkable 
but also unnecessary.  
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defence of provocation ,the argument that the objective standard serves as a deterrent to the ill-
tempered man should be viewed with some skepticism when impulsive crimes are concerned, since 
the only direct deterrent factor is limited to the distinction between the penalty for a conviction of 
murder and the possible sentence for manslaughter due to provocation 
1720
 S v Eadie supra (n 18).  
1721
 Hoctor supra (n 355) at 204. 
1722
 Snyman supra (n 2) at 166. 
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5.1.7.1. The objective test constitutes an unjust imposition of dominant cultural 
values.  
It is submitted that another significant problematic feature of the objective test in both 
the Canadian provision as well as the provision in English law relates to the objective 
tests inability to respond to different social realities and for ―superimposing a notion of 
abstract equality where systematic inequality is the norm.‖1723 One of the most 
persuasive arguments against the implementation of an objective test is therefore that it 
essentially ―imposes dominant cultural values on others.‖  
 
The application of an objective can thus be problematic and dangerous, as Louw 
correctly argues: 
 ―When values change, the reasonable man changes; the apparently objective test carries the real 
danger of imposing dominant cultural values on other…Each case of reasonableness must be 
determined taking into account of all relevant facts regarding the accused‘s capabilities.‖1724 
 
This criticism is key, especially in light of the history and racial and social-economic 
diversity in South Africa, furthermore, social and economic back ground may differ 
immensely from person to person and it is unfair and unjust to apply a uniform standard 
which cannot take cognisance such differences. 
1725
 
 
It is submitted that introducing an objective test is inherently unfair and unjust as it 
requires a uniform standard of behaviour from individuals in a society which is 
extremely diverse in terms of education, cultural and racial background. 
Louw comments:  
                                                     
1723
  Nelson supra (n 1050) at 1026. 
1724
  R. Louw ―S v Ngema 1992 (2) SACR 651 (D) The reasonable man and the tikloshe‖ (1993) 6 South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice at 363.  
1725
  New South Wales Law Reform Commission para 2.20, (cited by S. Pather ―Provocation - Acquittals 
Provoke a Rethink‖ (2002) 15 South African Journal of Criminal Justice 337 at 351) The Law 
Reform Commission of New South Wales stated that the inclusion of an objective test in the form of 
a reasonable person is unworkable as it does not consider the personal characteristics of the accused 
when criminal liability is assessed. 
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―[S]tarkly illustrates that potential unfairness of the use of an objective reasonable man test in a 
heterogeneous society where the actor may be measured against an unattainable standard, 
culturally or otherwise.‖1726 
 
Especially in light of the history and racial diversity of South Africa; furthermore, social 
and economic back-ground may differ immensely from person to person. 
1727
 An 
important argument against the adoption of an objective standard relates to the changing 
face of society, in that the law must be adaptable to different circumstances and changes 
that might take place within an ever-changing and evolving society. How would an 
objective test within the provocation defence adapt?  
 
It is submitted that it is not adaptable, as there is little room for adapting the reasonable 
man according the changing values of society. The provisions in England and Canada 
are example of this; the out-dated values system of a bygone era have caused 
tremendous problems relating to various types of discrimination, notably gender 
discrimination.  
 
If one considers the historical origins of the provocation defence where a man‘s wife 
was considered his property, therefore entitling him to kill his wife‘s lover if found in 
the act of adultery, the legal convictions of modern-day society does not consider the 
circumstances of such a killing acceptable, how will the objective test account for the 
changing values of society to ensure the law is in line with the will of the people. 
 
The law must be multi-dimensional and adaptable in order to serve its intended purpose. 
This point was made clear in the Australian case of Moffa, where the court criticised the 
application of the objective ordinary person test and states: 
―The objective test is not suitable even for a superficially homogenous society, and the more 
heterogeneous our society becomes, the more inappropriate the test is. Behaviour is influenced by 
age, sex, ethnic origin ,climate and other living condition, biorhythms, education, occupation and, 
above all, individual differences. It is impossible to construct a model of a reasonable or ordinary 
                                                     
1726
  Louw supra (n 1724) at 361. 
1727 New South Wales Law Reform Commission para 2.20, (cited by Pather supra (n 1725)  at 351,  the 
Law Reform Commission of New South Wales stated that the inclusion of an objective test in the 
form of a reasonable person is unworkable as it does not consider the personal characteristics of the 
accused when criminal liability is assessed. 
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South Australian for the purpose of assessing emotional flashpoint, loss of self-control and 
capacity to kill under particular circumstances.‖1728 
 
This criticism has a special significance in the South African context, especially 
considering the diverse nature of the population. For instance in case of Mbombela1729, 
the accused killed the deceased because he was believed that the deceased was actually 
a ―tikoloshe‖. In certain African cultures, a ―tikoloshe‖ is believed to a mischievous evil 
creature. The ―tikoloshe‖ is highly feared therefore killing it was in accordance with 
culture. The Appellate Division however disagreed and found the killing unreasonable 
since a reasonable man could not have such a belief. 
 
This case reveals the possible injustice that can ensue with applying a uniform standard 
in the form of the reasonable man test, since the attributes of the reasonable man will be 
differ according to the value and belief system of each community. 
In this regard Yeo makes a valid argument and states: 
―To insist that all these different ethnic groups conform to the one standard of behaviour set by the 
group having the greatest numbers (or holding the political reins of power) would create gross 
inequality. Equality among the various ethnic groups is achieved only when each group realizes 
the other‘s right to be different and when the majority does not penalise the minority groups for 
being different.‖1730 
 
It is submitted that the critical question concerning the introduction of an objective 
standard in the form of ―reasonableness‖, is what content should be given to this 
concept especially considering the extreme divides in the value structures of South 
Africans.1731 Determining whose values to reflect in this standard is problematic, should 
it reflect Western standards or African standard, determining this standard would be 
difficult and implementing it may prove problematic. Heyns argues that in a country as 
diverse as South African, utilitarianism means that that the values and will of the 
majority of the country would be imposed on the minority, certain values are known to 
                                                     
1728
 Moffa (1976-77) 13 A.L.R 225 (Aust.H.C) cited by Quigley supra (n 995) at 22. 
1729
 S v Mbombela supra (n 107). 
1730
 S. Yeo,‖Power of Self-control in Provocation and Automatism‖ (1992) 14 Sydney Law Review 3,12. 
1731
 C. Heyns ―Reasonableness‖ in a divided society‖ (1990) 107 South African Law Journal 266 at 279. 
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considered more important than life therefore ―such an approach would simply be a 
recipe for a blood bath.‖1732 
 
In terms of this argument, if a standard is determined, the other pertinent question is to 
what degree of rigidity should characterise the objective standard. The rationale 
underpinning the idea of ―reasonableness‖ is the pursuit of fairness and in achieving 
fairness all individuals of a society should be held to the same standard. The standard of 
the reasonable man test holds individuals in a society to a minimum standard of 
behaviour, determined by Western standards.1733 Determining what the legal convictions 
of a community as diverse as South Africa‘s, will be a tremendous task. 
 
The objective test is a standard feature in the provocation defence of most common law 
jurisdictions and presents most of the same problems in these jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, in most of these jurisdictions it is clear that there is disquiet with enforcing 
a rigid single objective standard in societies which are becoming more and more diverse 
in nature.
1734
 In Canada, the application of the objective test is problematic since juries 
are required to construct the hypothetical ordinary person without guidance from the 
trial judge.1735  
 
Especially when the objective test is considered to be the cornerstone of criminal law 
and a flexible objective test is feared for possibly eroding the principles of criminal law, 
which is to encourage reasonable and responsible behaviour from members of the 
society it governs.
1736
  
 
This stringent application of the courts was considered harsh for not allowing the 
relevant circumstances and context behind the act or insult. This indicates that the use of 
an objective test in trying to uncover what was going on in the mind of human being is 
fundamentally illogical and application of this standard would be difficult besides being 
                                                     
1732
 Heyns supra (n 1731) at 294. 
1733
 Heyns supra (n 1731) a 281. 
1734
 Clough supra (n 20) at 125 (English law) see discussion in chapter 3 at 109 and 127; Stuart supra (n 
70) at 544-545(Canadian law)  see discussion in chapter 4 at 179. 
1735
 Quigley supra (n 995) at 25. 
1736
 Stuart supra (n 70) at 544-545. 
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extremely unfair. The use of ―reasonable man‖ or the ―ordinary man‖ to determine 
acceptable behaviour has been justifiably described as ―oxymoronic‖. 1737 
 
5.1.7.2. Difficulties in application of an objective test 
It is observed that in respect of the provocation defence in  English  and Canadian law, 
one of the main areas of dissatisfaction with the defence  surrounded the objective test 
and the dilemma regarding which characteristics should be attributed to the ―reasonable 
person‖ in the objective test.1738  
 
These problems are directly linked to standard of the ―ordinary‖ or ―reasonable‖ person 
and determining which characteristics should be given to the ordinary/reasonable person 
has been controversial in jurisdictions such as England and Canada.
1739
 The objective 
test was also found to be difficult to interpret the accused‘s attributes and indicates that 
the scope of the objective does require some flexibility. Determining the attributes of 
the reasonable/ordinary man has proved extremely challenging. 
1740
  
 
As Heller pertinently asks: 
―Is the reasonable person simply Everyman, an individual without race, class, gender, or any other 
non-universal characteristics? Or is the reasonable person someone who resembles the defendant 
herself, possessing some or all of the defendant‘s characteristics?‖1741  
 
In terms of English law and the now repealed Homicide Act of 1957, the reasonable 
man test created confusion in cases as the judges found great difficulty in explaining the 
attributes of the ―reasonable man‖ to the jury who grappled with this concept.1742  The 
difficulties with the application of the objective test featured prominently in the Law 
Commissions report concerning reformation of the defence.
1743
  
                                                     
1737
 Clough supra (n 20) at 118. 
1738
 Quigley supra (n 995) at 25. 
1739
 See discussion in Chapter 3 at 127 and in Chapter 4 at 179.  
1740
 Allen supra (n 462) at 216. 
1741
 Wells supra (n 798) at 106 citing K.J Heller ―Beyond the Reasonable Man? A sympathetic but 
Critical assessment of the use of subjective standards of reasonableness in Self-defence and 
Provocation‖ (1998) 26 A, J Cr L 1 at 4. 
1742
 Clough supra (n 20) at 124. 
1743
 See Chapter 3 at 127 for findings of the Law Commission. 
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The Law Commission identified problems with the objective test becoming more 
subjective than it should be, especially considering the interpretation given by the Court 
in Morgan Smith1744.1745 There was a clear tendency of the courts in England to ―soften‖ 
the rigidness of the objective test by adding certain attributes of the accused to the 
hypothetical reasonable man. This raised fears that  safeguards to the provocation 
defence was diminishing with subjectivising the objective standard. One of the 
difficulties of the old defence can be attributed to the inconsistence application of legal 
principles of and policies due to the tendency of the courts to subjectivise the objective 
test.
1746
  
 
This is due to an elementary problem related to the existence of an inherent 
contradiction, i.e. the reasonable person does not kill and from a moral standpoint there 
should be no reason why a short-tempered person should benefit from a defence based 
on loss of temper as this was fundamentally flawed and could not be justified.
1747
  
 
With these criticisms in mind, the provocation defence in England was changed in an 
attempt to solve the problems of the defence in terms of section 3 of the Homicide Act. 
The reasonable person test received criticism for being ―anthropomorphised‖ to 
ridiculous lengths.1748 Hence in terms of the old provocation defence the application and 
construction of the reasonable person was troublesome to the extent that it became 
unworkable and eventually lead to its exclusion from the new defence. Interestingly, the 
new defence has done away with terms like ―reasonable man‖ and ―ordinary person‖, 
however standards of reasonableness and ordinariness still play a prominent role.
1749
  
 
It is submitted that the reluctance to use the terms like ―reasonable‖ and ―ordinary‖ 
indicates that these notions are considered problematic, constructing and determining 
the parameters of reasonableness is difficult if not impossible within the defence of 
                                                     
1744
  Smith (Morgan) supra (n 715).  
1745
 Norrie supra (n 837) at 282, 
1746
 Norrie supra (n 837) at 282. 
1747
 Elliot and Quinn supra (n 525) at 82. 
1748
 Mitchell and Mackay supra (n 823) at 1. 
1749
 Yeo supra (n 869) at 11. 
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provocation. In terms of the new defence in term of the Coroners and Justice Act, there 
are only two characteristics which may be taken into consideration when determining 
the defendant‘s capacity for self-control, age and sex. In this respect the scope of the 
defence is reduced in certain ways.
1750
  
 
A fundamental error in the rationale behind limiting characteristics to just ―sex‖ and 
―age‖, the new law ignores other factors which may have made the defendant more 
prone to being provoked, for instance alcoholism cannot be considered if the taunt is not 
related to the defendant being an alcoholic. If this link is not present then the defendant 
has to seek refuge in the defence of diminished responsibility. Norrie correctly argues 
that this factor makes the new provision not only narrower but also irrational.
1751
. 
 
The conflict between the Privy Council and The House of Lords regarding the 
characteristics that should be taken into account in the objective test represents the 
discord and disagreement which plagued the courts and are as a result of difficulties 
inherent in applying an objective test.
1752
 This lack of consensus left the objective test 
and the defence of provocation in disarray.
1753
  
 
The confusion regarding application of the objective test led to inconsistent decisions. 
The objective test was sometimes applied stringently and sometimes an overly flexible 
approach was taken. The lack of consistency in this regard resulted in certain decisions 
being socially unacceptable; this is evident where a less rigid application of the 
objective test was applied. This led to undesirable characteristics being taken into 
account, these included glue sniffing1754 addiction and attention-seeking personality 
traits becoming authentic considerations.1755  
                                                     
1750
 Norrie supra (n 837) at 282, at 283.  
1751
 Section 54(1) (c) of Coroners and Justice Act 2009;  Norrie supra (n 837) at 283; This is in 
accordance with the position adopted in the case of Holley supra (n 670) which overruled the Smith 
(Morgan) supra (n 715), this approach was welcomed since it was considered to be good law 
(despite only being at Privy Council level) as it proclaimed that self-control should be constant. 
1752
 Elliot and Quinn supra (n 525) at 79 
1753
 Elliot and Quinn supra (n 525) at 79. 
1754
  Morhall supra (n 713). 
1755
  Mitchell and Mackay supra (n 823) at 1; The Law Commission agreed with the position of the 
minority in Morgan(Smith) supra (n 715) and  affirmed the decision in Holley supra (n 670)  that 
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The new approach to the objective test is in line with the approach in Camplin
1756
 and 
the ruling of the Privy Council in Holley.
1757
 The new objective criteria reflects the view 
of the Privy Council who ruled that self-control was uniform and objective. Therefore 
the jury should not make an assessement of the self-control which the defendant was 
able to exercise as an individual. It is on this principle that is the new provision is 
seemingly founded upon. 
 
By only allowing the general characteristics of age and sex, the objective test retains its 
objective nature in the English defence to a large extent. It is submitted that by insisting 
on retaining a restrictive objective test, the new English defence will suffer similar 
problems of the old defence
1758
 Similar problems may potentially arise with the law 
allowing certain characteristics to be considered and disallowing others, it is submitted 
that that the inclusion of the characteristic of ―sex‖ may be an example of this as it is 
uncertain what the exact role is that this ―characteristic‖ will play. 1759  
 
The addition of ―sex‖ as a characteristic has generated criticism, with Yeo correctly 
arguing that by giving recognition to the defendant‘s sex, the Act potentially created 
controversy since it might condone the argument that women generally have a higher 
level of self-restraint and tolerance than men.1760 The impact of this is that it might 
further perpetrate the stereotype that woman who kill are "either aberrational or evil 
monsters or excessively pathological."1761 Yeo states that this potential gender 
                                                                                                                                                           
matters affecting the accused‘s general capacity for self-control and those that affect the gravity of 
the provocation directed at the defendant should be differentiated, however this excluded the 
characteristic of age.  
1756
  Camplin supra (n 580) see discussion in Chapter 3 at 113. 
1757
  Holley supra (n 670), See Chapter 3 at 109-110 and at 117 for discussion of this case and the 
approach of the Privy Council to the restrictiveness of the objective test. 
1758
  Norrie supra (n 837) at 282, one of the other problems identified with the old defence was that the 
law could not distinguish between those characteristics that should ethically be permitted to excuse 
and those that should not. In not recognising the link between the provoking factor and the provoked 
conduct although narrows the scope of the new defence. 
1759
  Norrie supra (n 837) at 281. 
1760
  Yeo supra (n 869) at 11. 
1761
  Yeo supra (n 869) at 11. 
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discrimination may have been the reason why the Law Commission did not include 
―sex‖ as a factor that should be taken into account in the objective test.1762  
 
With regard to allowing age to be considered as a general characteristic, the Law 
Commission stated ―capacity for self-control is an aspect of maturity, and it would be 
unjust to expect the same level of a 12- year -old and an adult‖.1763  It must be argued 
that the new law is still not clear what the role age plays; there is uncertainty on whether 
it impacts on the defendants capacity for tolerance and self-restraint or if it is relevant to 
the circumstances of the defendant. The Law Commission had acknowledged these 
issues and stated that ―mental age is a complex subject‖, but stated that the objective test 
would be undermined if psychiatric and psychological evidence concerning maturity 
was scrutinized. Although it may have been sensible to extend the objective test, the 
Law Commission did not support such a move due to policy reasons‘. 1764 
 
In respect of the objective test in the provocation defence in Canada, it must be noted 
that nature of the problems experienced in English law is very similar to those 
experienced in Canadian law. The objective test in the Canadian provocation defence
1765
 
operates to assess whether the act or insult was sufficient to deprive an ordinary person 
of self-control.
1766
  
 
The objective test has undergone a certain amount of change over the years; the 
Supreme Court of Canada initially followed the approach of the English case of 
                                                     
1762
 Yeo supra (n 869) at 11 in reference to Murder, manslaughter and Infanticide (2006) supra (n 799) at 
para 5.38, In Partial Defences to Murder (2004) supra (n 799) the Law Commission argued that the 
law should be gender neutral unless absolutely necessary, in respect of the ―fear‖ trigger, this could 
indicate that women are more vulnerable than men who are generally physically stronger. 
1763
 Partial Defences to Murder (2004) supra (n 799) at  para.3.110; Norrie, supra (n 837) at 288 is correct 
in arguing that recognizing age as impacting on capacity for self-control may be problematic since 
the focus is not on age but on maturity. Arguments put forward centre around determining the true 
maturity of a person, for instance an adult could possess the maturity of a child. 
1764
 Edwards supra (n 650) at 238 discussing Partial Defences to Murder (2004) supra (n 799) at para 
3.1.30). 
1765
 Section 232(2) of the Criminal Code. 
1766
 Roach supra (n 26) at 252. 
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Camplin
1767
 in Hill
1768
, wherein the stringent objective test was relaxed to the extent that 
it allowed the attributes of sex and age of the defendant to be attributed to the 
reasonable man. Evidently, the Supreme Court of Canada found difficulties in applying 
a stringent objective test. It is submitted that concerns of this nature indicate that the 
basis for the provocation defence in Canada is inherently problematic which results in 
the tendency to subjectivise the objective test. 
 
However, despite being partly relaxed by the case of Hill,
1769
 questions surrounding 
which individual factors of the defendant should be considered still remained. The 
tendency to relax the objective test in the Canadian provocation defence occurred again 
in the more recent case of Thibert
1770
  where the Supreme Court examined (in a 
concerted way) the objective standard in the provocation defence after a decade since 
Hill
1771
 and like Hill,
1772
 the courts attention was focused on application of the ordinary 
person test.
1773
  
 
It is submitted that law makers have battled for decades to solve the problems associated 
with the objective test to little avail. Like England, Canada is also grappling with the 
common problem of interpretation and application of the objective test. The case of 
Thibert
1774
 illustrates this point, this case has been widely criticised by academics for 
the outcome and it is argued that the nature of the objective standard has been changed 
                                                     
1767
 Camplin supra (n 580). 
1768
 Hill supra (n 1064) see chapter 4 at 179-180 for discussion of this case. 
1769
 Hill surpra (n 1064). 
1770
 Thibert supra (n 1053) at 51; Roach supra (n 26) at 256-257 argues that the proper focus in Thibert 
should have been on the deceased‘s taunts just before the shooting however the approach of the 
majority has given significance to the breakup of the marriage and its history.
1770
 The decision of the 
court to assess conduct using the standard of the married man may potentially excuse male violence 
towards women based on the breakup of the relationship. 
1771
In Hilll supra (n 1064) the Supreme Court acknowledged this problem and stated that it would be fair 
to consider the accused‘s age as an ―important contextual consideration.‖ Currently it would be an 
error in law if a jury was not instructed to consider the reaction of ordinary person of the accused‘s 
age when applying the objective test to determine loss of self-control.  
1772
 Hill supra (n 1064). 
1773
 Hyland supra (n 25) at 146. 
1774
 Thibert supra (n 1053). 
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so drastically that it resembles the subjective test.
1775
  The controversies generated by 
the Thibert
1776
 judgment stem from the courts decision that a greater number of the 
accused‘s characteristics should be taken into account when applying the ordinary 
person standard.
1777
 Evidently, the court adopted a less cautious approach wherein the 
ordinary person was given a contextual definition.
1778
  
 
However, the court in Thibert
1779
 has been criticized for this approach and 
commentators have argued that in effect this cannot be called an objective standard.
 1780
 
It has been replaced by a subjective standard and remains the objective standard only in 
name.
1781 
The Thibert
1782
 has shifted the provocation defence onto new ground by 
rejecting the distinction between a uniform standard of self-control and an 
                                                     
1775
 Sahni supra (n 1135) at 144;149-150: argues that this is dangerous since widening the objective 
standard to such a degree as done in Thibert undermines goal of encouraging behaviour which is 
reasonable and responsible. This in effect creates an ordinary person who is the ―ordinary distraught, 
angry man whose wife has been having an affair and who has not slept for 34 hours.‖; Goman supra 
(n 980) at 488 believes that the accused killed another human being out of jealousy and anger and 
not because he was provoked. The accused deliberately sought out his wife with a loaded firearm 
hence it is outrageous that he be able to use the defence of provocation.  
1776
  Thibert supra(n 1053) at 19 The court analysed previous case law regarding the ordinary person test 
and stated: ―In summary then, the wrongful act or insult must be one which could, in light of the 
past history of the relationship between the accused and the deceased, deprive an ordinary person, of 
the same age, and sex, and sharing with the accused such other factors as would give the act or insult 
in question a special significance, of the power of self-control.‖; Sahni supra (n 1120) at 148  argues 
that the statement made by Cory J is inconsistent with the case of Hill supra (n 1064) , Cory J takes 
the ordinary person test further by allowing the history and background of the relationship between 
the accused and the victim to be taken into account in the application of the objective standard.  
1777
 Sahni supra (n 1135) at 148-149,150: states that even though Cory.J in maintains that application of 
the objective test is dependent on the facts of each case, his analysis of Thibert allows for 
consideration of certain traits which should not form part of the objective standard. Recognition of 
factors such as distress caused by an extra marital affair and lack of sleep in the objective test is 
undesirable.
 
 
1778
 Nelson supra (n 1050) at 1042-1043. 
1779
 Thibert supra (n 1053). 
1780
 Hyland supra (n 25) at 148: Hyland argues that that Thibert has significantly altered the objective test 
and has eroded the significance of the objective standard, by preferring an entirely individualised 
objective test.  
1781
 Sahni supra (n 1135) at 144-143. 
1782
 Thibert supra (n 1053). 
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individualized test to determine the gravity of the provocative act and adopting instead 
an ordinary person test which is individualized.
1783
  
The basis of the criticism towards this case is the impact of this development is that it 
may increase the scope of the provocation defence. Accused persons may argue that due 
to their personal attributes, it was reasonable for them to have lost self-control in their 
circumstances which led to the killing of their victim, regardless of how trivial the 
victim‘s provocative act was.1784  
 
It is submitted that a subjectivising of the objective test should not lead to such result, 
this indicates that with or without an objective test the provocation defence in Canada is 
fundamentally flawed. Though, it must be noted that the success rate of the provocation 
defence remains low and judges have not broadened the objective standard significantly 
since the case of Thibert.
1785
  
 
Stuart, in this light refers to the law reform bodies in New Zealand
1786
 and South 
Australia
1787
 who have called for purely subjective tests which make room for personal 
characteristics, idiosyncrasies and other factors including low intelligence.
1788
 The 
problems relating to the objective test in England and Canada leads to the ultimate 
conclusion that the provocation defence as a whole in England needs re-examination 
since the assessing of what amounts to provocation is relative in different cultures.1789  
 
                                                     
1783
 Hyland supra (n 25) at 169; Sahni supra (n 1135) at 150 argues that the danger of this approach is that  
the Thibert judgment has given virtually limitless use of the defence since all accused persons can 
argue that their individual attributes gave rise to a loss of self-control which was reasonable. If lack 
of sleep and distress from extra marital relationships are allowed consideration then this leaves the 
door wide open for attributes such as homophobia and racism. 
1784
 Hyland supra (n 25) at 169. 
1785
 Thibert supra (n 1053). 
1786
 New Zealand Law Reform  Committee, Report on Culpable Homicide (1977). 
1787
 Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee of South Australia, 4
th
 Report : The Substantive 
Criminal law (1977)  at pp.21-24 cited by Stuart supra (n 70) at 545. 
1788
 Stuart supra (n 70) at 545 notes that this view received support albeit from the minority in the 
Australian High Court case of Moffa supra (n 1728). 
1789
 Wells supra (n 798) at 104, at 106 states that the central debate regards how to reflect the different 
contexts in which people kill within the homicide laws. 
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As discussed previously, the courts in South Africa have struggled with application of 
principles of the defence of non-pathological incapacity which resulted in controversial 
acquittals,
1790
 although academics have attributed the tendency to easily acquit to the 
lack of an objective test and an over emphasis of subjectivism. However, it is submitted 
calls for an objective test is misguided, it is clear that the objective test has posed 
difficulties especially in regard to application. Aligning South African law with England 
or Canada will amount to a regression to a law that is out of touch with the realites of 
society and with a law that cannot be successfully applied, the result of adopting an 
objective test is likely to be problematic and lead to an outcome that is inherently unjust. 
 
As Louw correctly argues, an objective test, whether relative or absolute, will always 
lead to an unsatisfactory compromise since the accused will be judged against the 
standards of someone else.1791  
 
This argument is supported by the results of the comparative analysis which reveal that 
the objective test in both jurisdictions is inherently troublesome and the source of most 
of the controversy surrounding the provocation defence. Furthermore, critics of the 
objective test and its restrictive nature, attribute the problems regarding gender 
inequality in both the England and Canadian provisions to limiting the range of 
characteristics that can be taken into account when applying the objective test.  
 
This essential trait of the reasonable man test must be criticised for undermining the 
goal of eradicating discrimination. There has been debate in Canada regarding whether 
the objective test should become more subjective due to the increasing need for 
introducing individualising factors in cases involving provocation.1792. It is the function 
of the criminal justice system to discourage criminal behaviour, however in this instance 
it comes at a severe price, as it adversely impacts society at large by unjustifiably 
reducing the scope and distorting the function of the provocation defence which is to aid 
individuals who suffer a loss of self-control.  
 
                                                     
1790
 S v Moses supra (n 16) and S v Nursingh supra (n 16) and S v Arnold supra (n 16). 
1791
 Louw supra (n 1724) at 364. 
1792
 Roach supra (n 26) at 259-260. 
 291 
5.1.7.3. Objective test for capacity subject to constitutional challenge 
The policy-based approach of Eadie
1793
 is centred on the concept of ―reasonableness‖, 
however a valid argument raised by Hoctor is that the judgment subverts the principle 
upon which the concept of justification of the criminal law is based. It is in terms of the 
principle of individual autonomy that individuals must be held accountable for his or 
her own conduct.
1794
  Therefore, individuals are autonomous moral agents who possess 
the right to freedom of action, therefore it is in light of this principle they are held 
responsible for their actions.1795  
 
The principle of criminal responsibility founded on culpability is based on the 
recognition that the individual is a moral entity who is capable of understanding and of 
choosing.1796 Reverence for the right to dignity of an individual entails recognising that 
all individuals are permitted to make choices which are as unique as they are.1797 
 
An important part of the principle of autonomy is the normative element which states 
that individuals should be accorded respect and must be considered as agents who are 
capable of independent agency. This principle lies at the heart of Ronald Dworkins 
philosophy that every individual is entitled to respect and equality.
1798
  
 
The principle of autonomy therefore accords great importance to the rights of the 
individual such as the right to liberty in the context of what the state is allowed to do in 
a given situation. A crucial aspect of this principle is therefore that indivuduals must be 
protected from official censure through the criminal law except if it can be shown that 
they chose to act in the manner in question.
1799
 This is in line with Hart‘s eminent 
philosophy that an indivual should not be held criminally liable if the capacity and fair 
                                                     
1793
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1794
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 166.  
1795
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 166 citing A.Ashworth Principles of criminal law  (1999) 3ed at 27. 
1796
 Hoctor  S V ―Dignity, criminal law and the Bill of Rights‖ (2004) 121 SALJ 304 at  309. 
1797
 Ibid at 312. 
1798
 R.Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously (1977) at 180 discussed by Ashworth supra (n 57) at 24.  
1799
 Ashworth supra (n 57) at 24. 
 292 
opportunity to behave otherwise is absent.
1800
 Therefore, if the principle of autonomy is 
to be respected, the State must let individual‘s decide the manner in which they are to 
behave and refrain from usurping this right. 
 
Raz delineates the three main characteristics of the autonomy-based doctrine of 
freedom: 
―First, its primary concern is the promotion and protection of positive freedom which is 
understood as the capacity for autonomy, consisting of the availability of an adequate range of 
options, and of the mental abilities necessary for an autonomous life.Second, the state has the duty 
not merely to prevent the denial of freedom, but to promote it by creating the conditions of 
autonomy. Third, one may not pursue any goal by means which infringe people‘s autonomy unless 
such action is justified by the need to protect or promote the autonomy of those people or of 
others.‖1801 
 
In terms of the present study and the issue of enforcing an objective test for capacity 
devoid of a subjective test for capacity, it is submitted that this is in clear violation of 
the right to dignity which forms the basis for culpability.1802 Dworkin states that the 
most important characteristic of Western political culture is the belief in the human 
dignity that the individual possesses.  
 
In this regard, Dworkin states: 
―[T]hat people have the moral right- and the moral responsibility- to confront the most 
fundamental questions about the meaning and value of their own lives for themselves, answering 
to their own conscience and convictions… [i]ndeed the most basic premise of Western democracy- 
that government should be republican rather than despotic- embodies a commitment to that 
conception of dignity.‖1803 
 
Dignity is a fundamental tenet upon which the criminal law is built. There is a 
commonality between the criminal law and constitutional law, which is the perception 
of the individual, rooted in the principle of autonomy of the self and on the right of 
                                                     
1800
 H.L.A Hart  Punishment and Responsibilty (2008) 2
nd
 ed, chapter 6, discussed by Ashworth supra (n 
57) at 25. 
1801
 J.Raz The Morality of Freedom (1986) at 425. 
1802
 Hoctor supra (n 1796) at 309. 
1803
 R.Dworkin Life‘s Dominion (1993) at 166-167. 
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human dignity. In terms of this principle, an individual should not be regarded as an 
object or instrument.
1804
  
 
In this light, and in terms of the principle of automony, the introduction of an objective 
test for conative capacity can be subjected to constitutional challenge for unjustifiably 
infringing on the right to dignity, granted by section 10 of the 1996 Constitution. The 
imposition of a fixed standard of behaviour upon the indivudal, in the form of the 
reasonable person / ordinary person standard deprives the individual of free choice and 
individual autonomy, the right to dignity of the individual is therefore infringed. 
 
The constitutional law as well as the criminal law is based on the principles of liberal 
philosophy where individuals are presumed to be morally autonomous. An assumption 
exists that the fundamental ability to appreciate reality and differentiate between right 
from wrong exists. The preservation of the right to dignity entails that the value and the 
worth of an individual is protected.
1805
 The application of an objective test within the 
capacity inquiry violates the right to dignity. 
 
Furthermore,it is submitted that, apart from the infringement of the right to dignity,  the 
right to freedom and security of the person in terms of section 12(1) (a) of the 1996 
Constitution may also be unjustifiably infringed by the introduction of an objective test 
in Eadie.1806 Holding an accused person accountable to the standard of a reasonable 
person is unconstitutional because the capacity and fair opportunity to behave otherwise 
may not have existed. 
 
Furthermore, it is submitted that it is not possible to make a correct assessment of the 
mind of an individual who is accompanied by mental baggage in the form of life 
experiences, with an objective assessment; hence, it is not only illogical but also 
contrary to the principles which underpin the notions of justice to apply objective 
criteria to assess criminal capacity. The theoretical approach which is focuses on the 
state of mind of an accused person should remain.1807 Every human being is distinct thus 
                                                     
1804
 Hoctor supra (n 1796) at 306. 
1805
 Hoctor supra (n 1796) at 305. 
1806
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 167. 
1807
 Snyman supra (n 1) at 13. 
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their reaction or capacity for self-control to a provocative act or emotional stress may 
differ from individual to individual in light of this inherent uniqueness. 
 
Ashworth contended that the doctrine of provocation in England is reproached with a 
―cruel inconsistency‖ in that it aims to act as a concession to human frailty although 
applying the same standard to individuals who may possess unequal capacity, this 
results in a concession to ―normal‖ people but not to others possessing lower levels of 
capacity. Therefore in terms of this principle the subjective and objective test express 
core feature of provocation in England, which is that it is a ground for extenuation?1808 
Therefore, the function of the objective test relates to the element of partial element and 
the assessment of the conduct of the provoker.1809 
 
 In this respect it is illogical to make an assessment of a reaction arising out of severe 
provocation or emotional stress using an objective test; this may result in a travesty of 
justice being done both to the accused and to society in general. It is submitted that the 
degree of response to a stressful situation varies from person to person, therefore in this 
light; it seems unjust to bring in objective elements into a defence which focuses on an 
individual‘s response and state of mind at a crucial point in time. Judging an 
individual‘s mind-set is the heart of the defence, and in this view, an objective test has 
no place.  
 
It must be remembered that the criminal law serves to protect the rights of the people it 
governs by enforcing certain rules, these are all engineered with the intention of 
protection of individuals and preserving the well-being of the community. The defence 
of non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress has been 
developed principally to accommodate a handful of individuals who in rare and 
exceptional circumstances and owing to certain events suffer a total loss of control due 
to non-pathological factors. 
 
                                                     
1808
 Ashworth supra (n 462) at 317. 
1809
 Ashworth supra (n 462) at 317. 
 295 
It is submitted that the introduction of an objective test in Eadie
1810
 is problematic. It has 
been the source of controversy since time immemorial because on a fundamental level it 
is illogical. The tendency of the courts in England and Canada to individualize the 
objective test represents a natural inclination since making such an assessment without 
attributing subjective factors will lead to a travesty of justice. It is submitted that the 
adoption of an objective test would be highly problematic and create significant 
uncertainty and confusion within the defence. 
 
5.1.7.4. Implications of an objective test introduced in Eadie 
The implications of an objective element alters the nature of the defence, it has been 
reworked to the extent that the defence becomes a different defence. This distortion is a 
direct result of the court in Eadie
1811
 basing its judgment on policy considerations rather 
than the established and well-developed foundational principles to criminal liability.  
 
Hence, the criticism of the Eadie1812 case is based on the courts attempt to remedy a 
perceived  troublesome aspect of law without  a proper impact assessment of the wider 
implications of an objective test ,essentially the court digressed from years of precedent 
due to its disagreement or confusion and being unduly influenced by the convictions of 
the community. 
 
As Louw fittingly argues: 
―While calls for a more policy-driven application of our law might appease public sentiment, such 
calls do not always lead to good law. Where a policy shift is not logical, it may appear to coincide 
too readily with public opinion. The introduction of an objective policy based test for provocation 
does not make legal sense.‖1813 
 
 
It is submitted that the introduction of an objective standard will not only negate the 
positive developments made since the landmark case of Chretien
1814
 , but will also 
prejudice the defendant, comparing character traits and type of reaction to a generic 
                                                     
1810
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1811
 S v Eadie surpa (n 18). 
1812
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1813
 Louw supra (n 5) at 203. 
1814
 S v Chretien supra (n 204). 
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standard which in itself is hard to determine will lead to more confusion and 
uncertainty. Rumpff CJ in Chretien
1815
 fittingly stated that ―the need to punish criminal 
conduct versus the undesirability of penalising a person for conduct for which, owing to 
voluntary drunkenness, he was not responsible‖.1816  
 
It is the responsibility of the courts when basing decisions on policy grounds, to keep in 
mind the values and the norms of society it is responsible for and to apply these values 
when making a pronouncement. Judges have the task to ―perform a balancing act 
between two competing values, each in itself a worthy and desirable one‖.1817  
 
In this respect, Louw highlights the importance of ensuring a balance that when 
tailoring the law along lines of policy while simultaneously ensuring the new approach 
built on a solid foundation of legal principle. Louw thus states that a movement towards 
―a more normative approach to our criminal law heralded by public sentiment aghast at 
the country‘s alarming crime rate, but it is not in line with the considered decisions of 
the court and it is not in line with our general principles. It ought to be reviewed.‖1818 
 
Louw correctly argues that the principles of law should not be so binding that it cannot 
be relaxed when the interests of justice are concerned, but if the court makes a change to 
principle it must be done with caution and careful consideration of what exactly will be 
in the interests of justice. This can be achieved if the interests of the accused are 
balanced with the interests of the public.
1819
  
 
It is submitted that the court in Eadie
1820
 failed to maintain this balance rather it created 
a drastic imbalance in favour of policy by blatantly disregarding foundational principles 
of the defence of non-pathological incapacity. It is thus submitted that the court in 
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 S v Chretien supra (n 204). 
1816
 S v Chretien supra (n 204) at 66. 
1817
 M.M Corbett ―Aspects of the role of policy in the evolution of our common law (1987) 104 SALJ 52 
at 67. 
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 Louw supra (n 5) at 206. 
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 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
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Eadie
1821
 unwittingly redefined the defence with the addition of objective factors in the 
test for capacity, with the aim of shrinking the boundaries of the defence. 
 
In reference to public policy and its influence on legal decisions, Hoctor cites the 
landmark case of Makwanyane,
1822
 where the Constitutional Court ―did not merely 
adopt the majority community view favouring the death penalty‖.1823 Dlamini states 
when policy is considered, factors relating to society must be considered, and that is 
needed to improve society, the functioning of the community and aiming to benefit its 
citizens. Principle on the other hand is different; justice and fairness takes precedence 
over all other considerations it is ―a standard that is to be observed, not because it will 
advance or secure an economic, political or social situation deemed desirable, but 
because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or other dimension of morality‖.1824  
 
The court in Eadie
1825
 was under the same duty to affect such a balancing act in relation 
to provocation or emotional stress. It is clear from the changes made to the defence of 
non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress that the court did 
not achieve such a balance, rather the import of Eadie prejudices criminal law and 
individuals of society at the same time. Concerns regarding the safety of society and 
crime control are important, these concerns should not be pivotal.
1826
  
 
It is clear that in an attempt to solve the controversies of the provocation defence, courts 
and academic writers are of the belief that the introduction of an objective standard is 
the solution to preventing facile acquittals,
1827
 however, Louw correctly argues that the 
problem lies in the need to find a way of validating provocation as a defence while 
preventing facile acquittals.
1828
  
                                                     
1821
  S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1822
  S v Makwanyane  (1995) 2 SACR 1 (CC). 
1823
  Hoctor supra (n 1) at 147. 
1824
  Dworkin supra (n 1798) at 22 cited by Dlamini supra (n 89) at 137. 
1825
  S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1826
  Hoctor supra (n 1) at 147. 
1827
  Krause supra (n 290) at 350 states that the court was correct in acknowledging that non-pathological 
incapacity should not be a complete defence despite the court‘s reasoning for this view being 
flawed.  
1828
  Louw supra (n 5) at 204. 
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5.1.8. Provocation defence in England and Canda inherently problematic 
In analysing the respective provisions governing the provocation defence it is clear that 
both England and Canada have struggled with their respective provisions. It is in light 
of the many problems and criticisms of the defence in both jurisdictions that have 
spurred critics to call for abolition of the provocation defence in England and Canada.  
Mitchell states that the abolition of the old provocation defence in England was not 
surprising since one of the underlying problems was that the difficulty in identifying a 
clear rationale behind the defence.
1829
 The former defence in England was extremely 
problematic, calls for abolition were made on the basis that it is ―bound to encourage 
and exaggerate a view of human behaviour which is sexist, homophobic, and racist.‖1830  
 
The rationale for the defence in Canada and England is to prevent an injustice occurring 
wherein a person is convicted of murder despite being undeserving of a conviction. In 
this regard, Wells argues that the provocation defence in England carries a message,for 
one, though it is based on the concession to human frailty principle, it is also based on 
the actions of the victim or another person other than the accused.1831 In respect of 
Canadian provision, Renke states that the doctrine of provocation ―accommodates the 
complexity of being human‖ and plays an important role in the administration of 
justice.1832 . 
 
                                                     
1829
 Mitchell supra (n 555) at 131 states that some commentators have categorised the rational of the 
provocation defence as being excusatory in nature seeing that the accused lost control due to the 
provocation and therefore being less culpable, second school of thought subscribed to by writers 
such as Ashworth believe an element of justification exists in the requirement loss of self-control. In 
terms of the third school of opinion regard the rationale as partial responsibility due to the disturbed 
mental state of the accused. 
1830
 C. Wells Provocation: The case for Abolition-Rethinking English Homicide (2000) at 85, at 86 Wells 
argues that though the partial defence of provocation is well established in the English common law, 
the defence is categorised under voluntary manslaughter and this is peculiar given that a successful 
plea of provocation results in the reduction in culpability yet the law categorises this defence as 
voluntary manslaughter. The relationship between the provocation defence and other defences such 
as self-defence and diminished responsibility brings about practical and conceptual difficulties 
1831
  Wells supra (n 1830) at 86. 
1832
  Renke supra (n 28) at 778. 
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However, it is submitted that a significant problem preventing the proper functioning of 
the provocation defences in England and Canada is the respective objective tests as well 
the problematic concept of loss of self-control. It is submitted that the provocation in 
both jurisdictions is rampant with internal contradictions; the requirement of loss of 
control which is a fundamental requirement in both the defences in England and Canada 
is criticised since it is postulated against the objective test of the reasonable/ordinary 
man makes the defence impractical and therefore unusable.1833 
 
The loss of self control requirement is problematic in both jurisdictions and is the major 
cause of gender discrimation against the battered women.
1834
 It is submitted that the 
concept of self-control lacks content and is superficial, since the description of the 
concept is founded on outward physical displays of loss of self-control such as ―going 
beserk‖1835 which associated with anger above other emotions. What is evident though 
is that the concept of self-control is deeply linked to angered states and the so called 
―eruptive moment‖.1836 The requirement of loss of self-control is considered an essential 
part both the respective juridictions, as it is the only factor which differentiates 
provocation cases from other cases involving premediating killings. 
 
The problem with this approach and with the vague short-sighted concept of loss of self-
control in England and Canada is it easily excludes individuals who may have not 
suffered a loss of self-control resulting from anger or rage, this applies to the ―battered 
women‖ and other individuals who have experienced abuse and act out of fear.The 
―eruptive moment‖ is lacking so the traditional concept of loss of self-control in 
England and Canada is incompatible with killings arising out of fear or emotional 
stress.
1837
 
 
                                                     
1833
 Wells supra (n 1830) at 105 suggests three broad options. The first would be to expound upon the 
objective test, second option is to abandon the objective test altogether. The final option, the 
wholesale abolition of the provocation defence. 
1834
 Edwards supra (n 650) at 228. 
1835
 Edwards supra (n 650) at 224. 
1836
 Edwards supra (n 650) at 228. 
1837
 Edwards supra (n 650) at 228. 
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England should be commended for strides made in this area and addition of ―fear‖ as a 
qualifying trigger in the new loss of control defence. However the same cannot be said 
for Canada where the requirement of ―suddenness‖ characterising both the provocation 
and retaliation are insurmountable obstablces for women. The requirement that the loss 
of self-control must be sudden, together with the requirement that the provocation must 
be sudden have resulted in gender discrimination against the abused persons who kill 
their perpetrator such as the battered women.
1838
  
 
This common area has troubled the provocation defence in England and still poses an 
issue in the Canadian provocation defence concerns the battered woman and how to 
bring her within the ambit of the provocation defence. These points of criticisms relate 
to the question of whether cumulative provocation should be accepted to ensure that the 
partial defence better caters for the abused woman.1839  
 
It is argued that the sexist foundations which influenced the law on provocation 
continued with the section 3 of the Homicide Act, the previous defence was criticised 
for discriminating against woman when they assumed the form of either the deceased or 
defendant.1840 Furthermore, the experiences of the battered woman were not fully 
understood by judges and jurors and this problem has made the provocation defence a 
risky option for the battered woman.1841  
 
Horder states that men are more prone to lose control in the manner set out by Devlin J 
in Duffy1842 whereas women would likely experience a more complex set of emotions, 
especially where the provoker is an abusive husband, a woman would likely have mixed 
motives comprising of fear and anger.1843 According to Horder, this reaction is 
characteristic of someone who is physically less powerful and aggressive than the male 
provoker. Anger at the provoker would be lessened by the fear of possible reaction to an 
angry response. The ―mixed‖ reaction results in delayed loss of control and may likely 
                                                     
1838
 Quigley supra (n 1015) at 253, Renke surpa (n 28) at 749. 
1839
 Elliot and Quinn supra (n 525) at 82. 
1840
 Edwards supra (n 650) at 240-241. 
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 Elliot and Quinn surpa (n 525) at 82. 
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 Duffy supra (n 550). 
1843
 J. Horder Excusing Crime (2004) at 97. 
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leave the provoked with a heightened emotional state. In this light battered woman were 
not sufficiently accommodated by the law.1844   
 
Over the last two decades, the requirements of the defence were ―stretched‖ in order to 
bring the battered woman within the ambit of the defence.1845 Despite reformation of the 
provocation defence in English law, the new provisions are still subjected to criticism, 
since the defence of the battered woman, whose reaction objectively assessed, will be 
considered to be excessive since an ordinary person with a normal degree of tolerance 
and self-restraint would not have used excessive force.1846 
 
Recognising fear as a qualifying trigger to loss of self-control is generally a welcomed 
addition, it will favour the battered woman, battered woman will still need to be 
subjected to the loss of self-control test.1847 Despite this favourable change, the question 
of how well battered woman will benefit by the new defence still remains to be seen. It 
is submitted that some of the problems which plagued the old defence of provocation 
still persist, although to a lesser extent.   
 
This objective assessment of capacity for self-control in English law is still troublesome 
and has the potential to cause the battered woman to fail in her defence. It is submitted 
that the problems of gender discrimination may persist since the foundations and 
principles upon which the new Act is based may be to blame as the law has possible 
gone from being biased towards men to now being biased towards woman and 
discriminatory to men.  
 
It is evident that both England and Canada have grappled with problems relating to the 
gendered nature of the provocation defence. These relate to providing a defence for the 
battered woman and the criticisms that the provocation defence provides a safe haven 
for those that commit spousal, specifically homicides involving the murder of female 
intimate partners. Of particular concern was the increasing number of cases where the 
provocation defence was raised where the circumstances involved sexual jealousy and 
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 Horder supra (n 556) at 129. 
1845
 Edwards supra (n 650) at 226. 
1846
 Miles supra (n 930) at 32.  
1847
 Mitchell and Mackay supra (n 823) at 5,-6. 
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extra-marital affairs.
1848
 In England, it is these factors which influenced the decision by 
the Home Secretary to request an assessment by Law Commission to assess the partial 
defences, especially its operation in cases involving domestic violence.
1849
  
 
The problem of domestic homicides in most cases involve the killing of women by men, 
women are considered to represent at least three quarters of domestic homicides in 
Canada, Australia as well as the United States.
1850
 ―Provocation has acquired some 
standing in other jurisdictions as a defence for abused women who kill but it has not as 
yet been effectively used in Canada.‖1851  
 
After analysis of the provocation defence in Canada, it is evident that spousal homicides 
and the gendered nature of the provocation defence is one of the foremost problems in 
that jurisdiction. The Canadian provocation defence has been criticized for assisting 
jealous husbands who witness their wives in the act of adultery succeed with their 
defence.
1852
  
 
Most of the controversy surrounding the provocation defence centres not only on the 
purpose of the defence but also the application. It is contended that one of the 
fundamental short-comings of the defence is that it excuses violent reactions to both 
violent and non-violent acts. This form of excusing violence is outdated by modern 
                                                     
1848
 These cases inevitably involved scrutiny of the deceased‘s reputation and should the defence succeed, 
it also sends out a negative message that the law blames the deceased for her own demise. 
1849
  Elliot and Quinn supra (n 525) at 84. 
1850
  Forell supra (n 1019) at 162 citing U.S Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Crime 
Data Brief:Intimate Partner Violence, 1993-2001 1 (2003). 
1851
 Baker supra (n 1006) at para. 193; Nelson supra (n 1050) states men usually kill out of jealousy or 
rage in the ―heat of passion‖; Forell supra (n 1019) argues this is in stark contrast to women who 
will usually kill their abusers out of fear and despair. In this way ―heat of passion‖ has replaced the 
honour killing as the basis for provocation. Forell further argues at 163 (discussing Thibert supra (n 
1053) and Stone supra (n 999)  that the boundaries of ―heat of passion‖ have been undesirably 
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defence in provocation. Feminists have emphatically argued for men who kill their intimate partners 
out of possessiveness or rage to be convicted of murder and not manslaughter, provocation law in 
Canada and the decisions by the Supreme Court ―remain solicitous to men who kill their intimates 
out of jealousy or rage‖. 
1852
 Goman supra (n 994) at 499. 
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standards of society.
1853
 The partial defences in Canada has been the subject of review 
by the Department of Justice
1854
 unfortunately legislative reform doesn‘t seem likely 
due to conflicting opinions regarding options of reform.
1855
  
 
The controversy surrounding the defence relate both to its purpose and its 
application.
1856
 Hence, the theory underpinning the defence as well the practical 
application is flawed. In terms of the theoretical underpinning of the defence, which is 
the recognition of human frailty, Nelson argues that the defence operates more to excuse 
violence in a manner which is out-dated by modern standards of thinking.
1857
   
 
This troubling aspect has led to calls for the abolishment of the defence or at least some 
form of limitation. However, the criticisms of the loosening of the objective test is 
misplaced; the underlying rationale for the defence is flawed and therefore results in 
confusion and inconsistent judgments. The problem of gender discrimination in the 
form of alleged bias towards jealous husbands illustrates that the provocation defence 
failed catch up with an ever-changing society, this illustrates that the law governing the 
provocation defence failed to evolve alongside the needs of society and in accordance 
with a progressive society.
1858
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 Nelson supra (n 1050) at 1060-1061. 
1854
 Reforming Criminal Code Defences: Provocation, Self-Defence and Defence of Property (1998) at 1-
20. 
1855
  Stuart supra (n 70) at 547. 
1856
  Nelson supra (n 1050) at 1060. 
1857
  Nelson supra (n 1050) at 1060; Roach supra (n 26) at 251 states people have a legal right to leave a 
relationships and to occasionally make disapproving remarks about the ex-partners and that the 
court‘s continued refusal to acknowledge this legal right in its broad interpretations could deny equal 
rights and protection to women. 
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  Edwards supra (n 650) at 223-241: the problematic requirement of sudden loss of self-control was the 
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did not recognise emotions such as fear as a factor that could undermine self-control. In regard to the 
addition of fear as a trigger to loss of self-control, Edwards argues that the philosophical foundations 
of the new defence of "fear-and-anger-loss of self-control" are incompatible. The reason for this 
criticism is rooted in the different way in which men and women lose self-control. Loss of self-
control occurs in many ways depending on the qualifying trigger, it is good that the new defence 
gives recognition to this fact. 
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It must be noted that the provocation defences in both jurisdictions have failed to evolve 
to suit the changing nature of society, the defence has been criticised for failing to break 
away from its sexist roots wherein a man was entitled to kill upon discovering his wife 
in the act of adultery. Criticism that the defence is solicitous to men who kill their 
intimate female partners is a serious indictment on the justice system. Provocation 
defence enables jealous partners from escaping full might of the law by raising 
provocation and escaping with a manslaughter conviction.  
 
The prevalence of spousal homicides in Canada and the perception that the provocation 
defence protects scorned men who kill their lovers have cast the provocation defence in 
a bad light, it is for this reason that feminists want men to be held more accountable. By 
the law and not be allowed to escape with a conviction of manslaughter.
 1859 
It is argued 
that this practice has no place in a modern and civilized society. The family and friends 
of the deceased are put through agonizing court processes where ―dirty laundry‖ about a 
loved one is exposed. The law is seen as serving the perpetrator rather than protecting 
the victim.
1860 
 
Like the provocation defence in England, the provocation defence in Canada also 
reflects the law‘s inability to evolve to suit modern-day thinking. It is cases such as 
Thibert
1861
, which have become the centre of the debate in recent times in Canada and 
has further fuelled these criticisms. It has been argued that judgments such as Thibert
1862
 
operate ―to elevate jealous husbands to a class or group with special characteristics that 
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  Forell supra (n 1019) at 162, Nelson supra (n 1050) at 1063 argues that one of the concerning aspects 
of the defence is that it excuses violent reactions to both violent and non-violent acts. This factor is 
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  Forell supra (n 1019) at 162. 
1861
  Thibert supra (n 1053). 
1862
  Thibert supra (n 1053). 
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must be considered when determining if murder was a reasonable response to a 
deceased‘s words.‖ 1863   
 
It has been argued that this development  is ironic since the Supreme Court in  
Thibert
1864
  has returned the defence to its origins where women where seen as property 
and adultery was an invasion of property and provocation served the purpose of 
assisting men who avenged their honour with murder.
1865
  
 
In this light it is contended that the basis of provocation in Canada has changed from 
killing to protect one‘s honour to killing in ―heat of passion‖. The concept of killing in 
the ―heat of passion‖ now encompasses any form of infidelity or attempting to end a 
relationship.
 1866 
Currently, the defence is considered a licence to kill arising from 
jealousy. The nature of the defence needs to be properly understood, as an accused must 
succeed only in rare cases where loss of self-control was extreme.
 1867  
 
The defence should only succeed in exceptional cases. In this regard Grant argues that 
fears of an increased number of men being excused as a result of troubling decisions 
such as Stone,1868 did not materialise since statistics support the suggestion that judges 
have taken spousal homicides seriously and consider the killing of an intimate partner to 
be a heinous act.1869  However, despite this observation and the argument by Grant, it is 
submitted that women are still at a great risk of being killed by an intimate partner
 
and 
                                                     
1863
 Goman supra (n 994) at 499, at 415 citing K.Roach ―Provocation and Mandatory Life Imprisonment‖ 
(editorial) (1999), 41 C.L.Q 273 argues that the defence should not be allowed to excuse murder 
because of jealousy. Some commentators have gone as far as to propose that the defence should be 
abandoned altogether in cases involving spousal homicides. 
1864
 Thibert supra (n 1053); Gorman supra (n 994) at 494 is critical of the court‘s reasoning that it is 
acceptable that the history of the relationship between the accused and the deceased should be taken 
into account. The killing occurred because the deceased had an affair with the defendant‘s wife and 
not because of any provocation. 
1865
 Gorman supra (n 994) at 478-479. 
1866
 Forell supra (n 1019) at 162. 
1867
 Goman supra (n 994) at 480-481. 
1868
 Stone supra (n 999). 
1869
 Grant supra (n 1013) at 814-815. 
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this doesn‘t change the fact that there are problems with the defence which is affords 
little protection for women both when they are the victim or the defendant. 1870  
 
In effect the Supreme Court has ensured that the old rule that a man who kills his 
adulterous wife should not receive life imprisonment. Thibert
1871
 has undoubtedly made 
it difficult for a judge to refuse to put the provocation defence to the jury where the 
killing involved adultery by the defendant‘s wife.1872   
 
It is therefore submitted that the defence in Canada should be reframed to include 
killings committed by the battered women by recognising loss of self-control due to 
cumulative provocation. This may entail the abandonment of the requirement of 
suddenness; this will bring victims of abuse, such as the battered woman within its 
ambit. 
 
It is often contended that in modern forward-thinking legal systems a defence based 
inherently on an enraged stated should not be allowed. Calls for abolition of the 
provocation defence both in South Africa and in jurisdictions such as Canada and 
England are based on this argument. It is also argued that the leniency afforded by the 
law to the hot-tempered individual in the form of the provocation defence has wider 
implications especially considering the possible the adverse impact on marginalised 
sectors of society such as homosexuals.1873  
                                                     
1870
  Gorman supra (n 994) at 494-495 consideration of the history of the relationship may allow jealous 
husbands to escape a murder conviction, This allows a husband to brood over the events pertaining 
to the troubled relationship with his wife, then using a single act such as choosing to break up as an 
avenue to murder her. This does not amount to provocation and is not a temporary loss of self-
control. 
1871
  Thibert supra (n 1053). 
1872
  Trotter supra (n 1187) at 669; Gorman supra (n 980) at 479  states that Thibert is not aberration but is 
a reflection of 16
th
 and 17
th
 century thinking, where adultery was considered there greatest form of 
provocation.
 
The history of the defence in Canadian criminal law illustrates the purpose of the 
provocation defence which was assist jealous husbands who witnessed their wives in the act of 
adultery and committed murder. If the defence of provocation were to be abolished, the out-dated 
thinking found in Thibert would be reflected in sentencing. Gorman states that it is unfortunate that 
the courts in Canada ensured the continuance of this out-dated thinking.  
1873
  Elliot and Quinn supra (n 525) at 82. 
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It is submitted that the objective test in both England and Canada have led to 
inconsistent case law and thus the cause of much uncertainty and controversy. Firstly, in 
Canada, the current defence in terms of 232 of the Criminal Code
1874
 is beset with 
controversies, for one, the provision is criticised for its complexity which has resulted in 
the courts struggling with interpretations and application.
1875
  Furthermore, in the 
subjective test regulating the loss of self-control and the lack of consensus regarding the 
characteristics to be taken into account in the objective test are problematic features of 
the provocation defence in Canada. 
1876
 
 
In England, the new defence attempted to clear the confusion regarding the objective 
test and extend the scope of the defence in order to make it more accessible to 
vulnerable groups like battered woman. However, despite these attempts certain 
problems still persist and commentators argue that many ambiguities and confusion still 
persist.
1877
 It is submitted that the problems associated the objective test in both 
jurisdictions have led to another major problem, that of gender discrimination. In 
England the provisions governing the provocation defence have undergone reformation 
due to various problems; one of the foremost issues was the problem relating to 
providing a defence which would encompass the battered woman. After extensive 
consultation and investigation the new law enacted provided a wider defence which 
                                                     
1874
  Stuart supra (n 70) at 544-545: argues that the defence of provocation is unnecessarily complex and 
thereby unacceptable. 
1875
  Stuart supra (n 70) at 544-545. 
1876
  Stuart supra (n 70) at argues that an alternative to a purely subjective test would be to recognise that 
at the outset the test be subjective but ultimately objectivity takes over. This compromise approach 
was endorsed by the English Law Revision Committee.  This bold approach would make the murder 
under extenuating circumstances broader. Stuart states that adopting such an approach would bring 
honesty and directness to the complex homicide laws, At 544-545 Stuart contends that this approach 
would entail the removal of the initial reasonable person test thereby solving the conundrum of 
which individual factors to consider. All characteristics would be taken into account including 
characteristics such as hot-temperedness. Although a transition into total subjectivity raises 
questions of bogus defences succeeding, Stuart asserts that this worry is unfounded if there is 
reliance on the inherent common sense of the triers of fact. 
1877
  Leigh supra (n 907) at 2, Withey supra (n 875) at 12, Mitchell and Mackay supra (n 823) at 2, Norrie 
supra (n 823) at 307. 
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encompassed a loss of self-control due to fear as well as anger. The old defence in 
England was reviewed and reformed in 2009.
1878
  
 
A major problem with previous defence in England was the difficulty in encompassing 
persons who kill their abusers, such as the battered woman within its ambit. The 
gendered nature of the defence prevented abused women from accessing the defence. 
The battered woman had to rely on defences such as diminished responsibility which 
was not necessarily the correct defence. This caused a major travesty of justice since the 
law catered for the men while discriminating against women. However, despite 
reformation of the provocation defence in England, the battered woman may continue to 
be faced with the problem of trying to persuade the jury that the amount of force used to 
kill the victim was ―justifiable‖, especially in circumstances where the abuse perpetrated 
was not serious.
1879
  
 
It is submitted that this does a pose a problem since this requirement will be assessed 
objectively; hence the battered woman still faces a tough challenge as this means that 
the killing must have been justifiable in the eyes of the jury and not in the mind of the 
accused.
1880
 The difficulty in achieving gender equality is due to the stringent nature of 
the objective test.
1881
 It is submitted that discrimination of many forms will result from 
the application of an objective test into the provocation defence.  
 
It is submitted that apart from the many difficulties associated with the objective test, 
the subjective test and the requirement of the loss of self-control have proven equally 
troubling.It is submitted that the reason for these problems can be attributed to the 
                                                     
1878
 However, despite reformation of the defence, it is submitted that the new provisions are lacking in 
certain respects, for instance, the requirement that the provocative act must be ―extremely grave in 
character‖ might cause confusion and controversy since it is not clear which circumstances this will 
cover. 
1879
  Edwards supra (n 650) at 240. 
1880
  Edwards supra (n 650) at 232, 240. 
1881
 The new provision in terms of the Coroners Act is perceived to be prejudicial to men and criticised on 
this basis. The new provision in England has received immense criticism for seemingly prejudicing 
men by virtue of the provision excluding extra-marital affairs from being a qualifying trigger; this is 
evidence that obtaining a balance in the form of a codified provision is difficult and may lead to 
some form of discrimination due to imposed limits.  
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underlying rationale underpinning the provocation defence in England and Canada, 
which is inherently flawed. It is submitted that the concept of self-control is problematic 
as the concept lacks content since it is linked strongly to enraged states. This results in a 
bias towards men who are known for losing their tempers suddenly as opposed to 
women who may lose self-control slowly and in many circumstances out of fear. It is 
submitted that this has resulted in problems associated with gender discrimination and 
the failure to curb the scourge of spousal homicides. 
 
The historical survey together with the comparative analysis of the provocation defence 
in English law and Canadian law reveal that the defence of provocation emerged 
essentially to accommodate weakness of human nature and frailty in circumstances 
where the killing can be considered less blameworthy usually on moral grounds, for 
example; where a husband killed his wife upon discovery of an adulterous affair, 
historically this killing would be committed in defence of honour.  
 
This basis for the provocation defence in England and Canada continued for many 
decades despite criticisms, the defence is trenchantly criticised for maintaining remnants 
of this out dated law. Critics of the provocation defence in both England and Canada 
have argued that it is not applicable to modern times where gender equality is 
enshrined.
1882
 These criticisms of the defence relate to the perceived bias towards  
favouring of an angered state which ultimately means bias towards men who are more 
inclined to react on impulse and in a fit of rage, this is argued to be discriminatory 
against women who react differently to provocative situations.
1883
  
 
However, allegations of gender discrimination in relation to the ambit of the defence 
and incidents of spousal homicides still feature prominently in England and Canada and 
are hard to ignore, this has fuelled condemnation at allowing a defence based on 
                                                     
1882
 Horder supra (n 556) 123-124.  Horder posed the pertinent question of why should someone who 
killed out of fear rather than anger is deprived of the defence, since fear can undermine self-control 
especially in cases where the provoker is more powerful. 
1883
 In England and Canada the provocation defence is structured around the concept of loss of self 
control and the belief that, it is the responsibility of the law to accommodate a particular human 
failing, which in this case is the tendency to lose self-control in response to provocation 
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provocation which is perceived to aid the jealous husband or the revenge killer and 
furthermore deprive individuals such as the battered woman from a defence. 
 
In light of the problems related to gender discrimination against the battered women and 
intimate femicide associated with the provocation defence in England and Canada it is 
worth assessing if these issues pertain to the defence of non-pathological incapacity due 
to provocation and emotional stress in South Africa.In South Africa, violence against 
women and children are prevalent and disturbing social evils.1884  
 
Burchell states that the traditional subjective approach to provocation and emotional 
stress excluding provided the best foundation for building a defence of non-pathological 
incapacity that would accommodate that battered women or other abused persons in 
circumstances involving prolonged domestic abuse.
1885
 Victims of abuse such as the 
battered women may have, in terms of the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress, introduced evidence of abuse to show that criminal 
capacity was lacking due to such causes such as severe emotional stress or provocation. 
The accused must show that the incapacity was temporary and brief and the retaliation 
did not emanate from a pathological disease or defect.
1886
  
 
Carstens and Le Roux note that the courts in South Africa are ad idem on the following 
aspects: if the assault was not imminent the defence of private defence may not be 
appropriate, furthermore the ―battered woman syndrome‘ results in severe mental 
trauma which is categorised as being non-pathological and a killing committed while in 
this traumatic state is usually a once-off occurrence.
1887
 However, the radical changes 
                                                     
1884
  Burchell supra (n 2) at 329-30 states that recognition has been given in literature to the ―battered 
woman syndrome‖ and evidence based on this syndrome has been admitted in courts in South 
Africa, notably the Supreme Court of Appeal case of Ferreira (2004) 2 SACR 454 (SCA) where the 
court accepted the evidence on the physical and psychological abuse committed upon the accused 
was held by the court to be substantial and compelling  and justified the need to impose a more 
lenient sentence of 6 years imprisonment, however the accused served three years already , the 
remaining three of the six years  was  suspended .  
1885
  Burchell supra (n 2) at 333. 
1886
  Reddi supra (n 1575) at 278. 
1887
  Carstens and Le Roux supra (n 3) at 188 citing S v Nursingh supra (n 16). 
 311 
effected by the Eadie
1888
 case may have restricted the test for non-pathological 
incapacity which may extend to provocation and emotional stress.
1889
  
 
It is submitted that in light of the scourge of domestic abuse and the prevalence of 
―battered woman syndrome‖ where victims kill their perpetrators while in a state of 
trauma and possibly lacking capacity, the pronouncements of Eadie
1890
 are highly 
problematic and does a disservice to victims of abuse who are left without the most 
viable defence available in South African law since it has been equated with sane-
automatism and will require the accused to show involuntary conduct, this will result in 
the accused failing in this defence and receiving a conviction which may not be in the 
interests of justice. Even though the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress is viewed with great circumspection by the courts, it is 
submitted that it is vital that the law accommodates individuals of abuse within its ambit 
and provide the opportunity for a ―fighting chance‖. 
 
It is submitted an objective assessment of these requirements is inherently unjust and 
illogical and does little to address the injustices of the past in terms of gender 
discrimination. The attempt at reform is to be applauded but certain problems still 
persist despite changes, as Edwards states that the new provocation defence may be the 
―dogs breakfast‖ that many have held it to be.1891 
 
                                                     
1888
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1889
 Burchell supra (n 2) at 333 states (in light of Eadie) that the subjective approach towards the defence 
of putative private defence may be better suited to providing a just and fair result for those 
individuals who find themselves in the situations involving abuse as opposed to the objectively 
assessed defence of private defence founded upon the concept of an immediate threat of danger. 
1890
  S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1891
  Edwards supra (n 650) at 240 citing Baroness Mallalieu, HL Hansard, vol.712, col.577, 7 July 2009; 
―Over the past 10 years, I have had to attend , as all practising barristers have, continuing 
professional development conferences , when the new law is explained to the criminal bar. Time and 
again , I have had people turn to me, look at me in disbelief and say,‖how on earth did you let that 
pass through the House of Lords?‖ All I can say is that gallant attempts have been made that have 
not succeeded. However, if these clauses on provocation go through I shall not be able to show my 
face again there at all. The phrase ―dogs breakfast‖ would be a ―kindness‖. 
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The defence of non-pathological incapacity having been approached with caution, it is 
submitted that South African criminal law has managed to prevent provocation and 
emotional stress being used or abused by jealous lovers to perpetrate crimes against 
their partners, the defence of non-pathological incapacity is not known for enabling or 
encouraging gender violence, furthermore in respect of accommodating persons such as 
the ―battered woman‖ it is submitted that by recognising that  affective functions may 
lead to loss of self-control, the defence of non-pathological incapacity due ot 
provocation and emotional stress becomes the favoured defence for the battered women. 
 
In this light the defence of non-pathological incapacity is preferred over the provisions 
in England and Canada as the theoretical underpinning is sounder whereas a coherent 
rationale for the defence in England and Canada is lacking in respect of the loss of self-
control requirement, the objective test and the fact that it is uncertain whether the 
defence is a justification or an excuse.In terms of the defence of non-pathological of 
non-pathological incapacity where the defence is judged according to the psychological 
approach , the accused may be acquitted on legal principle  and lack of blameworthiness 
rather than a misguided view of accommodating human frailty. 
 
5.3. Conclusion 
The aim of this study was to re-assess the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress in South African law, which despite being inherently 
controversial, continues to occupy a place in the law. The criminal law in South Africa 
has recognised the negative impact of provocation and   emotional stress on self-control 
which may lead to the lack of criminal capacity. It must be stated that the defence of 
non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress is not only 
important, but also a necessary and valid defence. 
 
The psychological or principle-based approach to provocation and emotional stress by 
the South African criminal law was a positive development as it preserves the intergrity 
of the law by applying an approach which is in line with the rights and values of the 
Consititution of South Africa.  The study reveals that the defence is a necessary part of 
the criminal law as it recognises a state of lack of capacity brought about by non-
pathological factors. It is the most suitable defence for abused persons such as the 
battered woman amongst others. Unfortunately, the well established principled nature of 
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the defence has been drastically curtailed by the notorious case of Eadie.
1892
 The 
problematic reasoning in Eadie
1893
 has eroded the founding principles of the defence. 
The conflation of the defence of sane automatism with conative capacity is therefore the 
most troubling aspect of this case. 
 
 On a fundamental level, the effect of the pronouncements in Eadie
1894
 is highly 
prejudicial to society in general; an individual who suffered a lack of capacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress.This is inherently unjust. Therefore in light problems 
generated by Eadie
1895
 and the after a critical analysis of the defence preceeding 
Eadie,
1896
 it is submitted that the law must be restored to the two-stage assessment of 
criminal capacity in terms of Laubscher.
1897
 The principle-based or psychological 
approach to criminal liability is preferred as it is compatable with the fundamental 
values of the criminal justice system and in line with the ethos of the Constitution. 
 
Assesing the current state of the defence was necessary, especially in light of the 
dramatic and far-reaching changes brought about by the Eadie
1898
 decision. In order to 
achieve this objective, this investigation traced the evolution of the defence of non-
pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress in South African law, 
from its early roots where emphasis was placed on objectivity and where provocation 
was a partial defence. The development of the provocation defence in English law and 
Canadian law was also traced; English law is one of the common law parent systems of 
South African law, thus assessing how both jurisdictions treat provocation within the 
criminal law system provided insight into the underlying values of provocation in two 
compared jurisdictions.  
 
In studying the development of the defence in South African law, it is clear that there is 
controversy and confusion surrounding aspects of the defence. Analysis of South 
                                                     
1892
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1893
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1894
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1895
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1896
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1897
 S v Laubscher supra (n 1). 
1898
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
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African case law reveal that certain decisions, namely Arnold,
1899
 Moses
1900
 
Nursingh
1901
 and the landmark case of Eadie
1902
 have been the source of debate , 
controversy and much confusion. It is submitted that in both the cases of Moses
1903
 and 
Nursingh
1904
 the court erred in acquitting the accused. 
 
The acquittals in these cases caused outrage, especially considering the gravity of the 
killings. In the Nursingh
1905
 case, the accused killed three people and was acquitted this 
ignited debate, with many commentators questioning the validity of the defence and 
raised concerns regarding the dangers of a defence which was perceived to be inherently 
dangerous to society, and questions the integrity of the criminal law. 
 
However, in Moses,
1906
 the accused systematically went about killing the deceased in 
his quest to exact revenge from the deceased, the facts of this case strongly indicates the 
presence of criminal capacity. The acquittals by the court drew immense criticism with 
many academics arguing that extending the defence of non-pathological incapacity to 
accommodate disruption in affective functions was unacceptable and not in line with the 
influential Rumpff Commission Report which cautioned against recognising emotional 
responses linked to affective functions impinging on the inquiry into criminal capacity.  
 
Certain commentators felt that the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress was therefore intrinsically problematic since it allowed 
for an accused to easily receive an acquittal as demonstrated by Arnold,
1907
 Moses
1908
 
and Nursingh
1909
.
1910
 These concerns led to calls for an addition of an objective test into 
                                                     
1899
S v  Arnold supra (n 16). 
1900
 S v Moses supra (n 16). 
1901
 S v Nursingh supra (n 16). 
1902
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1903
 S v Moses supra (n 16). 
1904
S v  Nursingh supra (n 16). 
1905
 S v Nursingh supra (n 16). 
1906
 S v Moses supra (n 16). 
1907
  S v Arnold supra (n 16), see criticisms of this case by Snyman supra (n 121) at 250. 
1908
 S v Moses supra (n 16). 
1909
 S v Nursingh supra (n 16).  
1910
 Snyman supra (n 121) at 250-251, Burchell supra (n 1320) at 41. 
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the capacity inquiry to ensure that judges are better able to assess the validity of the 
accused‘s defence thus curbing the problems of facile acquittals and ensuring just and 
fair results.
1911
  
 
However, it is submitted that upon careful analysis of the judgment in both Arnold,
1912
, 
Moses
1913
 and Nursingh
1914
 suggest that the principles underpinning the defence of non-
pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress may not have been 
applied correctly thus resulting in unfair acquittal.  
 
The Moses
1915
 and Nursingh
1916
 case demonstrates a major failing in the court‘s 
reasoning since, upon assessment of the facts in both cases convincingly suggest that 
both the accused in these cases performed clear goal directed actions which strongly 
indicates that criminal capacity was not present. Furthermore, there are indications that 
the court failed to distinguish between diminished capacity and lack of capacity, and the 
accused may only experience diminished capacity which is a factor that is taken into 
account in sentencing and does not amount to an acquittal.  
 
It is therefore submitted that it is a misconception that the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity allows murderers to escape conviction. Moses
1917
 and Nursingh
1918
 
demonstrate that if legal principle is not applied correctly to the facts of each then the 
outcome of the case will be questionable.  
 
One of the main undertakings of this study was to analyse the leading case of Eadie
1919
 
in order to determine the how this case has changed the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress. This case has received some praise 
                                                     
1911
 Burchell supra (n 1320) at 41. 
1912
S v Arnold supa (n 16). 
1913
 S v Moses supra (n 16). 
1914
 S v Nursingh supra (n 16). 
1915
 S v Moses supra (n 16). 
1916
 S v Nursingh supra (n 16). 
1917
 S v Moses supra  (n 16). 
1918
S v Nursingh supra (n 16). 
1919
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
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and a lot of criticism. The Eadie
1920
 case effected fundamental changes to the defences 
to the extent that the defence of non-pathological incapacity may have been abolished.  
 
Firstly, it is clear that the court, in light of the acquittals in Arnold,
1921
 Moses
1922
 and 
Nursingh
1923
 undertook a mission, driven primarily by policy considerations to severely 
curtail the operation of the defence by basing its findings on legal theory. However, the 
results of this quest were disastrous for both policy and principle. It is submitted that the 
Eadie
1924
 judgment created two problems; firstly, the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity was equated with the defence of sane automatism, this is inherently troubling 
since it results in the scope of the defence being drastically reduced, an individual 
would have to show involuntary conduct in order to successfully plead the defence.  
 
Effectively, the defence of non-pathological incapacity was reduced to the defence of 
sane automatism. The courts conflation of the defence of non-pathological incapacity to 
that of sane automatism is fundamentally incorrect as the two defences are distinct since 
they apply to two different elements of criminal liability. 
 
Furthermore, the impact of Eadie
1925
on the existing provocation defence is grave, since 
an accused would only be able to rely on the defence if involuntary conduct was shown. 
This result is dire, it is submitted that the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress serves an important societal need. For instance, the 
victims of abuse like the battered women of society for one will be left without a 
defence, despite having suffered a loss of criminal capacity. This leaves no other avenue 
but plead diminished capacity which still results in a conviction.  
 
The practical implications of the judgment are that the test for voluntary conduct or 
automatism is the same as the test for conative capacity.
1926
 This change will adversely 
                                                     
1920
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1921
 S v Arnold supra (n 16). 
1922
 S v Moses supra (n 16). 
1923
 S v Nursingh supra (n 16). 
1924
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1925
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1926
 Hoctor (n 1485) at 81. 
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impact other areas of criminal law, specifically; voluntary conduct being a prerequisite 
for liability and the effect of intoxication affects liability.
1927
  If it was the courts 
intention to limit the scope of the defence it should have went about doing so in a 
different manner, without resorting to reasoning which is unsound and not in line with 
precedent.
1928
. However, convicting a person who lacked criminal capacity is inherently 
unjust and unconstitutional.  
 
The Eadie
1929
 case was an opportunity to bring clarity to the defence however this 
opportunity was squandered, the court has not provided the correct solution for the 
dilemma‘s facing the defence. Equating loss of control with automatism has come close 
to eliminating the defence all together, even as a partial defence. 
1930
  
 
The Eadie
1931
 judgment has been praised for its emphasis on policy considerations, 
however the basis for the changes effected are unsound, and have come at the expense 
of the founding principles of the defence, thus creating distortion and confusion in the 
fundamental legal principles of criminal liability. The attempt at reformation of the 
defence has backfired and in the aftermath is mere shadow of the defence that once was.  
Furthermore, the effect of the conflation is that for all practical purposes the defence 
non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress was abolished.1932  
 
This is development has drastically diminished the scope defence of non-pathological 
incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress to the extent that it may only exist in 
                                                     
1927
  Snyman supra (n 77) at 22; Louw supra (n 5) at  205  argues essentially lack of conative capacity has 
been confused with involuntary conduct; clearly the court in  had a problem with accepting that an 
individual can lack the ability to act in accordance with the appreciation of right and wrong 
(conative capacity) whilst still possessing capacity.This scenario is impossible since a person cannot 
act as an automaton, for example, while experiencing an epileptic seizure or while sleep-walking 
and simultaneously possessing the capacity to know what he was doing while in this state was 
wrong.  
1928
  Louw supra (n 5) at 206  
1929
  S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1930
  Louw supra (n 5) at 204. 
1931
  S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1932
  Snyman supra (n 77) at 21-22. 
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theory, and if the defence survived, it has greatly diminished in scope.1933  This has 
created enormous uncertainty and confusion within a well-developed area of law which 
was not in need of reformation.  
 
The other significant problem with the Eadie
1934
 judgment is the introduction of an 
objective test into the inquiry into criminal capacity.
1935
 It is apparent that the court was 
intent on sending a message to society not to give into emotions and to control their 
tempers and not to seek refuge in the defence of non-pathological incapacity, it with this 
concern in mind that the court sought to remedy this perceived problem through the 
addition of an objective test. Furthermore, it is clear that the court‘s understanding of 
the purpose and operation of the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress is weak. The defence does not operate where free will 
is in operation, therefore the very basis of the court‘s motive to deter ―succumbing to 
temptation‖ is incorrect.1936 
 
In order to determine if detractors are indeed correct in advocating for the incorporation 
of an objective standard into the capacity inquiry, a comparative analysis was conducted 
with the respective provisions governing the provocation defence in England and 
Canada.  
 
In the South African context the development of the defence has followed a distinct and 
unique path. The element of criminal capacity has become a cornerstone of South 
African criminal law, recognition of criminal capacity makes the defence of non-
pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress a distinguishing feature 
of the criminal law.  
 
                                                     
1933
 Snyman supra (n 77)  at 21 states that the defence may survive in cases where incapacity is alleged 
due to factors such as shock, panic, tension and fear. It is argued further that these states have a close 
relation to provocation and cannot be separated practically; Hoctor supra (n 1) at 148 states there is 
still a place for the defence despite the developments in Eadie, however the defence has been 
drastically attenuated. 
1934
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1935
 S v Eadie supra (n 18) at para 64, Louw supra (n 5) at 202-203. 
1936
 Hoctor supra (n 1) at 148 discussing S v Eadie supra (n 18) at para 60. 
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This difference is fundamental cannot be ignored, the defence in South African relating 
to provocation has digressed from its English origins to the adoption of concept of 
criminal capacity which is the heart of the defence unlike the defence in England and 
Canada where the concept of loss of self-control is vague, lacks content and rooted an 
outdated perception of loss of self-control. 
 
 The provocation defence is a codified partial defence in both Canada and England. It is 
submitted there are various pitfalls associated with codifying. The defence may become 
pigeon holed and thereby reducing the scope. This can result in various types of 
discrimination. As the comparative analysis reveals, gender discrimination and applying 
provisions to an ever changing society has posed many difficulties. Hence, it is 
submitted that codification of the defence will not suit South Africa due to the diversity 
of our the society that is still coming to grips with  vast cultural differences and 
inequalities of the past that still play a role in the lives of many.1937  
 
In terms of these arguments it is submitted that the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity should not be codified. Codification of the defence may not ensure 
consistency of judgments. The problems with ambiguity and interpretation of provisions 
in Canada and England demonstrate the difficulties associated with codification. 
 
Furthermore, a fundamental different is that successfully pleading provocation in 
England and Canada cannot lead to an acquittal, the rational behind the adoption of a 
―middle ground‖ approach is also a controversial aspect of the defence since it is 
uncertain whether the defence in both jurisdictions amount to justification or an excuse, 
and some commentators have argued that the reason for the laws leniency stems from 
avoiding the mandatory life sentence for murder.If this was abolished then it has been 
contended that there would not be a need for the provocation defence. Furthermore, 
these provisions contain both a subjective test and an objective test. 
 
                                                     
1937
  Dlamini supra (n 89) at 137 states that the biggest problem in the treatment of provocation is that the 
approach taken has been an ―all or nothing‖ approach. This approach is incorrect since provocation 
cannot be pigeon holed into one category or the other; it can fit into more than one. This will depend 
on the specific circumstance of each case and after considering the intensity of the provocation 
which element is excluded. 
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It is submitted that this area of criminal law requires an assessment of the mind-set of 
the accused at the time of the killing and applying a strict set of criteria to make this 
determination is illogical. Therefore the incorporation of foreign provisions or ideas 
must take cognisance of these factors. Besides this major difference, other differences 
are also present hence it would be most unwise to incorporate laws from jurisdictions 
where founding principles on which the defence  is based differs. 
 
It is evident that the objective test is considered to be a necessary element in both the 
English and Canadian provocation defences, with its main purpose being to ensure that 
the provocation defence is not abused.  The rationale underpinning the objective test in 
the form of the reasonable man or ordinary person test is to hold society to a uniform 
standard of behaviour.
1938
 However, the standard of the reasonable/ordinary person has 
been criticized for being contradictory since an ordinary or reasonable person doesn‘t 
kill when provoked.
1939
  
 
Furthermore, this rigid standard has been criticized for being too harsh, especially 
considering that the provocation defence is a partial one in England and Canada. In 
Canada this perceived harshness has been tempered by case law which allows the 
characteristics of the accused to be considered in certain instances.
1940
  
 
A significant finding of the comparative analysis reveals that the objective test has 
posed numerous difficulties in application. The problem of the objective test in the form 
of the reasonable or ordinary person centres on identifying the characteristics of the 
reasonable/ordinary person and applying this uniform standard to the accused. In 
Canada and in other common law jurisdictions, the objective test in the form of the 
ordinary person standard was rigid and inflexible, in that none of the unique 
characteristics of the accused could be attributed to the ordinary person such age, sex, 
race or physical disability.  
                                                     
1938
  Quigley supra (n 995) at 21. 
1939
  Moffa supra (n 1728), per Murphy J (dissenting); Colvin supra (n 1069) at 222 states that the 
objective test operates to restrict the defence to those defendants whose conduct the juries can 
empathize with. Colvin argues that if this is the intention then it would be better if the juries are 
allowed to make an evaluative judgment directly on the conduct of the accused.  
1940
  Thibert supra (n 1053).  
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In the controversial Canadian case of Thibert1941 the court increased the scope of the 
objective test, allowing consideration of past insults and the background of the 
relationship.1942 The English cases of Smith (Morgan)1943 and Holley 1944 represent the 
differing opinions of the Privy Council and House of Lords on this issue. The on-going 
debate left the provocation defence in England in a state of confusion. Due to the 
persisting problems of the objective test the Law Commission proposed reformation of 
the defence. 
 
It is therefore evident that there is a definite tendency of the courts in both England and 
Canada to relax the objective test by attributing an increased number of characteristics 
of the accused to the reasonable/ordinary man. The restrictive nature of the objective 
test can be attributed for leading to inconsistent application of principle, resulting in 
confusion and has led to diverging opinions on the limitations that should be placed on 
the attributes of the reasonable man/ ordinary person.  
 
Clearly, England and Canada have struggled with creating a balance in respect of the 
problem of accommodating human weakness while simultaneously ensuring that a 
person‘s right not to be killed by enraged individuals is protected. This delicate balance 
has seemed elusive and almost impossible to achieve. This indicates that fundamentally, 
the rationale for the objective test is flawed and application of this rigid standard is 
practically unworkable since the courts are unable to effectively apply a stringent 
objective standard, a just and fair result cannot be obtained especially considering the 
nature and differing effects of provocation on different individual.  
 
It is submitted that the biggest problem with an objective assessment is that it requires 
the same standard of behaviour of all members of society. In South African law, the 
defence of non-pathological incapacity is indeed innovative yet workable on a practical 
level since it is based on sound criminal law principles which are without unnecessary 
complexities.  
                                                     
1941
 Thibert supra (n 1053). 
1942
 Gorman supra (n 994) at 494. 
1943
 Smith (Morgan) supra (n 715). 
1944
 Holley supra (n 670). 
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In the South African context, criticisms targeted at the subjective nature of the inquiry 
are misguided. The purely subjective test for criminal capacity ensures just and fair 
outcomes in line with principles of dignity and fairness. A purely subjective test is the 
only way in which provocation defence can function effectively.  
 
The comparative analysis has proven this point, the provocation defence in the Canada 
and England contain both an objective and subjective test.The purpose of both tests is to  
to ensure that the law creates a balance between policy and principle, however this has 
proven difficult. Therefore, it is submitted that the proposal for the addition of an 
objective test in the form of a reasonable or ordinary person is potentially problematic 
for several reasons. 
 
Firstly, it is submitted that this favoured approach is unworkable on a practical level and 
instead of bringing balance to the defence will result in more confusion and difficulty. 
Courts will struggle to determine which of the accused characteristics take into account 
and which should not. Problems with application of the objective test are prevalent in 
England and Canada. 
 
Therefore, in this light, it is submitted that calls for the introduction of an objective test 
into the provocation defence in South Africa will open a Pandora‘s Box of issues. A 
proper application and understanding of the defence will prevent facile acquittals. The 
introduction of an objective test is an unwelcome development as it does not suit the 
defence and ultimately is not necessary. In a diverse nation such as South Africa an 
objective assessment will not be in the interests of justice since it results in the 
unjustifiable imposition of dominant cultural values. 
 
South Africa has a diverse population with differing cultures and peoples of different 
socio economic backgrounds due to the political history of the country set it apart not 
only from England and Canada but from the rest of the world. This important fact 
supports the argument against the incorporation of provisions from both Canada and 
England. As Snyman argues that the danger of an objective test is that judges and juries, 
when determining the reaction of an ordinary person belonging to a certain culture, may 
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raw on discriminatory generalisations about certain cultures of minority groups even 
where there is little understanding of that culture.1945 
 
The imposition of an objective test is subject to constitutional challenge, assessing 
criminal capacity with an objective inquiry may infringe on an individual‘s right to 
dignity by undermining the foundational requirement that individuals are autonomous 
moral agents who are entitled to freedom of action, and therefore depriving the 
individual of the right to choose how to behave goes against the constitutional 
foundations upon which the principles of criminal culpability are based.1946 
 
Certainly, it is true that the law needs to maintain a balance between recognizing human 
weakness and ensuring society is protected. Only in exceptional circumstances should 
the law allow leniency when a human being is killed.
 1947  
The law recognizes that 
certain exceptional circumstances may in rare instances cause a lack of criminal 
capacity hence the defence not only justified but based on sound legal principle and 
serves a societal need which is ultimately the purpose of the justice system. An 
individual cannot be held criminal liable for an act which was committed without 
criminal capacity. This would result puts the criminal law in disrepute and place the 
justice system in bad standing.  
 
The defence of non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress has 
developed in South African law over many years
1948
; it possesses a moral foundation as 
well as a solid legal underpinning.The defence is difficult to prove and the courts have a 
natural disinclination to make a finding that the accused was in fact totally incapacitated 
by factors such as provocation and emotional stress and that this provides sufficient 
safeguard to protect against underserving acquittals. 
 
The recognition that a state of lack of criminal capacity does occur due to non-
pathological causes such as provocation and emotional stress is a necessary validation, 
                                                     
1945
 Snyman ―Die erkenning van objektiewe faktore by die verweer van provokasie in die strafreg‖ (2006) 
Tydskrif vir Regwetenskap 57 at 71, cited by Krause supra (n 290) at 343. 
1946
 Hoctor supra (n 1796) at 309. 
1947
 Sahni supra (n 1175) at 151. 
1948
 See Chapter 2 at 17 for development of the defence in South African law. 
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on this basis the defence serves an important need in society and has earned its place in 
South African criminal law.
1949
 It is clear that the defence in South Africa should follow 
its own route as both defences of provocation have their own separate criticisms that 
suggest that they cannot be adopted directly into the South African defence on 
provocation. This further supports the view that the defence as it existed before the 
Eadie
1950
 judgment did justice to the South African society and was in line with 
fundamental principles of South African criminal law.  
 
As discussed previously, the provisions in England and Canada are far from perfect and 
problems concerning interpretation and application of the provisions still pose 
difficulties for judges and juries especially in application of the objective test in both 
England and Canada. The structure of the defence in both England and Canada is 
intrinsically troublesome. The requirement of loss of self-control lacks content and a 
source of confusion as it was never fully explained in English law.
1951
 Hence, it is 
unwise to adopt the English model of the provocation defence since it is far from perfect 
and serves the needs of a society which is dramatically different from South Africa.  
 
The defence of non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress as it 
existed before the Eadie
1952
 decision was innovative and based on years of well-
reasoned precedent. The courts in South Africa were not faced with the problems 
concerning the application of the objective test, unlike England and Canada. This is due 
to the development of element of criminal capacity and the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity which was an innovative, unique and well-reasoned concept, and these 
developments opened the doors for provocation and emotional stress to be considered as 
defence excluding capacity.  
 
                                                     
1949
  Navsa JA in S v Eadie supra (n 18) stated that such a state is notionally possible, the court recognises 
the defence and if it is accepted that such a state of non-pathological incapacity is possible due to 
provocation or emotional stress. 
1950
  S v  Eadie supra (n 18). 
1951
  Yeo supra (n 865) at 184; Mitchell and Mackay supra (n 823) at 1. 
1952
  S v Eadie supra (n 18).  
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In conclusion, it must be stated that the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress is not only important, but also a necessary and valid 
defence. 
 
The psychological or principle-based approach to provocation and emotional stress by 
the South African criminal law was a positive development.  The defence is a necessary 
part of the criminal law as it recognises a state of lack of capacity brought about by non-
pathological factors. It is the most suitable defence for abused persons such as the 
battered woman amongst others.Unfortunately, the well established principled nature of 
the defence has been drastically curtailed by the notorious case of Eadie. The 
problematic reasoning in Eadie has eroded the founding principles of the defence. The 
conflation of the defence of sane automatism with conative capacity is therefore the 
most troubling aspect of this case. 
 
On a fundamental level, the effect of the pronouncements in Eadie is highly prejudicial 
to society in general; an individual who suffered a lack of capacity due to provocation 
and emotional stress.This is inherently unjust. Therefore in light problems generated by 
Eadie and the after a critical analysis of the defence preceeding Eadie, it is submitted 
that the law must be restored to the two-stage assessment of criminal capacity in terms 
of Laubscher. The principle-based or psychological approach to criminal liability is 
preferred as it is compatable with the fundamental values of the criminal justice system 
and in line with the ethos of the Constitution. 
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5.4 Recommendations 
The Eadie
1953
 judgment is problematic on several levels and has brought tremendous 
confusion and uncertainty to the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to 
provocation and emotional stress. The status of the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress is in limbo as a result of Eadie
1954
 
and is therefore in need of review; Supreme Court of Appeal must redress the defence in 
light of the problematic pronouncements of Eadie
1955
 and bring some much needed 
clarity to this area of the criminal law. Judicial intervention is necessary in order to 
bring clarity to the defence of non-pathological incapacity due to provocation and 
emotional stress by returning the law as it existed before the Eadie
1956
 judgment, this 
entails over rulling Eadie.
1957
  
 
It is proposed that the law must be restored to the purely subjectively assessed two stage 
test for capacity as it was delineated in Laubscher.
1958
  Furthermore, it is evident that 
here have been problems regarding the tendency of the courts and expert witnesses 
conflating the defence of sane automatism and the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity, this has lead to uncertainty and confusion and ultimately inconsistencies in 
case law when the courts rely too heavily on expert testimony which results in the 
erosion of legal principles. This problem must be addressed; the Supreme Court of 
Appeal needs to provide clarity in this regard by emphasing that the defence of non-
pathological incapacity is distinct and separate from the defence of sane automatism. 
 
In light of the comparative analysis this approach is preferred, the defence of non-
pathological incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress is on a well reasoned 
foundation based on legal principle.Unlike the defences in both England and Canada 
which are based on the misguided need accommodate human frailty and predicated on 
the problematic concept of loss of self-control. This is where the defence in both 
jurisdictions fail as it is based on sympathy rather than on principles of criminal 
                                                     
1953
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1954
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1955
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1956
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1957
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
1958
 S v Laubscher supra (n 1).  
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liability. It is submitted that the concept of loss of self-control lacks content in both 
England and Canada.  
 
It is submitted that South African law has not experienced problems with gender 
discrimination within the realms of the provocation defence unlike England and Canada. 
South African criminal law has progressed and come out of out-dated founding 
principles whereas England and Canada have not evolved much from the inception of 
the provocation defence, whereas South African law has made tremendous strides in 
this regard, the progressive nature of the development of the defence ensures that it is 
not biased to one gender, the defence does not serve the purpose of the jealous husband 
unlike English law and Canadian law 
 
The defence of non-pathological incapacity is a simple formulation which lacks the 
unnecessary complexities and unfair rigidness of both the English and Canadian 
codified provisions. A coherent rationale exists which provides for a solid basis for 
providing an acquittal if in the rare instances it is found that criminal capacity is lacking 
due to provocation and emotional stress. 
 
 The subjective nature of the capacity inquiry allows for an accurate assessment of loss 
criminal capacity. Furthermore, the decision to assess criminal capacity subjectively 
was correct, the objective test and the notion of the reasonable man in assessing the 
effect of provocation are inherently problematic. The restrictive natures of the 
provocation defence in England and Canada have led to problems of gender 
discrimination by not encompassing persons such as the battered woman.The 
recognition of affective functions causing lack of criminal capacity has brought persons 
such as the battered women within the scope of the defence, this was a positive and 
forward thinking development in South African law. 
 
The South African criminal law system in respect of the provocation defence is unique 
and more enlightened. 
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Burchell and Milton have stated in the context of South African law in its historical 
perspective:1959 
―Our criminal law is stronger than both its parent systems. The courts have created order out of the 
chaos of Roman-Dutch criminal law and strengthened t by the introduction of the detail and 
precision of the English law of crimes. At the same time our courts have avoided most of the 
peculiar eccentricities of the English criminal law, including its needless proliferation of finely 
divided or overlapping offences, and have created general principles of criminal liability more 
logical, coherent and just than those of English law.‖ 
 
However it is also submitted that the problems associated with defence prior to the 
Eadie
1960
 decision cannot be ignored must be addressed with the view of preserving the 
defence while effecting changes pertaining to evidentiary matters, namely the regulation 
of expert testimony and defining the roles of experts .  
 
The problem of uncertainty in regard to the necessity of expert witnesses in pleading the 
defence, this lack of clarity must be addressed. A possible solution would be to 
formulate a framework regulating the role of expert testimony which addresses the issue 
the importance of referring accused‘s persons for psychiatric evaluation. This is 
especially important considering the nature of defence, which involves emotional stress, 
emotional collapse, shock, fear as well as provocation even though these emotional 
disturbances are non-pathological in nature the law should provide for an avenue 
wherein accused‘s person may be referred for short periods of psychiatric evaluation. It 
has generally been accepted that the battered women suffers from a state of post-
traumatic stress disorder therefore regulating this area of the law in order to allow for 
referrals for psychiatric evaluation and counselling is essential. 
  
The defence of non-pathological incapacity is lacking in this respect, consultation and 
review of this area is required with the view of formulating a structure that could form 
part of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Act of 1977. 
 
                                                     
1959
 J.M. Burchell and J. Milton Principles of Cirminal Law 1
st
 ed (1991) at 27. 
1960
 S v Eadie supra (n 18).  
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Furthermore, from the assessment of the Nursingh
1961
  case that the lack of expert 
evidence on the part of the prosecution may have deprived the court of a balanced view 
regarding the accused‘s version of events. Thus, it is proposed that expert testimony 
should be mandatory. This will ensure that the court obtains a balanced, well informed 
view, which willt work to prevent facile acquittals and ensure consist outcomes of 
cases.  
 
Furthermore, expert evidence should be led after evidence relating to the accused‘s 
version of events has been heard. Expert witnesses would thus have an opportunity to 
re-evaluate their evidence after hearing the facts of the case as well as hearing the 
accused‘s version being tested at cross-examination. This is important since the 
psychiatric evidence is largely based on the cogency of the accused‘s version of 
events.
1962
 These proposals will ensure that established principles which were eroded by 
Eadie
1963
 are restored while adressing a clear void in the defence of non-pathological 
incapacity due to provocation and emotional stress.  
 
                                                     
1961
 S v Nursingh supra (n 16). 
1962
 Burchell supra (n 1320) at 42. 
1963
 S v Eadie supra (n 18). 
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